At Maternidade Lucrecia Paim, a maternity hospital in Luanda, capital of Angola, an average of 150 babies are born a day during summer. This average drops to 70 babies per day in winter. It goes without saying that this facility’s oxygen supply should be efficient and effective enough to accommodate this volume. Sadly, for the past 2 years the hospital has had to rely on the use of oxygen cylinders to replace its malfunctioned Pressure Swing Adsorption Oxygen System (PSA) installed by a European company.
This has created untold challenges for the medical board and exorbitant expenditure for the purchase of bulk oxygen and cylinders. In October 2011, in line with Angola’s ongoing quest to rehabilitate its health care services, quality award winning South African company Intaka Tech and Angsam which is Intaka Tech Angolan partner, was called in to identify the problems, find solutions and ultimately improve the systems and facilities in a cost effective manner.
After an extensive investigation by Intaka Tech’s technical team, lead by Celso Dos Santos, Head of the Gas Department, a two phase approach was proposed. Dos Santos, says: “To remedy the present situation, the 1st phase would involve installing a medical pipeline connecting the hospitals main supply. This would then supply medical oxygen and medical air from the current PSA system which would become the primary supply for the hospital. A full maintenance check of the PSA’s systems and both compressors currently installed would be conducted. New control systems which include GPRS (Remote control of all parameters of the system), an Oxygen Analyzer, a Flow Meter, a Flow Control Valve and a Bacteriological Filter would also be installed.
Once that has been completed and systems are operational at acceptable levels, the 2nd phase would follow. This includes the installation of two brand new PSA Concentrators (Model 050). These units each produce 18 cubic metres per hour of oxygen, and by using these units in conjunction with the current air compressors already in existence, would produce 35% more oxygen than the current system (this is due to Intaka Tech's latest GGS technologies). A backup system in the form of a brand new oxygen filling compressor with a capacity to fill 8 - 12 oxygen cylinders per day would also be installed."
It was then with much pride, that in May 2012, Intaka Tech received the go ahead to proceed with Phase 1 and 2. Phase 1 was completely in July 2012 and the hospital, to the relief and delight of hospital staff and the medical board, was fully operational.
Phase 2 should be complete by September/October 2012. This will ultimately lead to the complete elimination of cylinders being purchased, allowing the hospital to produce their own gas, fill its own cylinders and distribute medical gas to all areas in the hospital.
Intaka Tech has over the past 5 years, more than 80 systems running in countries like South Africa and Namibia. With the professional expertise and the growing track record of Intaka Tech in Africa, the medical board of Maternidade Lucrecia Paim, by engaging with Angsam and Intaka Tech, has without doubt, proven success in all areas. Intaka Tech is confident that they have the solutions for many crises in other medical facilities throughout Africa.
Source: Intaka
Showing posts with label Angola. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Angola. Show all posts
Monday, September 3, 2012
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
Togo footballers attacked by mistake
A senior official of the dissident group that launched a fatal ambush on the Togo football team has expressed his "condolences", saying rebels attacked their bus by mistake. Rodrigues Mingas, secretary general of the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Flec), said his fighters had meant to attack security guards as the convoy passed through the Angolan province of Cabinda, which sits wholly inside the Democratic Republic of Congo.
"This attack was not aimed at the Togolese players but at the Angolan forces at the head of the convoy," Mingas told France 24 television. "So it was pure chance that the gunfire hit the players. We don't have anything to do with the Togolese and we present our condolences to the African families and the Togo government. We are fighting for the total liberation of Cabinda."
Cabinda is responsible for half of Angola's oil production. Before the attack Flec was not thought to be a serious risk. Last month an Angolan minister without portfolio, António Bento Bembe, who is a former Flec fighter, said the group no longer existed. He claimed all that remained of Flec was a few individuals who were trying to attract unhappy Cabindans with false statements.
Source: Mail & Guardian
"This attack was not aimed at the Togolese players but at the Angolan forces at the head of the convoy," Mingas told France 24 television. "So it was pure chance that the gunfire hit the players. We don't have anything to do with the Togolese and we present our condolences to the African families and the Togo government. We are fighting for the total liberation of Cabinda."
Cabinda is responsible for half of Angola's oil production. Before the attack Flec was not thought to be a serious risk. Last month an Angolan minister without portfolio, António Bento Bembe, who is a former Flec fighter, said the group no longer existed. He claimed all that remained of Flec was a few individuals who were trying to attract unhappy Cabindans with false statements.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Sunday, January 10, 2010
One dead in attack on Togo soccer team
Gunmen opened fire on a bus carrying Togo's national soccer squad to the top African tournament in Angola on Friday, killing the driver and wounding nine others, including two players, a Togo team official said. Togo captain Emmanuel Adebayor, who was on the bus but escaped unharmed, said his team might quit the African Nations Cup, where some of soccer's most valuable stars are due to play.
