The US: The bully who cried wolf

A habitual liar cannot be believed even when telling the truth.

There is a famous fable by ancient Greek storyteller Aesop about a shepherd boy who habitually lied for fun. While looking after a flock of sheep near a village, every now and then he would cry "Wolf! Wolf!" to bring the villagers rushing, just to laugh at them and their naivety. One day the wolf did actually attack his flock, and the shepherd boy cried "Wolf!! Wolf!"- this time for real.

But by then, the villagers had wisened up and ignored his cries. With no one coming to help, the boy could do nothing to stop the wolf feasting on his flock. Aesop concludes: "There is no believing a liar, even when he speaks the truth."

Thinking of this fable today, one cannot help but wonder: Did Iran attack the Japanese tanker Kokuka Courageous with limpet mines - as the United States claims it did on June 13? Does the video the US army produced indeed prove the accusation?

The US, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom say it does, Iran says it does not, and others have expressed doubts. So, who is telling the truth? Iran or the US and its allies? And why does it matter?

The urgency of these questions is now a matter of war and peace, of life or death. After that accusation, the potential military confrontation between the US and Iran has increased exponentially. On June 20, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced that it had shot down a US RQ-4A Global Hawk surveillance drone that it said had violated its airspace. US Central Command confirmed the drone was shot down by Iranian surface-to-air missiles but denied that it had violated Iranian airspace.

President Donald Trump called the downing of the drone a "big mistake", and then ordered a military attack on Iran only to reportedly change his mind and cancel it. There would have been approximately 150 Iranian casualties, Trump said, and that would have been "disproportionate".

As the US and Iran inch ever closer to a military confrontation, the question the world faces at large is who to trust, what to believe, where to place our critical judgement?

An average of 12 lies a day

As of June 10, by Washington Post's estimates, "President Trump has made 10,796 false or misleading claims over 869 days." That is probably a dictionary definition of a congenital liar. The newspaper further states: "The president crossed the 10,000 thresholds on April 26, and he has been averaging about 16 fishy claims a day since then. From the start of his presidency, he has averaged about 12 such claims a day."

In this context, it would be a mistake to judge the particulars of politics with the proverbial "Sunday School" sense of morality that is farthest removed from the abiding concerns of those who habitually lie. States, particularly the most powerful states, lie and these lies are for the best interests of the ruling elites in charge of those states.

From Vietnam to Iraq, the US has systematically and consistently lied to advance its own warmongering objectives. But the US is not the only state that lies habitually.

Right now, the interests of the US, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel all coalesce around targeting Iran and dismantling its share of regional power. Each one of these forces has its own internal reasons to wish Iran harm.

They, therefore, manufacture lies, exaggerate facts, take a smidgeon of truth and weave a long tale around it, all to turn Iran into a demon, the way they did with Iraq and Afghanistan in the past.

The US media is complicit in this charade. The Washington Post and the New York Times have stopped counting the lies Trump tells when it comes to the war with Iran.

The first casualty of war they say is the truth. That means all wars begin with a lie. Is the explosion of this Japanese tanker in the Gulf of Oman the lie that will result in yet another calamitous war in the region?

Today the fragile being of more than 80 million people is at the mercy of that piece of news for which John Bolton and Mike Pompeo have been gunning most of their political careers.

THE REGIME OF DECEPTION

The regime of deception now code-named "post-truth" or "alternative facts" is predicated on what the French philosopher Guy Debord called "the society of the spectacle", where an image has assumed a reality of its own and it no longer matters what it actually means.

We see a ship burning and we read the story that the US imperial narrative ascribes to it and its media regurgitates. What actually caused that fire and what proof there is for the claim are all entirely irrelevant questions.

Three sources tell us Iran did it: the US, Saudi Arabia, and the UK. They all might be what we think them to be - habitual liars - but they might still be telling the truth that Iran did actually blow a hole in that ship. The problem is, as wise Aesop points out, "there is no believing a liar, even when he speaks the truth."

Let us take them one at a time. The US launched a massive military attack against Iraq and wreaked havoc in the region, all based on a blatant lie that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction - a lie that the Bush administration staged and the New York Times consistently collaborated. Under the current administration that habitual tendency of states to lie has been exacerbated by a man who has a very casual relationship with the truth.

What about the UK? They also say the Iranians did it. They may very well be telling the truth. But we know for a fact that the British have a long colonial proclivity to tell lies to suit their interests. One such sustained course of lies was directed against democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh during the CIA-MI6 military coup of 1953 staged against him. The BBC was integral in spreading fake news at the time.

Well, that is the past, you might say, today the UK is certainly the paragon of truth and justice. Indeed it might be, except that it recently chose to turn its back on the truth: "The UK refuses to back UN inquiry into Saudi 'war crimes' amid fears it will damage trade Britain's Middle East and North Africa minister Alistair Burt argued that the Saudi-led coalition itself should investigate any atrocities it committed in its conflict against rebel forces in Yemen."

Can we really trust a treacherous regime that has an equally causal relationship with truth and can turn a blind eye to facts when it suits its purposes?

What about Saudi Arabia, which too has claimed Iranians did it. Certainly, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) could be a trustworthy source - except, he and his backers have repeatedly lied to the public in the face of facts about the tragic fate of slain Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. The same Saudi prince - a favourite of New York Times columnists and President Trump's Zionist son-in-law - is chiefly responsible for a genocide in Yemen in which "85,000 children have died from starvation".

None of this is to exempt Iran from being part and parcel of the selfsame scene and engaging in its own game of lies. Despite the death toll in Syria surpassing half a million, it has continued to fabricate a story about supporting a "legitimate government", while Bashar al-Assad has continued in a sustained course of murderous mayhem. Indeed, the Iranian authorities may very well have planted that mine in the Japanese tanker.

The issue we face is not the guilt or innocence of any party involved, but, instead, the complete collapse of any moral authority standing on the side of truth.

Nietzsche famously said: "Truths are illusions of which we have forgotten that they are illusions, metaphors which have become worn by frequent use and have lost all sensuous vigour."

In the Gulf of Oman, the truth has dived into the lowest depths of the sea in search of new, more convincing, metaphors.

SOURCE: AL JAZEERA

Hamid Dabashi

The Secret of the Seven Sisters

On August 28, 1928, in the Scottish highlands, began the secret story of oil.

Three men had an appointment at Achnacarry Castle - a Dutchman, an American and an Englishman.

The Dutchman was Henry Deterding, a man nicknamed the Napoleon of Oil, having exploited a find in Sumatra. He joined forces with a rich ship owner and painted Shell salesman and together the two men founded Royal Dutch Shell.

The American was Walter C. Teagle and he represents the Standard Oil Company, founded by John D. Rockefeller at the age of 31 - the future Exxon. Oil wells, transport, refining and distribution of oil - everything is controlled by Standard oil.

The Englishman, Sir John Cadman, was the director of the Anglo-Persian oil Company, soon to become BP. On the initiative of a young Winston Churchill, the British government had taken a stake in BP and the Royal Navy switched its fuel from coal to oil. With fuel-hungry ships, planes and tanks, oil became "the blood of every battle".

The new automobile industry was developing fast, and the Ford T was selling by the million. The world was thirsty for oil, and companies were waging a merciless contest but the competition was making the market unstable.

That August night, the three men decided to stop fighting and to start sharing out the world's oil. Their vision was that production zones, transport costs, sales prices - everything would be agreed and shared. And so began a great cartel, whose purpose was to dominate the world, by controlling its oil.

Four others soon joined them, and they came to be known as the Seven Sisters - the biggest oil companies in the world.

EPISODE 1: DESERT STORMS

In the first episode, we travel across the Middle East, through both time and space.

We waged the Iran-Iraq war and I say we waged it, because one country had to be used to destroy the other.
- Xavier Houzel, an oil trader

Since that notorious meeting at Achnacarry Castle on August 28, 1928, they have never ceased to plot, to plan and to scheme.

Throughout the region's modern history, since the discovery of oil, the Seven Sisters have sought to control the balance of power.

They have supported monarchies in Iran and Saudi Arabia, opposed the creation of OPEC, profiting from the Iran-Iraq war, leading to the ultimate destruction of Saddam Hussein and Iraq.

The Seven Sisters were always present, and almost always came out on top.

EPISODE 2: THE BLACK EL DORADO

At the end of the 1960s, the Seven Sisters, the major oil companies, controlled 85 percent of the world's oil reserves. Today, they control just 10 percent.

New hunting grounds are therefore required, and the Sisters have turned their gaze towards Africa. With peak oil, wars in the Middle East, and the rise in crude prices, Africa is the oil companies' new battleground.

Everybody thought there could be oil in Sudan but nobody knew anything. It was revealed through exploration by the American company Chevron, towards the end of the 70s. And that was the beginning of the second civil war, which went on until 2002. It lasted for 19 years and cost a million and a half lives and the oil business was at the heart of it.

- Gerard Prunier, a historian

But the real story, the secret story of oil, begins far from Africa.

In their bid to dominate Africa, the Sisters installed a king in Libya, a dictator in Gabon, fought the nationalisation of oil resources in Algeria, and through corruption, war and assassinations, brought Nigeria to its knees.

