Ending nearly 32 years of rule in Africa's third-largest country, President Mobutu Sese Seko yielded power on Friday. He quietly slipped out of this besieged capital aboard a flight to his northern hometown, which diplomats described as a brief stopover en route to permanent exile. By early evening, there were unconfirmed reports here that Mr. Mobutu, 66, had already left his hometown, Gbadolite, presumably for Morocco, where the President maintains one of many luxurious palaces. Moroccan officials acknowledged that Mr. Mobutu's plane had been given landing rights, but would not confirm whether Mr. Mobutu was on his way there.
Mr. Mobutu's departure came as rebels who have fought a stunningly successful seven-month war against the Government drew within five miles of Kinshasa's international airport at the city's edge, Western diplomats said, and readied themselves to take over control of the capital. Mr. Mobutu, who had resisted entreaties to hand over power, finally did so after his top generals warned him in a series of nighttime meetings that they could neither defend him or the city of Kinshasa any longer.
Diplomats said on Friday that Zaire's generals were trying to make contact with leaders of the rebellion to arrange their peaceful entry into the city so as to avoid destructive fighting or a repeat of the devastating pillaging the capital has already seen twice this decade. Late Friday, however, reports reached here from the de facto rebel capital, Lubumbashi, that the rebel foreign minister, Bizima Karaha, had demanded the unconditional surrender of Zaire's military before hostilities are called off. In the first possible sign of an unraveling of the remnants of Zaire's Army, Zairian security officials reported Friday night that Gen. Mahele Lioko, the Deputy Prime Minister and Chief of Staff, had been killed by officers opposed to talks with the rebels. Diplomats said they could only confirm that General Mahele had been detained at a military camp at the edge of town, where gunfire was heard Friday evening.
Zairian security officers said that on hearing the news, the Prime Minister, Gen. Likulia Bolongo, took refuge in the French Embassy. Late Friday evening, General Likulia's family was seen arriving at the Inter-Continental Hotel. Early this morning, a Western military analyst said that a rebel company traveling along the railroad tracks had entered central Kinshasa. ''Things are coming to a climax very quickly,'' he said. ''The situation is very dangerous now, but I expect it will all be over shortly.'' Mr. Mobutu delivered no message to a nation he has dominated almost since independence from Belgium in 1960. Instead, the first word that people here heard of the news came in foreign radio broadcasts.
Reading a Government statement before a hastily gathered assembly of journalists in Kinshasa on Friday afternoon, the Information Minister, Kin Kiey Mulumba, said that Mr. Mobutu acknowledged that negotiations with the rebels had failed. As a result, he said, the President had ''ceased to intervene in the conduct of the affairs of state.'' Mr. Mulumba said that Mr. Mobutu had not formally resigned from office and could not directly hand over power to the rebel leader, Laurent Kabila, because the country's laws forbade such a transition. People close to Mr. Mobutu said that the deliberate ambiguity allowed a famously vainglorious leader to depart believing that he had fulfilled an oft-repeated vow that he would never be known as the former President, but only as the late President. Given the advanced prostate cancer that has visibly weakened him in recent weeks, many foreign diplomats say that they expect Mr. Mobutu's health will soon fail him.
Mr. Mulumba added that the Government would continue discussions with the rebels over new political arrangements for the country, and said that the Constitution empowered the newly elected head of the National Assembly, Archbishop Laurent Monsengwo, to lead future negotiations. Even as Mr. Mobutu sought to put a good face on his departure, his army commanders made it clear Friday that they had no intention of fighting the rebels any longer. 'It is not military means that we lack,'' said a Defense Ministry official. ''But General Mahele does not want to sacrifice a whole people because of a battle for the power of a single man. That's finished.'' Besides being Chief of Staff and Deputy Prime Minister, General Mahele also served as Defense Minister. He was one of three top officers, including the Prime Minister, General Likulia , who visited Mr. Mobutu on Thursday evening to inform him that they could no longer defend the city or protect him. Western diplomats said the officers, also including Gen. Nzimbi Ngbale, the commander of Mr. Mobutu's feared Presidential Guard, then urged the President to leave the country. Zairian security sources said Friday night that General Nzimbi had crossed the Congo River to the Republic of Congo.