The bus had just entered the Angolan enclave of Cabinda, where separatists have waged a three-decade long war, when it came under heavy gunfire for several minutes, the team official said. An Angolan minister called the attack in Cabinda, which produces most of Angola's oil, an "act of terrorism". A separatist group, the Front for the Liberation of Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) claimed responsibility for the attack, which happened two days before the start of the 2010 African Nations Cup, Africa's most-followed sporting event. "This operation is just the start of a series of planned actions that will continue to take place in the whole territory of Cabinda," said the statement seen by Reuters and signed by FLEC's secretary general Rodrigues Mingas. In a statement published on state-owned news agency Angop, the Angolan government said: "The FLEC group that carried out this terrorist action came from the Republic of Congo and that is where it returned to after completing this action."
Cabinda is a small enclave separated from the rest of Angola by a strip of land belonging to the Democratic Republic of Congo. The roots of the conflict between the government and FLEC are deep but one of the main grievances is that Cabindans see few benefits from the oil produced from their land.
Source: mail & Guardian
The bus had just entered the Angolan enclave of Cabinda, where separatists have waged a three-decade long war, when it came under heavy gunfire for several minutes, the team official said. An Angolan minister called the attack in Cabinda, which produces most of Angola's oil, an "act of terrorism". A separatist group, the Front for the Liberation of Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) claimed responsibility for the attack, which happened two days before the start of the 2010 African Nations Cup, Africa's most-followed sporting event. "This operation is just the start of a series of planned actions that will continue to take place in the whole territory of Cabinda," said the statement seen by Reuters and signed by FLEC's secretary general Rodrigues Mingas. In a statement published on state-owned news agency Angop, the Angolan government said: "The FLEC group that carried out this terrorist action came from the Republic of Congo and that is where it returned to after completing this action."
Cabinda is a small enclave separated from the rest of Angola by a strip of land belonging to the Democratic Republic of Congo. The roots of the conflict between the government and FLEC are deep but one of the main grievances is that Cabindans see few benefits from the oil produced from their land.
Source: mail & Guardian
Friday, August 21, 2009
Angola hails Zuma visit as start of new era in ties
Angola's president hailed a visit by his South African counterpart Jacob Zuma on Thursday as the start of a new era to improve the once strained relationship between South Africa and the continent's biggest oil producer.
Jose Eduardo dos Santos, closer to Zuma than to former South African president Thabo Mbeki, said Angola needed more qualified labour from South Africa, which in turn could help rebuild infrastructure destroyed by Angola's 27-year civil war that ended in 2002 and tap into its oil and mining industry. "We want to create a strategic partnership between our two countries," Dos Santos said in a speech to his government and 11 South African ministers as he sat next to Zuma.
Zuma arrived in Angola for his two-day trip late on Wednesday, with a delegation of more than 150 South African businessmen. Pretoria billed the trip as the biggest business delegation to take part in a state visit abroad since the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994. "We believe we have not yet tapped into the real potential of bilateral relations between the two countries in all spheres, economic, social and political," Zuma said.
The two countries signed six accords ranging from trade to aviation. Both leaders, who met privately after their speeches, said they would also discuss ways to bolster cooperation and peacekeeping efforts in Africa through the Southern African Development Community (SADC). "We are ready to create a renewed dynamic between Angola and South Africa that ... will allow the SADC to become an engine of development for our sub-region and also for the rest of Africa," said Dos Santos.
Zuma said Angola and South Africa, which have two of the biggest military forces in Africa, would discuss peacekeeping efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and assess progress in the Zimbabwean unity government.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Jose Eduardo dos Santos, closer to Zuma than to former South African president Thabo Mbeki, said Angola needed more qualified labour from South Africa, which in turn could help rebuild infrastructure destroyed by Angola's 27-year civil war that ended in 2002 and tap into its oil and mining industry. "We want to create a strategic partnership between our two countries," Dos Santos said in a speech to his government and 11 South African ministers as he sat next to Zuma.
Zuma arrived in Angola for his two-day trip late on Wednesday, with a delegation of more than 150 South African businessmen. Pretoria billed the trip as the biggest business delegation to take part in a state visit abroad since the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994. "We believe we have not yet tapped into the real potential of bilateral relations between the two countries in all spheres, economic, social and political," Zuma said.
The two countries signed six accords ranging from trade to aviation. Both leaders, who met privately after their speeches, said they would also discuss ways to bolster cooperation and peacekeeping efforts in Africa through the Southern African Development Community (SADC). "We are ready to create a renewed dynamic between Angola and South Africa that ... will allow the SADC to become an engine of development for our sub-region and also for the rest of Africa," said Dos Santos.
Zuma said Angola and South Africa, which have two of the biggest military forces in Africa, would discuss peacekeeping efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and assess progress in the Zimbabwean unity government.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Tuesday, August 18, 2009
South Africa: Stronger Political, Business Ties on Agenda in Angola
PRESIDENT Jacob Zuma 's first state visit to Angola on Thursday ushers in a new era of relations -- not only between the two countries -- but also between Zuma and Angola's President Eduardo Dos Santos. The ruling MPLA in Angola and the African National Congress enjoyed historical relations as fraternal liberation movements. These deteriorated under former president Thabo Mbeki. It is hoped that Zuma's tenure will change this.