Oil may be flowing into the holds of huge tankers, but in Lagos, petrol shortages are chronic.

The country's four refineries are obsolete and the continent's main oil exporter is forced to import refined petrol - a paradox that reaps fortunes for a handful of oil companies.

Encouraged by the companies, corruption has become a system of government - some $50bn are estimated to have 'disappeared' out of the $350bn received since independence.

But new players have now joined the great oil game.

China, with its growing appetite for energy, has found new friends in Sudan, and the Chinese builders have moved in. Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir is proud of his co-operation with China - a dam on the Nile, roads, and stadiums.

In order to export 500,000 barrels of oil a day from the oil fields in the South - China financed and built the Heglig pipeline connected to Port Sudan - now South Sudan's precious oil is shipped through North Sudan to Chinese ports.

In a bid to secure oil supplies out of Libya, the US, the UK and the Seven Sisters made peace with the once shunned Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, until he was killed during the Libyan uprising of 2011, but the flow of Libyan oil remains uninterrupted.

In need of funds for rebuilding, Libya is now back to pumping more than a million barrels of oil per day. And the Sisters are happy to oblige.

EPISODE 3: THE DANCING BEAR

In the Caucasus, the US and Russia are vying for control of the region. The great oil game is in full swing. Whoever controls the Caucasus and its roads, controls the transport of oil from the Caspian Sea.

Tbilisi, Erevan and Baku - the three capitals of the Caucasus. The oil from Baku in Azerbaijan is a strategic priority
for all the major companies.

From the fortunes of the Nobel family to the Russian revolution, to World War II, oil from the Caucasus and the Caspian has played a central role. Lenin fixated on conquering the Azeri capital Baku for its oil, as did Stalin and Hitler.

On his birthday in 1941, Adolf Hitler received a chocolate and cream birthday cake, representing a map. He chose the slice with Baku on it.

On June 22nd 1941, the armies of the Third Reich invaded Russia. The crucial battle of Stalingrad was the key to the road to the Caucasus and Baku’s oil, and would decide the outcome of the war.

Stalin told his troops: "Fighting for one’s oil is fighting for one’s freedom."

After World War II, President Nikita Krushchev would build the Soviet empire and its Red Army with revenues from the USSR’s new-found oil reserves.

Decades later, oil would bring that empire to its knees, when Saudi Arabia and the US would conspire to open up the oil taps, flood the markets, and bring the price of oil down to $13 per barrel. Russian oligarchs would take up the oil mantle, only to be put in their place by their president, Vladimir Putin, who knows that oil is power.

The US and Putin‘s Russia would prop up despots, and exploit regional conflicts to maintain a grip on the oil fields of the Caucusus and the Caspian.

But they would not have counted on the rise of a new, strong and hungry China, with an almost limitless appetite for oil and energy. Today, the US, Russia and China contest the control of the former USSR’s fossil fuel reserves, and the supply routes. A three-handed match, with the world as spectators, between three ferocious beasts – The American eagle, the Russian bear, and the Chinese dragon.

EPISODE 4: A TIME FOR LIES

Peak oil – the point in time at which the highest rate of oil extraction has been reached, and after which world production will start decline. Many geologists and the International Energy Agency say the world's crude oil output reached its peak in 2006.

But while there may be less oil coming out of the ground, the demand for it is definitely on the rise.

The final episode of this series explores what happens when oil becomes more and more inaccessible, while at the same time, new powers like China and India try to fulfill their growing energy needs.

And countries like Iran, while suffering international sanctions, have welcomed these new oil buyers, who put business ahead of lectures on human rights and nuclear ambitions.

At the same time, oil-producing countries have had enough with the Seven Sisters controlling their oil assets. Nationalisation of oil reserves around the world has ushered in a new generation of oil companies all vying for a slice of the oil pie.

These are the new Seven Sisters:

Saudi Arabia's Saudi Aramco, the largest and most sophisticated oil company in the world; Russia's Gazprom, a company that Russia's President Vladimir Putin wrested away from the oligarchs; The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which, along with its subsidiary, Petrochina, is the world's secnd largest company in terms of market value; The National Iranian Oil Company, which has a monopoly on exploration, extraction, transportation and exportation of crude oil in Iran – OPEC's second largest oil producer after Saudi Arabia; Venezuela's PDVSA, a company the late president Hugo Chavez dismantled and rebuilt into his country's economic engine and part of his diplomatic arsenal; Brazil's Petrobras, a leader in deep water oil production, that pumps out 2 million barrels of crude oil a day; and Malaysia's Petronas - Asia's most profitable company in 2012.

Mainly state-owned, the new Seven Sisters control a third of the world's oil and gas production, and more than a third of the world's reserves. The old Seven Sisters, by comparison, produce a tenth of the world's oil, and control only three percent of the reserves.

The balance has shifted.

Source: Al Jazeera

Iran confirms military stationed in Syria

Iran has confirmed for the first time that forces from its revolutionary guards corps are in Syria helping Assad's government crush the rebellion. It warned it would get involved militarily if its Arab ally came under attack.

In a clear public signal of Tehran's continuing support for President Bashar al-Assad, the commander of the Islamic republic's elite military formation said that "a number" of members of the IRGC's Qods force were in Syria, though General Mohammad Ali Jafari gave no further details and claimed this did not constitute "a military presence".

It was a surprisingly candid response to persistent claims by western countries, the Syrian opposition and Israel that Iran is actively helping the regime fight its enemies in the 18th month of a bloody war.

Lakhdar Brahimi, the veteran Algerian diplomat who replaced Kofi Annan as UN envoy to Syria earlier this month, met Assad in Damascus on Saturday but warned afterwards that any progress would be slow and halting given the yawning gap between government and opposition.

"The crisis is dangerous and getting worse and it is a threat to the Syrian people, the region and the world," said Brahimi.

Reports from Syria on Sunday described government forces fighting rebels amid shelling and sniper fire in Damascus and Aleppo, as well as in Homs and Deir ez-Zor. The Local Coordination Committees, an activist network, reported 103 dead.

Enmeshed in rivalries

Opposition activists reported 115 people killed on Saturday. According to the UN some 20 000 people have been killed. Opposition sources say the figure is closer to 30 000.

Jafari's admission underlines the way in which the Syrian uprising has become enmeshed in regional and international rivalries.

Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey are arming Syrian rebel groups, while the US, Britain and France have called for Assad to go but are offering only limited and non-lethal backing to the armed opposition.

Russia and China have repeatedly blocked action against Syria at the UN.

The Qods force includes elements of special forces, intelligence-gathering and aid, and answers to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It has been accused of planning attacks inside Iraq since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Jafari said the IRGC was providing "intellectual and advisory help" to Syria.

British officials say the IRGC has provided riot control equipment and technical advice on how to crush dissent, for example on how to flood areas with security forces.

Intelligence-gathering

Iran is also providing support to improve the Syrian regime's intelligence-gathering capabilities and help to monitor protesters' use of the internet and mobile phone network, including text messaging.

Iran is said to have been dismayed at the heavy-handed way its long-standing Arab ally responded when the unrest began in March 2011, contrasting it with its relatively more sophisticated response to protests that followed its own disputed presidential election in 2009.

"If Syria came under military attack, Iran would also give military support but it ... totally depends on the circumstances," AFP reported Jafari as saying at rare press conference in Tehran.

The general also said the Strait of Hormuz, the channel at the mouth of the Gulf through which a third of the world's traded oil passes, would be a legitimate target for Iran should it be attacked.

"If war occurs in the region and the Islamic republic is involved, it is natural that the Strait of Hormuz as well as the energy [market] will face difficulties.

"The US has many vulnerabilities around Iran, and its bases are within the range of the guards' missiles. We have other capabilities as well, particularly when it comes to the support of Muslims for the Islamic republic," he said.

Tolerated

In Damascus, Brahimi also met Syrian opposition figures who are still tolerated by the regime.

"We told Mr Brahimi ... of our support for his efforts to resolve the crisis by ending the violence and killings, providing medical care and releasing political prisoners," said Hassan Abdel Azim, spokesperson for the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change.

But the head of the Free Syrian Army's military council in Aleppo, Colonel Abdel Jabar al-Oqaidi, predicted that the envoy's mission would fail, like Annan's, because he had nothing to offer people who were fighting for their freedom, al-Arabiya TV reported.

Syria's state news agency Sana quoted Assad as telling Brahimi that the success of his mission hinged on "pressuring countries which finance and train the terrorists, and which traffic weapons to Syria, to stop these actions".

In Istanbul, Tariq al-Hashimi, the fugitive Iraqi vice-president, said in interview that the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki was failing to stop ammunitions and armaments reaching Syrian government forces.

"My country is unfortunately becoming an Iranian corridor to support the autocratic regime of Bashar al-Assad," he said. "There is no doubt about that."

Source: Mail & Guardian

Mursi wants Egypt at centre of Arab affairs, urges end to Syrian government

Egypt's president on Wednesday promised to put Cairo back at the heart of Arab affairs and made an impassioned appeal to Arab states to work to end the bloodshed in Syria, saying the time had come to change the Syrian government. By Yasmine Saleh and Ayman Samir.