A member of Mr. Mobutu's entourage said the President sent the three generals away in fury when they first approached him about ending the war effort and leaving the country. A second meeting was held at midnight, this associate of the President said. Mr. Mobutu then said he needed time to reflect. At 4 A.M. Friday, Mr. Mobutu again summoned his generals and told them of his decision to leave the country. ''He left Kinshasa a very angry man,'' the presidential associate said. ''A man who could still not believe it was all over, and felt abandoned.'' On Friday, Western diplomats said that Zaire's top generals had already begun to make contact with the rebellion and were preparing ''to open the city'' to Mr. Kabila's forces.
News of Mr. Mobutu's departure spread slowly in Kinshasa on Friday, and for the most part life in the capital was virtually normal through most of the day. By late afternoon, however, there were isolated reports of soldiers firing off their weapons, intimidating people and stealing vehicles. In many districts of this city of five million people, neighborhood welcoming committees freely rehearsed songs and put the finishing touches on banners to greet the rebels. Meanwhile, the elite that had sprouted around Mr. Mobutu made haste to the exits. All day, private speedboats carrying the rich and until now powerful jetted across the Congo River to Brazzaville, the capital of Congo. Many carried with them whatever precious possessions they could, anticipating they may never return.
The end of Mr. Mobutu's rule opened a period of deep uncertainty for Zaire, first in a transition period that will now begin, and eventually, it is almost universally assumed here, under the rule of Mr. Kabila. Mr. Kabila has proved himself a deft political operator who succeeded in riding a localized ethnic rebellion in the country's eastern border region all the way to national power, but little is known of his intentions or abilities as a head of state. Diplomats who have met him recently say that the 56-year-old rebel leader, who has fought against Mr. Mobutu intermittently since the country's early independence period, speaks almost nostalgically of the kind of collectivized agricultural ventures and huge state projects that were in vogue in his Marxist youth.
More troubling, Western diplomats say, has been Mr. Kabila's human-rights record at the head of rebel forces that massacred Rwandan Hutu refugees. Similarly, Mr. Kabila has made a long string of contradictory public statements about the future of democracy in Zaire, ranging from warnings that opposition parties will be suspended to pledges that a consensus government will be formed with other anti-Mobutu parties. ''Kabila is like a jack-in-the-box on the question of democracy and elections,'' said a senior Western diplomat here. ''Now that he has arrived, we are all waiting to see which Kabila is going to pop out.'' The form that future negotiations with the rebels will take is equally in doubt. Mr. Kabila has repeatedly said that he will not accord any role to Archbishop Monsengwo, the head of the National Assembly, and will refuse to work with any politicians who have been allies of Mr. Mobutu.
Before the South African-led talks between Mr. Mobutu and Mr. Kabila broke down, diplomats had hoped to get both sides to accept a South African proposal for the formation of a new Government, led by Mr. Kabila, but allowing for broad representation of other political parties. Mr. Mobutu's quiet departure reflected the pain of a man who since early adulthood has known little but undisputed rule. Some diplomats and members of the President's entourage said that in recent weeks the Zairian leader had been angling for a ''dignified way'' out of power that would avoid the humiliation Mr. Kabila has publicly thirsted to give his enemy of three decades. The idea of an exit with dignity was tarnished by the news on Friday that a Swiss court had already placed a lien on one of the President's mansions, in Savigny, after a request by the public prosecutor of the rebel-held city of Lubumbashi.
Mr. Mobutu escaped Zaire with his family intact -- his wife, her twin sister, who is also his concubine, and their children -- but for the remainder of his life he will almost certainly be hounded by efforts by Zaire and private creditors to reclaim whatever is left of the estimated $5 billion fortune that he once accumulated. With help from neighboring countries, the insurgency of Laurent Kabila took only seven months to seize control of virtually the entire country and oust the longtime Zairian dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko.
