The politics of Mohammed Morsi's trial

The trial of Mohammed Morsi is a political trial designed by the Egyptian authorities to disgrace, delegitimise and dispose of the Muslim Brotherhood from the Egyptian political landscape. In a seminal study widely regarded as the most definitive account of the political trial, the Frankfurt school jurist Otto Kirchheimer regarded the political trial as a strategic mobilisation of the devices of law and justice to attain political ends.

"The classic political trial", Kirchheimer argued, is one in which the regime "attempt[s] to incriminate its foe's public behaviour with a view to evicting him from the political scene". Morsi's trial is a classic political trial designed to evict Morsi and his movement from the Egyptian political space.

Political trials are inevitable consequences of revolutions. From the English and French revolutions the 17th and 18th century to the Chinese and Iranian revolutions in the 20th century, the courtroom provided a convenient space for a ritualised elimination of former regimes.

Courts are mobilised not so much to eliminate the defunct regimes but to clarify, rationalise, justify and finally authenticate the revolution in an act of judgment. This is what is at work in Morsi's trial - the use of the courtroom to validate and authenticate a contested revolution. The court is not concerned with the determination of guilt and innocence so much as the rationalisation and justification of the events of July 3, 2013.

A revolution, not a coup d'etat?

The rhetoric of law and order, terrorism, and national security are all smokescreens for the power struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military-backed regime. Beneath the rhetoric of terrorism and national security, there are the unfathomable purposes of history and power - a history of a botched revolution; conflicting accounts of what happened on 3 July 2013 (a coup d'etat, a counter-revolution or a second revolution); and the violence and crackdown that followed. The trial reduces these complex historico-political events into an either - or binary proposition that fits the self-referential logic of law.

The charges against Morsi and others - "incitement to violence" and "conspiracy to commit terrorism" - are charges carefully chosen to serve as fulcrums - narrative anchors in which to ground the regime's pedagogic stunts. The trial provides the event - the stage, the language, and the choreography - that lends bodily form, as Alexis De Tocqueville once noted, to the pedagogic enterprise.

As a truth-bearing platform with superior ability of image formation and saturation, the trial gives juridical reality and an appearance of neutrality and objectivity to the narrative of the state.

Within its own self-referential logic, the trial weighs the charges, assigns blame and attributes responsibility for the events alleged by the prosecution. It does not take account of the political and historical war that rages just beneath the invocation of its discourses. The objections of Morsi and his co-accused regarding the coup d'etat, the violence of the military, and the criminal origin of the regime are incompatible with "how the law thinks". For the purpose of criminal law, these are "objection[s] that cannot be heard": They do not signify within law's logic, its rationality, and modes of thought.

Order legitimation and power rationalisation

The immediate purpose of the trial is two-fold. Firstly, the trial is the most effective silencing device: By delegating the matter to a sympathetic judiciary, the regime silences all forms of criticism while it neutralises the political field from its adversary. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the trial has the aim of rationalising and justifying the coup d'etat by retroactively situating Morsi's defeat within a broader historical, political and moral narrative.

Using its truth-bearing discourses that allow it to create images that can neither be effaced nor rectified, the trial rationalises and justifies the power of the military regime. By presenting the adversary in the worst possible moral and political light, the trial both elaborates and consolidates a historico-political thesis in the image of the military and its civilian elites. What matters is not the validity or meaningfulness of the image so much as its effectiveness.

By accusing and judging the defendants for these crimes, the regime has a didactic goal that far exceeds the elimination of the Muslim Brotherhood: It aims to create a generative politico-historical thesis and an enduring image capable of instilling fear, prudence and obedience in potential foes. By projecting and amplifying a terrorist image of Morsi and his movement in the courtroom, a site of truth and justice supposedly elevated from the expediency of power and politics, the trial vindicates and authenticates a historico-political thesis in the image of the regime.

'I am your president. You have no legitimacy'

However, trials are not chess games that go according to pre-arranged rules. They can denaturalise, as to expose its flimsy facade of legality. In exercising the authority to judge its enemies, it submits itself to the accusation of its adversaries and the judgment of history. Just as the state uses the devices of law as political weapons, Morsi too can turn to these weapons.

The device is not equally available to the state and Morsi, but the deliberative framework of the trial and the principle of calling to account means that the defendant has a speaking position from which he can give an account of himself and the charges. Indeed, if Morsi's first day in court is any indication to go by, his trial could well be the trial of the military regime.

In his first court appearance, Morsi rejected the legitimacy and the authority of the court to try him. He argues that he is "the legitimate president" of the republic and accuses the military of a coup and treason. He challenges the court to justify how an illegal action - a coup d'etat - gives rise to a legal right that enables the criminals to judge an elected president: "This coup is a crime and treasonous, and the court is held responsible for it."