Mohamed Mursi, making his first presidential address to the Arab League in Cairo, told Arab foreign ministers that Egypt and its people would "return to occupy their natural place at the heart of the Arab nation". Mursi, elected in June after last year's popular uprising forced Hosni Mubarak from power after three decades, said the time had come in Syria for "change and not wasting time speaking of reform. This time has passed now. Now it is time for change".

"The Syrian regime must take into account the lessons of recent and ancient history," he said in the speech in which he also talked of the revolt in Egypt.

Mursi also said a quartet of states - Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and Egypt - would meet to discuss the Syrian crisis.

"The quartet which Egypt has called for will meet now," he said, without giving details.

An Egyptian delegate said the president's comments meant the four states were talking about what action could be taken but the formal formation of the quartet was still under discussion. He said no date had been set for its representatives to meet.

Tehran has backed Syria's government but the three other states want President Bashar al-Assad to stand down.

Analysts said the group was unlikely to agree on how to handle the crisis but said the initiative was a sign of how determined the newly elected president was to put Egypt back at the centre of regional politics.

FRESH APPEAL

As Mursi was leaving the podium, the Islamist president briefly returned to the microphone to say: "Syria, Syria, this is the arena to do something", pointing to the ministers below him, and then again saying "Syria" before stepping away.

It was the second such appeal for action in a week by Mursi. At the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Iran on Aug. 30, Mursi referred to Tehran's ally as an "oppressive regime" and said it was an "ethical duty" to back rebels.

More than 20,000 people have been killed in Syria since initially peaceful protests against Assad erupted in March 2011. Tens of thousands more have fled across its borders to neighbouring states to escape the violence. Nasser al-Kidwa, deputy to Lakhdar Brahimi, the United Nations-Arab League mediator on Syria, arrived in Cairo on Wednesday to join the talks with Arab ministers. Brahimi, who is expected to visit Cairo on Sunday, has described his bid to broker peace as "nearly impossible" but Kidwa told reporters at Cairo airport that "we have not lost hope" despite the difficulties facing the mission.

According to a draft of the resolutions obtained by Reuters and approved on Wednesday, ministers called on the Arab League chief and its special committee on Syria to follow up with the U.N. secretary-general to outline a "new vision" for Brahimi.

The draft also called for Nilesat and Arabsat, two regionally owned satellite firms, to stop broadcasts of Syrian state and private channels. Broadcasts of the three Syrian channels on Nilesat stopped before the draft was approved, with a Nilesat source citing unspecified contract violations.

Abdelbasset Sida, head of the Syrian National Council (SNC) opposition alliance, told Reuters he was disappointed by the resolutions, saying Arabs should work more closely with Europeans opposed to Assad's rule and put more presure on Syria's ally Russia.

He said Arabs should back "using all means including force against the Syrian regime to reach that end". DM

Source: Daily Maverick

Analysis: Syria - three wars for the price of one

If you think the war in Syria is hard to follow, that’s because there’s actually three of them—at least. Distinct but interconnected, the competing web of allegiances and motivations puts al-Qaeda on the same side as the USA and makes a solution impossible. By SIMON ALLISON.

Many people, like this reporter, find the Syrian war confusing sometimes. It throws up all kind of strange and unnatural contradictions, like America appearing to be on the same side as al-Qaeda-linked jihadists and Al-Jazeera turning into a typical, propaganda-spouting state media house. No doubt policy-makers also find it difficult to understand. It’s been nearly two years and there’s still no sensible international policy on Syria, just a steady stream of ad-hoc condemnations and hamstrung mediations.

There’s a simple reason for all this confusion and complexity: it’s a very, very complicated situation. Even worse, there’s not just one war being fought in Syria, but at least three and possibly even more.
War number one is the one we’re all familiar with (especially if we’ve been watching too much Al-Jazeera). This is your typical Arab Spring narrative, pitting a downtrodden civilian population against the brutal regime that has repressed its people for so long. It’s a simple tale of good-versus-evil, of democracy taking on dictatorship, of the people sticking it to the man. We’ve seen variations of the theme in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, all of which ended with the people hurling off the yoke of dictatorship and replacing it with a new, enlightened, freely-elected government (oh, wait; it hasn’t quite ended like that in any of these countries, but let’s not spoil a good story with the facts).

Elements of this story are true in Syria. Certainly, the regime was brutal and autocratic, happy to stifle political freedoms and concentrate wealth and power in the hands of a very few, mostly of the Alawite ethnic minority. In fact, the Syrian security forces had such a world-class reputation for torture that they were, on occasion, prevailed upon by American intelligence to practise their craft on detainees as part America’s extraordinary rendition program.

There was popular dissent, too. Not much of it initially, but it grew in size and voice in the wake of the uprisings in other Arab countries. Whether or not the anti-Assad movement was really a majority will be argued over endlessly in years to come, but it is important to recognise that just as there was a large anti-Assad sentiment, so there was a significant chunk of the population that was happy with the status quo; autocracies are stable and peaceful, after all, unlike revolutions and civil wars.

War number two is not really about Syria at all. Instead, it’s about Middle Eastern and global geopolitics, and it’s very messy. In one corner is the Syrian Alawite regime and Iran, who are natural allies. The Alawites are a sect of Shi’a Islam, while Iran is an explicitly Shi’a state (as opposed to Sunni Islam, the other main branch of the religion). Russia finds itself in this camp too, desperate to protect its vital naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus—its only reliable warm water port. So too does China, which sees no reason to put its excellent trading relationship with Syria in jeopardy.

Ranged against this formidable combination is a regional alliance of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, all of which would love to see Bashar al-Assad replaced with a more compliant Sunni leader. All have designs on regional leadership, and in Syria they find common cause. Turkey was one of the first countries to express support for the Syrian rebels, while both Qatar and Saudi Arabia have helped to fund and arm them. Qatar has also been accused – with some justification – of using its hugely influential satellite TV channel, Al-Jazeera (specifically the Arabic version) to influence public opinion by portraying a one-sided version of events.

Lurking behind this regional triumvirate is the United States and the Western world, their foreign policy distorted, as usual, by their Iranian paranoia. Robert Fisk, doyen of Middle East correspondents, summed up their approach in the Independent: “This is an attempt to crush the Syrian dictatorship not because of our love for Syrians or our hatred of our former friend Bashar al-Assad, or because of our outrage at Russia, whose place in the pantheon of hypocrites is clear when we watch its reaction to all the little Stalingrads across Syria. No, this is all about Iran and our desire to crush the Islamic Republic and its infernal nuclear plans—if they exist—and has nothing to do with human rights or the right to life or the death of Syrian babies.”

Syria, in other words, is a proxy war; a relatively safe place (for everyone else, not for Syria) to fight the battles that can’t yet be fought in the open.

But it doesn’t end there. There’s a third war happening. This one pits the nominally Shi’a (though relatively secular) Syrian state against the global Sunni jihadist movement (known to Americans as “terrorists”). A flood of reports recently have explained how fighters from all over the Arab world, many of them battle-hardened in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq, have come to the support of the Syrian rebels.

This from Ed Husain in the National Review is typical: “Our collective excitement at the possibility that the Assad regime will be destroyed, and the Iranian ayatollahs weakened in the process, is blurring our vision and preventing us from seeing the rise of al-Qaeda in Syria. In March of this year, jihadis mounted seven attacks against Assad. By June, they had led 66 “operations”, and over half of these were on Syria’s capital, Damascus. The Syrian opposition is benefiting hugely from the terrorist organization’s determination, discipline, combat experience, religious fervour, and ability to strike the Assad regime where it hurts most.”

The War on Terror has reached Syria and somehow, America and al-Qaeda find themselves fighting on the same side. No wonder no one seems to know what’s really going on.

Nor does anyone know how to stop it. With all these tangled conflicts and competing interests and motivations, figuring out a solution seems like an impossible task. Which, so far, is exactly what it’s proven to be. DM

Source: Daily Maverick

British bank HSBC in money laundering probe

US prosecutors probing whether HSBC was involved in laundering money for Mexican drug cartels and moving cash for Saudi banks tied to terrorists. The New York Times reported Saturday.

Citing unnamed federal authorities with direct knowledge of the investigations, the newspaper said the investigators were also probing whether HSBC circumvented US law by transferring money through its American subsidiary for sanctioned nations, including Iran, Sudan and North Korea.

Last month, HSBC announced that its Mexico unit had paid a fine totalling $27.5-million to Mexico's banking regulators for breaching anti-money laundering controls.

Earlier, HSBC apologised and a senior executive resigned after US lawmakers accused Europe's biggest bank of giving Iran, terrorists and drug dealers access to America's financial system. In a 330-page report, the US Senate found the lender allowed affiliates in countries such as Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh to move billions of dollars in suspect funds into the United States without adequate controls. The report said HSBC's Mexican affiliate "transported $7.0 billion in physical US dollars to HBUS from 2007 to 2008… raising red flags that the volume of dollars included proceeds from illegal drug sales in the United States." According to The Times, eager to resolve the investigation, HSBC reached out to federal prosecutors in July in hopes of securing a settlement by September.