Timeline
Dec. 4, 1996 A month after the town of Goma became the rebels' first significant conquest, the area of rebel control has spread to other towns along Zaire's eastern border.
March 15, 1997 Kisangani, a key city at the head of navigation on the Congo River, falls to the rebels. Tens of thousands of Rwandan Hutu refugees are captured by the rebels, many of whom have scores to settle with the refugees. April 9, 1997 The rebels capture Lubumbashi, the country's second city, consolidating their control over Zaire's diamond, cobalt and copper mines. The Mobutu Government is deprived of its major source of income.
May 7, 1997 Driving toward Kinshasa, the rebel offensive takes Kenge, 120 miles from the capital. Thoughout the campaign, Government forces put up little resistance, fleeing rather than fighting.
May 16, 1997 With rebel forces in control of the entire country except for Kinshasa and Mobutu's hometown, Gbadolite, Mobutu flees the capital and gives up power.
Source: New York Times
Showing posts with label Zaire. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Zaire. Show all posts
Saturday, May 17, 1997
Friday, December 31, 1993
Mobutu meets with President George Bush at the White House
By most accounts, the United States was involved in both the death of Lumumba and the coup of 1965, which brought Mobutu to power, although the extent of this involvement is not certain. In any case, because of his longstanding relations with the American intelligence community, Mobutu was very aware of United States backing both as a resource and as a handicap.
Zaire generally received firm American support in the late 1960s and found American influence helpful in various economic and political disputes. The promulgation of a generous investment code in 1969 and a moderate political stance lured extensive foreign, including American, investment, and a substantial program of United States aid was continued. Mobutu returned from a visit to the United States in 1970 with pledges of substantial new investment. Relations continued to be warm until the Zairianization decree of November 30, 1973, which led to the transfer of a large number of foreign-owned enterprises, including facilities owned by international oil companies, into Zairian hands. Thereafter, relations were chilly.
But in 1975, the United States and Zaire found themselves supporting the same faction in the Angolan civil war (see Regional Relations , this ch.). The United States, apparently deciding that it needed a stable Zaire for political and economic reasons and sensing the potential for Zaire to support United States strategic interests in sub-Saharan Africa, promoted the relationship with Zaire. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's first official trip to Africa in April 1976 included a long visit to Kinshasa.
The Carter administration, which had declared its number-one foreign policy objective to be the promotion of human rights, posed a problem for the Mobutu regime, with its poor human rights record. For the first time, criticism of Mobutu by members of Congress and by voluntary agencies was met with some sympathy by the United States president. However, the skeptical attitude toward the Zairian government was partially reversed by Shaba I and Shaba II. On the occasion of the second invasion in 1978, President Jimmy Carter supported Mobutu's accusations of Cuban and Soviet involvement, even though no hard evidence was presented. But the United States refused to become involved militarily and sent only nonlethal military supplies, such as medical and transportation equipment. In 1980 the House of Representatives (concerned over human rights violations and the misuse of United States aid) voted to end all military assistance to Zaire; but the Senate reinstated the funds, reacting to pressure from Carter and American business interests in Zaire.
The election of the more conservative Ronald Reagan as United States president was well received in Zaire, and in fact United States concerns about Mobutu's human rights record became muted. Moreover, Mobutu again was seen as providing useful services to the United States in its struggle against the Soviet Union and Soviet allies such as Libya and Angola. The domestic context in the United States had changed, however, in that an increasing number of American groups had become opposed to administration policy toward Zaire.
As United States-Zaire relations became more visible in Washington, Mobutu countered by becoming more active in promoting a positive image of himself and his country. Two Washington lobbying firms with ties to the Reagan administration received hefty contracts from Mobutu.
