Startling revelations and powerful evidence of grand corruption implicating politicians from PW Botha to Jacob Zuma, global banks and corporations was presented at The People's Tribunal on Saturday and Sunday.
Overseen by an esteemed panel including former Constitutional Court Justice Zac Yacoob, the Tribunal has been set up by civil society groups to hear evidence on corruption, capture and economic crime over the last 40 years in South Africa.
The Tribunal has, thus far, heard evidence of covert networks of politicians, state companies and corporations involved in the systemic violation of the United Nations' weapons embargo on South Africa during apartheid.
Standing as a witness, author of "Apartheid Guns and Money" Hennie van Vuuren emphasised the importance of bringing this evidence to light is in recognising the actors that contributed to the gross violation of human rights during apartheid. Beyond the pursuit of justice, he said, the goal is also to recognise how these crimes are connected.
Apartheid's murderous military machine
At the heart of the arms machine, he said, was South African state-owned arms company Armscor which bought (and sold) weapons from abroad in contravention of a compulsory U.N. embargo on trading arms with the country.
Almost all military expenditure, which amounted to approximately 28% of the country's budget at the time or half a trillion rand in today's value, passed through the company, he said.
But to oil this military machine -- which was created in response to the "appetite for the apartheid government's involvement in conflict locally and on the continent" -- the company needed to circumvent the compulsory global sanctions. In come the French.
Die Groot Krokodil's deathly French Kiss
Realising weapons couldn't be procured from Pretoria, then-Prime Minister PW Botha ('Die Groot Krokodil') took business abroad. For some a city of love, South Africa's government made Paris, France, its city of bloodlust.
The South African embassy in Paris housed what was called the tegniese raad (technical council) from which Armscor would strike it's deals, which van Vuuren said was not known until they began researching years ago.
"This was there base... from which they'd go around Europe doing deals, in some instances liaising with partners in Africa (like Zaire)... and perhaps even China," he said.
Even leading figures in the anti-apartheid movement who tried to expose these links had no idea what was happening in Paris. Documentary evidence, van Vuuren said, showed how French intelligence would have regular meetings with Armscor officials on a regular basis in the 1970s and 1980s. That heads of intelligence from France and South Africa were meeting suggests politicians in the upper echelons of France's government were well aware of sanctions being broken, he said.
Central to this relationship, he added, was French arms company Thompson CSF -- today Thales -- which documentary evidence showed met with PW Botha's minister of defence to co-develop sophisticated missile technology for use in apartheid South Africa's warmongering locally and abroad.
Demonstrating just how far into the present dodgy relations continued, Van Vuuren highlighted that the same company, Thales, is implicated in paying bribes to now President Jacob Zuma through his financial adviser (and now convicted fraudster) Schabir Shaik.
"These are the 783 counts of corruption, fraud and money laundering [Zuma] currently faces today," he said.
The two faces of the international community
The story of the apartheid government's circumvention of sanctions, however, was more than just a French love affair with the Broederbond.
More than 50 countries were involved in sanctions-busting in one way or another, he said. Most notably, every single country on the United Nation's Security Council -- those very nations tasked with policing the sanctions that were imposed -- were all involved to some extent, he said.
Others included many countries across Europe and, notably, Israel. Armscor, he said, created offices in Tel Aviv which was "active in ensuring the relationship with Israel in the procurement and co-development of weapons could take place with a large contingent of officials based there".
Many of these nations, he said, voiced public opposition to apartheid while secretly adding fuel to the fire.
How to bankroll a bloody regime
Another key player, this time a bank, was Kredietbank in Belgium and its Luxembourg subsidiary.
Professor Bonita Meyersfeld, an academic and former director of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies at Wits, reiterated the bank's role in aiding Armscor: firstly, through creating shell companies to help erase the trail of money and, secondly, in creating access to bank accounts.
Through accounts managed by the bank, money to purchase arms could be transferred from Pretoria to the ultimate recipients without raising any alarms. More simply, by setting up fake companies and chanelling money through them, the apartheid regime was able to oil its military machine without let or hindrance.
"Countries such as Belgium, France, Portugal and others were able to utilise private entities to enter into engagements with banks that very elegantly set up these shelf companies," she said.
"There'd be hundreds of these across the world where a corporate actor in the Global North would take funds, channel them through shelf companies and money would land up in SA which then went to Armscor (and vice versa)".
"These are not just AK47s -- an image incalcated in films -- but parts of machine guns, helipcopters, parts used to maintain and facilitate this crime against humanity," she said.
Like a spy novel, though, they occurred in the back rooms of the very embassies that stood against apartheid, she said.
Why does this matter today?
In detailing the secret flow of money for arms, Meyersfeld said the purpose is to shine a light on the fact that there remains an urgent need to create a global body to regulate the conduct of banks.
"The reality is there is no international entity that can hold banks to account for their compliance or their non-compliance with standards around international banking, and more importantly for the participation in criminal activity," she said.
Despite the "accountability vacuum," one option she said was to use the OECD National Contact Point (NCP) which hears complaints from individuals who claim corporations are guilty of human rights violations. OECD countries adhering to guidelines on multinational corporations are required to setup NCPs which provide a mediation and conciliation platform for resolving issues involving those companies, she said.
While no silver bullet, this would be one currently available option for "some semblance of accountability" in relation to Kredietbank, she said. Reputation damage, she said, could ultimately result in operations closing or at the least spark efforts at reparations in the absence of a global entity with real teeth.
Insisting on the necessity of global institutions or mechanisms to ensure justice, Meyersfeld said corporations had gotten off scot-free for too long.
"They may not hold the gun to the mineworker at the mine, but they are the ones providing the funds to do this," she said.
When they do, she added, corporate social responsibility projects in response are not enough:
"Corporates can be the agent of harm and the agent of good. But you can't bomb an economy, then build a school".
Source: Marc Davies - Huffington Post
Showing posts with label Schabir Shaik. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Schabir Shaik. Show all posts
Monday, February 5, 2018
Thursday, April 21, 2016
Press Statement by Andrew Feinstein, Paul Holden and Hennie Van Vuuren regarding the release of the SERITI COMMISSION REPORT into the ARMS DEAL
On the 21st of April 2016, President Jacob Zuma announced the release of the report of the Commission of Inquiry into allegations of fraud, corruption, impropriety or irregularity in the Strategic Defence Procurement Package (the ‘Arms Deal’). During the same announcement, President Zuma provided a summary of the findings of the Commission.
The Commission found that there was nothing wrong with the Arms Deal in its conception, execution or economic impact, despite considerable evidence in the public domain to the contrary. Most importantly, it found that there was no evidence that any of the contracts in the Arms Deal were tainted by evidence of corruption, fraud or irregularity.
We are disappointed, but hardly surprised, that the Commission has come to these findings, which are tantamount to a cover-up. Indeed, it was abundantly clear during the work of the Commission that it was ill-disposed towards undertaking a full, meaningful and unbiased investigation into the Arms Deal. It routinely failed to either admit or interrogate any evidence of wrongdoing in relation to the Deal.
In August 2014, we withdrew from the Commission of Inquiry in protest at the manner in which it was conducting its investigation. Our withdrawal and subsequent refusal to testify before the Commission in October 2014 was supported by over forty civil society organisations who shared our concerns. We identified four primary problems, which we believed indicated that the Commission was failing to investigate the Arms Deal fully, meaningfully and without favour. These concerns were:
1. During the life of the Commission, a number of employees resigned in protest at the manner in which it was conducting its work. In at least two cases, the employees stated that they were resigning because the Commission did not intend to investigate the Arms Deal. Rather, the Commission was pursuing a ‘second agenda’, namely, to discredit critics of the Arms Deal and find in favour of the State and arms companies’ version of events;
2. The Commission refused to admit vital documentary evidence of wrongdoing during the public hearings. One such document was the Debevoise Plimpton Report, an internal audit of the arms company Ferrostaal, which received contracts in the Arms Deal. The Report indicated that Ferrostaal had made tens of millions of rands in payments to politically connected politicians and procurement officials. The report also quoted senior Ferrostaal employees as stating that the offset program was merely a conduit for bribes. In their resignation from the Commission, evidence leaders Advocates Barry Skinner and Carol Sibiya specifically pointed out that refusing to admit the Report ‘nullifies the very purposes for which the Commission was set up.’
3. The Commission refused to allow critical witnesses to testify about documents that they had not written, or events to which they were not personally witness. One major consequence of this is that the only people who could testify to corruption in the Arms Deal were those who paid or received bribes.
4. The Commission failed to provide documents to which we were entitled under the terms of our subpoena, despite repeated requests. The Commission claimed that it was refusing to do so as we were undertaking a ‘fishing expedition.’ The failure of the Commission to provide us with the documents to which we were legally entitled was typical of the Commission’s attitude of sometimes open hostility to critical witnesses.
Despite the above concerns, we are pleased that the Commission Report is now public. We look forward to interrogating its contents in full, and intend to provide a detailed response to the material therein at the earliest opportunity.
In addition, we are seeking legal advice as to the legality of the Commission’s conduct and the viability of a legal review to have the Report set aside. An announcement on this process will be made in due course.
We believe that the report represents a massive missed opportunity at arriving at the truth. However this is not the end of the road in the struggle for truth justice and accountability of corruption in the arms deal.
CONTACT
HENNIE VAN VUUREN
+27 82 902 1303
hennievvuuren@gmail.com
ANDREW FEINSTEIN
+1 929 392 0133
+44 7809728164
andrewfeinstein@me.com
PAUL HOLDEN
+44 795 088 3329
pauledwardholden@gmail.com
Source: Lawyers for Human Rights
The Commission found that there was nothing wrong with the Arms Deal in its conception, execution or economic impact, despite considerable evidence in the public domain to the contrary. Most importantly, it found that there was no evidence that any of the contracts in the Arms Deal were tainted by evidence of corruption, fraud or irregularity.
We are disappointed, but hardly surprised, that the Commission has come to these findings, which are tantamount to a cover-up. Indeed, it was abundantly clear during the work of the Commission that it was ill-disposed towards undertaking a full, meaningful and unbiased investigation into the Arms Deal. It routinely failed to either admit or interrogate any evidence of wrongdoing in relation to the Deal.