But officials said a settlement in the next couple of weeks was highly unlikely, the paper pointed out. – Sapa-AFP

Source: Mail & Guardian

It's Time to Engage Iran, Russia on Syria

The battle for Syria is best understood as the epicenter and early stages of a regional sectarian conflict, rather than the last days of President Bashar al-Assad.

The civil war in Syria should give pause to those who are fixated on a timeline for Assad's fall. The Syrian president has taken some hits in the past week but has settled in for a no-holds-barred fight to hold onto power. Absent a substantial military intervention by the US or others, the military balance remains with Assad, including in Aleppo, where anti-regime militias have made a major push to seize control. The security officials named to replace those killed last week are familiar hard liners and Assad loyalists. Assad's forces appear to have beaten back the rebels in Damascus. Syrian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Jihad Makdissi acknowledged Syria's possession of chemical weapons this week, described by experts as "probably the largest and most advanced" program in the Arab world, adding that that they will not be used "unless Syria is exposed to external aggression." This threat earned a rebuke from Russia but signaled that Assad has no plans to abdicate.

Another reason reports of Assad's demise may be premature is because of the regional power struggle that is playing out in Syria. The US has until now subcontracted the armed insurgency to the patronage of Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Many in the Gulf Cooperation Council states consider Syria a sectarian battlefield to check Iranian and Shiite power and influence. Assad is an Alawite, a sect of Shiism, as well as a key ally of Iran. Alawites represents approximately 12%, or 2.6 million, of Syria's 22 million people. The so-called Shia arc of Iranian influence also includes Lebanon, which is dominated by Hezbollah, and Iraq. Iran is not likely to give up the fight with the stakes so high. Assad also has a backer in Russia, which is unwilling for now to cede its influence in Syria. Moscow may believe that the worse things get, the more its influence grows, as only it holds the key to negotiations with the Syrian government.

The implications of Syria for Iraq cannot be understated. The New York Times reports today (July 25) that "The presence of jihadists in Syria has accelerated in recent days, in part because of a convergence with the sectarian tensions across the country's long border in Iraq." Iraq, which endured a brutal sectarian civil war after Saddam Hussein was deposed by US forces in 2003, has suffered a resurgence of terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda-linked Sunni extremists with both ideological and operational ties to a growing jihadist presence in Syria. The civil war in Syria also has consequences for Lebanon, which has already seen violence at its borders, as well as Turkey, Jordan and Israel.

The Obama Administration should be mindful of steps that might accentuate, rather than resolve, the Syrian civil war and its regional consequences. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said yesterday, July 24, that "we have to work closely with the opposition because more and more territory is being taken, and it will eventually result in a safe haven inside Syria, which will then provide a base for further actions by the opposition."

The introduction of safe havens would open a new chapter in the Syrian conflict. On the one hand, safe havens would provide a base for humanitarian and refugee assistance, as well as for opposition activities. But there is a catch. Safe havens can also prolong rather than end the violence, creating a de facto partition and potentially increasing the prospects of the division or collapse of the state. A safe haven can also be a catalyst for mission creep, an enticement for further military intervention by the US and others, and facilitate an increase in the presence of foreign fighters, including terrorists.

If the US seeks to prevent Syria's collapse, reduce the prospects for further bloodshed and facilitate as stable a transition as possible, then Washington needs to open an urgent new diplomatic front with Russia and Iran, the two countries which retain the most leverage with Assad.

Only Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin has the clout with Assad to initiate a conversation about a transition. The US is frustrated that Russia has thwarted initiatives at the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Syria. The sanctions effort at the Security Council, it should be said, has mostly been a waste of American diplomatic energy and capital because of Russia's position and because of the likely ineffectiveness of these sanctions on Assad, who is preoccupied with crushing the insurgency.

Iran has offered to be part of international discussions on Syria, but this has so far been nixed by the United States. Washington may, like its Gulf allies, see Iran as on defense because of the pressure of international sanctions and the conflict in Syria, and therefore want to keep Iran on the defense. While Iran may be down, it is far from out, especially in Syria and given the stalled nuclear negotiations. Better to have Iran engaged in Syria through diplomacy than via subterfuge and proxies, such as Hezbollah.

The US has no easy options or answers in Syria. It begins with do no harm. As Syria's civil war is inseparable from the broader regional conflict, the US must have its own strategy that assures that Syria does not deteriorate and go the way of 2003 Iraq, and in the process take Iraq of 2012 and others along with it.

Source: IISS

Yemen’s Unfinished Revolution

AFTER more than five months of continuous protests, I stand today in Change Square with thousands of young people united by a lofty dream. I have spent days and nights camped out in tents with fellow protesters; I have led demonstrations in the streets facing the threat of mortars, missiles and gunfire; I have struggled to build a movement for democratic change — all while caring for my three young children.

We have reached this historic moment because we chose to march in the streets demanding the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, an end to his corrupt and failed regime and the establishment of a modern democratic state. On June 4, our wish for Mr. Saleh’s departure was granted, but our demand for democracy remains unfulfilled. Following months of peaceful protests that reached every village, neighborhood and street, Yemen is now facing a complete vacuum of authority; we are without a president or parliament. Mr. Saleh may be gone, but authority has not yet been transferred to a transitional presidential council endorsed by the people. This is because the United States and Saudi Arabia, which have the power to ensure a peaceful transition to democracy in Yemen, have instead used their influence to ensure that members of the old regime remain in power and the status quo is maintained. American counterterrorism agencies and the Saudi government have a firm grip on Yemen at the moment. It is they, not the Yemeni people and their constitutional institutions, that control the country.

American intervention in Yemen is a product of the war on terror. In exchange for military and intelligence partnerships established after the bombing of the American destroyer Cole in 2000, the United States provided the Saleh regime with increased economic aid and military assistance. Because American security was given priority over all other concerns, counterterrorism agencies paid no attention to the human rights abuses being committed by their local partners. Indeed, American officials chose as local partners the Central Security Forces, the National Security Agency and the Republican Guard, all of which are controlled by Mr. Saleh’s sons and nephews. As a result of their partnership with United States counterterrorism agencies, these organizations received generous American financing as well as guidance and technical assistance. Because America has invested so heavily in Yemen’s security forces, it now seems that a transition to democracy will depend on whether Washington believes that investment will remain secure. The establishment of a new government will therefore be contingent on American officials’ approving the country’s new leaders. Sadly, it seems likely that the United States will support figures from the old regime rather than allow a transitional government approved by the people to take control of Yemen. This would be a grave mistake.

American policy makers must understand that the activists and young people who started Yemen’s peaceful revolution deeply respect the United States and Western civilization. Indeed, it was in Washington and other capitals throughout the free world that many of these activists learned the peaceful methods they employed during our revolution. We call on American officials to engage with the leaders of Yemen’s democracy movement and abandon their misplaced investment in the old regime’s security apparatus, which has killed more innocent women and children than terrorists. We understand America’s concerns about terrorism and recognize your right to attack terrorist sanctuaries. We have no objection to agreements that protect your security interests. We only ask that you respect international standards on human rights and the Yemeni people’s rights to freedom and justice.

On behalf of many of the young people involved in Yemen’s revolution, I assure the American people that we are ready to engage in a true partnership. Together, we can eliminate the causes of extremism and the culture of terrorism by bolstering civil society and encouraging development and stability. We also call upon our Saudi neighbors to let us pursue a democratic path. For 50 years, the Saudi government has provided a special committee of its ministers with an enormous annual budget to intervene in Yemeni affairs. Over the years, this committee has consistently meddled in Yemen’s domestic politics and exerted considerable influence over the country’s development. In many cases, Yemeni tribal leaders and other prominent individuals have received far more generous aid payments from Riyadh than from the Yemeni government.

Saudi interference in Yemen is also motivated by a fear that the Arab Spring, which spread from Tunis and Cairo to Sana, might soon reach Riyadh. But the fear that our revolution will cross the border is unfounded. This is an information age revolution; it spreads through Facebook, Twitter and other social media, which are not subject to political boundaries. We ask our neighbors in Saudi Arabia to stop hindering the rule of law and healthy economic development through the purchase of politicians and tribal leaders. We also call on the Saudi government to stop pursuing policies that undermine the people’s desire for democratic change. Saudi initiatives that aim to remove the president while keeping the old regime and its security apparatus intact risk unleashing a civil war, which would no doubt have dire consequences for Saudi Arabia as well as for Yemen.

The young people of this revolution have made their demands clear: authority must be handed over to a transitional presidential council approved by the people. This council will manage the country until a constitutional referendum and elections can be held. And the government’s security forces must never again be used to serve the personal agendas of government officials or to establish a monopoly on power.

Yemen’s people have charted the course of revolution and we will follow this course to its end. We have left our authoritarian past behind. Now, we ask our friends in Washington and Riyadh to help us build a democratic future.

Source: New York Times

Tension rising in Middle East: Could Israel attack Iran and why?

On August 21 the Bushehr nuclear power plant was officially launched. This marked a new stage in Iran's disputed nuclear programme. In the days preceding this event, former US ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, was quoted around the world as saying: "Israel has days to strike Bushehr" and further "diplomatically" hinted, “If Israel was right to destroy the Osiraq reactor [Iraqi nuclear reactor bombed by Israel in 1981], is it right to allow this one to continue? You can’t have it both ways.”

