The Secret of the Seven Sisters

On August 28, 1928, in the Scottish highlands, began the secret story of oil.

Three men had an appointment at Achnacarry Castle - a Dutchman, an American and an Englishman.

The Dutchman was Henry Deterding, a man nicknamed the Napoleon of Oil, having exploited a find in Sumatra. He joined forces with a rich ship owner and painted Shell salesman and together the two men founded Royal Dutch Shell.

The American was Walter C. Teagle and he represents the Standard Oil Company, founded by John D. Rockefeller at the age of 31 - the future Exxon. Oil wells, transport, refining and distribution of oil - everything is controlled by Standard oil.

The Englishman, Sir John Cadman, was the director of the Anglo-Persian oil Company, soon to become BP. On the initiative of a young Winston Churchill, the British government had taken a stake in BP and the Royal Navy switched its fuel from coal to oil. With fuel-hungry ships, planes and tanks, oil became "the blood of every battle".

The new automobile industry was developing fast, and the Ford T was selling by the million. The world was thirsty for oil, and companies were waging a merciless contest but the competition was making the market unstable.

That August night, the three men decided to stop fighting and to start sharing out the world's oil. Their vision was that production zones, transport costs, sales prices - everything would be agreed and shared. And so began a great cartel, whose purpose was to dominate the world, by controlling its oil.

Four others soon joined them, and they came to be known as the Seven Sisters - the biggest oil companies in the world.

EPISODE 1: DESERT STORMS

In the first episode, we travel across the Middle East, through both time and space.

We waged the Iran-Iraq war and I say we waged it, because one country had to be used to destroy the other.
- Xavier Houzel, an oil trader

Since that notorious meeting at Achnacarry Castle on August 28, 1928, they have never ceased to plot, to plan and to scheme.

Throughout the region's modern history, since the discovery of oil, the Seven Sisters have sought to control the balance of power.

They have supported monarchies in Iran and Saudi Arabia, opposed the creation of OPEC, profiting from the Iran-Iraq war, leading to the ultimate destruction of Saddam Hussein and Iraq.

The Seven Sisters were always present, and almost always came out on top.

EPISODE 2: THE BLACK EL DORADO

At the end of the 1960s, the Seven Sisters, the major oil companies, controlled 85 percent of the world's oil reserves. Today, they control just 10 percent.

New hunting grounds are therefore required, and the Sisters have turned their gaze towards Africa. With peak oil, wars in the Middle East, and the rise in crude prices, Africa is the oil companies' new battleground.

Everybody thought there could be oil in Sudan but nobody knew anything. It was revealed through exploration by the American company Chevron, towards the end of the 70s. And that was the beginning of the second civil war, which went on until 2002. It lasted for 19 years and cost a million and a half lives and the oil business was at the heart of it.

- Gerard Prunier, a historian

But the real story, the secret story of oil, begins far from Africa.

In their bid to dominate Africa, the Sisters installed a king in Libya, a dictator in Gabon, fought the nationalisation of oil resources in Algeria, and through corruption, war and assassinations, brought Nigeria to its knees.

Oil may be flowing into the holds of huge tankers, but in Lagos, petrol shortages are chronic.

The country's four refineries are obsolete and the continent's main oil exporter is forced to import refined petrol - a paradox that reaps fortunes for a handful of oil companies.

Encouraged by the companies, corruption has become a system of government - some $50bn are estimated to have 'disappeared' out of the $350bn received since independence.

But new players have now joined the great oil game.

China, with its growing appetite for energy, has found new friends in Sudan, and the Chinese builders have moved in. Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir is proud of his co-operation with China - a dam on the Nile, roads, and stadiums.

In order to export 500,000 barrels of oil a day from the oil fields in the South - China financed and built the Heglig pipeline connected to Port Sudan - now South Sudan's precious oil is shipped through North Sudan to Chinese ports.

In a bid to secure oil supplies out of Libya, the US, the UK and the Seven Sisters made peace with the once shunned Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, until he was killed during the Libyan uprising of 2011, but the flow of Libyan oil remains uninterrupted.

In need of funds for rebuilding, Libya is now back to pumping more than a million barrels of oil per day. And the Sisters are happy to oblige.

EPISODE 3: THE DANCING BEAR

In the Caucasus, the US and Russia are vying for control of the region. The great oil game is in full swing. Whoever controls the Caucasus and its roads, controls the transport of oil from the Caspian Sea.

Tbilisi, Erevan and Baku - the three capitals of the Caucasus. The oil from Baku in Azerbaijan is a strategic priority
for all the major companies.

From the fortunes of the Nobel family to the Russian revolution, to World War II, oil from the Caucasus and the Caspian has played a central role. Lenin fixated on conquering the Azeri capital Baku for its oil, as did Stalin and Hitler.

On his birthday in 1941, Adolf Hitler received a chocolate and cream birthday cake, representing a map. He chose the slice with Baku on it.

On June 22nd 1941, the armies of the Third Reich invaded Russia. The crucial battle of Stalingrad was the key to the road to the Caucasus and Baku’s oil, and would decide the outcome of the war.

Stalin told his troops: "Fighting for one’s oil is fighting for one’s freedom."

After World War II, President Nikita Krushchev would build the Soviet empire and its Red Army with revenues from the USSR’s new-found oil reserves.

Decades later, oil would bring that empire to its knees, when Saudi Arabia and the US would conspire to open up the oil taps, flood the markets, and bring the price of oil down to $13 per barrel. Russian oligarchs would take up the oil mantle, only to be put in their place by their president, Vladimir Putin, who knows that oil is power.

The US and Putin‘s Russia would prop up despots, and exploit regional conflicts to maintain a grip on the oil fields of the Caucusus and the Caspian.

But they would not have counted on the rise of a new, strong and hungry China, with an almost limitless appetite for oil and energy. Today, the US, Russia and China contest the control of the former USSR’s fossil fuel reserves, and the supply routes. A three-handed match, with the world as spectators, between three ferocious beasts – The American eagle, the Russian bear, and the Chinese dragon.

EPISODE 4: A TIME FOR LIES

Peak oil – the point in time at which the highest rate of oil extraction has been reached, and after which world production will start decline. Many geologists and the International Energy Agency say the world's crude oil output reached its peak in 2006.

But while there may be less oil coming out of the ground, the demand for it is definitely on the rise.

The final episode of this series explores what happens when oil becomes more and more inaccessible, while at the same time, new powers like China and India try to fulfill their growing energy needs.

And countries like Iran, while suffering international sanctions, have welcomed these new oil buyers, who put business ahead of lectures on human rights and nuclear ambitions.

At the same time, oil-producing countries have had enough with the Seven Sisters controlling their oil assets. Nationalisation of oil reserves around the world has ushered in a new generation of oil companies all vying for a slice of the oil pie.

These are the new Seven Sisters:

Saudi Arabia's Saudi Aramco, the largest and most sophisticated oil company in the world; Russia's Gazprom, a company that Russia's President Vladimir Putin wrested away from the oligarchs; The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which, along with its subsidiary, Petrochina, is the world's secnd largest company in terms of market value; The National Iranian Oil Company, which has a monopoly on exploration, extraction, transportation and exportation of crude oil in Iran – OPEC's second largest oil producer after Saudi Arabia; Venezuela's PDVSA, a company the late president Hugo Chavez dismantled and rebuilt into his country's economic engine and part of his diplomatic arsenal; Brazil's Petrobras, a leader in deep water oil production, that pumps out 2 million barrels of crude oil a day; and Malaysia's Petronas - Asia's most profitable company in 2012.

Mainly state-owned, the new Seven Sisters control a third of the world's oil and gas production, and more than a third of the world's reserves. The old Seven Sisters, by comparison, produce a tenth of the world's oil, and control only three percent of the reserves.

The balance has shifted.

Source: Al Jazeera

Bridging the African Union's divides

Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's success at the AU will be measured by her ability to gain consensus among heads of state, writes Liesl Louw-Vaudran.

When the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was trying to cajole the rest of Africa into accepting his grand idea of a United States of Africa, it was rumoured that he offered Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma the job of prime minister if she would back him. At the time she was South Africa’s minister of foreign affairs.