Angola has come under scrutiny over corruption, good governance and multiparty democracy, issues South African officials were at pains to say would not be ignored by the Zuma government in its dealings with Angola. The state visit, which will see an unprecedented number of business people accompany Zuma's large Cabinet entourage, signals new opportunities for South African business in areas such as gas, oil, gold and diamonds. Zuma will be supported by a bevy of ministers, including International Relations Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan, Public Enterprises Minister Barbara Hogan, Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies , Minerals Minister Susan Shabangu and Energy Minister Dipuo Peters.
The government is billing the visit as "the largest business delegation to take part in a state visit since 1994". It is expected a business conference will be hosted on the sidelines of the visit.n 2007 SA's exports to Angola amounted to R6bn while Angolan exports amounted to R12bn. Almost 90% of Angolan exports to SA in 2007 were petroleum related products, the Department of International Relations said.
Lindiwe Zulu, special adviser on international and foreign relations in the Presidency, told Business Day the binational commission between the two countries would be conducted at "head of state level" another indication that Angolan relations will be increased considerably during Zuma's tenure. "Relations should have been at this level from the very beginning. The two presidents will chair the sessions and South African and Angolan ministers will have one on one meetings concluding various memoranda of understanding," Zulu said. "You must remember that Angola also has important relations with Brazil and so do we. SA might want to look at trilateral agreements involving all three countries," Zulu said.
Source: AllAfrica
Angola has come under scrutiny over corruption, good governance and multiparty democracy, issues South African officials were at pains to say would not be ignored by the Zuma government in its dealings with Angola. The state visit, which will see an unprecedented number of business people accompany Zuma's large Cabinet entourage, signals new opportunities for South African business in areas such as gas, oil, gold and diamonds. Zuma will be supported by a bevy of ministers, including International Relations Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan, Public Enterprises Minister Barbara Hogan, Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies , Minerals Minister Susan Shabangu and Energy Minister Dipuo Peters.
The government is billing the visit as "the largest business delegation to take part in a state visit since 1994". It is expected a business conference will be hosted on the sidelines of the visit.n 2007 SA's exports to Angola amounted to R6bn while Angolan exports amounted to R12bn. Almost 90% of Angolan exports to SA in 2007 were petroleum related products, the Department of International Relations said.
Lindiwe Zulu, special adviser on international and foreign relations in the Presidency, told Business Day the binational commission between the two countries would be conducted at "head of state level" another indication that Angolan relations will be increased considerably during Zuma's tenure. "Relations should have been at this level from the very beginning. The two presidents will chair the sessions and South African and Angolan ministers will have one on one meetings concluding various memoranda of understanding," Zulu said. "You must remember that Angola also has important relations with Brazil and so do we. SA might want to look at trilateral agreements involving all three countries," Zulu said.
Source: AllAfrica
Sunday, October 29, 2000
South Africa's Arms Trade: Further Progress Needed
South Africa is not living up to its own high standards with respect to arms exports, Human Rights Watch charged. In a 45-page report, "A Question of Principle: Arms Trade and Human Rights," Human Rights Watch charged the South African government with selling weapons to countries with serious human rights problems, where an influx of weaponry could significantly worsen ongoing abuses.
In a 45-page report released today, "A Question of Principle: Arms Trade and Human Rights," Human Rights Watch charged the South African government with selling weapons to countries with serious human rights problems, where an influx of weaponry could significantly worsen ongoing abuses.
Human Rights Watch noted that after 1994, South Africa announced more restrictive policies on arms transfers. But the report charges that those policies are not always being followed. In 1994, a scandal erupted involving the sale by Armscor, the apartheid-era governmental arms export agency, of weapons to Yemen for probable on-shipment to the former Yugoslavia, then under U.N. embargo.
"South Africa has come a long way in overturning apartheid's awful legacy," said Joost Hiltermann, Executive Director of the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch. "In the arms trade, the country has committed to some very good human rights principles. But these principles are not consistently applied and are now under real threat."
The Human Rights Watch report cited examples of weapons sales since 1994 to governments engaging in repression against their own people or to countries involved in their own or others' civil wars. These sales clearly violated South Africa's own stated policies. Purchasers of South African arms include Algeria, Angola, Colombia, the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), India, Namibia, Pakistan, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
Hiltermann noted that South Africa has a strong record in other areas involving the nexus of military policy and human rights. The South African government has taken firm position on banning antipersonnel landmines, and has been one of the world's leaders in implementing the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. It has taken important steps to curb the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in southern Africa, and passed a law on mercenaries in 1998, which prohibited South African citizens from participating in either internal or international armed conflicts. But Hiltermann urged that the South African government do more to institutionalize the important policy reforms on arms sales made since the first democratic elections in 1994. "First and foremost, South Africa should formalize in law the arms export policies that the government has declared on paper, which include a code of conduct on arms transfers," said Hiltermann. He also urged a more significant role for parliament and civil society in arms trade decisions.