Shortly after American/Israeli Jeffry Goldberg – one of the most influential journalists on matters of Israel – wrote an article in The Atlantic called "The Point of No Return". In his article he also highlights the unavailability of an Israeli strike against Iran.

Amidst the so called Middle-East "peace negotiations" – a pathetic and hopeless attempt to divide the Palestinian territories between different rulers and their stooges – tension is rising in the Middle East. We are living in a period of great instability on a global level. In the Middle East this is especially reflected in the inability of US imperialism to be able to control the situation.

Out of this crisis Iran is presently emerging as a more powerful player in the Middle East. At the same time Israel is feeling pressure both strategically in the region but also to an increasing degree from its masses who have started to become numb to the hysterical military propaganda. Contradictions are building up in the Middle East and sooner or later they will have to be solved in one way or another. One thing is clear, the turbulence and instability seen hitherto is nothing compared with what is being prepared for the future.

Destruction of "equilibrium" in the Middle East

In 2003 US president George Bush started the war in Iraq. A hopelessly short-sighted adventure, that was supposed to put an end to “terrorism”, “restore democracy” and consolidate and manifest the domination of US imperialism in the region and globally. Instead, what the war in Iraq managed was to further destabilise the whole region bringing with it nothing but further misery for the downtrodden masses. The US army immediately revealed itself to be nothing but an occupation force, swiftly alienating the mass of the population. At the same time the offensive displayed the limits of US imperialism.

The War in Iraq could never have been won. Simply to maintain a most fragile “stability” the Americans needed the help of Iran and Syria who have considerable influence in the country. At the same time the once powerful Iraqi military apparatus, the only counterweight to the Iranian army, has been completely shattered.

With the dismantling of Saddam’s army, a vacuum was opened not only within Iraq itself but in the whole of the Middle East. In 2006 the 1.5m-strong armed forces of Iran were described, by General John Abizaid, chief of the US Central Command, to be "the most powerful military force in the region, except for the United States of America, [and Israel]". This situation poses a serious imbalance of forces in the Middle East, an imbalance that is acquiring a logic of its own.

But now Iraq itself is beyond its control. Huge sectarian rifts have opened up and are widening. The withdrawal of US combat forces in August has further increased this instability, but the US did not have any other options. The presence of US forces in Iraq was draining the US treasury of more than 2 billion dollars a week. In a crisis situation with millions losing their jobs in the US, this drain enormously increased the general alienation of US workers and youth to the war. There was no way any government could endure such an immense drain of resources for so long, neither from a political nor an economic point of view. (However, although “combat forces” have been withdrawn, some 50,000 US troops still remain in Iraq and are planned to stay until the end of 2011 to “advise” Iraqi forces and “protect” US interests.)

But to withdraw fully the US needs the cooperation of Iran (and Syria) who control important militia forces in Iraq and who through these could cause great chaos and instability. On top of this Iran has also displayed several times how it could even use regular Iranian ground forces to intervene in Iraq. Last December Iranian troops temporarily occupied well No 4 at the al Fakkah oil field, about 320km south-east of Baghdad. Although the troops withdrew shortly after the occupation – they only withdrew from the well, but remain on official Iraqi soil to this day – they met no resistance either from US or Iraqi troops. Also in the north there have been several incidents of Iranian troops moving into Iraqi soil ("in chase of terrorists") without Iraqi officials being able to seriously challenge their actions, because through its involvement in Iraqi politics and with its control over important sectarian armed forces Iran could create further chaos and instability. Herein lies the dilemma of the US.

Apart from its influence in Iraq, other factors are also acting as an insurance policy against an attack for Iran. Firstly Iran through the Qods forces of the IRGC controls many groups internationally that could put pressure on the US and its allies through terrorist actions and open warfare. The most important are the Hezbollah forces in Lebanon who control vast areas of that small but strategically important country. They have the capability of striking inside Israel, a close ally of the US and also hitherto a (if not the) dominant force in the Middle East.

Last but not least Iran has a large influence in the Persian Gulf and could, potentially, temporarily block the strait of Hormuz where more than 40% of the world’s crude oil has to pass in order to reach the world markets. Such an action, even for a short period, would have a very negative effect on the world economy that is already in a fragile state. Stratfor – the US-based strategic intelligence institute – claims that even in a best case scenario it would take at least one month to remove such a block. Besides bringing the world economy to its knees, such a block would also be a big threat against all the Gulf states, many of whom have already been severely hurt by the world economic crisis, and who all depend heavily on oil sales.

Before the US invaded Iraq the Iraqi army was acting as a counterweight to Iran and a guarantee against the threats that Iran posed, but now with the disintegration of Iraqi society the counterweight is hard to see.

The nuclear programme

It is in this context that Iran's nuclear programme acquires even more significance. For years Iran have been finalising the first phases of its nuclear facilities. Despite Ahmadinejad’s denials of the fact, it is clear to all that Iran's nuclear programme is not solely for civilian use. It would be probable and wise for the regime not to choose to completely finish this process, but to leave the project at an almost finished stage like in Japan and thus using all the strategic benefits and concessions of nuclear armament without paying the high price of protecting the bomb from hostile elements.

The history of nuclear weapons has shown that, besides allowing their owners to force concessions out of their neighbours, they also drastically complicate an attack on the nations who own them. As well as reducing the chance of other countries meddling and trying to dictate their internal affairs. The fact that the US has not yet been able to challenge the weak and rotten state apparatus in South Korea is partly a proof of this.

Of course, all the US cries against a nuclear Iran are purely hysterical and hypocritical in nature. For years Israel has used the strategic advantages of nuclear weapons to bully many Middle Eastern countries without any complaints from the US. Until now Israel has had the only nuclear arsenal in the region, but if Iran were to change the nuclear balance of forces the whole situation in the Middle East would further tilt to Iran's favour. It would weaken Israeli imperialism and strengthen Iran's position.

In this sense the opening of the Bushehr nuclear reactor on 21 August was a big provocation to Israel (and indirectly to all the countries of the Middle East and the US who is further threatened to lose influence and domination over these.)

Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, and a former CIA man with considerable diplomatic experience, recently put it like this:

“Israel now faces the biggest-ever challenge to its monopoly on the bomb in the Middle East from Iran. For Israel, Tehran is a dangerous opponent, close and threatening. There is a virtually unanimous consensus in Israel that Iran cannot be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons. From left to right, Israelis see an existential threat to their very survival. Current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu argued at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Forum in Jerusalem in 2007 that Iran is a “crazy,” even suicidal, state that will be prepared to sacrifice millions of its own citizens in a nuclear exchange with Israel.

“Though other Israeli leaders are more cautious, even they are strongly determined to keep Israel’s monopoly on nuclear weapons. Ephraim Sneh, former deputy defense minister and a much-decorated retired general in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), notes that ‘the most salient strategic threat to Israel’s existence is Iran.’ They fear Israel’s strategic room for maneuver in the region would be constrained by an Iranian nuclear deterrent. The success of Hezbollah and Hamas in the last few years has only added to Israeli concern. (The National Interest - August 24, 2010)

The Iranian dilemma

It is clear that as far as the general balance of power goes in the Middle East Iran has emerged strengthened. But the Iranian regime is not in full control of this process. The regime is actually forced to be more aggressive in foreign politics as it attempts to regain a social base by diverting the attention of the masses towards an external enemy and thus uniting the many factions within the state.The provocations of Messrs Ahmadinejad and others also flow from a strong necessity.

From Lebanon Hezbollah is always poking at Israel. In early August Lt-Col Harariof of the Israeli army was killed during a small episode of gun-fighting on the border between Lebanon and Israel.

The question of Iran is explosive. At the same time in recent years the Ahmadinejad regime has increasingly tried to spread influence in the Middle East and the African continent. Last year, former parliament speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nori said, that Bahrain was Iran’s 14th province. A statement that displays the ambitions and also the influence of the regime in regard to Bahrain, one of the leading financial centres of the Middle East.

Last year Mr Ahmadinejad visited mainly Christian Kenya, being joyously welcomed in the port of Mombasa, on the Muslim-inhabited coast. He struck a deal to export 4million tonnes of crude oil to Kenya a year, to open direct flights between Tehran and Nairobi, the two capitals, and to grant scholarships for study in Iran. Wherever Iran has embassies it also sets up cultural centres. Iran has also been trying to use its oil to get into Uganda. Zimbabwe’s president, Robert Mugabe, has also been courted, along with sub-Saharan Africa’s diplomatic and economic giant, South Africa. South Africa has been one of Iran’s doughtiest supporters at the UN, abstaining on a resolution to condemn Iran’s human rights violations and arguing against further embargoes and sanctions over Iran’s nuclear plans.

Of course the amount of “aid” that Iran gives Africa – and the amount of influence it consequently has – is still small compared with the sums Americans and Europeans give out, let alone China. But the important fact lies in the constant attacks against the political and economic influence of other countries, including Israel – especially in an economic situation where the markets all over the world have shrunk and where room for economic manoeuvrability is narrowing.