Morsi's defence will ask questions the prosecutor and the court cannot answer legally: According to what law, according to what rule of judgment and principle of justice do the courts and the social order they serve exercise the right to judge and punish an elected president? For Morsi and his supporters, "This is a military coup whose leaders must be put on trial in accordance with the constitution."

If an elected president can be called to the court to account for these acts, what of the military leaders who committed a treasonous offense? In other words, can the military bring Morsi to the court without calling the Revolution to the court? It is this question that law is ultimately incapable of answering without sliding into the abyss, to its origin in self-help. It is also here that the disjuncture between law and revolutions becomes most manifest, exposing the government and its courts to the judgement of history.

Regardless of how the court frames and ultimately settles these destabilising questions, Morsi's trial brings both the military and the revolution into the courtroom. The narratives and the verdict leave behind traces or remainders that cannot be integrated, or contained by the trial. It is this remainder, this excess, that exceeds the trial's ability to conceal and suppress, that returns to haunt Egypt and unsettle it from within.

Awol K Allo is a Fellow in Human Rights at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

Source: Al Jazeera

Mursi wants Egypt at centre of Arab affairs, urges end to Syrian government

Egypt's president on Wednesday promised to put Cairo back at the heart of Arab affairs and made an impassioned appeal to Arab states to work to end the bloodshed in Syria, saying the time had come to change the Syrian government. By Yasmine Saleh and Ayman Samir.

Mohamed Mursi, making his first presidential address to the Arab League in Cairo, told Arab foreign ministers that Egypt and its people would "return to occupy their natural place at the heart of the Arab nation". Mursi, elected in June after last year's popular uprising forced Hosni Mubarak from power after three decades, said the time had come in Syria for "change and not wasting time speaking of reform. This time has passed now. Now it is time for change".

"The Syrian regime must take into account the lessons of recent and ancient history," he said in the speech in which he also talked of the revolt in Egypt.

Mursi also said a quartet of states - Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and Egypt - would meet to discuss the Syrian crisis.

"The quartet which Egypt has called for will meet now," he said, without giving details.

An Egyptian delegate said the president's comments meant the four states were talking about what action could be taken but the formal formation of the quartet was still under discussion. He said no date had been set for its representatives to meet.

Tehran has backed Syria's government but the three other states want President Bashar al-Assad to stand down.

Analysts said the group was unlikely to agree on how to handle the crisis but said the initiative was a sign of how determined the newly elected president was to put Egypt back at the centre of regional politics.

FRESH APPEAL

As Mursi was leaving the podium, the Islamist president briefly returned to the microphone to say: "Syria, Syria, this is the arena to do something", pointing to the ministers below him, and then again saying "Syria" before stepping away.

It was the second such appeal for action in a week by Mursi. At the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Iran on Aug. 30, Mursi referred to Tehran's ally as an "oppressive regime" and said it was an "ethical duty" to back rebels.

More than 20,000 people have been killed in Syria since initially peaceful protests against Assad erupted in March 2011. Tens of thousands more have fled across its borders to neighbouring states to escape the violence. Nasser al-Kidwa, deputy to Lakhdar Brahimi, the United Nations-Arab League mediator on Syria, arrived in Cairo on Wednesday to join the talks with Arab ministers. Brahimi, who is expected to visit Cairo on Sunday, has described his bid to broker peace as "nearly impossible" but Kidwa told reporters at Cairo airport that "we have not lost hope" despite the difficulties facing the mission.

According to a draft of the resolutions obtained by Reuters and approved on Wednesday, ministers called on the Arab League chief and its special committee on Syria to follow up with the U.N. secretary-general to outline a "new vision" for Brahimi.

The draft also called for Nilesat and Arabsat, two regionally owned satellite firms, to stop broadcasts of Syrian state and private channels. Broadcasts of the three Syrian channels on Nilesat stopped before the draft was approved, with a Nilesat source citing unspecified contract violations.

Abdelbasset Sida, head of the Syrian National Council (SNC) opposition alliance, told Reuters he was disappointed by the resolutions, saying Arabs should work more closely with Europeans opposed to Assad's rule and put more presure on Syria's ally Russia.

He said Arabs should back "using all means including force against the Syrian regime to reach that end". DM

Source: Daily Maverick

Analysis: Syria - three wars for the price of one

If you think the war in Syria is hard to follow, that’s because there’s actually three of them—at least. Distinct but interconnected, the competing web of allegiances and motivations puts al-Qaeda on the same side as the USA and makes a solution impossible. By SIMON ALLISON.