Human Rights Watch called on South Africa to:
· establish a legal framework for its arms export policy;
· enhance the capacity of government officials to assess the human rights implications of arms transfers;
· increase the participation of parliament and civil society in arms trade decisions;
· make a greater commitment to full transparency in arms exports.
Source: Human Rights Watch
In a 45-page report released today, "A Question of Principle: Arms Trade and Human Rights," Human Rights Watch charged the South African government with selling weapons to countries with serious human rights problems, where an influx of weaponry could significantly worsen ongoing abuses.
Human Rights Watch noted that after 1994, South Africa announced more restrictive policies on arms transfers. But the report charges that those policies are not always being followed. In 1994, a scandal erupted involving the sale by Armscor, the apartheid-era governmental arms export agency, of weapons to Yemen for probable on-shipment to the former Yugoslavia, then under U.N. embargo.
"South Africa has come a long way in overturning apartheid's awful legacy," said Joost Hiltermann, Executive Director of the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch. "In the arms trade, the country has committed to some very good human rights principles. But these principles are not consistently applied and are now under real threat."
The Human Rights Watch report cited examples of weapons sales since 1994 to governments engaging in repression against their own people or to countries involved in their own or others' civil wars. These sales clearly violated South Africa's own stated policies. Purchasers of South African arms include Algeria, Angola, Colombia, the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), India, Namibia, Pakistan, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
Hiltermann noted that South Africa has a strong record in other areas involving the nexus of military policy and human rights. The South African government has taken firm position on banning antipersonnel landmines, and has been one of the world's leaders in implementing the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. It has taken important steps to curb the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in southern Africa, and passed a law on mercenaries in 1998, which prohibited South African citizens from participating in either internal or international armed conflicts. But Hiltermann urged that the South African government do more to institutionalize the important policy reforms on arms sales made since the first democratic elections in 1994. "First and foremost, South Africa should formalize in law the arms export policies that the government has declared on paper, which include a code of conduct on arms transfers," said Hiltermann. He also urged a more significant role for parliament and civil society in arms trade decisions.
Human Rights Watch called on South Africa to:
· establish a legal framework for its arms export policy;
· enhance the capacity of government officials to assess the human rights implications of arms transfers;
· increase the participation of parliament and civil society in arms trade decisions;
· make a greater commitment to full transparency in arms exports.
Source: Human Rights Watch
Wednesday, May 17, 1995
Now for Hire: South Africa's Out-of Work Commandos
To the old apartheid regime and supporters of its influence in this region, they were heroes, fighters who in units with names like Selous Scouts or Crowbar carried out devastating clandestine operations against neighboring countries or propped up clients of South Africa. To most of South Africa's neighbors, they were seen as brutal enforcers of this country's unchallenged dominance in the region.
With the apartheid era now over and the cold war a memory, South Africa's special forces, as they were known, briefly found themselves without a role. But now, with civil wars still dotting this continent and outside powers less interested than ever in becoming involved, scores of retired officers have signed on with a new breed of military outfit that straddles the line between the role of classic foreign adviser and outright guns for hire.
Nowhere have these new outfits played a larger role than in Angola, which has been embroiled in civil war for most of the last two decades. There, a Pretoria-based company known as Executive Outcomes has been credited with quickly turning around the civil war in favor of the nominally socialist Government, and forcing a settlement on Jonas Savimbi, leader of the badly battered rebel movement known as Unita, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. In the proxy conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa during the cold war, many of the 500 or so South African recruits with Executive Outcomes fought alongside Mr. Savimbi, a longtime client of South Africa and the United States. Their enemies at the time, in addition to the Angolan Army, were the 50,000 Cubans sent by Havana to bolster the forces of a Communist ally.
In addition to training Angolan Government soldiers, military observers here say that in the last two years the recruits have moved into remote bases that were abandoned after the Cubans pulled out in 1991, upgrading communications and flying highly effective combat sorties in Soviet-made Hind helicopters and MIG-23 fighters. "We consider that they made a very considerable difference to the success that M.P.L.A. has been able to achieve," said William Sass, a retired brigadier of the South African Defense Force, referring to the governing Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. "The line of what is a mercenary and what is not is a matter of interpretation, but they made an invaluable contribution to the operations of M.P.L.A. on the ground. If Unita had not signed the cease-fire, one could easily conceive of them having been wiped out."
South African officials describe Executive Outcomes as a dangerous outfit and concede that it could destabilize the region. So far, however, the officials say current laws leave the Government nearly powerless to crack down on such groups. With its Angolan successes high on its resume, Executive Outcomes has been aggressively marketing itself to other African countries with civil wars or other security problems. Just last week, the company announced that it had signed a deal with the Government of Sierra Leone to help its poorly organized army fight its civil war against a shadowy but increasingly effective rebel force known as the Revolutionary United Front.
Beyond Angola and Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes has declined to specify the African countries in which it is involved. Experts in African military affairs say there are indications that the group has opened talks with the Sudan, Somalia, Mozambique and Malawi.