As a side note we should remember that, as a result of Iran’s African activity, Israel has been trying to push its way back into the continent. In September Israel’s foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, made Israel’s first high level mission to Africa for decades, visiting Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda. Countering Iran’s influence was plainly one reason behind the trip.

On top of this there are of course the constant verbal and demagogic attacks of Ahmadinejad against Israel. These acts are indeed seen as a threat by the monstrous military state apparatus of Israeli that has based its legitimacy increasingly on its ability to crush the smallest obstacles with brute military force.

But the question is also as to whether the Ahmadinejad regime has any other choice. The revolutionary situation that opened up last year between the elections and Ashura has destabilised the regime which is now increasingly splitting. Although the splits between the reformists and hardliners are still present, the most important splits at present are opening up within the camp of the hardliners.

There is not one day that goes by without new splits and contradictions surfacing within this faction. The monstrous bureaucratic machine is devouring itself from within with factional infighting and corridor "back-stabbing". There is only one thing that these factions within the faction can agree upon, and that is the need for unity, as any serious crack in the higher echelons may give more room for the mass struggle to develop. But in the current situation a lasting unity within the regime is not possible. At the same time no faction or layer is strong enough to consolidate its power. Centrifugal forces are ripping the whole fabric of the apparatus apart. In this context Ahmadinejad’s demagogic (and hypocritical) so called anti-imperialism is a powerful tool, used to divert the attention of the masses, creating/preserving a social base and pushing for unity within his own ranks. Especially in a situation where war is on the agenda it could become an even more powerful tool.

This situation is also the source of a massive drain of support from key layers that used to back the regime but who are now beginning to move into opposition. This is perfectly exemplified with the latest strike in the Bazaar and the continuing defections of diplomats.

At the same time there are the economic factors pushing the regime. The Iranian economy is under enormous pressure. Although trustworthy figures are almost impossible to find, it is clear to everyone that the Iranian economy is in a deep crisis. The claims by the administration, that Iran has miraculously become self-sufficient in any major industry, should at best be seen as a joke.

Iran is not close to being self-sufficient. According to Professor at Northeastern University, U.S, Kamran Dadkhah, Iran needs investments worth $46.5 billion to build new refineries and increase production of oil products. So far, Iran has invested $8.2 billion in this sector within the fourth development programme. Over $6.3 billion is required to maintain and expand existing production. Over $2.1 billion has been invested. Of course Dadkhah could be exaggerating in order to serve other interests, but his estimates are still more accurate than the claims that Iran does not need to import gasoline.

The present character of the world economic crisis more than anything reveals how interconnected all economies are and how deep the international division of labour has developed within capitalism. The tax hikes and attacks on state subsidised basic consumer goods in the last years are signs of this contraction in the economy.

The regime is increasingly running out of options. It has to go on the offensive, either against its own people or beyond its borders. The crisis and the sanctions are having a big impact on the Iranian economy and Iran is forced to turn outwards in search of markets and supplies where possible. And even when it finds these, in China for instance, it will have to pay more for the same commodities and services.

The regime does not have a united line or a plan for the situation. There are some parts of the regime that pull towards accommodation with US imperialism while others argue that they should search for new markets. This conflict is not just between the “reformist” and the “hardline” factions, but also within both these factions. This was clearly displayed a month ago when the administration tried to open up negotiations with the US and Khamenei attacked them saying there would be no negotiations.

The Israeli dilemma

At the same time tensions are also rising within Israel. For years the question of growing poverty and misery has been leading to internal tensions. The Israeli elite have used the question of Palestine as a big diversion and to some extent this has worked. But the result has been that, 1) the state and military apparatus have placed their legitimacy on the might of their military and 2) sections of the masses are becoming numb to the constant warmongering.

Israel was created, supposedly, to provide a safe haven for Jews. The ideology of the state is Zionism, which attempts to bind together all Jews living in Israel across class lines. The state has justified its existence on the grounds that it is the sole protector of the people of Israel. On this basis the regime has demanded loyalty and has been able to suppress internal criticism. In this respect Iran’s nuclear programme is a great provocation, especially after the humiliating defeat in Lebanon in 2006 and the failure to destroy Hamas with the massive military campaign in Gaza in 2008.

In 2009 Israel had military expenditure to the tune of $14.3 billion. That is 7% of GDP - a ratio that is even higher than that of the US and fifth globally. On top of this massive drain of resources the country has been in an almost constant state of war mobilisation and two monstrous wars have been waged with no victory, leaving only a massive trail of blood behind it.

Especially the lack of any real victory is playing a big role. It is no secret to anyone that Hamas and Hezbollah have not come out of these wars weakened, on the contrary. In fact, increasingly, Israel is forced to lift the economic blockade on Gaza in order to offset the activities that go on through the smuggling tunnels between Gaza and Egypt.

Also the constant provocations of Ahmadinejad are playing a very undermining role – especially for the powerful military establishment. The Israeli masses have started to become tired of this caste that cannot succeed in any of its own aims and aspirations, let alone help the masses succeed in theirs. Although this process is still at an embryonic state it is nonetheless significant and, most importantly, it is narrowing the room for the regime to manoeuvre. The class divide is widening and class struggle will take a sharper character in the future.

In a March poll, published in The Times, Israelis were asked to name the "most urgent problem" facing Israel. Just 8% of Israeli Jews cited the conflict with the Palestinians, putting it fifth behind education, crime, national security and poverty.

According to the OECD, poverty in Israel is more widespread than in any other OECD country. Almost one in five people in Israel live in poverty – i.e. in a household with income less than half of the national average. A number of factors are behind this, but one of the most important is that many people in Israel don’t have jobs: about 40% of people of working age have no jobs, compared to about 33% in OECD countries. 23% of all elderly are currently living below the poverty line and according to Haaretz, at the end of 2008, in Jerusalem, 48 percent of Jewish and 74 percent of non-Jewish children where defined as poor.

Also, according to a special report on healthcare spending published by the Central Bureau of Statistics, the burden of family spending on healthcare has increased sharply in the last 10 years, while government investment pulled back. From 2000 to 2009, a family's average outlay on healthcare shot up from NIS 339 a month to NIS 633.

These figures are even more striking – especially in the eyes of dissatisfied Israelis – when they are compared to economic growth which is now at 4.1% (almost at the 4.7% level of the pre-crisis period).

The pressures flowing from this polarisation of society are also increasingly being reflected as tensions at the top. Although still small, serious divisions are taking shape within the ruling circles of Israel, within Mossad, the Knesset and even within the government.

Avigdor Lieberman (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and his populist and right-wing nationalist Yisrael Beiteinu party are heavily openly promoting an aggressive non-conciliatory policy towards Palestine – that is, to use brute force to beat the people of Palestine into submission – and Ehud Barak (Minister of Defence) from the Labour Party, reflecting the interests of the US, is supporting the opposite policy of "dialogue" – that is, to strike a deal with Fatah and maybe even Hamas to beat the people of Palestine into submission for them. This conflict has been the source of some trouble for Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who has had to balance to a certain degree between the two parties. Splits and divisions like these have a tendency to undermine the legitimacy and authority of a government.

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf

But it is not only the Israeli regime that is facing new trouble. George Friedman from Stratfor writes the following:

“The country most concerned about Iran is not Israel, but Saudi Arabia. The Saudis recall the result of the last strategic imbalance in the region, when Iraq, following its armistice with Iran, proceeded to invade Kuwait, opening the possibility that its next intention was to seize the northeastern oil fields of Saudi Arabia. In that case, the United States intervened. Given that the United States is now withdrawing from Iraq, intervention following withdrawal would be politically difficult unless the threat to the United States was clear. More important, the Iranians might not give the Saudis the present Saddam Hussein gave them by seizing Kuwait and then halting. They might continue. They certainly have the military capacity to try.

“In a real sense, the Iranians would not have to execute such a military operation in order to gain the benefits. The simple imbalance of forces would compel the Saudis and others in the Persian Gulf to seek a political accommodation with the Iranians. Strategic domination of the Persian Gulf does not necessarily require military occupation — as the Americans have abundantly demonstrated over the past 40 years. It merely requires the ability to carry out those operations."

Although Stratfor has a tendency to overestimate pure military capacity, i.e. amount of arms, men etc., as opposed to internal economic, social and political contradictions, there are certainly many truths in the above lines.

The position of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries has become more precarious since the fall of Saddam. Subsequently an unheard of arms race has started in the Gulf. Military expenditure is rising exponentially. Of the top 12 countries in the world using the largest percentages of their GDP on military spending, 8 are in the Middle East (and most of those around the Gulf).

In the last few weeks the US has initiated an arms deal worth $60 billion. This is the largest US arms deal ever. The Israeli government, which has often sought to block arms transactions with Arab states in the past (and just recently objected to a new Russian sale of cruise missiles to Syria), has yet to utter a peep of protest.

The situation is the same in the Gulf countries where US arms sales have escalated.US defence sales to the Gulf region more than doubled, from $US19 billion in 2001-04 to $US40 billion in 2005-08. There is no reason to think that this process has weakened since 2008.