A lot has changed since that summit in Accra, Ghana, in 2007 when a number of smaller African states gave in to Gaddafi’s bullying and buying of votes. Yet Dlamini-Zuma was duly elected as chairperson of the African Union Commission by a majority of heads of state at its 19th summit in Addis Ababa on July 15.

In effect, she will be the prime minister of an institution that aims to be the continental decision-making body. Of course, things are complicated because she will not be reporting to one executive president but to 54, give or take a few, depending on how many coups there have been on the continent.

The way South Africa lobbied for votes since the last unsuccessful bid for the position in January will not make her job any easier. Some countries are accusing South Africa of using the same tactics of which Gaddafi was guilty.

When she takes up office in Addis Ababa in three months’ time, her first task will have to be an attempt at some radical improvements at the commission – an institution bogged down by inefficiency, understaffing and underspending. Only 52% of posts are filled and the average underspending is 37%.

On this score she will probably do very well, or at least better than her ­predecessors. Walking into the AU Commission cannot be much worse than walking into the portfolio of home affairs in 2009.

For a while, Addis Ababa has been considered by diplomats to be a hardship post – a perception reinforced by the strain of working in a country with terrible phone infrastructure, restrictive laws and very little to offer expats.

The Anglophone and Francophone divide at the commission is also a reality – the men in boubous (robes) do not sit at the same lunch table as the East Africans in suits – but she will be able to use her skills as a South African to convince bureaucrats from diverse backgrounds to work together.

Despite what the rulebooks say, she will probably have to define her role and relationship with the heads of state as things go along. This she has to do with the rotating head of state who gets the position of AU chairperson for a year – a title often confused with that of the commission chairperson. Benin’s President Yayi Boni has this job at the moment and is doing it relatively well, but sometimes the AU chair is largely symbolic, especially when it is occupied by leaders such as Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Obiang Nguema, who filled this post last year.

Following the extensive battle to get Dlamini-Zuma elected, many are claiming that she will raise the profile of the AU. Certainly the drama between her and her predecessor, Jean Ping, has captured imaginations, but it will take much more than this to restore the credibility of the commission and of the AU. This is true of the union’s image internationally and among ordinary Africans.

Dlamini-Zuma will have the power and influence of South Africa behind her, but it will not always be an advantage given South Africa’s much-criticised Africa policy. Ping, also a former foreign minister, was unable to get heads of state to agree on almost anything and was decried for being weak.

Still, heads of state are unclear about how much power the commission chairperson should have. Former Mali president Alpha Omar Konaré clashed with many of his peers when he had this position. After his term ended the commission chair was again occupied by a minister, just as it was during the time of the Organisation of African Unity.

Consequently, when half of Africa’s heads of state at last year’s summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, decided to recognise the fledgling Libyan National Transitional Council and the other half – led by South Africa – refused to do so, Ping could not do much about it. The AU’s road map for Libya was completely ignored by Nato – a huge embarrassment for Africa.

Earlier this year, when some agreed with Malawi’s president that the International Criminal Court arrest warrant against Omar ­al-Bashir of Sudan should be respected and the other half wanted the 19th AU summit (that just took place) to be moved to Addis Ababa, Africa again looked hopelessly divided.

These divisions and the stalemate that preceded Sunday’s election made some analysts fear a total breakdown of the institution. Some advised that the AU should abandon efforts to model itself on the European Union, but rather look at a loose structure, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, leaving integration up to the regions.

For now, the AU’s reputation has been salvaged and there is real hope for a more efficient commission with Dlamini-Zuma at the helm.

A huge advantage for her is that she knows the AU commission very well. After all, she helped to implement its constitutive act in the early years after its creation in 2002.

“Your foreign minister doesn’t take no for an answer,” I remember a West African foreign minister telling me at an AU summit in Addis Ababa in 2003. It was during a marathon session on getting a resolution on gender parity pushed through the agenda.

At the time Dlamini-Zuma showed the same unwavering determination and work ethic she has become known for at home. It was not unusual for the media to be called to press briefings by Dlamini-Zuma at 2am or 3am to explain the latest AU decisions.

Ten years after its creation, things at the AU have not moved as quickly as what she and Thabo Mbeki, then her commander in chief, had envisioned. Funding remains a huge problem. More than half ($160-million) of its budget of $275-million for 2012 is paid for by external partners, mostly the European Union. An audit of the commission finalised in 2007 recommended vast reforms of it, but little of this has been implemented by Dlamini-Zuma’s predecessor.

An efficient AU will hugely improve its relations with international donors, especially now that this kind of money is getting scarce. Real action in solving peace and security issues will also improve the AU’s standing in the eyes of its citizens. But achieving credibility and raising the profile of the AU will ultimately depend not on the commission chairperson, but on the quality of leadership in its member states.

Source: Mail & Guardian

US expands covert military surveillance in Africa

The Obama administration is expanding its intelligence operations in sub-Saharan Africa, according to a lengthy report in the Washington Post. The increased surveillance is part of rapidly expanding military operations in Africa that are being carried out under the pretext of the “war on terror,” but are directed in large part at countering rising Chinese economic connections on the resource-rich continent.

The focus of the Post’s report was on aerial surveillance programs used to gather intelligence on local militant groups. The vast majority of these operations are being run by private companies, which are responsible for supplying pilots, sensor operators, intelligence analysts, mechanics, and linguists.

According to the report, about a dozen airbases have been developed in Africa since 2007. These bases are generally small additions to existing airfields in various African countries and are used to run small aircraft, disguised as private planes, and equipped with discreet surveillance equipment. Permission for these operations is usually granted by the local government in exchange for the US sharing the intelligence it gathers.

The program targets a wide variety of different groups on the pretext of combating terrorism. These include the loose affiliation of Tuareg secessionists and Islamists in Northern Mali, the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa, and al-Shabab in Southern Somalia. Although humanitarian concerns and the threat of global terrorism are being used to justify these operations, they in reality comprise part of a new Scramble for Africa, as the US and Europe compete over the area’s natural resources and seek to minimize Chinese influence.

In particular, the Post report cited two targets of growing interest on the part of the US military: Boko Haram in Nigeria, and the Lord’s Resistance Army’s operations in Sudan and South Sudan. In the case of Nigeria, which provides over 8 percent of the United States’ crude oil, the economic motivation for “anti-terrorism” is particularly clear.

Since the very beginning of AFRICOM’s operations, the US has been preparing plans for possible military intervention in Nigeria. In 2008, the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania conducted a series of “wargame scenarios” concerning possible interventions for AFRICOM, and estimated that it would take 20,000 troops to control the Niger Delta oilfields. At a February 18, 2008 AFRICOM conference, Vice Admiral Robert T. Moeller stated that the guiding principle of AFRICOM was to protect “the free flow of natural resources from Africa to the global market.”

Only a month later, the first commander of AFRICOM, General William Ward, declared that due to the US’s increasing reliance on African oil, the “number one theater-wide goal” would be combating terrorism. Although the US did not intervene militarily, the political significance of AFRICOM’s preparations could be seen when millions of Nigerian workers participated in a general strike against president Goodluck Jonathan’s end to fuel subsidies. Jonathan used a series of bombings claimed by Boko Haram to institute martial law and suppress the growing strike movement.

In the case of the Lord’s Resistance Army, the argument for “humanitarian intervention” is used to provide a similar cover for economic aims. According to The Post, AFRICOM is seeking a base in South Sudan that would both support the hunt for the LRA’s leader Kony and allow the US greater influence in the growing conflict between Sudan and South Sudan.

At the center of the Sudanese conflict are disagreements over oil revenues. Since South Sudan gained independence in 2011 it has been in continuous conflict with Sudan over control of oil fields in the border region and the fees to be paid to Sudan, whose pipelines are the only conduit available to export its oil. In April, while Sudan and South Sudan were engaged in regular border skirmishes, South Sudanese president, Salva Kiir, traveled to China in an attempt to gather support for construction of an alternate pipeline through Kenya.