With the arrival of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone, diplomats and other experts in African affairs say the chances for a peaceful resolution there may be receding. The country's leader, Capt. Valentine Strasser, has repeatedly offered to negotiate, but the rebels have said any talks must come after the withdrawal of foreign military personnel. Unlike the rebel movement in Angola, where an effective international embargo and the loss of his outside patrons prevented Mr. Savimbi from rearming, the insurgents in Sierra Leone have free rein over much of a mineral-rich countryside. With growing receipts from the sale of diamonds, timber, gold and other resources, there is little to stop them from beefing up their forces with outside help, thus turning a relatively low-intensity conflict into a much more devastating war.
Officials of Executive Outcomes have always declined to reveal the terms of their agreements with African countries, or even how many men they employ. Military experts and diplomats here say that the company typically pays $2,000 a month or more, and provides recruits with generous insurance coverage in case of injury or death. The company said that at least 10 recruits had been killed in Angola, including at least 2 executed by Mr. Savimbi's men. Officials of the company said that only Eeben Barlow, its general manager, who is a veteran of the Angolan conflict and a former officer in the South African intelligence service, was authorized to speak publicly about Executive Outcomes. But Mr. Barlow, who is 38, has neither returned calls nor responded to a detailed fax seeking comment. Assistants said he was out of the country this week and could not be reached.
In the past, Mr. Barlow has reacted angrily to suggestions that he is running a mercenary outfit. "Where the security in a country is a problem, we assist," he recently told the Reuters news agency. "We assist in water purification, construction and medical services. White South Africans are the only ones prepared to make a difference."
People familiar with the operations of the company scoff at the notion that civil construction is a large part of its activities. Instead, they describe a business that takes little interest in the moral implications of its work and is willing to sign on with whoever can pay them. If it is true that the company is primarily involved in training, experts say that its men also become closely involved in battlefield operations, if its record in Angola is any indication. "Our concern with Executive Outcomes is that something of a rogue in the region has been created," said Jackie Cilliers, director of the Institute for Defense Policy, a Johannesburg research organization. "While it may have actually contributed to a settlement in Angola, we may be witnessing the creation of something outside the control of government that could easily become a force for destabilization in Africa. It is guns for hire."
At the same time, people who have followed the company's involvement in Angola say it has expanded into numerous business ventures in areas like shipping, fishing and trucking. "These groups encourage a country not only to continue a war, but to escalate," said Aileen Marshall, an expert in conflict management at the Global Coalition for Africa, a Washington-based research organization of retired American diplomats, academics and former officials of several African countries. "Down the road there is the risk of a Cambodia-type situation where the Khmer Rouge are using gems and forests to fuel the war so that when the war ends the resources are either gone or are in illegal hands."
Source: New York Times
With the apartheid era now over and the cold war a memory, South Africa's special forces, as they were known, briefly found themselves without a role. But now, with civil wars still dotting this continent and outside powers less interested than ever in becoming involved, scores of retired officers have signed on with a new breed of military outfit that straddles the line between the role of classic foreign adviser and outright guns for hire.
Nowhere have these new outfits played a larger role than in Angola, which has been embroiled in civil war for most of the last two decades. There, a Pretoria-based company known as Executive Outcomes has been credited with quickly turning around the civil war in favor of the nominally socialist Government, and forcing a settlement on Jonas Savimbi, leader of the badly battered rebel movement known as Unita, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. In the proxy conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa during the cold war, many of the 500 or so South African recruits with Executive Outcomes fought alongside Mr. Savimbi, a longtime client of South Africa and the United States. Their enemies at the time, in addition to the Angolan Army, were the 50,000 Cubans sent by Havana to bolster the forces of a Communist ally.
In addition to training Angolan Government soldiers, military observers here say that in the last two years the recruits have moved into remote bases that were abandoned after the Cubans pulled out in 1991, upgrading communications and flying highly effective combat sorties in Soviet-made Hind helicopters and MIG-23 fighters. "We consider that they made a very considerable difference to the success that M.P.L.A. has been able to achieve," said William Sass, a retired brigadier of the South African Defense Force, referring to the governing Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. "The line of what is a mercenary and what is not is a matter of interpretation, but they made an invaluable contribution to the operations of M.P.L.A. on the ground. If Unita had not signed the cease-fire, one could easily conceive of them having been wiped out."
South African officials describe Executive Outcomes as a dangerous outfit and concede that it could destabilize the region. So far, however, the officials say current laws leave the Government nearly powerless to crack down on such groups. With its Angolan successes high on its resume, Executive Outcomes has been aggressively marketing itself to other African countries with civil wars or other security problems. Just last week, the company announced that it had signed a deal with the Government of Sierra Leone to help its poorly organized army fight its civil war against a shadowy but increasingly effective rebel force known as the Revolutionary United Front.
Beyond Angola and Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes has declined to specify the African countries in which it is involved. Experts in African military affairs say there are indications that the group has opened talks with the Sudan, Somalia, Mozambique and Malawi.