The pressure on all these states is mounting, both economically and socially. Since the beginning of the economic crisis these countries have been in a very weak situation spilling over into the beginnings of political crisis. The room for concessions to external players is very little. In August for instance there was an, albeit small, demonstration of 200 against unemployment in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia – a very significant development in this country, considering the lack of genuine democratic rights, and also a reflection of the rising unemployment, that is estimated to be around 20% of the native population.
Could there be an attack against Iran?

From all the above we can see that tensions are rising across the Middle East. The balance of power is shifting in Iran’s direction, but the other regimes in the region cannot simply accept this growing strength of Iran. It is clear that the contradictions must be solved at some point; it is in this context that a layer within the US and Israeli elite is contemplating an attack. Again George Friedman from Stratfor writes:

“...an Israeli strike against Iran without U.S. involvement difficult to imagine....(...)[there are] three counters [to an attack against Iran]. One [is] Hezbollah, which is the least potent of the three from the American perspective. The other two are Iraq and Hormuz. If the Iraqis were able to form a government that boxed in pro-Iranian factions in a manner similar to how Hezbollah is being tentatively contained, then the second Iranian counter would be weakened. That would ‘just’ leave the major issue — Hormuz.

“The problem with Hormuz is that the United States cannot tolerate any risk there. The only way to control that risk is to destroy Iranian naval capability before airstrikes on nuclear targets take place. Since many of the Iranian mine layers would be small boats, this would mean an extensive air campaign and special operations forces raids against Iranian ports designed to destroy anything that could lay mines, along with any and all potential mine-storage facilities, anti-ship missile emplacements, submarines and aircraft. Put simply, any piece of infrastructure within a few miles of any port would need to be eliminated. The risk to Hormuz cannot be eliminated after the attack on nuclear sites. It must be eliminated before an attack on the nuclear sites. And the damage must be overwhelming. (...)

“This opening gambit would necessarily attack Iran’s command-and-control, air-defense and offensive air capabilities as well as maritime capabilities. This would sequence with an attack on the nuclear capabilities and could be extended into a prolonged air campaign targeting Iran’s ground forces.

“Far from the less-than-rewarding task of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, going after Iran would be the kind of war the United States excels at fighting. No conventional land invasion, no boots-on-the-ground occupation, just a very thorough bombing campaign."

Added to all the above is the fact that US and Israeli interests do not always overlap.

At present the Obama administration would like to avoid war with Iran, as it needs the Iranian regime on board to help maintain some semblance of stability in Iraq. However, when the chips are down it is Israel that is the most reliable ally of US imperialism in the region and therefore the US could be forced to engage in a mission backing the Israeli generals or, at the very least, tacitly allow Israel to act. Especially if the Israelis chose to attack, leaving the Hormuz strait vulnerable, the US could be forced to support the attack so as to clear the threat to the strait. The point is that the Zionist regime follows its own interests that are based on the situation in Israel and not always on what Washington dictates. For the Israeli regime it is a matter of protecting the legitimacy and strategic position of the regime, while for the US administration it is a matter of protecting US interests, especially in Iraq, by attempting to stabilize the region as a whole, which means lowering the level of armed conflict.

Apart from these revealing considerations there have also been reports of Saudi Arabia having conducted tests to stand down its air defences to enable Israeli jets to make a bombing raid on Iran’s nuclear facilities. But no matter how and by whom such an attack would be carried out, it should be noted that this is not a new method in the Middle East. In 1981 Israel made a surprise air strike that destroyed an Iraqi nuclear reactor under construction in Osirak. Also in 2007 Israel conducted an airstrike on an allegedly secret nuclear installation in Syria.

But an attack is not the only topic on the agenda for US imperialism. The strategists of capital are actually split when it comes to the question as to how to approach Iran. One camp argues that an attack is inevitable, and that preparations should be made immediately. The other camp argues that Iran's new position should be accepted, but that it should be held in check by massively arming Israel (even with the US strengthening Israel’s nuclear arsenal) and the Gulf nations.

The truth is that both camps are right and wrong at the same time. The tensions between the rulers of the Middle East are rising to an unheard of level. At some point one of the players will have to make a move that could spin off into some kind of military confrontation. Especially the trigger-happy Israeli military establishment could be pressured to act – an act that would bring with it catastrophic consequences for the world economy and even more for the masses of the Middle East.

But from this the Iranian regime would probably even recuperate militarily quite fast. In this sense it is not even clear that an attack would be successful from the point of view of any party, but could still happen since none of the regimes can afford to show weakness or back down.

At the same time it is clear that the balance of power has shifted and that Iran - in any state - will play a more prominent role in the future of the Middle East. But to think that such a future is going to be stable, or just more stable than now is utopian. The present massive arms race in the region speaks for itself.
Effects of an attack on the revolutionary process in Iran

Although the mass movement in Iran has presently receded, the regime is still fragile. It has lost huge layers of support. This is in fact the main reason for its constant splitting. An attack from the US or Israel would be seen by the masses as an act to beat the country into submission to US and Israeli imperialism – thus it would cut through the developments that started last year. In this sense the regime would utilise the situation to regain control of the country and maybe even settle some scores.

But this development would only be temporary. Wars tend to bring to the fore all the contradictions that have built up in society. Iran would be no exception. After an initial period of withdrawal the mass movement would come to the fore once more and the deterioration of the regime would increase once more.

In the 1980s Khomeini used the war against Iraq to streamline the regime and to consolidate its power by physically destroying all opposition, but the situation is very different today. Besides the fact that the character of a hypothetical war today would be different in all manners, there is another factor. In the 1980s mass opposition was fragmented and the mass movement was on the ebb. Today the core who led the mass movement, with all its flaws, weaknesses and disorganisation, is the only undivided force in the country and, contrary to the regime, they have not received any decisive blows.

Besides this, the regime is hopelessly tangled up in a thousand wrangling cliques and factions, with a chronic and unsolvable deadlock that is presently dragging down the whole apparatus and that is not going to go away.

A consolidation of reaction in Iran would only become real after a long historical process with a series of decisive defeats for the masses. The regime could try to use a war to inflict such a defeat, but it is far from certain that it would succeed in the present conditions. Lenin explained that war – after an initial period with disorientation of the masses and the spread of patriotism etc, – at a later stage could become a powerful impulse for revolutionary explosions. Such development would not be unlikely in Iran.

The future only brings more instability

The fact is that American, Israeli, Saudi and Iranian strategists – as well as the many do-gooders – can think from here until eternity of a solution to bring “peace and stability” to the Middle East, but none of their “solutions” will do anything but add to and deepen the already existing instability. As long as the laws of capitalism govern the Middle East, no lasting peace can be reached.

For the rulers of the region this may even be tolerable. Maybe their faces, titles and headwear might change from time to time, but in general they will continue with their luxurious lifestyles as parasites leeching off the masses. But for the masses the situation will only become worse, as they will have to pay for the adventures of their rulers - if they accept at all that this is their destiny!

Unfortunately for the elite there is no evidence that this is the case. Already now most the regimes are hanging by a thread. For years the rulers have used questions of nationality and religion to confuse the masses and keep them in check, but the situation is changing. The fault lines are increasingly transcending national and religious lines and mass movements are taking shape everywhere acquiring a clearer class character.

Of course there is the movement in Iran, that has only temporarily receded, but it is clear that it will resurface on a higher level sooner or later. But also in other countries the class struggle is becoming sharper. In Turkey we saw the impressive struggle of the Tekel factory workers that managed to put immense pressure on the government. In Saudi Arabia as we also noted earlier there is growing discontent – with significant cracks in a hitherto very polished surface. In the West Bank the PFLP have bowed to immense pressure from below and have had to withdraw from the executive of the ruling PLO because of their deals with US and Israeli imperialism. And even in Israel, at some stage, we will see mass opposition to the regime that is exhausting its options to buy social peace with the pretext of "national security."

The most important situation, besides Iran, is developing in Egypt, one of the key countries in the region from the point of view of the class struggle. In the absence of genuine national mass organisations, Mohammad Elbaradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency and now outsider in the corridors of the Egyptian power struggle, is striving to become a focal point in opposition to the Mubarak regime and gain some kind of momentum, promoting a boycott of the parliamentary elections on a democratic programme aimed at the workers and poor. With all probability he has started something that he will not be able to control in the future.

All these developments will deepen and seriously affect each other in the next period. If Israel or the US attacks Iran it would correctly be seen by the masses as yet another imperialist attempt to beat the Middle East into submission. This would only further enrage the masses that are fed up with US imperialism and their stooges. It would be a further impulse for the masses to cease being used as pawns in the Middle East and enter the game as players. Once this happens no one will be able to resist and all the pathetic manoeuvres and corridor deals of the rotten regimes will be swept away.

The masses of the Middle East have shown time and time again that they are willing to rise and sacrifice everything to break loose from the shackles of capitalism and its never ending horrors. The only solutions to their miseries are to be found in a socialist society where the resources of the region are controlled by the workers and poor. Until that day comes, peace will only be a superficial and volatile concept.