China is a major investor in both Sudanese and South Sudanese oil infrastructure. Through an increased military presence, the US government hopes to offset Chinese economic influence. Last year in her tour of Africa, US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, said, “We don’t want to see a new colonialism in Africa,” in reference to Chinese influence on the continent.

Ultimately the aerial surveillance programs will be used to lay the groundwork for future military intervention. Last October, Obama deployed 100 military advisors to central Africa in order to work toward “the removal of Joseph Kony.” In Somalia, drones and special forces strikes are also being used to the same bloody effect as in Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan. Although the surveillance program in West and Central Africa is currently unarmed, several officials quoted in the Post emphasized the potential to expand the program.

According to the report, AFRICOM already had plans for a drone program against the LRA, but it was canceled without explanation. Recently, however, the Senate Armed Forces Committee authorized $50 million to expand surveillance operations in Africa and emphasized the need for aircraft that can “loiter over areas of interest for extended periods of time,” i.e., drones. One anonymous US military official told the Post that if they wanted to fly drones “I’m certain we could get the access and overflight [permission] that is necessary to do that.”

Source: World Socialist Web Site

Southern Sudan Makes Peace Deal

Southern Sudan signed a cease-fire on Wednesday with a renegade general four days before the oil-rich region votes in an independence referendum likely to create the world’s newest country. Fears of internal fighting have plagued the area despite excitement among southerners that independence could bring them peace after decades of conflict.

Lt. Gen. George Athor defected from the southern army last year to run for governor in Jonglei State, the largest and most volatile of the south’s 10 states. After losing the vote in April, General Athor revolted against the southern government. The revolt represented a significant security threat as the country prepared for Sunday’s weeklong referendum.

Southern Sudan’s vice president, Riek Machar, presided over the signing of the cease-fire in Juba, the south’s capital. The deal included terms for the reintegration of General Athor’s dissident forces in the southern army. Abraham Thon, the head of General Athor’s delegation, said the deal was “the end to all the troubles of the people of southern Sudan.”

David Gressly, head of the United Nations mission in Southern Sudan, said the agreement was “one more reflection of the many steps that have been taken since 2005,” when a north-south peace deal was signed, ending more than two decades of war.

Source: New York Times

Hundreds feared dead in Darfur clashes, says UN

Hundreds of civilians are feared to have died in a surge of fighting between the Sudanese army and rebels in the turbulent Darfur region, a United Nations source told Reuters on Monday. A spokesperson for Sudan's army denied any fighting was taking place in Darfur's mountainous Jabel Marra region and accused insurgents of harassing and attacking locals.

Reports of clashes throughout last week have marred Khartoum's announcement of a new peace push in the region and come just more than a month ahead of national elections. "We think that we have a mounting number of casualties ... The lower estimate is about 140. The higher estimate is closer to 400," said a UN source. He said the figures referred to civilian deaths.

The army spokesperson told Reuters: "There are no clashes between the Sudanese army and the forces of Abdel Wahed's movement." Abdel Wahed Mohamed al-Nur is the leader of a branch of the rebel Sudan Liberation Army (SLA).

Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir declared the war in Darfur over last Wednesday, announcing the release of 57 rebel captives after reaching an initial settlement with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Darfur's most powerful rebel force. Al-Bashir's government signed an agreement in Doha last Tuesday committing Sudan to reaching a final peace deal with the JEM by March 15. But the SLA and other rebels have rejected the deal, demanding that security be restored on the ground before talks begin.

Source: Mail & Guardian

Sudan: Accord Reached With Chad

Sudan and Chad agreed Tuesday to end their proxy wars and engage in direct talks and joint development projects to rebuild their war-affected border areas. President Idriss Déby of Chad made a surprise visit to Khartoum for talks with President Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan on Monday after ties between the oil-producing countries had hit bottom, with each supporting rebels fighting the other’s government.

Source: New York Times

Darfur: International Criminal Court’s Decision on Bashir Arrest Warrant

On February 3, 2010, the International Criminal Court (ICC) appeals chamber decided to reject the standard used to exclude genocide charges in the ICC's arrest warrant for President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan.

Last year, on March 4, 2009, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I issued an arrest warrant for al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Darfur. At that time, the Pre-Trial Chamber rejected the inclusion of genocide charges in the warrant on the basis that the prosecutor did not present "reasonable grounds to believe" that the Sudanese government possessed the necessary intent for the crime of genocide.

"Today's decision is a strong reminder that President al-Bashir is wanted for heinous crimes committed in Darfur," said Elise Keppler, International Justice Program senior counsel at Human Rights Watch. "President al-Bashir is a fugitive from justice who needs to appear in The Hague to answer to the allegations against him."

With today's decision, the appeals chamber instructed the pre-trial chamber to reassess the inclusion of genocide charges under a revised standard and amend the arrest warrant as necessary.

Source: Human Rights Watch

Alpha Blondy Moves Summerstage

A sea of energetic fans from all over the world welcomed Alpha Blondy, known as the “African Bob Marley” to New York City’s Central Park Summerstage on Sunday, July 19th.  The opening acts included performances by Lee “Scratch” Perry, identified as the “father” of reggae and Dubblestandart Sound System. The Ivorian reggae artist branded for his activism ignited this eclectic audience with his strong political lyrics that convey global peace and unity.

The origins of the crowd ranged from Brooklynites, to people from Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Diaspora of Africa. The celebration and dancing to the rhythms of his dynamic 12-piece band, the Solar System was non-stop. Alpha’s poignant songs for the evening where Cocody Rock and Peace in Liberia. He unified and uplifted his fans by combining a mini speech with chants into the microphone “Peace in Iraq, Peace in Afghanistan, Peace in Israel and Palestine, Peace in Sudan, Peace in Eritrea…” In the early months of 2008, an American tour was scheduled and was canceled as a result of Alpha experiencing serious health problems. His latest CD was released in 2007 titled “Jah Victory.”

Blondy was named as United Nations Ambassador of Peace for Cote D’Ivoire in 2005 and continuously remains dedicated to his humanitarian efforts through his charitable foundation Alpha Blondy Jah Glory. His mission is to eradicate generational poverty by providing grass roots social programs that are beneficial to the lives of underprivileged children and women from villages within Africa and Haiti.

The foundation’s remarkable programs are Tafari Genesis Retreat Camp and the Micro Loan Program. The camp is considered a safe haven, and escape, for many children who are victims of civil war, and chronic life threatening illnesses like sickle-cell anemia, AIDS and malaria. Alpha Blondy believes, “It should not hurt to be a child.” The plague of HIV and AIDS is causing many children to become orphans who are left to be raised by elders or grandmothers.

The Micro Loan Program provides training and financing as little as $50.00 U.S. dollars to assist women who have become head of households to manage, operate, and start their own businesses. Overall, Alpha Blondy empowers communities to become self sufficient by learning and utilizing basic skills. This concept generates opportunities for many women to maintain their integrity, rebuild confidence as well as provide for their families.

Source: Jamati

Zuma Should Grasp Opportunity to Break With the Recent Past

South Africa's new government should make human rights a central pillar of its foreign policy agenda, Human Rights Watch said today in a letter to President-elect Jacob Zuma.

Human Rights Watch expressed concern that in recent years - including during its two-year stint as a member of the United Nations Security Council - South Africa has chosen to side with some of the worst human rights abusers, including Iran, Burma, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. While it justifiably criticized the human rights practices of the United States and Israel and sought reform of international institutions, Pretoria failed to take the moral high ground and build a broad north-south alliance around strengthening international law and human rights. As a result, it squandered its international reputation, which it had so effectively built up in the 1990s, as a champion of human rights and the rule of law. "South Africans and their supporters all over the world who had such high hopes for this country's leadership on human rights felt betrayed by the previous government," said Georgette Gagnon, Africa director at Human Rights Watch. "This is a chance for Zuma to take the high road and restore credibility and balance to South Africa's foreign policy."

Human Rights Watch called attention to situations in three nations where South African leadership could lead to significant improvements and progress in human rights: Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zimbabwe.