With the arrival of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone, diplomats and other experts in African affairs say the chances for a peaceful resolution there may be receding. The country's leader, Capt. Valentine Strasser, has repeatedly offered to negotiate, but the rebels have said any talks must come after the withdrawal of foreign military personnel. Unlike the rebel movement in Angola, where an effective international embargo and the loss of his outside patrons prevented Mr. Savimbi from rearming, the insurgents in Sierra Leone have free rein over much of a mineral-rich countryside. With growing receipts from the sale of diamonds, timber, gold and other resources, there is little to stop them from beefing up their forces with outside help, thus turning a relatively low-intensity conflict into a much more devastating war.
Officials of Executive Outcomes have always declined to reveal the terms of their agreements with African countries, or even how many men they employ. Military experts and diplomats here say that the company typically pays $2,000 a month or more, and provides recruits with generous insurance coverage in case of injury or death. The company said that at least 10 recruits had been killed in Angola, including at least 2 executed by Mr. Savimbi's men. Officials of the company said that only Eeben Barlow, its general manager, who is a veteran of the Angolan conflict and a former officer in the South African intelligence service, was authorized to speak publicly about Executive Outcomes. But Mr. Barlow, who is 38, has neither returned calls nor responded to a detailed fax seeking comment. Assistants said he was out of the country this week and could not be reached.
In the past, Mr. Barlow has reacted angrily to suggestions that he is running a mercenary outfit. "Where the security in a country is a problem, we assist," he recently told the Reuters news agency. "We assist in water purification, construction and medical services. White South Africans are the only ones prepared to make a difference."
People familiar with the operations of the company scoff at the notion that civil construction is a large part of its activities. Instead, they describe a business that takes little interest in the moral implications of its work and is willing to sign on with whoever can pay them. If it is true that the company is primarily involved in training, experts say that its men also become closely involved in battlefield operations, if its record in Angola is any indication. "Our concern with Executive Outcomes is that something of a rogue in the region has been created," said Jackie Cilliers, director of the Institute for Defense Policy, a Johannesburg research organization. "While it may have actually contributed to a settlement in Angola, we may be witnessing the creation of something outside the control of government that could easily become a force for destabilization in Africa. It is guns for hire."
At the same time, people who have followed the company's involvement in Angola say it has expanded into numerous business ventures in areas like shipping, fishing and trucking. "These groups encourage a country not only to continue a war, but to escalate," said Aileen Marshall, an expert in conflict management at the Global Coalition for Africa, a Washington-based research organization of retired American diplomats, academics and former officials of several African countries. "Down the road there is the risk of a Cambodia-type situation where the Khmer Rouge are using gems and forests to fuel the war so that when the war ends the resources are either gone or are in illegal hands."
Source: New York Times
Sunday, November 5, 1989
NAMIBIAN VOTERS DENY TOTAL POWER TO SWAPO
Along this city's well-traveled Talstrasse last week, almost every corner had a large red and blue billboard. `Vote Without Fear,' the signs instructed passing Namibians. Signs on neighborhing streets informed passersby, `Your Vote Is Your Secret.'
Erected by the South African administrator general, who with the United Nations is responsible for the maintenance of Namibia through independence, the signs were designed to calm the fears of Namibian voters as they elected a constituent assembly. In the balloting, the first major step toward independence, the Marxist South West African People's Organization won most of the votes, about 75%, according to unofficial figures. But SWAPO fell short of the two-thirds majority it was predicting and thus was denied total power to write a new constitution.
This is despite the fact that to Namibians, who have been ruled by South Africa since 1915, democracy is a foreign concept. The administrator general and the U.N. Transitional Assistance Group, or UNTAG, had been busy correcting widespread misconceptions about election rules. The unfamiliarity with the voting process, combined with Namibia's 60% illiteracy rate, opened the door for intimidation and deception tactics by many of Namibia's political parties.
For instance, some Namibians were led to believe that political parties would be informed about how their votes were cast and that there would be retribution if they voted for a rival party. Several SWAPO leaders went so far as to threaten that if SWAPO failed to gain 50% of the vote, they might renew the guerrilla war SWAPO has waged for 23 years. This tactic may have been perhaps the most intimidating of all, because it turned the election into a referendum on the war.
Stories abound of political parties spreading deliberate disinformation about the voting. During the campaign, SWAPO reportedly told many Namibians to `put a big `X' on the SWAPO ballot if you support SWAPO, but if you are against us, put a small `x' on the SWAPO ballot.'
Like other African independence elections, Namibia's constituent-assembly elections may have been its last. Though SWAPO now contends that it is prepared, if necessary, to work with other parties to develop a coalition government, it has strong totalitarian inclinations, and fear is widespread that a SWAPO-dominated government would lead Namibia into one-party rule.
There is concern that SWAPO will not respect rival opinions in the prospective coalition, and may use the constituent assembly as a stepping stone to total control in Namibia, similar to the approach used by the Marxist-Leninist factor of the Sandinistas following the overthrow of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua. Werner Neef, an adviser to the Christian Democratic Action Party, says that the CDA will not join a coalition with SWAPO.