Nevertheless, in November 1990, Congress cut military and economic aid (except for some humanitarian aid) to Zaire, crystallizing the longstanding division between Congress and the executive branch and between liberals and conservatives on Zaire policy. As it adjourned, Congress denied the Bush administration's request for US$4 million in military aid and stipulated that US$40 million in economic aid be funneled through humanitarian agencies not affiliated with the Zairian government. Its decision was based on human rights violations--the September 1990 Lubumbashi massacre in particular--and accusations that Mobutu's vast wealth was largely stolen from the Zairian people.
By 1992 the United States-Zaire relationship had reached a turning point. The end of the Cold War had diminished the strategic significance of Zaire to the United States, and events in Zaire since 1990 had made it clear that Mobutu's days in power were numbered. In 1991-92, the United States, together with Belgium and France, attempted to promote peaceful political change in Zaire, by pressuring Mobutu to oversee the transition to democratic government and to depart voluntarily. The Zairian opposition, however, still perceived this approach as a continued "propping up" of the Mobutu regime and called for an unequivocal United States rejection of Mobutu, which was not forthcoming.
In October 1992, the United States joined Belgium and France in extending official support to the Tshisekedi government. The United States also reiterated its support for the national conference and its hope that the conference would lead ultimately to fair and free elections.
Since that time, the United States has continued to support the legitimacy of the Tshisekedi government and to insist that the Mobutu government live up to its promise to turn over real power to that government. It has consistently denounced Mobutu's obstruction of the transition process and has refused to recognize the rival Birindwa government. Moreover, the Clinton administration has taken several concrete steps to show its displeasure with the Mobutu regime. The United States has not replaced its ambassador to Zaire, who was reassigned in March 1993. The United States also refused to allow Zaire's central bank governor into the United States to attend a World Bank-IMF meeting and has made it clear that Mobutu is not welcome in the United States. Nevertheless, the United States has stopped short of taking or even advocating harsher measures against the regime, such as the imposition of economic sanctions or the confiscation of Mobutu's assets abroad. As such, in the view of some observers the United States has put only very limited pressure on Mobutu to step down. Many see this policy as an indication that the United States still regards Mobutu as a stabilizing factor, a viewpoint that would explain United States acceptance of Mobutu as part of the transition process in Zaire. The United States-brokered political accord that accompanied the Transitional Act permitted President Mobutu to remain as titular head of state and thus a legitimate institution of government, albeit with limited powers. One unintended effect of this arrangement has been to confer some legitimacy on Mobutu and thus allow him to obstruct the transition process and the functioning of the legitimate government under Tshisekedi.
Throughout 1993 the United States has continued to urge the various political forces in Zaire to continue negotiating, apparently believing that ongoing negotiations will eventually lead to a power-sharing compromise. It appears increasingly likely that the United States would accept a so-called "neutral administration" replacing both the Mobutu-appointed government and the Tshisekedi government.
Source: US Congress Library
Zaire generally received firm American support in the late 1960s and found American influence helpful in various economic and political disputes. The promulgation of a generous investment code in 1969 and a moderate political stance lured extensive foreign, including American, investment, and a substantial program of United States aid was continued. Mobutu returned from a visit to the United States in 1970 with pledges of substantial new investment. Relations continued to be warm until the Zairianization decree of November 30, 1973, which led to the transfer of a large number of foreign-owned enterprises, including facilities owned by international oil companies, into Zairian hands. Thereafter, relations were chilly.
But in 1975, the United States and Zaire found themselves supporting the same faction in the Angolan civil war (see Regional Relations , this ch.). The United States, apparently deciding that it needed a stable Zaire for political and economic reasons and sensing the potential for Zaire to support United States strategic interests in sub-Saharan Africa, promoted the relationship with Zaire. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's first official trip to Africa in April 1976 included a long visit to Kinshasa.