In Sudan, a number of interlinking issues continue to undermine human rights. The major elements are: the armed conflict, lack of security, and obstruction of humanitarian aid in Darfur; African Union and Arab League moves to help President Omar al-Bashir evade justice; and the threat of renewed north-south conflict between Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Those responsible for the worst crimes in Darfur know they will not face justice and the Sudanese government has used the International Criminal Court's (ICC) arrest warrant for al-Bashir as a pretext to expel international humanitarian organizations, unnecessarily endangering further the lives of millions of civilians in Darfur.

Human Rights Watch called on the new South African government to: support the ICC's work in Sudan and the principles of international justice, and press other African countries to do the same; and press Sudan to reverse its decision to expel humanitarian agencies, and reinstate the full scope of humanitarian assistance in Darfur.

In its letter to President-elect Zuma, Human Rights Watch also detailed how the new government could help end the rampant abuses in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and help set the country firmly on a democratic footing. To its great credit, South Africa has contributed a substantial number of peacekeeping troops to the United Nations force in Congo. The UN force is involved in joint military operations with Congolese government forces against brutal Hutu militias like the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR).

But UN peacekeepers have so far been unsuccessful in restraining government soldiers from also committing abuses against civilians. To make matters worse, the deputy commander of the Congolese military force is reported to be Bosco Ntaganda, a former rebel commander who has been charged with war crimes by the ICC. Human Rights Watch said that South African forces should not be standing by while abuses are taking place or working with people like Ntaganda.

Human Rights Watch called on the new government to help the Congolese government establish a vetting mechanism to remove from the army and police individuals accused of serious human rights violations, and to ensure that they are brought to justice rather than promoted; and press the Congolese authorities to punish abusive soldiers and their commanders and to bring abuses to a halt.

In Zimbabwe, despite the formation of a new power-sharing government, the crisis persists and human rights abuses continue. Police continue to intimidate and arrest activists, and supporters of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), the longtime governing party, continue their violent invasions of commercial farms. Police and prosecuting authorities who have remained under the control of ZANU-PF in the power-sharing government have continued politically motivated prosecutions of political opponents and have failed to investigate ongoing allegations of torture. Key state and judicial institutions remain partisan and unreformed. The government is yet to initiate comprehensive legislative reforms and repeal repressive laws like the Public Order and Security Act, Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, as well as a litany of laws that restrict media operations.

Human Rights Watch called on the new South African government to: monitor closely the progress of all parties to Zimbabwe's power-sharing agreement in carrying out all commitments they made as part of the Global Political Agreement, including respecting individual rights, passing human rights-centered legislative reforms, drafting a new constitution, and holding fresh elections that meet international standards of freedom and fairness; and press Zimbabwe's inclusive government to commit to, and institute, genuine political change. "The new government of President Zuma should establish early on that it is committed to playing a positive role in ending repression and abuses not only on the continent but in other parts of the world," Gagnon said. "Zimbabwe is an obvious place to start."

Source: Human Rights Watch

Omar Hassan al-Bashir

On June 30, 1989, Lieut. Gen. Omar Hassan al-Bashir, a military leader in Sudan, seized power in a bloodless coup backed by Islamists. He assumed the presidency in 1993.

He has been accused of genocide by the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and has been vilified throughout the world as an incorrigible mass murderer bent on slaughtering his own people in the conflict-riddled region of Darfur.

He has stayed in power, appealing to national pride and causing deep-seated fears that the nation could tumble into Somalia-like chaos if he were removed.

In February 2009, judges at the International Criminal Court approved a warrant for his arrest. According to court lawyers and diplomats, the judges rejected diplomatic requests to allow more time for peace negotiations in Darfur.

The criminal court judges took more than seven months to examine the evidence on Mr. Bashir before charging him, on March 4, 2009, with five counts of crimes against humanity, including murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture and rape. The two counts of war crimes were for attacks against a civilian population and for pillaging. In their statement, the judges said the court did not recognize immunity for a head of state and called for the cooperation of all countries - not just the 108 nations that are members of the court - to bring Mr. Bashir to justice.

The question of whether genocide was being committed in Darfur has been divisive, and was so among the judges, who said 2-to-1 that the prosecutor had not provided sufficient evidence of the government's intent, the key issue in determining genocide. The Bush administration and other governments, as well as some human rights activists, have called the attacks on civilians government's actions genocide. The United Nations has stopped short of doing so.

It is the first time the court has sought to detain a sitting head of state, and it could further complicate the tense, international debate over how to solve the Darfur crisis.

In announcing his request for a warrant, the prosecutor in the case, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, said that Mr. Bashir had "masterminded and implemented" a plan to destroy three main ethnic groups in Darfur, the Fur, the Masalit and the Zaghawa. The prosecutor said that the president, responding to attacks by rebel groups seeking greater autonomy, had used government soldiers and Arab militias and had "purposefully targeted civilians" belonging to these groups, killing 35,000 people "outright" in attacks on towns and villages.

Although there has been sporadic fighting in Darfur for decades, the conflict significantly intensified in 2003, when the rebel groups attacked Sudanese forces. The Arab-led government responded with a ferocious counterinsurgency campaign, which the prosecutor called a genocidal strategy against Darfur's black African ethnic groups.

The Sudanese forces and government-sponsored militias swept the countryside. They burned down villages, raped countless women and drove hundreds of thousands of people off their land, all part of an effort to put down the rebellion. Mr. Moreno-Ocampo has accused Mr. Bashir of being the mastermind of this strategy, the one with "absolute control."

There is broad concern that removing Mr. Bashir from power could threaten a landmark peace treaty between the Sudanese government and other rebels in the southern part of the country. The treaty was signed in 2005 to end a civil war in which 2.2 million people died, far more than in Darfur.

Source: New York Times

U.S. Africa Command Stands Up

On the first day of October, the new United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) became fully operational. The last major action proposed by former defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the new command is chartered to support U.S. military and diplomatic initiatives across a huge continent and among an enormously diverse population. It's no secret that the decision to establish the command was controversial in Africa, and that reception initially ranged from cool to frosty, though that is said to be warming slightly.

Certainly the new command is making every effort to appear helpful and collaborative. The four-star commander has two deputy commanders, one three-star for military operations and one ambassador for civil-military relations; its mission statement and other supporting guidance focus on "soft" activities like conflict prevention, consultation and aid. Signally, the title "combatant command," another holdover from the Rumsfeld era, does not appear, replaced instead by "regional military command" and the more historic "unified command." Considering the state of affairs on the African continent, this is all to the good.

Despite understandable uneasiness (or confusion) in some African capitols, this is a propitious time for Africom to stand up. First, change is coming to Africa, though unevenly. In the Moslem north, would-be moderate Arab states are clashing with radical Islamist movements. In the south, states like Botswana are emerging as stable countries after decades of post-colonial and post-Cold War violence; South Africa, the regional powerhouse, continues its emergence from apartheid to a true modern, multiparty democracy. American objectives and policies, distracted by ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and chastened by reality, are more likely to be more consultative and expectations are likely to be more modest than when the Neocons made sweeping gestures over large-scale maps. As a result, U.S. Africa Command's operations are likely to be more truly sensitive to the concerns and needs of host countries than previously, and the United States will be less likely to blunder into ill-considered adventures on the continent. The command's new structure and the military-civil makeup of its staff holds out the hope that U.S. civil-military operations will at long last be better coordinated.

There are certainly reasons why the United States should be involved in Africa's continued development. The command's area of operations covers 53 African countries, ranging from stable democracies to utterly failed states like Somalia. Aside from internal strife from tribalism or other political friction, disintegrative narco-criminal gangs and burgeoning Islamic radicalism challenge many of Africa's 53 states. State terrorism, such as in Sudan, continues to be a source of instability and terror. Finally, the potential reemergence of great-power competition for Africa's natural resources, and in particular its energy supplies, supports a greater American focus on the continent's diverse challenges and opportunities. There has never been a real issue about whether we should take an interest in Africa; the question was always how. Here are a few suggestions for the new commander and his staff.