In August 2014, we withdrew from the Commission of Inquiry in protest at the manner in which it was conducting its investigation. Our withdrawal and subsequent refusal to testify before the Commission in October 2014 was supported by over forty civil society organisations who shared our concerns. We identified four primary problems, which we believed indicated that the Commission was failing to investigate the Arms Deal fully, meaningfully and without favour. These concerns were:
1. During the life of the Commission, a number of employees resigned in protest at the manner in which it was conducting its work. In at least two cases, the employees stated that they were resigning because the Commission did not intend to investigate the Arms Deal. Rather, the Commission was pursuing a ‘second agenda’, namely, to discredit critics of the Arms Deal and find in favour of the State and arms companies’ version of events;
2. The Commission refused to admit vital documentary evidence of wrongdoing during the public hearings. One such document was the Debevoise Plimpton Report, an internal audit of the arms company Ferrostaal, which received contracts in the Arms Deal. The Report indicated that Ferrostaal had made tens of millions of rands in payments to politically connected politicians and procurement officials. The report also quoted senior Ferrostaal employees as stating that the offset program was merely a conduit for bribes. In their resignation from the Commission, evidence leaders Advocates Barry Skinner and Carol Sibiya specifically pointed out that refusing to admit the Report ‘nullifies the very purposes for which the Commission was set up.’
3. The Commission refused to allow critical witnesses to testify about documents that they had not written, or events to which they were not personally witness. One major consequence of this is that the only people who could testify to corruption in the Arms Deal were those who paid or received bribes.
4. The Commission failed to provide documents to which we were entitled under the terms of our subpoena, despite repeated requests. The Commission claimed that it was refusing to do so as we were undertaking a ‘fishing expedition.’ The failure of the Commission to provide us with the documents to which we were legally entitled was typical of the Commission’s attitude of sometimes open hostility to critical witnesses.
Despite the above concerns, we are pleased that the Commission Report is now public. We look forward to interrogating its contents in full, and intend to provide a detailed response to the material therein at the earliest opportunity.
In addition, we are seeking legal advice as to the legality of the Commission’s conduct and the viability of a legal review to have the Report set aside. An announcement on this process will be made in due course.
We believe that the report represents a massive missed opportunity at arriving at the truth. However this is not the end of the road in the struggle for truth justice and accountability of corruption in the arms deal.
CONTACT
HENNIE VAN VUUREN
+27 82 902 1303
hennievvuuren@gmail.com
ANDREW FEINSTEIN
+1 929 392 0133
+44 7809728164
andrewfeinstein@me.com
PAUL HOLDEN
+44 795 088 3329
pauledwardholden@gmail.com
Source: Lawyers for Human Rights
Monday, July 9, 2012
When will the political interference stop?
After President John F Kennedy was assassinated, Malcolm X famously said that the assassination was a case of the “chickens coming home to roost,” adding that “chickens coming home to roost never did make me sad; they’ve always made me glad.” In other words, he was implying that since the white man had used violence so often and so easily in America (especially against black Americans), it was just cosmic balance that the President would become a victim of violence.
Well, the chickens are coming home to roost big time with regard to the on-going political manipulation and abuse of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) by various political factions within the ANC. When a perception takes hold that the NPA will prosecute some and avoid prosecuting others solely on the basis of their political connections or on the basis of whether they belong to the faction associated with the incumbent President or not, the credibility of that institution is fatally compromised.
When newspapers then report allegations of flagrant political interference in decisions to prosecute politically connected politicians (as the Mail & Guardian again did on Friday), few well-informed people will read such reports with scepticism. After all, we know that the NPA has often made decisions in the past based on political rather on legal considerations (including in the case relating to the prosecution of President Zuma and then later, the dropping of charges against President Zuma).
It was exactly to prevent this sorry state of affairs, that the drafters of our Constitution included a provision in section 179(4) of the Constitution which states that: “National legislation must ensure that the prosecuting authority exercises its functions without fear, favour or prejudice”. Of course, politicians, including then President Thabo Mbeki and now President Jacob Zuma, do not like to focus on this section of the Constitution, instead pointing to section 179(6) of the Constitution to justify direct interference in the decisions of the NPA. This section states that: “The cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice must exercise final responsibility over the prosecuting authority”.
What the politicians choose to ignore is the following.
The Constitutional Court, in the First Certification Judgment, confirmed that despite this strange provision about the Minister having to exercise final responsibility for the NPA, the Constitution created an independent body in the following terms:
[Section] 179(4) provides that the national legislation must ensure that the prosecuting authority exercises its functions without fear, favour or prejudice. There is accordingly a constitutional guarantee of independence, and any legislation or executive action inconsistent therewith would be subject to constitutional control by the courts.
The politicians also conveniently ignore the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), in which it dealt with the need for the NPA to be independent while also taking cognisance of the need for the Minister to take final responsibility for the NPA in the following terms:
[T]he Constitution on the one hand vests the prosecutorial responsibility in the NPA while, on the other, it provides that the Minister must exercise final responsibility over it. These provisions may appear to conflict but, as the Namibian Supreme Court held in relation to comparable provisions in its Constitution, they are not incompatible. It held (I am using terms that conform with our Constitution) that although the Minister may not instruct the NPA to prosecute or to decline to prosecute or to terminate a pending prosecution, the Minister is entitled to be kept informed in respect of all prosecutions initiated or to be initiated which might arouse public interest or involve important aspects of legal or prosecutorial authority.
That is why the NPA Act requires members of the prosecuting authority to serve “impartially” and exercise, carry out or perform their powers, duties and functions “in good faith and without fear, favour or prejudice” and subject only to the Constitution and the law. The Act further provides that no one may interfere “improperly” with the NPA in the performance of its duties and functions (in section 32(1)(b) of the Act).
The Act confirms that the manner in which the Minister exercises final responsibility over the NPA is by obliging the NDPP, at the request of the Minister, to furnish the latter with information or a report with regard to any case and to provide the Minister with reasons for any decision taken. The Minister can ask for information, but cannot give any instructions or make any requests regarding the prosecution or non-prosecution of anybody (unless, of course, the Minister is intent on committing a criminal offence by “improperly” trying to influence the NPA).
Of course, problems around political interference in the work of the NPA and the corrupt influence of political loyalties on NPA decisions arise not only when the Minister tries to issue illegal and criminal instructions to the NPA (as former Minister Bridget Mbandla did when she sent a letter – drafted by Menzi Simelane – to former head of the NPA, Vusi Pikoli to stop the arrest of a crook who also happened to be the Police Commissioner ), but also when members in leadership positions inside the NPA stop acting in good faith and instead make decisions based purely on their own political loyalties and self-interest.
When they are willing to do the bidding of their political masters without being instructed to do so, or when they improperly follow the hints or instructions of the Minister or other member of the relevant political faction inside the ANC, they destroy the credibility of the NPA and directly undermine the Rule of Law by creating a situation in which some criminals are above the law because of the political protection they enjoy.
The allegations in the Mail & Guardian regarding the interference in the “Three Amigo’s” case as well as the allegations tha5t the disciplinary charges were brought against prosecutor Glynnis Breytenbach for what appears to be her rather enthusiastic pursuit of the company owned by President Zuma’s financial benefactors, the Gupta’s, or because of her pursuit of that bastion of probity and honesty, Richard Mdluli, illustrate the dangers of the political “capturing of the NPA rather well.
Even if all these allegations are false, given the past abuse of the NPA many people will think them credible or even true. They will think it is true because the chickens have truly come home to roost for the politically much abused and subverted NPA. Who on earth is ever going to believe the protestations of the NPA that there is no political interference when there is such strong proof of on-going political interference at the NPA? I know, I won’t.
It is ironic that President Zuma, who complained bitterly about the abuse of the NPA by the Thabo Mbeki faction when he was facing corruption charges has overseen the further erosion of trust in this institution. I guess it was bad when the other guys were doing it, but now that he is in charge the principles are slightly different to suite the politics. But I guess he will only realise how the chickens have ccome home to roost if he loses his bid for another term as ANC and South African President and again faces the possibility of having to explain to a judge why he took a bribe from Schabir Shaik.
Source: Constitutionally Speaking
Well, the chickens are coming home to roost big time with regard to the on-going political manipulation and abuse of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) by various political factions within the ANC. When a perception takes hold that the NPA will prosecute some and avoid prosecuting others solely on the basis of their political connections or on the basis of whether they belong to the faction associated with the incumbent President or not, the credibility of that institution is fatally compromised.
When newspapers then report allegations of flagrant political interference in decisions to prosecute politically connected politicians (as the Mail & Guardian again did on Friday), few well-informed people will read such reports with scepticism. After all, we know that the NPA has often made decisions in the past based on political rather on legal considerations (including in the case relating to the prosecution of President Zuma and then later, the dropping of charges against President Zuma).
It was exactly to prevent this sorry state of affairs, that the drafters of our Constitution included a provision in section 179(4) of the Constitution which states that: “National legislation must ensure that the prosecuting authority exercises its functions without fear, favour or prejudice”. Of course, politicians, including then President Thabo Mbeki and now President Jacob Zuma, do not like to focus on this section of the Constitution, instead pointing to section 179(6) of the Constitution to justify direct interference in the decisions of the NPA. This section states that: “The cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice must exercise final responsibility over the prosecuting authority”.
What the politicians choose to ignore is the following.
The Constitutional Court, in the First Certification Judgment, confirmed that despite this strange provision about the Minister having to exercise final responsibility for the NPA, the Constitution created an independent body in the following terms:
[Section] 179(4) provides that the national legislation must ensure that the prosecuting authority exercises its functions without fear, favour or prejudice. There is accordingly a constitutional guarantee of independence, and any legislation or executive action inconsistent therewith would be subject to constitutional control by the courts.
The politicians also conveniently ignore the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), in which it dealt with the need for the NPA to be independent while also taking cognisance of the need for the Minister to take final responsibility for the NPA in the following terms:
[T]he Constitution on the one hand vests the prosecutorial responsibility in the NPA while, on the other, it provides that the Minister must exercise final responsibility over it. These provisions may appear to conflict but, as the Namibian Supreme Court held in relation to comparable provisions in its Constitution, they are not incompatible. It held (I am using terms that conform with our Constitution) that although the Minister may not instruct the NPA to prosecute or to decline to prosecute or to terminate a pending prosecution, the Minister is entitled to be kept informed in respect of all prosecutions initiated or to be initiated which might arouse public interest or involve important aspects of legal or prosecutorial authority.
That is why the NPA Act requires members of the prosecuting authority to serve “impartially” and exercise, carry out or perform their powers, duties and functions “in good faith and without fear, favour or prejudice” and subject only to the Constitution and the law. The Act further provides that no one may interfere “improperly” with the NPA in the performance of its duties and functions (in section 32(1)(b) of the Act).
The Act confirms that the manner in which the Minister exercises final responsibility over the NPA is by obliging the NDPP, at the request of the Minister, to furnish the latter with information or a report with regard to any case and to provide the Minister with reasons for any decision taken. The Minister can ask for information, but cannot give any instructions or make any requests regarding the prosecution or non-prosecution of anybody (unless, of course, the Minister is intent on committing a criminal offence by “improperly” trying to influence the NPA).