The SWAPO victory could lead to ethnic-based violence. SWAPO's power base is rooted in Namibia's largest tribe, the northern-based Ovambos. Indeed, SWAPO lost Namibia outside of Ovambo territory to the free-market Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, winning overall only because it defeated the Alliance by 197,000 votes to 9,200 in the northern region of Ovambo.
There are fears that an Ovambo-based SWAPO government might persecute other tribes such as the Hereros, Namas and Bushmen. SWAPO has admitted keeping many non-Ovambos in underground pits in its camps in Angola and Zambia and torturing them as `spies.'
SWAPO's win also raises security concerns. Since 1964, SWAPO has received financial and military support from the Soviet Union, and SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma has boasted of his strong alliance with Cuba's Fidel Castro, SWAPO also enjoys close relations with the African National Congress, which sent SWAPO 300 minibuses to assist in getting SWAPO supporters to the polls.
There is deep concern that the SWAPO-dominated government may attempt to model Namibia after its northern neighbor, Angola, by bringing in Cuban troops and Soviet military advisers. There is even deeper concern that SWAPO may cooperate with the Angolan regime in launching military attacks against Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, which is based in southern Angola. However, South Africa's proximity and may force SWAPO military restraint.
SWAPO's ecomomic vision is no more promising, but its traditional Marxist-Leninist rhetoric moderated considerably during the campaign. SWAPO told foreign investors recently that is does not support wholesale nationalization, and Mr. Nujoma has said that he does not wish the country's 70,000 whites to flee since their technical and management skills are needed. But according to Mishake Muyongo of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, which got 29% of the votes. `SWAPO will say in public `We want whites here,' but then in private they will turn around and say `Get rid of these people.' '
For southern Africa, the outcome of Namibia's independence process will be critical for the strategic and economic composition of the region. With Namibia's mineral wealth and abundant land (the country is twice the size of France), a moderate, free-market approach by the country's new government could lead to strong economic growth, perhaps making Namibia a regional success story among the underdeveloped front-line states. Conversely, a statist, authoritarian approach by Namibia will likely sway the regional political and economic balance in the other direction.
The outcome is equally important for the U.N., which, as the monitor of Namibia's independence process, has embarked on one of its most ambitious missions to date. More than 6,200 members of UNTAG are in the country to oversee the process, and the U.N. brought in more than 1,000 additional personnel to serve as official election observers.
Having funded SWAPO, given it observer status in New York, and recognized it as `the sole, authentic representative of the Namibian people' in General Assembly resolutions, the U.N.'s capability for objectivity is in justifiable doubt. Indeed, several Namibian political parties contend that the U.N.'s longstanding finanical and diplomatic support for SWAPO tipped the scale in SWAPO that is now taking issue with the U.N.'s formal declaration after the polls closed that the five-days elections were `free and fair.'
But perhaps the greatest irony of the Namibian independence process is the composition of the member nations represented in UNTAG. Nondemocratic nations such as Cuba, Libya, Romania, East Germany and the U.S.S.R. have been sent to Namibia to oversee democratic procedures that they forbid in their own countries.
For Namibians, the concern is not merely that many of these countries have their own dubious agenda in southern Africa, but also that the political system of an independent Namibia may soon be shaped in their image.
Source: US Library of Congress
Erected by the South African administrator general, who with the United Nations is responsible for the maintenance of Namibia through independence, the signs were designed to calm the fears of Namibian voters as they elected a constituent assembly. In the balloting, the first major step toward independence, the Marxist South West African People's Organization won most of the votes, about 75%, according to unofficial figures. But SWAPO fell short of the two-thirds majority it was predicting and thus was denied total power to write a new constitution.
This is despite the fact that to Namibians, who have been ruled by South Africa since 1915, democracy is a foreign concept. The administrator general and the U.N. Transitional Assistance Group, or UNTAG, had been busy correcting widespread misconceptions about election rules. The unfamiliarity with the voting process, combined with Namibia's 60% illiteracy rate, opened the door for intimidation and deception tactics by many of Namibia's political parties.
For instance, some Namibians were led to believe that political parties would be informed about how their votes were cast and that there would be retribution if they voted for a rival party. Several SWAPO leaders went so far as to threaten that if SWAPO failed to gain 50% of the vote, they might renew the guerrilla war SWAPO has waged for 23 years. This tactic may have been perhaps the most intimidating of all, because it turned the election into a referendum on the war.
Stories abound of political parties spreading deliberate disinformation about the voting. During the campaign, SWAPO reportedly told many Namibians to `put a big `X' on the SWAPO ballot if you support SWAPO, but if you are against us, put a small `x' on the SWAPO ballot.'
Like other African independence elections, Namibia's constituent-assembly elections may have been its last. Though SWAPO now contends that it is prepared, if necessary, to work with other parties to develop a coalition government, it has strong totalitarian inclinations, and fear is widespread that a SWAPO-dominated government would lead Namibia into one-party rule.