First, it's essential that every member of the command understand the essentially modest contribution that a headquarters of 1300 people can actually make in Africa, an enormous continent of 800 million people, where nearly half of the population is under the age of 15, where disease and malnutrition are rampant in vast areas and where, despite chaotic conditions, the economy is expected to grow 6.2 per cent next year. A strong dose of humility, and a focus on supporting the aspirations of emerging states, will go a long way.

Second, do not underestimate the great value of American diversity. While the conditions of the African diasporas to the United States was tragic, the consequences are that Africa is the ancestral home to a huge number of Americans, forging common ties of blood and kin not found with any other major power. In a sense, Africans see their African-American descendants "returning" to Africa, much like Irish-Americans going "home" to Erie. This can give the United States a huge advantage in overcoming bitter memories of colonialism if our policies and objectives recognize it.

Third, given the scope and diversity of the continent, U.S. Africa Command's activities will necessarily bring the command much closer to U.S. diplomatic missions and the chiefs of missions, the resident U.S. Ambassador. Given the Africa Command's mission and operational dynamics, the U.S. missions will essentially be the command's "maneuver units," and it is vital for the command and the U.S. ambassadors in the region to work out effective relationships. Even given the necessity for military-to-military contacts, it is the U.S. ambassador, not the commander of Africa Command, who should be the "face" of U.S. policy toward, say, South Africa or Gambia. Rather, U.S. Africa Command's dedication to effective civil-military cooperation should extend beyond its staff, and include recognition of, and support to, U.S. ambassadors and their resident military assistance teams, if present. U.S. foreign policy has a long history of confusion and occasionally conflict between diplomats and soldiers; Africom should dedicate time and effort to insuring that "conflict prevention" -- part of the Africom concept of operations -- begins at home.

Fourth, the Africom staff, teamed with appropriate Department of Defense officials, should propose and support legislation designed to untangle the present laws and regulations governing military assistance. The present laws governing U.S. assistance generally, and military assistance in particular, date back to the passionate 1970s, when legislators set out to clip the wings of military adventurism. The past decade has awakened many in Washington for the need for a fundamental rewrite, but until the present there has been no service or agency willing to take on the bone-wearying, long-term task of seeing military assistance untangled, and the advent of a new administration -- of whatever party -- makes it probable that there won't be movement on this unglamorous but vital subject for at least a couple of years. As a new command with an obvious stake in the outcome, the new military-civilian hybrid headquarters could well take this on.

Fifth, and along the lines of military assistance, the number of African military officers attending U.S. military schools should be ramped up. "African" covers a lot of ground, and in this case includes both the cosmopolitan, Europeanized officer corps of the Mediterranean littoral with those of the deepest interior. Not only would all take back to their home countries ties with America and American officers -- some of whose careers would intersect with their African classmates over the years -- but the command's, and America's interests would be considerably advanced. At present, attendance at U.S. service schools is too expensive, handled by the State Department instead of more expeditiously by Defense, and too restricted by Service classroom space; all should be reversed. Costs should be cut or shared, the Defense Department should have the lead on defense-related schools, and more classroom space should be made available. The lure of a school in the United States is a potent sweetener for military-to-military relations, and U.S. Africa Command should make this an urgent priority above other legislation outlined above. Finally, the command should vigorously resist the well-meaning suggestion, made in some quarters, that special schools or courses should be organized for African officers. The ghettoization of African officers to second-rate schools -- for that is exactly how it would be perceived on the continent -- would be deeply resented, and would frustrate the strategic intent of schooling foreign officers in American classes, alongside American counterparts.

At a recent conference, retired ambassador Bob Houdek, a senior official with wide experience in Africa and the national intelligence community, spoke urgently against the placement of Africom headquarters in Africa itself. Ambassador Houdek pointed out that the establishment of a thousand-person headquarters, with families and homes maintained to U.S. standard, with the attendant and necessary security measures --walls, barbed-wire fences, armored cars -- would create the appearance of a colonial oasis in the midst of a country most liable to be in poverty, and at the mercy of unanticipated coups and changes of government. Better, he said convincingly, to put the headquarters in the United States, as in the case of Central Command, and commute to advanced command posts in Africa when necessary. The United States, he pointed out, is in the process of closing a number of posts in the United States that could easily accommodate a unified command headquarters at a minimum of the cost of establishing a U.S. base in Africa.

Whatever the final form it takes, the establishment of U.S. Africa Command is a good idea whose time has come -- finally. The command's emphasis on civil-military integration and a low-key operational profile is appropriate and well suited to its mission. We should wish it well.

Source: USAFRICOM

South Africa's Human Rights Reputation Tarnished

As a member of the United Nations security council for two years, South Africa has had many opportunities to speak out forcefully for human rights - or to join those speaking out against them. Again and again, it has chosen the latter course. The South African government's unwillingness to confront President Robert Mugabe on his extremely abusive governance of Zimbabwe is well known to South Africans, and justly controversial. Less well known are the many other important international issues on which the South African government has sided with reactionary rather than progressive forces.

Burma is the best-known case. With Russia and China, South Africa has blocked efforts to condemn the military government's lethal crackdown on peaceful protesters last year. Perhaps the department of foreign affairs has forgotten that, when Burma was still democratic, it demanded that the evils of apartheid, including the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, should be brought before the security council.

The international solidarity movement against apartheid constantly confronted the argument that what happened inside a country's borders was none of the rest of the world's business. That is precisely the argument that the South African government now makes frequently at the security council. It narrowly defines what constitutes a "threat to international peace and security", and insists that all other matters be taken up at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. Meanwhile, in Geneva, outside the limelight, South Africa has demonstrated a similar pattern - failing to support key resolutions condemning human rights abuses in countries from Iran to Uzbekistan, and aligning itself with countries whose human rights records are, by anyone's standard, abysmal.

At the UN this month, a diplomatic struggle is shaping up to be South Africa's lowest moment yet. The issue is Darfur, and more specifically the request by the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for an arrest warrant for Omar al-Bashir, the Sudanese president. The accusation: genocide and crimes against humanity, the world's most serious crimes. News of the warrant request was greeted with joy among the millions of Darfuris who have been driven from their homes by government forces acting in concert with janjaweed militias. Tens of thousands of Africans have died in this civil war, most of them civilians, and most of them as a result of Sudanese government actions.

The Sudanese government has begun a concerted campaign to evade justice for these crimes and the South African government has become its accomplice. Together with Libya, also on the security council, South Africa has been leading an effort to suspend the International Criminal Court's request for the next 12 months. Suspending the request for an arrest warrant would send a clear signal, not only to the Sudanese government, but also to tyrants everywhere that they can continue to cheat justice through international political machination. I was present at the negotiations on the treaty for the International Criminal Court 10 years ago in Rome, and listened with admiration to the speech of Dullah Omar, the South African justice minister, in ringing support of this important new human rights institution. Achieving a strong treaty at those talks was an uphill battle, but we won. Only the steadfast leadership of South Africa, along with a handful of others, overcame the opposition of major powers such as the United States, China and Israel.

The International Criminal Court is not an anti-African institution, as some have alleged. It is a pro-African institution: pro-civilians in Darfur whose villages have been burned to the ground, pro-women in the Democratic Republic of Congo who have been raped in wartime, pro-children in northern Uganda who have been abducted as child soldiers. It is opposed to government and rebel leaders responsible for such crimes, no matter where they live.

The prosecutor has also been looking into situations in Colombia and Afghanistan, as well as crimes committed in the Russian-Georgian armed conflict. It is truly heartbreaking to see South Africa preparing to abandon the court at a critical juncture in its history. Sadly, it appears to be part of a trend that is putting Pretoria's foreign policy on the wrong side of history. Perhaps only a fervent and sustained outcry from South African society can restore the country to its rightful path and begin to repair the damage that has already been done to its reputation.

Source: Human Rights Watch

State of Anarchy

Since mid-2005, hundreds of civilians have been killed, more than 10 thousand houses burned, and approximately 212,000 persons have fled their homes in terror to live in desperate conditions deep in the bush in northern Central African Republic (CAR). Bordering eastern Chad and war-ravaged Darfur in Sudan, this area has been destabilized by at least two major rebellions against the government of President Franois Boziz.