Of course, problems around political interference in the work of the NPA and the corrupt influence of political loyalties on NPA decisions arise not only when the Minister tries to issue illegal and criminal instructions to the NPA (as former Minister Bridget Mbandla did when she sent a letter – drafted by Menzi Simelane – to former head of the NPA, Vusi Pikoli to stop the arrest of a crook who also happened to be the Police Commissioner ), but also when members in leadership positions inside the NPA stop acting in good faith and instead make decisions based purely on their own political loyalties and self-interest.
When they are willing to do the bidding of their political masters without being instructed to do so, or when they improperly follow the hints or instructions of the Minister or other member of the relevant political faction inside the ANC, they destroy the credibility of the NPA and directly undermine the Rule of Law by creating a situation in which some criminals are above the law because of the political protection they enjoy.
The allegations in the Mail & Guardian regarding the interference in the “Three Amigo’s” case as well as the allegations tha5t the disciplinary charges were brought against prosecutor Glynnis Breytenbach for what appears to be her rather enthusiastic pursuit of the company owned by President Zuma’s financial benefactors, the Gupta’s, or because of her pursuit of that bastion of probity and honesty, Richard Mdluli, illustrate the dangers of the political “capturing of the NPA rather well.
Even if all these allegations are false, given the past abuse of the NPA many people will think them credible or even true. They will think it is true because the chickens have truly come home to roost for the politically much abused and subverted NPA. Who on earth is ever going to believe the protestations of the NPA that there is no political interference when there is such strong proof of on-going political interference at the NPA? I know, I won’t.
It is ironic that President Zuma, who complained bitterly about the abuse of the NPA by the Thabo Mbeki faction when he was facing corruption charges has overseen the further erosion of trust in this institution. I guess it was bad when the other guys were doing it, but now that he is in charge the principles are slightly different to suite the politics. But I guess he will only realise how the chickens have ccome home to roost if he loses his bid for another term as ANC and South African President and again faces the possibility of having to explain to a judge why he took a bribe from Schabir Shaik.
Source: Constitutionally Speaking
Tuesday, December 14, 2010
Corruption SA - the almost irresistible tsunami
The common solution to the perennial conundrum of what happens when the “Unstoppable Force” hits the “Immovable Object” is that either the force must stop or the object must move. In the fight against Africa’s greatest evil, the big question is whether corruption is unstoppable and/or immovable. “Political hyenas” has to be SA's political phrase of the year. In grown-up politics, at any rate. “Bloody agent” may appeal to the younger types, but the fact is this year has really been dominated by one overarching issue: Corruption.
2010 is the year in which the fight against corruption gained a public and popular political hero, Zwelinzima Vavi. It’s also the year when those who may be corrupt, those who may be hyenas, started to make their own presence felt, started to use their considerable power. This is an issue that will probably dominate 2011, and will definitely become a big issue in the ANC’s big year in 2012.
It’s very easy to claim that this is all Jacob Zuma’s fault. He’s the President, and hell, it’s not like he’s clean himself. The full story of how exactly he escaped having to answer questions under oath about those “loans” from Schabir Shaik is in itself possibly a corruption story of the highest order. But the person (Mokotedi Mpshe) who made the final decision is now a judge himself, so we’ll probably never know the full full extent of it.
And having a head of state with that perception around him doesn’t make the fight against corruption any easier. Just look at the SABC. The man who ran it, Dali Mpofu does many a wrong thing, gets sacked and walks away with millions. Other people, in the lower echelons of the corporation are only human if they think well, I’ll just start my own company and start to bill the corporation as well. The same dynamic could easily affect our traffic cops and councillors. Hell, if he’s doing it, why not? And it doesn’t matter if Zuma actually did anything wrong or not; it’s the perception that matters.
But as easy as that would be, the fact is that corruption is a much bigger issue than just one man. Corruption, the hyenas, now have a momentum behind them that sometimes looks well nigh unstoppable. And that momentum started long before Zuma, it started almost before Mbeki. The fact is that capitalists, the filthy lucre-ites, got their dirty fingers into the ANC, and those vulnerable to such an approach, probably even before Nelson Mandela took his oath of office.
The real question now though is: Has this momentum become irresistible? Or is it a one tsunami that can be tamed? Most societies have a type of momentum to them that moves in ebbs and flows. Prohibition and alcohol abstinence took hold of the US for a while, and then let go its grip. Some countries in Eastern Europe flirted, very painfully, with hard-core socialism as a sort of foreplay to communism, before changing their minds. Here, capitalism still wins and as a result most of the rich are still white. The trends that gather momentum quickly and strongly are those that appeal to our baser instincts. Most people want to get rich, thus the “Clever Boys of the Alliance” (the SACP) have such a difficult fight on their hands.
Corruption, of course, appeals to a very base instinct, which makes it very difficult to fight. In most places, what seems to work is a division of power. That gift the US gave to the world of checks and balances is the one silver bullet we know of that fights corruption with some success. Not total success mind you, but close enough for us. And therein lies the problem. Our checks and balances are weaker than they should be: the ANC’s deployment committee has seen to that. The balance between the minister who sets policy and the government mandarin who is supposed to implement it is gone.
Nowhere is this more stark than in this year’s appointment by Zuma of Menzi Simelane to the post of national director of public prosecutors. By his own admission (during the Ginwala Commission) he is not someone who believes the National Prosecuting Authority should be entirely independent of the justice ministry. (The judge who ruled he couldn’t find the appointment was unlawful, only pointed out there was no evidence Zuma even thought about appointing someone else.)
The fact is that those who claim to be keen on fighting corruption, in which, based on their public statements, we have to include the likes of Zuma, Gwede Mantashe and the rest of the ANC’s top six, are not giving us any proof of real commitment. Time and time again these people have defended the ANC’s deployment policy, and time and time again they have claimed to be fighting corruption. The two are mutually exclusive.
The fact is, to quote Kofi Annan, “Anything is possible, if only we have the political will”. The ANC, at the moment, doesn’t appear to us, to have that level of political will. And without the ANC behind you, you are not going to change the momentum of this country very easily. In fact, it may be impossible.
Source: Daily Maverick
2010 is the year in which the fight against corruption gained a public and popular political hero, Zwelinzima Vavi. It’s also the year when those who may be corrupt, those who may be hyenas, started to make their own presence felt, started to use their considerable power. This is an issue that will probably dominate 2011, and will definitely become a big issue in the ANC’s big year in 2012.
It’s very easy to claim that this is all Jacob Zuma’s fault. He’s the President, and hell, it’s not like he’s clean himself. The full story of how exactly he escaped having to answer questions under oath about those “loans” from Schabir Shaik is in itself possibly a corruption story of the highest order. But the person (Mokotedi Mpshe) who made the final decision is now a judge himself, so we’ll probably never know the full full extent of it.
And having a head of state with that perception around him doesn’t make the fight against corruption any easier. Just look at the SABC. The man who ran it, Dali Mpofu does many a wrong thing, gets sacked and walks away with millions. Other people, in the lower echelons of the corporation are only human if they think well, I’ll just start my own company and start to bill the corporation as well. The same dynamic could easily affect our traffic cops and councillors. Hell, if he’s doing it, why not? And it doesn’t matter if Zuma actually did anything wrong or not; it’s the perception that matters.
But as easy as that would be, the fact is that corruption is a much bigger issue than just one man. Corruption, the hyenas, now have a momentum behind them that sometimes looks well nigh unstoppable. And that momentum started long before Zuma, it started almost before Mbeki. The fact is that capitalists, the filthy lucre-ites, got their dirty fingers into the ANC, and those vulnerable to such an approach, probably even before Nelson Mandela took his oath of office.
The real question now though is: Has this momentum become irresistible? Or is it a one tsunami that can be tamed? Most societies have a type of momentum to them that moves in ebbs and flows. Prohibition and alcohol abstinence took hold of the US for a while, and then let go its grip. Some countries in Eastern Europe flirted, very painfully, with hard-core socialism as a sort of foreplay to communism, before changing their minds. Here, capitalism still wins and as a result most of the rich are still white. The trends that gather momentum quickly and strongly are those that appeal to our baser instincts. Most people want to get rich, thus the “Clever Boys of the Alliance” (the SACP) have such a difficult fight on their hands.
Corruption, of course, appeals to a very base instinct, which makes it very difficult to fight. In most places, what seems to work is a division of power. That gift the US gave to the world of checks and balances is the one silver bullet we know of that fights corruption with some success. Not total success mind you, but close enough for us. And therein lies the problem. Our checks and balances are weaker than they should be: the ANC’s deployment committee has seen to that. The balance between the minister who sets policy and the government mandarin who is supposed to implement it is gone.
Nowhere is this more stark than in this year’s appointment by Zuma of Menzi Simelane to the post of national director of public prosecutors. By his own admission (during the Ginwala Commission) he is not someone who believes the National Prosecuting Authority should be entirely independent of the justice ministry. (The judge who ruled he couldn’t find the appointment was unlawful, only pointed out there was no evidence Zuma even thought about appointing someone else.)
The fact is that those who claim to be keen on fighting corruption, in which, based on their public statements, we have to include the likes of Zuma, Gwede Mantashe and the rest of the ANC’s top six, are not giving us any proof of real commitment. Time and time again these people have defended the ANC’s deployment policy, and time and time again they have claimed to be fighting corruption. The two are mutually exclusive.
The fact is, to quote Kofi Annan, “Anything is possible, if only we have the political will”. The ANC, at the moment, doesn’t appear to us, to have that level of political will. And without the ANC behind you, you are not going to change the momentum of this country very easily. In fact, it may be impossible.
Source: Daily Maverick
Sunday, September 5, 2010
The end may be nigh for Zuma - and it is surprisingly familiar
History, the old cliché goes, has a funny way of repeating itself. And like most clichés, this one is true. Just take the case of South Africa's beleaguered president. It was back in October 2005 - almost five years ago to the month - that Jacob Zuma became the rallying point in the revolution against then-ANC leader and South African president Thabo Mbeki.
In the preceding months, businessman Schabir Shaik had been found guilty of, among other things, being involved in a corrupt relationship with Zuma. Subsequent to this, Zuma had been charged with corruption and sacked from his position as the country's deputy president. His downfall had then been confirmed by his being forced to step down from all ANC leadership positions while charges were pending. He was a goner. Then came the rebellion.
Delegates arrived at the ANC mid-term National General Council in Tshwane, determined to reverse the decision to strip him of his party power. As far as they were concerned, this was a continuation of Mbeki's purging of leaders he perceived as being threats. History records that this successful rebellion was the beginning of the attrition of Mbeki's power and the revival of Zuma's fortunes. After Tshwane, the previously feared and unassailable Mbeki was never able to regain his grip on power. It all ended badly when he was toppled at the Polokwane conference in December 2007 and then, humiliatingly, was ejected from the Union Buildings nine months later.