There is concern that SWAPO will not respect rival opinions in the prospective coalition, and may use the constituent assembly as a stepping stone to total control in Namibia, similar to the approach used by the Marxist-Leninist factor of the Sandinistas following the overthrow of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua. Werner Neef, an adviser to the Christian Democratic Action Party, says that the CDA will not join a coalition with SWAPO.
The SWAPO victory could lead to ethnic-based violence. SWAPO's power base is rooted in Namibia's largest tribe, the northern-based Ovambos. Indeed, SWAPO lost Namibia outside of Ovambo territory to the free-market Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, winning overall only because it defeated the Alliance by 197,000 votes to 9,200 in the northern region of Ovambo.
There are fears that an Ovambo-based SWAPO government might persecute other tribes such as the Hereros, Namas and Bushmen. SWAPO has admitted keeping many non-Ovambos in underground pits in its camps in Angola and Zambia and torturing them as `spies.'
SWAPO's win also raises security concerns. Since 1964, SWAPO has received financial and military support from the Soviet Union, and SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma has boasted of his strong alliance with Cuba's Fidel Castro, SWAPO also enjoys close relations with the African National Congress, which sent SWAPO 300 minibuses to assist in getting SWAPO supporters to the polls.
There is deep concern that the SWAPO-dominated government may attempt to model Namibia after its northern neighbor, Angola, by bringing in Cuban troops and Soviet military advisers. There is even deeper concern that SWAPO may cooperate with the Angolan regime in launching military attacks against Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, which is based in southern Angola. However, South Africa's proximity and may force SWAPO military restraint.
SWAPO's ecomomic vision is no more promising, but its traditional Marxist-Leninist rhetoric moderated considerably during the campaign. SWAPO told foreign investors recently that is does not support wholesale nationalization, and Mr. Nujoma has said that he does not wish the country's 70,000 whites to flee since their technical and management skills are needed. But according to Mishake Muyongo of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, which got 29% of the votes. `SWAPO will say in public `We want whites here,' but then in private they will turn around and say `Get rid of these people.' '
For southern Africa, the outcome of Namibia's independence process will be critical for the strategic and economic composition of the region. With Namibia's mineral wealth and abundant land (the country is twice the size of France), a moderate, free-market approach by the country's new government could lead to strong economic growth, perhaps making Namibia a regional success story among the underdeveloped front-line states. Conversely, a statist, authoritarian approach by Namibia will likely sway the regional political and economic balance in the other direction.
The outcome is equally important for the U.N., which, as the monitor of Namibia's independence process, has embarked on one of its most ambitious missions to date. More than 6,200 members of UNTAG are in the country to oversee the process, and the U.N. brought in more than 1,000 additional personnel to serve as official election observers.
Having funded SWAPO, given it observer status in New York, and recognized it as `the sole, authentic representative of the Namibian people' in General Assembly resolutions, the U.N.'s capability for objectivity is in justifiable doubt. Indeed, several Namibian political parties contend that the U.N.'s longstanding finanical and diplomatic support for SWAPO tipped the scale in SWAPO that is now taking issue with the U.N.'s formal declaration after the polls closed that the five-days elections were `free and fair.'
But perhaps the greatest irony of the Namibian independence process is the composition of the member nations represented in UNTAG. Nondemocratic nations such as Cuba, Libya, Romania, East Germany and the U.S.S.R. have been sent to Namibia to oversee democratic procedures that they forbid in their own countries.
For Namibians, the concern is not merely that many of these countries have their own dubious agenda in southern Africa, but also that the political system of an independent Namibia may soon be shaped in their image.
Source: US Library of Congress
Wednesday, June 8, 1977
British South Africa Police
A mercenary[1] is a person who takes part in an armed conflict, who is not a national or a party to the conflict, and is
As a result of the assumption that a mercenary is essentially motivated by money, the term mercenary usually carries negative connotations.
Many of the adventurers in Africa who have been described as mercenaries were in fact ideologically motivated to support particular governments, and would not fight "for the highest bidder". An example of this was the British South Africa Police (BSAP), a paramilitary, mounted infantry force formed by the British South Africa Company of Cecil Rhodes in 1889/1890 that evolved and continued until 1980.
[1] Article 47 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1)
Source: Wikipedia
"motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party".
As a result of the assumption that a mercenary is essentially motivated by money, the term mercenary usually carries negative connotations.
Many of the adventurers in Africa who have been described as mercenaries were in fact ideologically motivated to support particular governments, and would not fight "for the highest bidder". An example of this was the British South Africa Police (BSAP), a paramilitary, mounted infantry force formed by the British South Africa Company of Cecil Rhodes in 1889/1890 that evolved and continued until 1980.
[1] Article 47 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1)
Source: Wikipedia
Wednesday, June 16, 1976
Angolan Witnesses Testify Against Mercenaries
Angolan prosecution witnesses accused 13 British and American mercenaries today of murder, massacre, laying minefields, abuse of civilians, pillage and the destruction of property.
Source: New York Times
Source: New York Times
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