The vast majority of summary executions and unlawful killings, and almost all village burnings, have been carried out by government forces, often in reprisal for rebel attacks. While both main rebel groups have been responsible for widespread looting and the forced taxation of the civilian population in areas they control -and rebels in the northeast have committed killings, beatings, and rape -their abuses pale in comparison to those of the Central African Armed Forces (Forces armes Centrafricaines,FACA) and the elite Presidential Guard (Garde prsidentielle, GP). As the International Criminal Court (ICC) begins investigations into atrocities committed during the 2002-2003 rebellion against former President Patass, it should also investigate possible war crimes under its jurisdiction committed in the current round of fighting.

This report documents the human rights abuses and breaches of international humanitarian law being committed in northern CAR and describes the make-up, origins, and aims of the most significant rebel groups. The Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (Arme populaire pour la restauration de la Rpublique et la dmocratie, APRD) is active in the northwestern provinces of Ouham, Ouham-Pend, and Nana-Grbizi. The Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (Union des forces dmocratiques pour la rassemblement,UFDR) is most active in remote northeastern provinces of Bamingui-Bangoran and Vakaga.

In February and March 2007 Human Rights Watch researchers visited the majority of towns and villages affected, documenting summary executions, unlawful killings, beatings, house burnings, extortion and unlawful taxation, the recruitment and use of children as soldiers, and many other human rights abuses. Human Rights Watch researchers interviewed over 100 persons, including many victims and witnesses, local and regional government officials, military commanders, rebel officials, religious leaders, and representatives of local and international humanitarian organizations active in northern CAR.

Until quite recently there was little international awareness of the situation in northern CAR. However, in 2006, human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law began to receive some attention. The killings, village burnings, displacement, and humanitarian suffering are now occasionally reported in the international press and are the subject of increasing diplomatic notice, usually being seen as "spill-over" from the continuing crisis in Darfur.

Little attention, however, has been paid to the actual dynamics of conflict, which are largely home grown. The main rebel protagonists are Central Africans with local grievances. Human Rights Watch's research suggests that the degree of linkage with the situation in Darfur has been exaggerated. The APRD in the northwest is so poorly equipped that it is difficult to imagine it has foreign sponsorship. Human Rights Watch has found no other evidence of such support. Although there have been contacts between the UFDR and Sudan-sponsored Chadian rebels opposed to the Chadian President Dby based in the northeast of CAR in early 2006, foreign support does not appear to be a driving force behind this rebellion.

Neither has attention been paid to the issue of responsibility for human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law, nor to action to ensure accountability. The sorry fact is that the perpetrators of violence and abuse, the majority of them government soldiers, have so far enjoyed total impunity for acts that include war crimes.
The APRD Rebellion

The APRD rebellion in the northwest was launched almost immediately after controversial 2005 elections led to the election of General Boziz as President. These had excluded the candidacy of ex-President Patass, who had been overthrown by General Boziz in March 2003. The leadership of the APRD rebellion consists mostly of former Presidential Guards of Patass, himself from the region. The APRD has about 1,000 poorly equipped members, including 200 rebels armed with automatic weapons, and another 600 with home-made hunting weapons. They claim their aim is to engage in "dialogue" to address the political exclusion of Patass and his supporters and to improve the security situation in the northwest, rather than to overthrow the government.

One of the main grievances of the population of the northwest is lack of security. Armed bandits, known as zaraguinas or coupeurs de route, regularly attack villagers and have taken advantage of insufficient security provided by the state to increase attacks. The zaraguinas commonly kidnap children for ransom and regularly kill civilians during raids. Many cattle-herders from the Peulh ethnic groupin the northwest, particularly targeted because of their valuable livestock, have fled to the safety of larger towns and refugee camps in Chad. Along with the political grievances of former Patass supporters, the failure of the CAR security forces to protect local communities from banditry is an important element in the development of the APRD, and many local armed self-defense groups have merged into the rebel group.
The UFDR Rebellion

From October to December 2006, the UFDR rebel movement gained international attention by seizing military control of the major towns in the remote Vakaga and Bamingui-Bangoran provinces of northeastern CAR, right on the border of Sudan's Darfur region. The UFDR's bold military offensive led to French military intervention on behalf of the CAR government in December 2006, allowing the security forces to regain control of urban centers.

The UFDR rebellion has its roots in the deep marginalization of northeastern CAR, which is virtually cut off from the rest of the country and is almost completely undeveloped. Elements from the Gula ethnic group, many of them trained militarily as anti-poaching units, are at the core of the rebellion, citing grievances such as discrimination against their community and the alleged embezzlement by the CAR authorities of compensation funds received from the Sudanese government following clashes perpetrated by Sudanese nomads in 2002. As the rebellion has grown, a backlash of anti-Gula sentiment among government officials, the military, and the general population has developed. As a result, most of the Gula population has fled government-controlled areas in fear of retaliation.

A second element making up the UFDR is Boziz's own former colleagues, so-called ex-librateurs, who participated in his overthrow of former President Patass in 2003. They accuse Boziz of betraying his promises and failing to compensate them for their support.
Abuses by FACA and GP Forces

Since the beginning of the conflict in mid 2005 with rebel forces in northern CAR, the CAR security forces have committed serious and widespread abuses against the civilian population, including multiple summary executions and unlawful killings, widespread burning of civilian homes, and the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians, which have instilled terror in the civilian population. In most instances, these village burnings and killings were in direct response to recent rebel activity in the area and amount to unlawful reprisals against the civilian population. It is the FACA and GP that have been responsible for the vast majority of the most serious human rights abuses in the conflict, and they have carried out these atrocities in full confidence of impunity from accountability for their crimes.

During the course of its research, Human Rights Watch documented 119 summary executions and unlawful killings committed by government security forces in both the northwest and northeast (the vast majority in the northwest), including at least 51 committed since late 2005 by a single military unit, the Bossangoa-based GP unit, commanded at the time by Lieutenant Eugne Ngakoss.

Human Rights Watch believes that the killings it has documented are only a fraction of the total number of those committed by government security forces. Since the beginning of the conflict these are estimated to amount to many hundreds. Killings committed by security forces have often involved dozens of civilian deaths in a single day and have often included unspeakable brutality. For example, on February 11, 2006, a single GP unit killed at least 30 civilians in more than a dozen separate villages located along the Nana-Barya to Bmal road. On March 22, this same GP unit beheaded a teacher in Bmal, cutting off his head with a knife while he was still alive. Other civilians have simply "disappeared" in military custody, arrested and not seen alive again.

Since December 2005, government forces, particularly the GP, have also been almost solely responsible for the burning down of more than 10,000 civilian homes in northwestern CAR. Hundreds of villages across vast swathes of northern CAR have been destroyed. Troops arrive in villages and indiscriminately fire into the civilian population, forcing them to flee before burning down their homes, sometimes looting them first. In December 2005, GP forces burned down 500 to 900 houses in the Markounda area. A Human Rights Watch count in the Batangafo-Kabo-Ouandago-Kaga Bandoro area found a total of 2,923 burned homes, including more than 1,000 homes in the large market town of Ouandago alone. In some places every single home in every single village was burned. Similarly massive destruction can be found all around the town of Paoua, all the way east to Nana Baryahundreds of kilometers of villages destroyed by government security forces.

The reprisal and counterinsurgency tactics of the CAR security forces have affected the lives of over 1 million people and have forced an estimated 212,000 civilians to abandon their road-side homes and live deep inside the bush, too fearful to return to their burned villages in case of repeat attack. Another 78,000 have sought refuge in neighboring Chad and Cameroon. The level of civilian fear in northern CAR is palpable. People are simply not to be seen in many areas, hiding far away. At the sound of approaching cars, everyone flees, dropping their possessions, sometimes even abandoning babies in their haste.