Five years on, Zuma, the beneficiary of the Tshwane rebellion, finds himself going into an NGC unsure of his grip on power. It is he who is now under siege, much like Mbeki was five years ago. Zuma will have to do some deft political work if he is to prevent the inevitable slip of power from his hands. He is already facing a low-level insurgency within the party, as many leaders openly deride him and the previously loyal unions taunt him about his nocturnal energies. This time, however, he will not have an Mbeki to blame for his woes. He will be a victim of his own self-destruction and inability to appreciate it when life gives you a second chance to redeem yourself. He has been the prime conspirator in an anti-Zuma campaign.
In the 16 months he has been in power, Zuma has been consistent in one aspect: failing to live to up to the nation's low expectations of him. Even his close allies, who genuinely believed he had the potential to rise above himself, have been left aghast at his lack of leadership outside of his Nkandla homestead. Hence the revolt that has been creeping up on him. Already, the ANC Youth League has thrown down the gauntlet - announcing that the conviction of its president, Julius Malema, by an internal disciplinary committee be nullified. This means the league is spoiling for a head-to-head confrontation with Zuma, who initiated the process earlier this year. The league - which once cravenly backed Zuma - now ridicules him.
On the other side of the ideological divide you have Cosatu, which has made it clear it does not want to be treated like an abused spouse. The trade union federation knows its power well, having been the engine behind Mbeki's ouster and Zuma's rise. The federation's leaders had expected to be treated with more respect than they were during Mbeki's time. But they have found that their proximity to the new ANC leadership has borne no fruit. Instead, fault lines between them and the so-called nationalists in the ANC have deepened.
The "nationalists" have treated Cosatu and the SACP with the same suspicions as Mbeki did, alleging that their agenda is to "capture" the ANC and turn it into a socialist organisation. And then you throw into this mix Zuma's propensity to humour everyone and not take any decisions. This has frustrated Cosatu, which invested heavily in the campaign to get Zuma elected, in the belief that labour's cause would have a more sympathetic ear. If there is any group that feels let down and betrayed by Zuma's rule, it is the trade union movement. Organised labour has been betrayed on policy shifts, the war against corruption, the non-functioning of the alliance and Zuma's addiction to gift-bearing businessmen who seem to have more access to him than those who propelled him to power.
Then you have the general disgruntlement with Zuma among ANC members and supporters who believe he is in power to have fun and to increase the size of the spousal office. Unlike him, they have got over the Umshini Wam fad and want more from their president.
Zuma is well aware that power is slipping away from him. According to insiders, he has started to display the signs of paranoia that afflicted his predecessor. Many in the higher echelons now believe it will take a miracle for Zuma to make it back for a second term as ANC president in 2012. Like Thabo Mbeki's Tshwane experience, the countdown for Zuma could well begin in Durban in a fortnight.
Source: Times Live
In the preceding months, businessman Schabir Shaik had been found guilty of, among other things, being involved in a corrupt relationship with Zuma. Subsequent to this, Zuma had been charged with corruption and sacked from his position as the country's deputy president. His downfall had then been confirmed by his being forced to step down from all ANC leadership positions while charges were pending. He was a goner. Then came the rebellion.
Delegates arrived at the ANC mid-term National General Council in Tshwane, determined to reverse the decision to strip him of his party power. As far as they were concerned, this was a continuation of Mbeki's purging of leaders he perceived as being threats. History records that this successful rebellion was the beginning of the attrition of Mbeki's power and the revival of Zuma's fortunes. After Tshwane, the previously feared and unassailable Mbeki was never able to regain his grip on power. It all ended badly when he was toppled at the Polokwane conference in December 2007 and then, humiliatingly, was ejected from the Union Buildings nine months later.
Five years on, Zuma, the beneficiary of the Tshwane rebellion, finds himself going into an NGC unsure of his grip on power. It is he who is now under siege, much like Mbeki was five years ago. Zuma will have to do some deft political work if he is to prevent the inevitable slip of power from his hands. He is already facing a low-level insurgency within the party, as many leaders openly deride him and the previously loyal unions taunt him about his nocturnal energies. This time, however, he will not have an Mbeki to blame for his woes. He will be a victim of his own self-destruction and inability to appreciate it when life gives you a second chance to redeem yourself. He has been the prime conspirator in an anti-Zuma campaign.
In the 16 months he has been in power, Zuma has been consistent in one aspect: failing to live to up to the nation's low expectations of him. Even his close allies, who genuinely believed he had the potential to rise above himself, have been left aghast at his lack of leadership outside of his Nkandla homestead. Hence the revolt that has been creeping up on him. Already, the ANC Youth League has thrown down the gauntlet - announcing that the conviction of its president, Julius Malema, by an internal disciplinary committee be nullified. This means the league is spoiling for a head-to-head confrontation with Zuma, who initiated the process earlier this year. The league - which once cravenly backed Zuma - now ridicules him.
On the other side of the ideological divide you have Cosatu, which has made it clear it does not want to be treated like an abused spouse. The trade union federation knows its power well, having been the engine behind Mbeki's ouster and Zuma's rise. The federation's leaders had expected to be treated with more respect than they were during Mbeki's time. But they have found that their proximity to the new ANC leadership has borne no fruit. Instead, fault lines between them and the so-called nationalists in the ANC have deepened.
The "nationalists" have treated Cosatu and the SACP with the same suspicions as Mbeki did, alleging that their agenda is to "capture" the ANC and turn it into a socialist organisation. And then you throw into this mix Zuma's propensity to humour everyone and not take any decisions. This has frustrated Cosatu, which invested heavily in the campaign to get Zuma elected, in the belief that labour's cause would have a more sympathetic ear. If there is any group that feels let down and betrayed by Zuma's rule, it is the trade union movement. Organised labour has been betrayed on policy shifts, the war against corruption, the non-functioning of the alliance and Zuma's addiction to gift-bearing businessmen who seem to have more access to him than those who propelled him to power.
Then you have the general disgruntlement with Zuma among ANC members and supporters who believe he is in power to have fun and to increase the size of the spousal office. Unlike him, they have got over the Umshini Wam fad and want more from their president.
Zuma is well aware that power is slipping away from him. According to insiders, he has started to display the signs of paranoia that afflicted his predecessor. Many in the higher echelons now believe it will take a miracle for Zuma to make it back for a second term as ANC president in 2012. Like Thabo Mbeki's Tshwane experience, the countdown for Zuma could well begin in Durban in a fortnight.
Source: Times Live
Monday, April 19, 2010
How corruption sustains the ANC – and is killing our democracy
Official opposition leader Helen Zille’s latest weekly newsletter offers up an essential analysis of why corruption within the ANC is endemic and how its deep, poisonous tentacles are steadily strangling South Africa’s constitutional democracy.
Read it below:
Why Zuma couldn’t stop corruption, even if he wanted to
The utterances of the ANC today have all the hallmarks of the double-think of George Orwell’s 1984. If you haven’t read the book, double-think involves holding two contradictory ideas in your head at the same time. This means that when your actions contradict your words, you actually believe your own propaganda. Examples of ANC double-think abound, but nowhere is it more apparent than its stance on corruption. How often have we seen commentators praising ANC leaders, including the President, for their tough talk on corruption? It always ends with rhetoric. Action never follows.
When the President launched the ANC’s manifesto before the last election, he said: “Most importantly, the ANC will step up measures in the fight against corruption within its ranks and the State…this will include measures to review the tendering system, to ensure that ANC members in business, public servants and elected representatives do not abuse the State for corrupt practices.”
In his State of the Nation address this year, he said: “We will pay particular attention to combating corruption and fraud in procurement and tender processes…” He said the same thing the year before. Yet, we have seen no measures introduced to actually do anything about corruption.
These repeated anti-corruption promises are deeply ironic given the cloud of corruption that hangs over the President himself. Extreme double-think must be necessary for Zuma to speak of his “zero tolerance” approach to corruption when he knows how many quashed charges hang over his own head. More than that. As he attacks corruption, President Zuma knows that the ANC undermined the independence of the National Prosecuting Authority to avoid ANC leaders, including himself, having to answer corruption charges in court. The Constitution itself is being sacrificed to the ANC’s corruption.
What’s more, the ANC has even set up front companies to institutionalise corruption. Most notorious is Chancellor House. Its purpose is to channel tenders and contracts from the ANC in government to the ANC in business in order to enrich the ANC and its leaders. Straight, institutionalised corruption.
Chancellor House facilitated the deal between Eskom and Hitachi Africa, to manufacture boilers for the proposed Medupi Power Station, from which the ANC stands to make an estimated R1-billion tax free profit. Eskom will have to pay with taxpayers’ money. And, as a result, the ANC will become one of the wealthiest political parties in the world. Let South Africans remember this when they pay their inflated electricity bills.
So, while some in the ANC leadership rail against the proliferation of tenderpreneurs, the ANC has become the tenderpreneur-in-chief. A pattern is emerging here: the more corrupt the ANC becomes, the tougher its anti-corruption stance. Indeed, this is how double-think works. The graver the deed, the greater the falsehood required to neutralise it in one’s mind.
It is time for everyone to realise that corruption is not just an aberration in the ANC that must be ‘rooted out’ from time to time. The ANC needs corruption to survive, it is its lifeblood. It needs it to fund its election campaigns. It needs it to pay the loyalty networks necessary for ANC leaders to entrench their power. And it needs corruption to pay for its leadership’s lifestyles. ANC leaders in the party, the state, and in business have become an interlocked network of patronage and corruption. Everyone knows that everyone else is corrupt, so they cover up for each other, and abuse power to tighten their grip, undermining independent institutions and eliminating opposition both inside and outside the Party.
In the process, the ANC is turning South Africa into a criminal state. What will it take to get us out of this sordid mess?
The obvious thing would be for President Zuma to stop talking about corruption and take decisive action to actually expose and prevent it. He could announce anti-corruption measures such as preventing political parties from doing business with the state. He could announce laws which prevent government employees from doing business with government. And, he could stop the deployment of cadres to parastatals and institutions integral to the fight against corruption, such as the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). He could re-instate the independence of the criminal justice system to expose and prosecute corruption without fear or favour.
But he cannot do any of these things without exposing himself and his closest political allies to criminal prosecution. The criminal justice system has been perverted as an instrument for persecuting political opponents and protecting political allies. But even this selective use of the criminal justice system is becoming difficult because the entire ANC edifice — allies and opponents alike — are caught in what Allister Sparks calls a ‘corruption gridlock’. Senior ANC members have so much dirt on each other, that they dare not take action against corruption. If one goes down, he will take the rest down with them. This is precisely what Jacob Zuma himself threatened to do when faced with prosecution relating to the arms deal before he became President.