The main problem is not the strength of capitalism, nor the willingness to struggle and sacrifice of the workers and poor. The main problem is the lack of a mass revolutionary leadership, based on the ideas of Marxism. A leadership that is rooted not in the narrow circles of the "left", but that is firmly tied to the mass of workers and poor in all neighbourhoods from Tehran to Cairo and that takes its starting point from the realities that exist on the ground.

The forces of revolutionary Marxism are still too weak to play this role, but there has never been a better time for building our forces than now. All the contradictions of the system are becoming obvious to all with the masses in a state of turmoil. But in order to reap during the revolutionary events of the future we must sow now. We must build a strong nucleus that is able to intervene in the mass movements of the future and give them direction. If we succeed – and we most certainly will – there will be plenty of opportunities to win over the masses and provide that leadership that is required if we are to sweep away the rotten regimes in the region and with them the whole rotten system of capitalism. This would then be replaced with a Socialist Federation of the Middle East where the resources of the region would be used by its peoples to develop society to unprecedented levels and out of the dead end of capitalist wars and savagery.

Source: In defence of Marxism: the website of the International Marxist Tendency
Written by Hamid Alizadeh Wednesday, 01 December 2010

U.S. to Join Talks on Helping Yemen

A month after the failed airplane bomb plot that put this country’s problem with Al Qaeda in the international spotlight, the United States and 20 other countries are gathering for a conference on Wednesday in London to discuss ways to address Yemen’s growing instability. But in their efforts to move beyond a narrowly military approach to fighting Al Qaeda here, the conference participants are likely to run up against a morass of social, political and logistical obstacles that have frustrated similar efforts in the past. And some diplomats and analysts say they fear that the sudden rush of aid and attention, if it is not handled properly, could reinforce patterns of patronage that have contributed indirectly to Yemen’s culture of extremism. Western donors have already begun increasing their aid commitments, and the London conference — though not aimed at securing more money — is focused on the need to address the many crises that help breed radicalism in Yemen.

The facts are appalling: half the population is living on less than $2 a day; the official rate of illiteracy is 45 percent; fewer than half of Yemenis from ages 15 to 24 are employed. Outside the major cities, access to public water supplies, electricity and health services is vanishingly rare. Those desperately poor hinterlands have become a haven for Qaeda militants, who have regrouped here in the past two years and claimed credit for training Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian militant accused of trying to bomb a Detroit-bound jet on Dec. 25.

Addressing Yemen’s needs, though, is no simple matter. As in Afghanistan and Iraq in recent years, security concerns have put some of this country’s poorest and most dangerous areas beyond the reach of development assistance. An intermittent war rages in the country’s remote north, and a secessionist movement has grown worse in the south. A vast, corrupt and spectacularly inefficient government bureaucracy has been a stubborn obstacle to aid as well. For those reasons, only a tiny fraction of the $4.7 billion pledged to Yemen during a London donor conference in 2006 has been spent. More money, in other words, is not necessarily the answer. Yemen’s main development agency, the Social Fund for Development, has $12 million in unspent aid money for the Jawf Province, a huge, impoverished area where Qaeda militants have found refuge, said the agency’s director, Abdulkarim Ismail al-Arhabi. The province is too dangerous, and there are no effective intermediaries who could help spend it, Mr. Arhabi said. Western donors say they understand the challenges and are calling for political and economic reform to pave the way for more effective aid. Fixing Yemen’s system of diesel fuel subsidies — which consume almost a third of the budget and are widely said to be an avenue for smuggling and kickbacks — is an important priority, diplomats say.

The conference will also seek a more unified international approach to Yemen, including support from its immediate neighbors. Pressing Persian Gulf countries to open their labor markets to Yemenis could provide tremendous relief for the ailing economy, Western and Yemeni officials say. Another focus will be Saudi Arabia, which gives far more to Yemen than any other country, though mostly through unofficial channels. Western diplomats say they hope to persuade Saudi Arabia to start making its support conditional on political and economic reforms in Yemen. But previous reform efforts have repeatedly stalled. And diplomats say that the publicity created by the Dec. 25 bombing attempt could generate more foreign military and development aid, which in turn could — without the necessary reforms — strengthen the patronage networks that have helped weaken Yemen’s state institutions in the past.

Part of the problem, critics say, is that Yemen’s president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, has concentrated too much power in his own hands, skillfully balancing the country’s various political and tribal groups over his 32 years in office, but failing to build a modern state. “At the heart of the economic problem is corruption, and at the heart of the corruption problem is unchecked presidential power,” said Abdel Ghani al-Iryani, a political consultant. Government officials counter that patronage is part of the price of stability in a country that is fragmented along lines of sect, tribe, region and social class. They say that corruption, though widespread, has been exaggerated, and that reforms are under way. Last year Mr. Saleh endorsed a 10-point plan that would bring new blood to the civil service and cut back on the government’s use of diesel fuel. “The corruption is a symptom of the lack of money, the lack of capacity for monitoring this kind of thing,” said Jalal Yacoub, a deputy finance minister and one of the authors of the plan.

The Yemeni state’s administrative weakness, Mr. Yacoub added, derives in part from two major crises of recent years. North Yemen and South Yemen united in 1990, and the north had to absorb hundreds of thousands of public employees from the formerly socialist south. A year later, Saudi Arabia expelled a million Yemeni laborers, following Mr. Saleh’s decision to side with Saddam Hussein in the first Persian Gulf war. Afterward, the Yemeni civil service became a social safety net, as Yemen struggled to find jobs for the returning workers. Mr. Yacoub and other Yemeni officials say they put their hopes in well-financed pilot projects that can quickly improve people’s lives, especially in remote areas where distrust of the government is high. That is also the goal of the United States Agency for International Development, which channels its aid mostly through Yemeni nongovernmental groups. The agency signed a $121 million three-year development assistance program in September, a major increase. But that effort will be hampered by Washington’s inability to send Americans to Yemen’s most dangerous areas, which are also some of its poorest. And they are not the first efforts of their kind. Starting in 2003, a former United States envoy, Edmund J. Hull, traveled to Marib, Jawf, Shabwa and Abyan Provinces to foster aid projects, including the building of new hospitals. “The formula was ‘no security without development, no development without security,’ ” Mr. Hull recalled. “I proposed a virtuous circle to replace the vicious circle.”

Today, the provinces Mr. Hull focused on constitute the main havens of Al Qaeda in Yemen.

Source: New York Times

The New Huthi Game

Abdul Malik al-Houthi's third initiative towards the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can only be described as a new game and one of the ongoing Houthi ploys against Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The Houthi talk about a truce with Saudi Arabia is something that should not be given any attention, or even considered, and in fact this is a new condemnation against the Houthis, and a confession admitting that they were the ones to attack and target Saudi territory.

In the statement attributed to Abdul-Malik al-Houthi he said that they [the Houthis] are prepared to withdraw from Saudi territory, however the question here is; what territory do the Houthis occupy in the first place from which they can withdraw from? It is well known that the Houthis are fighting a guerilla war, infiltrating and fleeing, and so they are not a regular army. However it is clear that the Saudi message reached the Houthis; this message is that the violation of Saudi Arabian territory is something that cannot be tolerated under any circumstances. The greatest mistake that any Arab country can make is accepting the mergence of protuberances along its borders, whether this is armed groups or others, serving foreign objectives and threatening the security of Arab states. The Houthis are an example of this, in the same manner as other groups that hijack the state, exploiting a very old message, in the same manner as what Hezbollah is doing in Lebanon.

In the [audio] tape attributed to Abdul Malik al-Houthi, and in which he proposed the new initiative, he also put the blame for the war on Saudi Arabia, saying that it would have been better for Saudi Arabia to go to war with Israel, rather than the Houthis. This is the same logic that is employed by Hamas against Egypt, and the same logic employed by Hezbollah against Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and this is also the same logic employed by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the Iranian official and media statements, in justifying the violations of the sovereignty of Arab states, and particularly when defending the Houthis.

Therefore the new Houthi truce is nothing more than an attempt to escape the conflict with Saudi Arabia in the hopes of preserving what remains of their forces, especially when they see international support for Riyadh's right to defend its territory and international support for Yemen during its present crisis, and above all else they have noticed an Iranian failure to defend them, or even alleviate the pressure on them.

It also appears that the Houthi initiative came as a quick response to the statement made by Saudi Assistant Defense Minister, Prince Khalid Bin Sultan, to the effect that Saudi Arabia plans to establish a military base in the Jizan region. As a result of this, the Huthis felt that the Saudi movement against them was serious and well-planned and had a serious message, namely to ensure that what happened [with regards to Houthi infiltration] would never be repeated under any circumstances. Therefore it is imperative that there is no leniency or sympathy for the Houthis, otherwise who can guarantee that there will not be a seventh war in Yemen, and who can guarantee that the Houthis will not once again attack Saudi Arabian territory, or kill Saudi border guards, as they did previously, especially as their storing of weapons – whether this is inside Saudi territory or in the border region – is an indication of the Houthis evil intentions towards Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and that they are a new group in the mould of Hezbollah. Therefore the conclusion of this talk is that the Houthis cannot be trusted whatsoever, even if there is a truse.

Source: Asharq Al-Awsat