Living conditions for the displaced are life-threatening. They have no access to clean water, are often desperately short of food supplies, and their widely dispersed shelters are beyond the reach of the humanitarian community. Educational facilities have been closed, and aside from mobile clinics run by international organizations in some areas, health care is non-existent.
Rebel Abuses

APRD rebels in the northwest have engaged in widespread extortion, forced taxation, kidnappings for ransom, and beatings of civilians, particularly in the Batangafo-Kabo-Ouandago area of Ouham province. In that area, particularly on the Batangafo-Ouandago road, almost all villages have been systematically looted of all livestock, and village leaders have been regularly kidnapped for ransom. APRD rebels also have large numbers of child soldiers in their ranks, some as young as 12. APRD commanders expressed willingness to Human Rights Watch to demobilize the child soldiers if the post-demobilization security of the children could be guaranteed.

During its investigation in the field, Human Rights Watch documented one summary execution by the APRD (the killing of Mohammed Haroon in June 2006, in Gbazera) and did not identify any cases of home-burning by the group. Human Rights Watch has not received any credible additional reports of summary killings or village burnings by APRD rebels from local or international human rights organizations or journalists. On June 11, 2007, APRD rebels fired upon a vehicle of the international humanitarian organization Doctors without Borders (Mdecins Sans Frontires, MSF), killing Elsa Serfass, an MSF nurse. While the APRD immediately apologized for the incident, saying it had been a "mistake," the persons responsible should be held to account.

Human Rights Watch's research found that UFDR rebels in the northeast have carried out widespread abuses against the civilian population. During attacks on villages and towns they have often indiscriminately fired at fleeing civilians, leading to unlawful killings. Meanwhile, UFDR rebels have been responsible for summary executions of captured civilians. From October to December 2006, the rebels carried out massive looting of the belongings and livestock of the civilian population in areas they controlled. There have been allegations of rape by UFDR rebels, although Human Rights Watch has only been able to corroborate one case-a woman raped by five UFDR rebels during their brief capture of Birao in March 2007. The UFDR also has child soldiers in its ranks, and Human Rights Watch found that some of them had been forcibly recruited.
The Need for Protection

Establishing credible mechanisms to protect the civilian population from abuses is fundamental to addressing the human rights crisis in northern CAR. The responsibility for civilian protection lies first and foremost with the CAR authorities: they must take immediate steps to end military abuses and to re-establish a functioning police force and court system that serve to protect the rights of the civilian population.

However, the international community can also do more. A stronger international protection presence in the north is urgently needed. There already is a substantial UN human rights presence in CAR, in the form of a 19-person human rights unit in the office of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the Central African Republic (Bureau d'appui des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix en Rpublique centrafricaine, BONUCA), a long-standing UN peace support mission established in 2000. However, the human rights unit has been largely passive to date and does not effectively monitor or report on human rights abuses in the north. The UN should take the necessary measures, including changes to the mandate of the human rights section, to ensure that the BONUCA human rights unit effectively monitors and reports on human rights abuses in the north, in the same way that the human rights units of UN peacekeeping missions operate in neighboring Sudan and DRC.

If the UN Security Council moves ahead with the deployment of a UN protection mission to CAR and Chad, that mission should focus on the real protection needs of the civilian population of both countries, and not focus solely on neutralizing the "spill-over effect" of the Darfur crisis.
The Need for Accountability

The crimes being committed in northern CAR by government security forces are no secret inside the country. Local newspapers and radio frequently report them, opposition parliamentarians have prepared public reports documenting the atrocities, and diplomatic envoys regularly raise their concerns with President Boziz. Despite this, the government has not investigated, prosecuted, or punished a single military officer, or even publicly reprimanded them for any of the abuses. Even in the capital, Bangui, security forces carry out summary killings of suspected bandits and rebels with impunity. During Human Rights Watch's visit, two handcuffed Chadian rebel suspects were executed on the outskirts of Bangui by security forces. The commander of the most notorious of the units, Lieutenant Eugne Ngakoss of the Bossangoa-based GP unit that has killed dozens of civilians and is directly implicated in most of the village burnings in the north, remains a free man and an active duty military officer to date.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor's office is already involved in the CAR, having announced in May 2007 that they would investigate crimes committed in CAR during the 2002-2003 fighting, and that they would continue to monitor possible crimes committed during the current conflict. The investigations of the ICC in CAR should not, however, detract from the primary obligation of the CAR authorities to end impunity and bring about accountability for crimes committed by its armed forces and others. Ultimately, the crisis in northern CAR will only be resolved when law and order is restored, and the institutions of justice have the capacity to punish those who commit crimes against the civilian population, including members of the army and the elite GP.

The international community-particularly France, without whose direct military support the government of President Boziz would not survive-have an obligation to speak out about the abuses in northern CAR and to demand accountability for the crimes committed in northern CAR.

Source: Human Rights Watch

Darfur force 'to be all-African'

Africa will provide all of the 26,000 peacekeepers to be sent to Sudan's Darfur region, the head of the African Union (AU) has said. AU chairman Alpha Oumar Konare said enough African troops had been promised for no outside help to be needed but he did not give details.

The UN had expected to call on Asian troops. Critics say Africa lacks enough trained troops for an effective force. Sudan's government has long opposed the involvement of non-African soldiers. It only agreed to a joint United Nations-AU force after months of negotiations. The UN Security Council resolution setting up the force said the troops would be mostly African but they would be under UN command.

UN spokesman Farhan Haq said that while there may be enough AU troops for the force, it was important to get the right mix of abilities on the ground. "It's not simply a question of raw numbers of troops - we're trying to find a good mix of skills," he told the BBC News website. "We're looking to make sure this force is robust, it's mobile, it's well-armed and equipped, so that it can carry out the full mandate that it needs to perform."

Speaking after talks in Khartoum with the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, Mr Konare said: "I can confirm today that we have received sufficient commitments from African countries that we will not have to resort to non-African forces." He added that the "ball is now in the court of the UN" to provide funding for the force.

Mr Bashir, who has long argued that a UN-backed force would be a violation of Sudan's sovereignty and could worsen the situation there, backed Mr Konare's plan. "[We] support the AU force, which consolidates the efforts of the Sudanese government to ensure security, peace and stability in Darfur," he said after their meeting. Mr Konare did not give a breakdown of the countries offering to supply more personnel, leading correspondents to question the viability of an all-African force.

BBC Africa analyst David Bamford said it was unclear where so many African troops would come from. Senegal and Malawi have promised to send peacekeepers to Darfur, while the AU has said that Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia and Nigeria have also promised to contribute.

Hafiz Mohamed from lobby group Justice Africa said Sudan would be able to manipulate AU troops - as he said they had been doing with the 7,000 AU troops already in Darfur. "This will affect the whole credibility of the new resolution," he told the BBC's Network Africa programme.

Mr Konare's announcement came just days after the UN published a list of Asian countries it said had already committed troops and police officers to a Darfur force. UN officials said the joint AU-UN force would be "predominantly African", but confirmed that countries including Indonesia, Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh had pledged personnel.

According to a UN resolution, the composition of the force must be decided by 30 August. At least 200,000 people are believed to have died and more than two million have been left homeless in Darfur since fighting broke out in 2003. Sudan's Arab dominated government, and the pro-government Janjaweed militias, are accused of war crimes against the region's black African population - although the UN has stopped short of calling it genocide. Sudan has always denied backing the Janjaweed militias and argued that the problems in Darfur were being exaggerated for political reasons.

Source: BBC

Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur

This 85-page report documents the role of more than a dozen named civilian and military officials in the use and coordination of “Janjaweed” militias and the Sudanese armed forces to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur since mid-2003.

Omar al-Bashir, as commander-in-chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces, played a pivotal leadership role in the military campaign in Darfur. His public statements were precursors to military operations and to peaks in abuses by Sudanese security forces. There are indications that they echoed the private directives given to civilian administration and military and security services. For instance, on December 30, 2003, al-Bashir announced that: "Our top priority will be the annihilation of the rebellion and any outlaw who carries arms." A few days later, in January 2004, the Sudanese security forces began an offensive that used systematic force in violation of international humanitarian law to drive hundreds of thousands of people from rural areas in Darfur. The methodological use of aerial support to target civilians in the military campaign, despite protests from air force officers, also appears to reflect the involvement of high-level officials in Khartoum.