This explains why the corruption in the arms deal was so successfully covered up. It explains why Julius Malema was able to get away with what he did and said before any rebuke whatsoever from Zuma. It explains why Schabir Shaik is still on medical parole, despite no evidence that he is terminally ill.
In all of these cases, the ANC leadership is paralysed because of its dubious past and future interest in maintaining the status quo. Zuma cannot go beyond rhetoric and take real action against corruption for fear of alienating those who have enough information to bring him down. His time and energy is spent placating those who hold this power over him instead of governing. This is the consequence of endemic corruption.
Most people think Zuma needed to avoid jail so he could become President. Actually, the opposite is true. Zuma needed to become President so that he could avoid jail.
Now that he has succeeded, Zuma is paralysed as a President. You can be sure that nothing will come of his rebuke of Malema. There will be no tough anti-corruption measures taken while he is in office. And, in time, Schabir Shaik will receive a presidential pardon.
If we dig deep enough, I believe we would discover that Jacob Zuma continues to benefit from corrupt relationships to this day. The lifestyle of his family is too lavish to be affordable on his presidential income. We wonder how he can spend R65 million – which he has insisted is his own money – renovating his residence at Nkandla. And we marvel at how he can support his wives, his fiancée and 20 children on a single salary.
But we also know that his family members, including his wives, are involved in over 100 companies – some of which benefit from state contracts. It was therefore not surprising that Zuma missed the deadline to declare his financial interests by 10 months, and only disclosed his assets when public pressure forced him to. The irresistible inference is that his advisors were sanitising his business interests for public consumption.
All of this tells us why Zuma cannot get tough on corruption, even if he wanted to. The cronies he relies on for political support benefit from corruption too much. Not only this, the ANC benefits. Most of all, Zuma and his family benefit.
This week, the DA tabled private members legislation in the National Assembly that, if passed, would put an end to political parties doing business with the state. This would have prevented the ANC from using its influence at Eskom to grant a multi-billion rand state contract to a company it has a stake in.
Also this week, we announced new legislation in the Western Cape, where the DA governs, that will prevent state employees and their families from doing business with the state, because of the clear conflict of interest this presents.
I have challenged President Zuma to implement this legislation at national level and I look forward to seeing his response. But I am not holding my breath. After all, he is caught in a corruption gridlock. He has too much to lose from taking decisive action against graft.
But what Zuma and his cronies need to understand is that, if they do not act against corruption in their ranks soon, they will lose in the end. They must remember that we live in a democracy and that they are subject to the will of the people. The time will come when even the ANC’s staunchest supporters will realise what their party has become. The only remedy available in a democracy is to vote for an alternative.
As ANC NEC member Jeremy Cronin said this week: “The ANC should realise overwhelmingly that the honeymoon is over.”
Source: Afrodissident: Alex Matthews
Read it below:
Why Zuma couldn’t stop corruption, even if he wanted to
The utterances of the ANC today have all the hallmarks of the double-think of George Orwell’s 1984. If you haven’t read the book, double-think involves holding two contradictory ideas in your head at the same time. This means that when your actions contradict your words, you actually believe your own propaganda. Examples of ANC double-think abound, but nowhere is it more apparent than its stance on corruption. How often have we seen commentators praising ANC leaders, including the President, for their tough talk on corruption? It always ends with rhetoric. Action never follows.
When the President launched the ANC’s manifesto before the last election, he said: “Most importantly, the ANC will step up measures in the fight against corruption within its ranks and the State…this will include measures to review the tendering system, to ensure that ANC members in business, public servants and elected representatives do not abuse the State for corrupt practices.”
In his State of the Nation address this year, he said: “We will pay particular attention to combating corruption and fraud in procurement and tender processes…” He said the same thing the year before. Yet, we have seen no measures introduced to actually do anything about corruption.
These repeated anti-corruption promises are deeply ironic given the cloud of corruption that hangs over the President himself. Extreme double-think must be necessary for Zuma to speak of his “zero tolerance” approach to corruption when he knows how many quashed charges hang over his own head. More than that. As he attacks corruption, President Zuma knows that the ANC undermined the independence of the National Prosecuting Authority to avoid ANC leaders, including himself, having to answer corruption charges in court. The Constitution itself is being sacrificed to the ANC’s corruption.
What’s more, the ANC has even set up front companies to institutionalise corruption. Most notorious is Chancellor House. Its purpose is to channel tenders and contracts from the ANC in government to the ANC in business in order to enrich the ANC and its leaders. Straight, institutionalised corruption.
Chancellor House facilitated the deal between Eskom and Hitachi Africa, to manufacture boilers for the proposed Medupi Power Station, from which the ANC stands to make an estimated R1-billion tax free profit. Eskom will have to pay with taxpayers’ money. And, as a result, the ANC will become one of the wealthiest political parties in the world. Let South Africans remember this when they pay their inflated electricity bills.
So, while some in the ANC leadership rail against the proliferation of tenderpreneurs, the ANC has become the tenderpreneur-in-chief. A pattern is emerging here: the more corrupt the ANC becomes, the tougher its anti-corruption stance. Indeed, this is how double-think works. The graver the deed, the greater the falsehood required to neutralise it in one’s mind.
It is time for everyone to realise that corruption is not just an aberration in the ANC that must be ‘rooted out’ from time to time. The ANC needs corruption to survive, it is its lifeblood. It needs it to fund its election campaigns. It needs it to pay the loyalty networks necessary for ANC leaders to entrench their power. And it needs corruption to pay for its leadership’s lifestyles. ANC leaders in the party, the state, and in business have become an interlocked network of patronage and corruption. Everyone knows that everyone else is corrupt, so they cover up for each other, and abuse power to tighten their grip, undermining independent institutions and eliminating opposition both inside and outside the Party.
In the process, the ANC is turning South Africa into a criminal state. What will it take to get us out of this sordid mess?
The obvious thing would be for President Zuma to stop talking about corruption and take decisive action to actually expose and prevent it. He could announce anti-corruption measures such as preventing political parties from doing business with the state. He could announce laws which prevent government employees from doing business with government. And, he could stop the deployment of cadres to parastatals and institutions integral to the fight against corruption, such as the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). He could re-instate the independence of the criminal justice system to expose and prosecute corruption without fear or favour.
But he cannot do any of these things without exposing himself and his closest political allies to criminal prosecution. The criminal justice system has been perverted as an instrument for persecuting political opponents and protecting political allies. But even this selective use of the criminal justice system is becoming difficult because the entire ANC edifice — allies and opponents alike — are caught in what Allister Sparks calls a ‘corruption gridlock’. Senior ANC members have so much dirt on each other, that they dare not take action against corruption. If one goes down, he will take the rest down with them. This is precisely what Jacob Zuma himself threatened to do when faced with prosecution relating to the arms deal before he became President.
This explains why the corruption in the arms deal was so successfully covered up. It explains why Julius Malema was able to get away with what he did and said before any rebuke whatsoever from Zuma. It explains why Schabir Shaik is still on medical parole, despite no evidence that he is terminally ill.
In all of these cases, the ANC leadership is paralysed because of its dubious past and future interest in maintaining the status quo. Zuma cannot go beyond rhetoric and take real action against corruption for fear of alienating those who have enough information to bring him down. His time and energy is spent placating those who hold this power over him instead of governing. This is the consequence of endemic corruption.
Most people think Zuma needed to avoid jail so he could become President. Actually, the opposite is true. Zuma needed to become President so that he could avoid jail.
Now that he has succeeded, Zuma is paralysed as a President. You can be sure that nothing will come of his rebuke of Malema. There will be no tough anti-corruption measures taken while he is in office. And, in time, Schabir Shaik will receive a presidential pardon.
If we dig deep enough, I believe we would discover that Jacob Zuma continues to benefit from corrupt relationships to this day. The lifestyle of his family is too lavish to be affordable on his presidential income. We wonder how he can spend R65 million – which he has insisted is his own money – renovating his residence at Nkandla. And we marvel at how he can support his wives, his fiancée and 20 children on a single salary.
But we also know that his family members, including his wives, are involved in over 100 companies – some of which benefit from state contracts. It was therefore not surprising that Zuma missed the deadline to declare his financial interests by 10 months, and only disclosed his assets when public pressure forced him to. The irresistible inference is that his advisors were sanitising his business interests for public consumption.
All of this tells us why Zuma cannot get tough on corruption, even if he wanted to. The cronies he relies on for political support benefit from corruption too much. Not only this, the ANC benefits. Most of all, Zuma and his family benefit.
This week, the DA tabled private members legislation in the National Assembly that, if passed, would put an end to political parties doing business with the state. This would have prevented the ANC from using its influence at Eskom to grant a multi-billion rand state contract to a company it has a stake in.
Also this week, we announced new legislation in the Western Cape, where the DA governs, that will prevent state employees and their families from doing business with the state, because of the clear conflict of interest this presents.
I have challenged President Zuma to implement this legislation at national level and I look forward to seeing his response. But I am not holding my breath. After all, he is caught in a corruption gridlock. He has too much to lose from taking decisive action against graft.
But what Zuma and his cronies need to understand is that, if they do not act against corruption in their ranks soon, they will lose in the end. They must remember that we live in a democracy and that they are subject to the will of the people. The time will come when even the ANC’s staunchest supporters will realise what their party has become. The only remedy available in a democracy is to vote for an alternative.
As ANC NEC member Jeremy Cronin said this week: “The ANC should realise overwhelmingly that the honeymoon is over.”
Source: Afrodissident: Alex Matthews
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
Leaders’ Lavishness Gives Rise to ‘Lifestyle Audits’
Jacob Zuma, the president of South Africa, has 20 children, three wives and a fiancée. Recently, the matter of how he supports this large and widely dispersed family has been vigorously questioned. Indeed, the finances of everyone in government are suddenly viewed with a skepticism that often drifts into contempt. Zwelinzima Vavi, a labor leader and longtime ally of Mr. Zuma’s, is calling for “lifestyle audits” of all senior officials to surmise who is on the take and just how much they are taking.
For years, people have noticed a mismatch between the income and the outgo of many within the governing African National Congress. The A.N.C. is the party of Nelson Mandela, the organization that liberated the country from apartheid, the home of many heroes now struggling to get rich. In his novel “Black Diamond,” Zakes Mda, one of the nation’s leading writers, wryly observed, “In this brave new world, accumulation of personal wealth is dressed up in militarism, as if capitalism is the continuation of the guerrilla warfare that was fought during apartheid.”