The Carter administration, which had declared its number-one foreign policy objective to be the promotion of human rights, posed a problem for the Mobutu regime, with its poor human rights record. For the first time, criticism of Mobutu by members of Congress and by voluntary agencies was met with some sympathy by the United States president. However, the skeptical attitude toward the Zairian government was partially reversed by Shaba I and Shaba II. On the occasion of the second invasion in 1978, President Jimmy Carter supported Mobutu's accusations of Cuban and Soviet involvement, even though no hard evidence was presented. But the United States refused to become involved militarily and sent only nonlethal military supplies, such as medical and transportation equipment. In 1980 the House of Representatives (concerned over human rights violations and the misuse of United States aid) voted to end all military assistance to Zaire; but the Senate reinstated the funds, reacting to pressure from Carter and American business interests in Zaire.
The election of the more conservative Ronald Reagan as United States president was well received in Zaire, and in fact United States concerns about Mobutu's human rights record became muted. Moreover, Mobutu again was seen as providing useful services to the United States in its struggle against the Soviet Union and Soviet allies such as Libya and Angola. The domestic context in the United States had changed, however, in that an increasing number of American groups had become opposed to administration policy toward Zaire.
As United States-Zaire relations became more visible in Washington, Mobutu countered by becoming more active in promoting a positive image of himself and his country. Two Washington lobbying firms with ties to the Reagan administration received hefty contracts from Mobutu.
Nevertheless, in November 1990, Congress cut military and economic aid (except for some humanitarian aid) to Zaire, crystallizing the longstanding division between Congress and the executive branch and between liberals and conservatives on Zaire policy. As it adjourned, Congress denied the Bush administration's request for US$4 million in military aid and stipulated that US$40 million in economic aid be funneled through humanitarian agencies not affiliated with the Zairian government. Its decision was based on human rights violations--the September 1990 Lubumbashi massacre in particular--and accusations that Mobutu's vast wealth was largely stolen from the Zairian people.
By 1992 the United States-Zaire relationship had reached a turning point. The end of the Cold War had diminished the strategic significance of Zaire to the United States, and events in Zaire since 1990 had made it clear that Mobutu's days in power were numbered. In 1991-92, the United States, together with Belgium and France, attempted to promote peaceful political change in Zaire, by pressuring Mobutu to oversee the transition to democratic government and to depart voluntarily. The Zairian opposition, however, still perceived this approach as a continued "propping up" of the Mobutu regime and called for an unequivocal United States rejection of Mobutu, which was not forthcoming.
In October 1992, the United States joined Belgium and France in extending official support to the Tshisekedi government. The United States also reiterated its support for the national conference and its hope that the conference would lead ultimately to fair and free elections.
Since that time, the United States has continued to support the legitimacy of the Tshisekedi government and to insist that the Mobutu government live up to its promise to turn over real power to that government. It has consistently denounced Mobutu's obstruction of the transition process and has refused to recognize the rival Birindwa government. Moreover, the Clinton administration has taken several concrete steps to show its displeasure with the Mobutu regime. The United States has not replaced its ambassador to Zaire, who was reassigned in March 1993. The United States also refused to allow Zaire's central bank governor into the United States to attend a World Bank-IMF meeting and has made it clear that Mobutu is not welcome in the United States. Nevertheless, the United States has stopped short of taking or even advocating harsher measures against the regime, such as the imposition of economic sanctions or the confiscation of Mobutu's assets abroad. As such, in the view of some observers the United States has put only very limited pressure on Mobutu to step down. Many see this policy as an indication that the United States still regards Mobutu as a stabilizing factor, a viewpoint that would explain United States acceptance of Mobutu as part of the transition process in Zaire. The United States-brokered political accord that accompanied the Transitional Act permitted President Mobutu to remain as titular head of state and thus a legitimate institution of government, albeit with limited powers. One unintended effect of this arrangement has been to confer some legitimacy on Mobutu and thus allow him to obstruct the transition process and the functioning of the legitimate government under Tshisekedi.
Throughout 1993 the United States has continued to urge the various political forces in Zaire to continue negotiating, apparently believing that ongoing negotiations will eventually lead to a power-sharing compromise. It appears increasingly likely that the United States would accept a so-called "neutral administration" replacing both the Mobutu-appointed government and the Tshisekedi government.
Source: US Congress Library
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)