Human Rights Watch concluded that beginning in May 2002, even before the more devastating phases of the conflict, al-Bashir was very likely aware of abuses committed by the security forces in Darfur. By mid-2004, reports of tens of thousands of displaced people and information from dozens of police complaints, press accounts, and reports by numerous organizations, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, made it clear that massive abuses were taking place in Darfur. Apart from this specific information, the government's previous use of ethnic militias in the southern Sudan conflict provided ample warning that such forces invariably targeted civilians and committed other war crimes.

Source: Human Rights Watch

International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur

Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, here is this Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General from Geneva, dated 25 January 2005.

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, on 18 September 2004 the Security Council adopted resolution 1564 requesting, inter alia, that the Secretary-General ‘rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable’.

In October 2004, the Secretary General appointed Antonio Cassese (Chairperson), Mohamed Fayek, Hina Jilani, Dumisa Ntsebeza and Therese Striggner-Scott as members of the Commission and requested that they report back on their findings within three months. The Commission was supported in its work by a Secretariat headed by an Executive Director, Ms. Mona Rishmawi, as well as a legal research team and an investigative team composed of investigators, forensic experts, military analysts, and investigators specializing in gender violence, all appointed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Commission assembled in Geneva and began its work on 25 October 2004.

In order to discharge its mandate, the Commission endeavoured to fulfil four key tasks: (1) to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties; (2) to determine whether or not acts of genocide have occurred; (3) to identify the perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur; and (4) to suggest means of ensuring that those responsible for such violations are held accountable. While the Commission considered all events relevant to the current conflict in Darfur, it focused in particular on incidents that occurred between February 2003 and mid-January 2005.

The Commission engaged in a regular dialogue with the Government of the Sudan throughout its mandate, in particular through meetings in Geneva and in the Sudan, as well as through the work of its investigative team. The Commission visited the Sudan from 7-21 November 2004 and 9-16 January 2005, including travel to the three Darfur States. The investigative team remained in Darfur from November 2004 through January 2005. During its presence in the Sudan, the Commission held extensive meetings with representatives of the Government, the Governors of the Darfur States and other senior officials in the capital and at provincial and local levels, members of the armed forces and police, leaders of rebel forces, tribal leaders, internally displaced persons, victims and witnesses of violations, NGOs and United Nations representatives.

The Commission submitted a full report on its findings to the Secretary-General on 25 January 2005. The report describes the terms of reference, methodology, approach and activities of the Commission and its investigative team. It also provides an overview of the historical and social background to the conflict in Darfur. The report then addresses in detail the four key tasks referred to above, namely the Commission’s findings in relation to: i) violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by all parties; ii) whether or not acts of genocide have taken place; iii) the identification of perpetrators; and iv) accountability mechanisms. These four sections are briefly summarized here.

A copy of the report can be downloaded (in pdf format) here.

Now for Hire: South Africa's Out-of Work Commandos

To the old apartheid regime and supporters of its influence in this region, they were heroes, fighters who in units with names like Selous Scouts or Crowbar carried out devastating clandestine operations against neighboring countries or propped up clients of South Africa. To most of South Africa's neighbors, they were seen as brutal enforcers of this country's unchallenged dominance in the region.

With the apartheid era now over and the cold war a memory, South Africa's special forces, as they were known, briefly found themselves without a role. But now, with civil wars still dotting this continent and outside powers less interested than ever in becoming involved, scores of retired officers have signed on with a new breed of military outfit that straddles the line between the role of classic foreign adviser and outright guns for hire.

Nowhere have these new outfits played a larger role than in Angola, which has been embroiled in civil war for most of the last two decades. There, a Pretoria-based company known as Executive Outcomes has been credited with quickly turning around the civil war in favor of the nominally socialist Government, and forcing a settlement on Jonas Savimbi, leader of the badly battered rebel movement known as Unita, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. In the proxy conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa during the cold war, many of the 500 or so South African recruits with Executive Outcomes fought alongside Mr. Savimbi, a longtime client of South Africa and the United States. Their enemies at the time, in addition to the Angolan Army, were the 50,000 Cubans sent by Havana to bolster the forces of a Communist ally.

In addition to training Angolan Government soldiers, military observers here say that in the last two years the recruits have moved into remote bases that were abandoned after the Cubans pulled out in 1991, upgrading communications and flying highly effective combat sorties in Soviet-made Hind helicopters and MIG-23 fighters. "We consider that they made a very considerable difference to the success that M.P.L.A. has been able to achieve," said William Sass, a retired brigadier of the South African Defense Force, referring to the governing Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. "The line of what is a mercenary and what is not is a matter of interpretation, but they made an invaluable contribution to the operations of M.P.L.A. on the ground. If Unita had not signed the cease-fire, one could easily conceive of them having been wiped out."

South African officials describe Executive Outcomes as a dangerous outfit and concede that it could destabilize the region. So far, however, the officials say current laws leave the Government nearly powerless to crack down on such groups. With its Angolan successes high on its resume, Executive Outcomes has been aggressively marketing itself to other African countries with civil wars or other security problems. Just last week, the company announced that it had signed a deal with the Government of Sierra Leone to help its poorly organized army fight its civil war against a shadowy but increasingly effective rebel force known as the Revolutionary United Front.

Beyond Angola and Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes has declined to specify the African countries in which it is involved. Experts in African military affairs say there are indications that the group has opened talks with the Sudan, Somalia, Mozambique and Malawi.

With the arrival of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone, diplomats and other experts in African affairs say the chances for a peaceful resolution there may be receding. The country's leader, Capt. Valentine Strasser, has repeatedly offered to negotiate, but the rebels have said any talks must come after the withdrawal of foreign military personnel. Unlike the rebel movement in Angola, where an effective international embargo and the loss of his outside patrons prevented Mr. Savimbi from rearming, the insurgents in Sierra Leone have free rein over much of a mineral-rich countryside. With growing receipts from the sale of diamonds, timber, gold and other resources, there is little to stop them from beefing up their forces with outside help, thus turning a relatively low-intensity conflict into a much more devastating war.

Officials of Executive Outcomes have always declined to reveal the terms of their agreements with African countries, or even how many men they employ. Military experts and diplomats here say that the company typically pays $2,000 a month or more, and provides recruits with generous insurance coverage in case of injury or death. The company said that at least 10 recruits had been killed in Angola, including at least 2 executed by Mr. Savimbi's men. Officials of the company said that only Eeben Barlow, its general manager, who is a veteran of the Angolan conflict and a former officer in the South African intelligence service, was authorized to speak publicly about Executive Outcomes. But Mr. Barlow, who is 38, has neither returned calls nor responded to a detailed fax seeking comment. Assistants said he was out of the country this week and could not be reached.

In the past, Mr. Barlow has reacted angrily to suggestions that he is running a mercenary outfit. "Where the security in a country is a problem, we assist," he recently told the Reuters news agency. "We assist in water purification, construction and medical services. White South Africans are the only ones prepared to make a difference."

People familiar with the operations of the company scoff at the notion that civil construction is a large part of its activities. Instead, they describe a business that takes little interest in the moral implications of its work and is willing to sign on with whoever can pay them. If it is true that the company is primarily involved in training, experts say that its men also become closely involved in battlefield operations, if its record in Angola is any indication. "Our concern with Executive Outcomes is that something of a rogue in the region has been created," said Jackie Cilliers, director of the Institute for Defense Policy, a Johannesburg research organization. "While it may have actually contributed to a settlement in Angola, we may be witnessing the creation of something outside the control of government that could easily become a force for destabilization in Africa. It is guns for hire."

At the same time, people who have followed the company's involvement in Angola say it has expanded into numerous business ventures in areas like shipping, fishing and trucking. "These groups encourage a country not only to continue a war, but to escalate," said Aileen Marshall, an expert in conflict management at the Global Coalition for Africa, a Washington-based research organization of retired American diplomats, academics and former officials of several African countries. "Down the road there is the risk of a Cambodia-type situation where the Khmer Rouge are using gems and forests to fuel the war so that when the war ends the resources are either gone or are in illegal hands."

Source: New York Times