The catalyst for the current demand for accounting is not Mr. Zuma but rather the second most quoted member of the A.N.C., the leader of its youth league, Julius Malema. A virtual unknown two years ago, Mr. Malema, 29, is a young man seemingly unwise beyond his years. His A.N.C. comrades could perhaps tolerate his abuse of political opponents, enjoying how he denounced them as Satanists or demeaned the women as too ugly to marry. He recently insulted the country’s Afrikaner minority by leading students in the old struggle chant, “Kill the farmer, kill the Boer.” In a nation where the police say 861 white farmers have been killed since 2001, some deemed this sing-along insensitive to say the least. But Mr. Malema has also turned his tongue on veteran A.N.C. stalwarts, particularly leaders of the party’s alliance partners, the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions, calling them reactionaries. He said the Communists presented themselves as champions of the working class while “they spend most of their time drinking red wine.”
Mr. Malema is popular in the townships, where most young people delight in the entertainment value of his scalding wit. But he is increasingly despised within his own party’s hierarchy and now claims that several A.N.C. leaders are out to “smear” him. This hardly seems implausible. For a long time, people have wondered how a young man with an impoverished past has collected enough cash to own a fine home in the Johannesburg suburbs. Mr. Malema serves Johnnie Walker Red Label whisky and Moët & Chandon Champagne at his parties. He wears Gucci suits and a Breitling watch. He walks through poor communities in designer jeans.
In a single weekend last month, three major newspapers published exposés about Mr. Malema, asserting that he has amassed a fortune through government contracts steered to businesses in which he owns an interest. According to The City Press, one company, SGL Engineering Projects, which listed Mr. Malema as a director, won $20 million in contracts from municipalities in Mr. Malema’s home province. The company’s earnings have multiplied in just the past two years, even though its work has often been found shoddy, news reports said. These simultaneous revelations may have been a case of coincidental sleuthing — or perhaps closely timed leaks from well-informed enemies. Under pressure to respond, Mr. Malema, speaking through his attorney, said that in 2008 he resigned his directorships in all companies. He insisted that he was unaware that he currently held a position in SGL.
Mr. Zuma has routinely supported his pugnacious acolyte, and this time was no different. “I’m not sure Malema has no right to business, on what basis I don’t know,” the president said. But blood was in the water, and soon the call for lifestyle audits stretched into the presidency itself. Mr. Zuma said such invasive accounting was unnecessary, arguing that by law government officials already were obligated to disclose their business interests, gifts and assets. The president was correct about that. In fact, by law he was supposed to report the details of his finances within 60 days of assuming office. He was inaugurated 10 months ago but had yet to comply with the ethics code.
Last Wednesday, a week after the news media finally awakened to Mr. Zuma’s non-compliance — and after even some political allies had joined political adversaries in their disapproval — the president submitted an accounting of his holdings, though the extent of that disclosure has yet to become public. As to how he supports all those dependents, part of the answer emerged Tuesday when Collins Chabane, a minister within the presidency, said the government provided more than $2 million a year for “spousal” support. The examples he gave were for expenses relating to the duties of Mr. Zuma’s wives in their capacities as first ladies, such as secretaries, air travel, cellphones and computers. No details were given regarding government support for the president’s children. The payment of Mr. Zuma’s bills has been an issue before. In 2005, a close friend and financial adviser, Schabir Shaik, was found guilty of bribing Mr. Zuma in return for help in various business deals. The moneybags were open for items big and small: vacations, medical bills, even the allowance for Mr. Zuma’s children. The trial judge said the two had a “mutually beneficial symbiosis.”
Mr. Zuma was later charged with 16 counts of fraud, corruption and racketeering. He avoided a trial when prosecutors dismissed the case because of misconduct within their ranks, just weeks before he was sworn in as president.
Mr. Shaik, sentenced to 15 years, spent only 28 months in jail before being freed on medical parole in March 2009. At the time, he was said to be near death, though he has since been observed driving around Durban in his BMW X6. That is not the automobile Mr. Malema prefers. He sits behind the wheel of a black C63 Mercedes-Benz AMG.
Source: New York Times
For years, people have noticed a mismatch between the income and the outgo of many within the governing African National Congress. The A.N.C. is the party of Nelson Mandela, the organization that liberated the country from apartheid, the home of many heroes now struggling to get rich. In his novel “Black Diamond,” Zakes Mda, one of the nation’s leading writers, wryly observed, “In this brave new world, accumulation of personal wealth is dressed up in militarism, as if capitalism is the continuation of the guerrilla warfare that was fought during apartheid.”
The catalyst for the current demand for accounting is not Mr. Zuma but rather the second most quoted member of the A.N.C., the leader of its youth league, Julius Malema. A virtual unknown two years ago, Mr. Malema, 29, is a young man seemingly unwise beyond his years. His A.N.C. comrades could perhaps tolerate his abuse of political opponents, enjoying how he denounced them as Satanists or demeaned the women as too ugly to marry. He recently insulted the country’s Afrikaner minority by leading students in the old struggle chant, “Kill the farmer, kill the Boer.” In a nation where the police say 861 white farmers have been killed since 2001, some deemed this sing-along insensitive to say the least. But Mr. Malema has also turned his tongue on veteran A.N.C. stalwarts, particularly leaders of the party’s alliance partners, the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions, calling them reactionaries. He said the Communists presented themselves as champions of the working class while “they spend most of their time drinking red wine.”
Mr. Malema is popular in the townships, where most young people delight in the entertainment value of his scalding wit. But he is increasingly despised within his own party’s hierarchy and now claims that several A.N.C. leaders are out to “smear” him. This hardly seems implausible. For a long time, people have wondered how a young man with an impoverished past has collected enough cash to own a fine home in the Johannesburg suburbs. Mr. Malema serves Johnnie Walker Red Label whisky and Moët & Chandon Champagne at his parties. He wears Gucci suits and a Breitling watch. He walks through poor communities in designer jeans.
In a single weekend last month, three major newspapers published exposés about Mr. Malema, asserting that he has amassed a fortune through government contracts steered to businesses in which he owns an interest. According to The City Press, one company, SGL Engineering Projects, which listed Mr. Malema as a director, won $20 million in contracts from municipalities in Mr. Malema’s home province. The company’s earnings have multiplied in just the past two years, even though its work has often been found shoddy, news reports said. These simultaneous revelations may have been a case of coincidental sleuthing — or perhaps closely timed leaks from well-informed enemies. Under pressure to respond, Mr. Malema, speaking through his attorney, said that in 2008 he resigned his directorships in all companies. He insisted that he was unaware that he currently held a position in SGL.
Mr. Zuma has routinely supported his pugnacious acolyte, and this time was no different. “I’m not sure Malema has no right to business, on what basis I don’t know,” the president said. But blood was in the water, and soon the call for lifestyle audits stretched into the presidency itself. Mr. Zuma said such invasive accounting was unnecessary, arguing that by law government officials already were obligated to disclose their business interests, gifts and assets. The president was correct about that. In fact, by law he was supposed to report the details of his finances within 60 days of assuming office. He was inaugurated 10 months ago but had yet to comply with the ethics code.
Last Wednesday, a week after the news media finally awakened to Mr. Zuma’s non-compliance — and after even some political allies had joined political adversaries in their disapproval — the president submitted an accounting of his holdings, though the extent of that disclosure has yet to become public. As to how he supports all those dependents, part of the answer emerged Tuesday when Collins Chabane, a minister within the presidency, said the government provided more than $2 million a year for “spousal” support. The examples he gave were for expenses relating to the duties of Mr. Zuma’s wives in their capacities as first ladies, such as secretaries, air travel, cellphones and computers. No details were given regarding government support for the president’s children. The payment of Mr. Zuma’s bills has been an issue before. In 2005, a close friend and financial adviser, Schabir Shaik, was found guilty of bribing Mr. Zuma in return for help in various business deals. The moneybags were open for items big and small: vacations, medical bills, even the allowance for Mr. Zuma’s children. The trial judge said the two had a “mutually beneficial symbiosis.”
Mr. Zuma was later charged with 16 counts of fraud, corruption and racketeering. He avoided a trial when prosecutors dismissed the case because of misconduct within their ranks, just weeks before he was sworn in as president.
Mr. Shaik, sentenced to 15 years, spent only 28 months in jail before being freed on medical parole in March 2009. At the time, he was said to be near death, though he has since been observed driving around Durban in his BMW X6. That is not the automobile Mr. Malema prefers. He sits behind the wheel of a black C63 Mercedes-Benz AMG.
Source: New York Times
Sunday, September 6, 2009
'Moe, the spy'
Should Moe Shaik get the nod as the country's top spook, his appointment will be part of a pattern of handpicked allies from KwaZulu-Natal who manage President Jacob Zuma's most sensitive security jobs. These securocrats are largely Zulu-speaking and have close ties to the president. Moe Shaik is a personal friend of Zuma and a former comrade in the ANC's intelligence wing.
Seen as clever, shrewd and manipulative, Moe is described as someone who gets in an opponent's face - good qualities for a spy. His critics describe him as arrogantSoon he could be running the country's state security apparatus. Moe, real name Riaz, refused to speak to the Sunday Tribune about his rumoured appointment. "I really don't know where it comes from; no one has talked to me about it. I will therefore reserve my comment," he said. But those in the know say he expects to get the job.
Moe is not generally known for reticence and keeping a low profile. Part of a well-known "struggle" family, he shares the media spotlight with brothers Younis, Shamin (Chippy) and the infamous Schabir. The brothers rallied around Schabir, a former financial adviser to Zuma, who was found guilty of soliciting a bribe on Zuma's behalf and went to jail.
He was paroled earlier this year on medical grounds after serving a fraction of his sentence. Moe acted as the family's spokesman, strongly defending his brother's conduct. In the early 2000s Moe served as democratic South Africa's ambassador to Algeria. While ambassador to the north African country, he is believed to have struck deals with that country about the prospect of buying arms from South Africa. But he really came under the media spotlight in 2003 when he and former transport minister Mac Maharaj openly accused the then director of public prosecutions Bulelani Ngcuka of being an apartheid spy.
At the time Ngcuka was overseeing fraud and corruption investigations into Schabir Shaik and Zuma. Both Moe and Maharaj were prime drivers of Operation Vula, a clandestine ANC operation which sought to deliver classified information as well as smuggle weapons into the country in the run-up to the country's first democratic elections in 1994. His recruitment into intelligence work started in 1980 when Moe and Younis both attended the University of Durban-Westville, where they were reportedly influenced politically by the likes of Pravin Gordan of the Natal Indian Congress. Gordan is now minister of finance. Moe qualified as a optometrist.
He first ingratiated himself with ANC covert operations in 1981 when he sneaked into Swaziland to make contact with the banned party's underground movement. It proved to be a turning point for Moe and the Shaik family.He quickly recruited Younis and they both set up a new ANC intelligence network. The recruitment expanded as the Shaiks enlisted more people. In 1985 Moe and Younis were detained by the Security Police and in later years Moe tearfully told of how he had been tortured. Following the dismal failure of the initial project, Moe embarked on one of the most famous and clandestine ANC projects in 1988. It was code-named "Vula", and this time it was Chippy's turn to take the big stage.
The brother infiltrated various apartheid government defence projects and passed the critical information to the ANC. Chippy's wife, Zerena, apparently worked as a personnel clerk. When the ANC was unbanned, Moe landed various security roles within the ruling party. His brother Schabir steered the economic interests of the Shaiks and was soon rubbing shoulders with cabinet ministers and foreign corporate executives, keen to do business with the ANC. Out of favour during the presidency of Thabo Mbeki, Moe was often asked by the media to interpret the strategies of the Zuma camp in the run-up to the ANC's 52nd national conference in Polokwane, where Mbeki was ousted by Zuma as the party's leader. On several occasions he has angered party and alliance leaders by making comments about issues ahead of the ANC's own attempts to stage-manage events.
This year, ahead of the general election, he predicted charges against Zuma would be withdrawn, earning a rebuke from the ANC Youth League and from ANC stalwart Lindiwe Sisulu, who was liaising with prosecutors to get Zuma off the hook. In hindsight, it is thought he may have had a role in gaining access to tape recordings made by the NIA, that showed Ngcuka, now a private citizen, was still playing a role in the prosecution of Zuma. This evidence led to the fraud and corruption charges against Zuma being dropped and smoothed his path to becoming president.
During the Polokwane battle, he surprised many by predicting Reserve Bank Governor Tito Mboweni's demise in the Zuma administration and the survival of then finance minister Trevor Manuel, owing to the latter's willingness to go along with the new policy direction of the ANC and its alliance partners. Moe's possible appointment to the top NIA job has drawn a negative reaction from the Democratic Alliance, which asks if he can distinguish between being a senior civil servant acting on behalf of the country and being an ANC functionary serving the interests of the Zuma faction.
The DA's Theo Coetzee said: "Moe Shaik is deeply involved in faction fights within the ruling party, and we must therefore assume that his appointment will further politicise the NIA." Zuma, a former ANC spymaster, would know that in appointing Moe he would have an ally. This could be useful in the political battles that lie ahead.
Source: IoL
Seen as clever, shrewd and manipulative, Moe is described as someone who gets in an opponent's face - good qualities for a spy. His critics describe him as arrogantSoon he could be running the country's state security apparatus. Moe, real name Riaz, refused to speak to the Sunday Tribune about his rumoured appointment. "I really don't know where it comes from; no one has talked to me about it. I will therefore reserve my comment," he said. But those in the know say he expects to get the job.
Moe is not generally known for reticence and keeping a low profile. Part of a well-known "struggle" family, he shares the media spotlight with brothers Younis, Shamin (Chippy) and the infamous Schabir. The brothers rallied around Schabir, a former financial adviser to Zuma, who was found guilty of soliciting a bribe on Zuma's behalf and went to jail.
He was paroled earlier this year on medical grounds after serving a fraction of his sentence. Moe acted as the family's spokesman, strongly defending his brother's conduct. In the early 2000s Moe served as democratic South Africa's ambassador to Algeria. While ambassador to the north African country, he is believed to have struck deals with that country about the prospect of buying arms from South Africa. But he really came under the media spotlight in 2003 when he and former transport minister Mac Maharaj openly accused the then director of public prosecutions Bulelani Ngcuka of being an apartheid spy.
At the time Ngcuka was overseeing fraud and corruption investigations into Schabir Shaik and Zuma. Both Moe and Maharaj were prime drivers of Operation Vula, a clandestine ANC operation which sought to deliver classified information as well as smuggle weapons into the country in the run-up to the country's first democratic elections in 1994. His recruitment into intelligence work started in 1980 when Moe and Younis both attended the University of Durban-Westville, where they were reportedly influenced politically by the likes of Pravin Gordan of the Natal Indian Congress. Gordan is now minister of finance. Moe qualified as a optometrist.
He first ingratiated himself with ANC covert operations in 1981 when he sneaked into Swaziland to make contact with the banned party's underground movement. It proved to be a turning point for Moe and the Shaik family.He quickly recruited Younis and they both set up a new ANC intelligence network. The recruitment expanded as the Shaiks enlisted more people. In 1985 Moe and Younis were detained by the Security Police and in later years Moe tearfully told of how he had been tortured. Following the dismal failure of the initial project, Moe embarked on one of the most famous and clandestine ANC projects in 1988. It was code-named "Vula", and this time it was Chippy's turn to take the big stage.
The brother infiltrated various apartheid government defence projects and passed the critical information to the ANC. Chippy's wife, Zerena, apparently worked as a personnel clerk. When the ANC was unbanned, Moe landed various security roles within the ruling party. His brother Schabir steered the economic interests of the Shaiks and was soon rubbing shoulders with cabinet ministers and foreign corporate executives, keen to do business with the ANC. Out of favour during the presidency of Thabo Mbeki, Moe was often asked by the media to interpret the strategies of the Zuma camp in the run-up to the ANC's 52nd national conference in Polokwane, where Mbeki was ousted by Zuma as the party's leader. On several occasions he has angered party and alliance leaders by making comments about issues ahead of the ANC's own attempts to stage-manage events.
This year, ahead of the general election, he predicted charges against Zuma would be withdrawn, earning a rebuke from the ANC Youth League and from ANC stalwart Lindiwe Sisulu, who was liaising with prosecutors to get Zuma off the hook. In hindsight, it is thought he may have had a role in gaining access to tape recordings made by the NIA, that showed Ngcuka, now a private citizen, was still playing a role in the prosecution of Zuma. This evidence led to the fraud and corruption charges against Zuma being dropped and smoothed his path to becoming president.
During the Polokwane battle, he surprised many by predicting Reserve Bank Governor Tito Mboweni's demise in the Zuma administration and the survival of then finance minister Trevor Manuel, owing to the latter's willingness to go along with the new policy direction of the ANC and its alliance partners. Moe's possible appointment to the top NIA job has drawn a negative reaction from the Democratic Alliance, which asks if he can distinguish between being a senior civil servant acting on behalf of the country and being an ANC functionary serving the interests of the Zuma faction.
The DA's Theo Coetzee said: "Moe Shaik is deeply involved in faction fights within the ruling party, and we must therefore assume that his appointment will further politicise the NIA." Zuma, a former ANC spymaster, would know that in appointing Moe he would have an ally. This could be useful in the political battles that lie ahead.
Source: IoL
Monday, October 1, 2007
Pikoli's suspension 'sinister'
The shock suspension of South Africa's prosecutions head amid silence by President Thabo Mbeki has led to concerns of "sinister" dealings and government meddling in the country's justice system. Mbeki's integrity came under fire this week as his suspension of top prosecutor Vusi Pikoli was linked to the alleged pending arrest of national police commissioner Jackie Selebi, who is seen as an ally to the president.
With no reaction from Mbeki, analysts and opposition political parties fear Mbeki may have acted out of a desire to protect Selebi, also the president of international policing agency Interpol. Analyst Steven Friedman of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa said suggestions of political interference in the justice system was cause for serious concern. "If Selebi is not charged, clearly there will be a suggestion that the president got Pikoli out of the way to protect Selebi," he told AFP. Friedman said Mbeki's silence on the issue was damaging, bordering on disdainful, and created the impression that "something sinister is afoot". Selebi faced a raft of calls to quit last year when his friend, businessman Glen Agliotti, was charged with the mafia-style killing of mining magnate Brett Kebble.
Last Sunday, Mbeki suspended Pikoli due to what a government statement said was an irretrievable breakdown in his relationship with the country's justice minister. But news reports on Friday claimed Pikoli's suspension followed within days of Mbeki learning about Selebi's pending arrest, with the NPA believed to have obtained the warrant last week. Opposition political parties have called for Selebi's head, and for Mbeki to quell the speculation by breaking his silence on the alleged link between the two events. "If the speculation turns out to be correct, then we have a dilemma," said Human Sciences Research Council political commentator Adam Habib. "If the predident suspended Mr Pikoli on the grounds that he had issued a warrant for the commissioner's arrest, then it suggests that an invasion is being made into an independent institution's operations. "Intervening in the operations of the National Prosecuting Authority constitutes a violation of our constitution."
No confirmation has been forthcoming from the government, prosecutors or Selebi's office of reported claims that a warrant had been issued for the commissioner's arrest. Main opposition Democratic Alliance leader Helen Zille said in a statement on Friday it "seems clear that the suspension of Pikoli was motivated by the desire of President Mbeki to protect his close ally (Selebi)." "The implications of this development for our democracy are profound. "If true, this latest allegation ... points to the fact that we have entered the phase of an imperial Presidency, where the President appears to govern almost with impunity."
The weekly Mail and Guardian newspaper suggested in an editorial Friday that Pikoli's suspension pointed to political expediency impacting on crime-fighting. "Pikoli's suspension is closely intertwined with the ... investigation into Selebi's alleged links with organised crime," it said. "There is a persuasive view that Mbeki wishes to head this off before the ANC's Polokwane conference for fear of the political harm it might do him."
The ANC meets in Polokwane in the Limpopo province at year-end to elect a new leader, with Mbeki still in the running for a third term as party head. Main contender, ANC deputy president Jacob Zuma, is also in the national prosecuting authority's aim, ever since his financial advisor Schabir Shaik was convicted in 2005 of corruption and fraud in connection with bribes arranged for Zuma. Mbeki's spokesperson Mukoni Ratshitanga could not be reached for comment.
Source: News 24
With no reaction from Mbeki, analysts and opposition political parties fear Mbeki may have acted out of a desire to protect Selebi, also the president of international policing agency Interpol. Analyst Steven Friedman of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa said suggestions of political interference in the justice system was cause for serious concern. "If Selebi is not charged, clearly there will be a suggestion that the president got Pikoli out of the way to protect Selebi," he told AFP. Friedman said Mbeki's silence on the issue was damaging, bordering on disdainful, and created the impression that "something sinister is afoot". Selebi faced a raft of calls to quit last year when his friend, businessman Glen Agliotti, was charged with the mafia-style killing of mining magnate Brett Kebble.
Last Sunday, Mbeki suspended Pikoli due to what a government statement said was an irretrievable breakdown in his relationship with the country's justice minister. But news reports on Friday claimed Pikoli's suspension followed within days of Mbeki learning about Selebi's pending arrest, with the NPA believed to have obtained the warrant last week. Opposition political parties have called for Selebi's head, and for Mbeki to quell the speculation by breaking his silence on the alleged link between the two events. "If the speculation turns out to be correct, then we have a dilemma," said Human Sciences Research Council political commentator Adam Habib. "If the predident suspended Mr Pikoli on the grounds that he had issued a warrant for the commissioner's arrest, then it suggests that an invasion is being made into an independent institution's operations. "Intervening in the operations of the National Prosecuting Authority constitutes a violation of our constitution."
No confirmation has been forthcoming from the government, prosecutors or Selebi's office of reported claims that a warrant had been issued for the commissioner's arrest. Main opposition Democratic Alliance leader Helen Zille said in a statement on Friday it "seems clear that the suspension of Pikoli was motivated by the desire of President Mbeki to protect his close ally (Selebi)." "The implications of this development for our democracy are profound. "If true, this latest allegation ... points to the fact that we have entered the phase of an imperial Presidency, where the President appears to govern almost with impunity."
The weekly Mail and Guardian newspaper suggested in an editorial Friday that Pikoli's suspension pointed to political expediency impacting on crime-fighting. "Pikoli's suspension is closely intertwined with the ... investigation into Selebi's alleged links with organised crime," it said. "There is a persuasive view that Mbeki wishes to head this off before the ANC's Polokwane conference for fear of the political harm it might do him."
The ANC meets in Polokwane in the Limpopo province at year-end to elect a new leader, with Mbeki still in the running for a third term as party head. Main contender, ANC deputy president Jacob Zuma, is also in the national prosecuting authority's aim, ever since his financial advisor Schabir Shaik was convicted in 2005 of corruption and fraud in connection with bribes arranged for Zuma. Mbeki's spokesperson Mukoni Ratshitanga could not be reached for comment.
Source: News 24
Sunday, August 21, 2005
Zuma controversy 'a test'
ANC deputy president Jacob Zuma has described the controversy around him as a challenge to South Africa's Constitution.
The test was how these matters were being handled, he told Metro FM on Tuesday. "I'm saying that things that are happening are a challenge to our democracy, a challenge to our constitution, a challenge to our political maturity, a challenge to the understanding of the nation as a whole. How then do we then deal with the situation, I think, that's what I'm saying," he said. "And in no way can you have a country that doesn't go through challenges at a given time. I think the test is how do you address those issues in order to find an appropriate solution."
President Thabo Mbeki fired Zuma as SA's deputy president in July after he was found by Durban High Court to have had a generally corrupt relationship with his former financial adviser Schabir Shaik.
Source: News 24
The test was how these matters were being handled, he told Metro FM on Tuesday. "I'm saying that things that are happening are a challenge to our democracy, a challenge to our constitution, a challenge to our political maturity, a challenge to the understanding of the nation as a whole. How then do we then deal with the situation, I think, that's what I'm saying," he said. "And in no way can you have a country that doesn't go through challenges at a given time. I think the test is how do you address those issues in order to find an appropriate solution."
President Thabo Mbeki fired Zuma as SA's deputy president in July after he was found by Durban High Court to have had a generally corrupt relationship with his former financial adviser Schabir Shaik.
Source: News 24
Friday, October 10, 2003
ANC tense as Hefer commission gets ready
Tensions in the ANC mounted at the weekend as the ruling party braced itself for a public airing of allegations from senior members that the national director of public prosecutions, Bulelani Ngcuka, was an apartheid spy.
It could prove to be the most testing few weeks for President Thabo Mbeki and his party since it swept to power in the country's first democratic elections in 1994 when a commission of enquiry, headed by Judge Joos Hefer, starts work on Monday.
There are fears that the ANC, which is already divided into opposing political camps over the Scorpions' investigation into Deputy President Jacob Zuma, could take further strain if those who made the accusations against Ngcuka - ANC veteran Mac Maharaj and senior government official Mo Shaik - disclose more information at the commission. There are fears that far from putting the spy controversy to rest, as it is intended to do, the commission could provide a platform for Maharaj and Shaik which could feed the tit-for-tat spy-naming and even tear the ANC apart along populist and technocrat lines. The threat of a split within the cabinet was made worse in August
It was announced by Justice minister Penuell Maduna on Thursday that the commission would be expanded to include an investigation into his own office, as line minister responsible for the national prosecuting authority, to ensure that there had been no abuse of the office as a result of "past obligations", a euphemism for spying for the apartheid regime. Zuma, who has consistently claimed that the investigation into his accepting an alleged R500 000 bribe from a French arms company is politically motivated, is expected to be called by the commission to substantiate his claims.
The fact that Zuma was the head of ANC intelligence when the organisation returned to South Africa from exile in 1990 has exacerbated the tensions and perceptions that there are two rival camps forming within the ANC over the suspended investigation into Zuma's alleged bribe. The threat of a split within the cabinet was made worse in August when Zuma allegedly won the day against Maduna when he tried to get a ruling, allegedly in line with Mbeki's wishes, that ANC officials should refrain from commenting on the Zuma affair. Between them, Zuma, as the former intelligence master, and Maharaj, as the former head of the underground Operation Vula, command widespread support within the ANC as was illustrated by Zuma's hero's welcome at Cosatu's annual conference last month and slogans denouncing Ngcuka.
Others expected to be called by the commission include Ngcuka, who is expected to attend the hearings throughout, Maduna, Maharaj, Mo Shaik, mining magnate Brett Kebble, MP Patricia de Lille, former Sunday Times journalist Ranjeni Munusamy, Schabir Shaik, Zuma's self-styled financial adviser who is facing trial on fraud charges, and, possibly a former spy master such as Niel Barnard or Mike Louw, who headed the apartheid-era National Intelligence Services. It is considered unlikely that Mbeki, who finds himself at the centre of the ANC's most bitter internal battle since coming to power in 1994, will be called to testify at the commission.
Commission sources said yesterday that it was already making provisions to sit for two months or more despite its brief to complete its work as soon as possible. It was earlier expected that the commission would sit for no longer than a month. Maduna, who himself was named as an apartheid spy when Independent Democrats leader Patricia de Lille read from a list of alleged ANC spies in parliament in 1997, is also under pressure for allegations of nepotism and corruption in the liquidation section of the justice department by a senior justice ministry official. Maduna also received a letter this week from mining magnate Brett Kebble in which it is understood that he accused Maduna and Ngcuka of undermining the justice department and abusing their official positions.
Kebble was allegedly named by Ngcuka in a derogatory context in an off-the-record briefing to black editors several months ago. Mbeki's legal adviser, Mojanku Gumbi, said yesterday that the inclusion of Maduna did not relate to allegations that he was an apartheid spy but was as a result of his position as the minister with line responsibility for Ngcuka's department.
Ngcuka stands accused by the likes of Maharaj, Mo Shaik and Brett Kebble of abusing his office by using it to get at his political enemies among who are those who resent his alleged role as an apartheid spy. Ngcuka has vigorously denied the claims and Mbeki has backed him up insisting that the "masses of the people" would not forgive those who made spying allegations.
Source: IoL
It could prove to be the most testing few weeks for President Thabo Mbeki and his party since it swept to power in the country's first democratic elections in 1994 when a commission of enquiry, headed by Judge Joos Hefer, starts work on Monday.
There are fears that the ANC, which is already divided into opposing political camps over the Scorpions' investigation into Deputy President Jacob Zuma, could take further strain if those who made the accusations against Ngcuka - ANC veteran Mac Maharaj and senior government official Mo Shaik - disclose more information at the commission. There are fears that far from putting the spy controversy to rest, as it is intended to do, the commission could provide a platform for Maharaj and Shaik which could feed the tit-for-tat spy-naming and even tear the ANC apart along populist and technocrat lines. The threat of a split within the cabinet was made worse in August
It was announced by Justice minister Penuell Maduna on Thursday that the commission would be expanded to include an investigation into his own office, as line minister responsible for the national prosecuting authority, to ensure that there had been no abuse of the office as a result of "past obligations", a euphemism for spying for the apartheid regime. Zuma, who has consistently claimed that the investigation into his accepting an alleged R500 000 bribe from a French arms company is politically motivated, is expected to be called by the commission to substantiate his claims.
The fact that Zuma was the head of ANC intelligence when the organisation returned to South Africa from exile in 1990 has exacerbated the tensions and perceptions that there are two rival camps forming within the ANC over the suspended investigation into Zuma's alleged bribe. The threat of a split within the cabinet was made worse in August when Zuma allegedly won the day against Maduna when he tried to get a ruling, allegedly in line with Mbeki's wishes, that ANC officials should refrain from commenting on the Zuma affair. Between them, Zuma, as the former intelligence master, and Maharaj, as the former head of the underground Operation Vula, command widespread support within the ANC as was illustrated by Zuma's hero's welcome at Cosatu's annual conference last month and slogans denouncing Ngcuka.
Others expected to be called by the commission include Ngcuka, who is expected to attend the hearings throughout, Maduna, Maharaj, Mo Shaik, mining magnate Brett Kebble, MP Patricia de Lille, former Sunday Times journalist Ranjeni Munusamy, Schabir Shaik, Zuma's self-styled financial adviser who is facing trial on fraud charges, and, possibly a former spy master such as Niel Barnard or Mike Louw, who headed the apartheid-era National Intelligence Services. It is considered unlikely that Mbeki, who finds himself at the centre of the ANC's most bitter internal battle since coming to power in 1994, will be called to testify at the commission.
Commission sources said yesterday that it was already making provisions to sit for two months or more despite its brief to complete its work as soon as possible. It was earlier expected that the commission would sit for no longer than a month. Maduna, who himself was named as an apartheid spy when Independent Democrats leader Patricia de Lille read from a list of alleged ANC spies in parliament in 1997, is also under pressure for allegations of nepotism and corruption in the liquidation section of the justice department by a senior justice ministry official. Maduna also received a letter this week from mining magnate Brett Kebble in which it is understood that he accused Maduna and Ngcuka of undermining the justice department and abusing their official positions.
Kebble was allegedly named by Ngcuka in a derogatory context in an off-the-record briefing to black editors several months ago. Mbeki's legal adviser, Mojanku Gumbi, said yesterday that the inclusion of Maduna did not relate to allegations that he was an apartheid spy but was as a result of his position as the minister with line responsibility for Ngcuka's department.
Ngcuka stands accused by the likes of Maharaj, Mo Shaik and Brett Kebble of abusing his office by using it to get at his political enemies among who are those who resent his alleged role as an apartheid spy. Ngcuka has vigorously denied the claims and Mbeki has backed him up insisting that the "masses of the people" would not forgive those who made spying allegations.
Source: IoL
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