Many people, like this reporter, find the Syrian war confusing sometimes. It throws up all kind of strange and unnatural contradictions, like America appearing to be on the same side as al-Qaeda-linked jihadists and Al-Jazeera turning into a typical, propaganda-spouting state media house. No doubt policy-makers also find it difficult to understand. It’s been nearly two years and there’s still no sensible international policy on Syria, just a steady stream of ad-hoc condemnations and hamstrung mediations.

There’s a simple reason for all this confusion and complexity: it’s a very, very complicated situation. Even worse, there’s not just one war being fought in Syria, but at least three and possibly even more.
War number one is the one we’re all familiar with (especially if we’ve been watching too much Al-Jazeera). This is your typical Arab Spring narrative, pitting a downtrodden civilian population against the brutal regime that has repressed its people for so long. It’s a simple tale of good-versus-evil, of democracy taking on dictatorship, of the people sticking it to the man. We’ve seen variations of the theme in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, all of which ended with the people hurling off the yoke of dictatorship and replacing it with a new, enlightened, freely-elected government (oh, wait; it hasn’t quite ended like that in any of these countries, but let’s not spoil a good story with the facts).

Elements of this story are true in Syria. Certainly, the regime was brutal and autocratic, happy to stifle political freedoms and concentrate wealth and power in the hands of a very few, mostly of the Alawite ethnic minority. In fact, the Syrian security forces had such a world-class reputation for torture that they were, on occasion, prevailed upon by American intelligence to practise their craft on detainees as part America’s extraordinary rendition program.

There was popular dissent, too. Not much of it initially, but it grew in size and voice in the wake of the uprisings in other Arab countries. Whether or not the anti-Assad movement was really a majority will be argued over endlessly in years to come, but it is important to recognise that just as there was a large anti-Assad sentiment, so there was a significant chunk of the population that was happy with the status quo; autocracies are stable and peaceful, after all, unlike revolutions and civil wars.

War number two is not really about Syria at all. Instead, it’s about Middle Eastern and global geopolitics, and it’s very messy. In one corner is the Syrian Alawite regime and Iran, who are natural allies. The Alawites are a sect of Shi’a Islam, while Iran is an explicitly Shi’a state (as opposed to Sunni Islam, the other main branch of the religion). Russia finds itself in this camp too, desperate to protect its vital naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus—its only reliable warm water port. So too does China, which sees no reason to put its excellent trading relationship with Syria in jeopardy.

Ranged against this formidable combination is a regional alliance of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, all of which would love to see Bashar al-Assad replaced with a more compliant Sunni leader. All have designs on regional leadership, and in Syria they find common cause. Turkey was one of the first countries to express support for the Syrian rebels, while both Qatar and Saudi Arabia have helped to fund and arm them. Qatar has also been accused – with some justification – of using its hugely influential satellite TV channel, Al-Jazeera (specifically the Arabic version) to influence public opinion by portraying a one-sided version of events.

Lurking behind this regional triumvirate is the United States and the Western world, their foreign policy distorted, as usual, by their Iranian paranoia. Robert Fisk, doyen of Middle East correspondents, summed up their approach in the Independent: “This is an attempt to crush the Syrian dictatorship not because of our love for Syrians or our hatred of our former friend Bashar al-Assad, or because of our outrage at Russia, whose place in the pantheon of hypocrites is clear when we watch its reaction to all the little Stalingrads across Syria. No, this is all about Iran and our desire to crush the Islamic Republic and its infernal nuclear plans—if they exist—and has nothing to do with human rights or the right to life or the death of Syrian babies.”

Syria, in other words, is a proxy war; a relatively safe place (for everyone else, not for Syria) to fight the battles that can’t yet be fought in the open.

But it doesn’t end there. There’s a third war happening. This one pits the nominally Shi’a (though relatively secular) Syrian state against the global Sunni jihadist movement (known to Americans as “terrorists”). A flood of reports recently have explained how fighters from all over the Arab world, many of them battle-hardened in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq, have come to the support of the Syrian rebels.

This from Ed Husain in the National Review is typical: “Our collective excitement at the possibility that the Assad regime will be destroyed, and the Iranian ayatollahs weakened in the process, is blurring our vision and preventing us from seeing the rise of al-Qaeda in Syria. In March of this year, jihadis mounted seven attacks against Assad. By June, they had led 66 “operations”, and over half of these were on Syria’s capital, Damascus. The Syrian opposition is benefiting hugely from the terrorist organization’s determination, discipline, combat experience, religious fervour, and ability to strike the Assad regime where it hurts most.”

The War on Terror has reached Syria and somehow, America and al-Qaeda find themselves fighting on the same side. No wonder no one seems to know what’s really going on.

Nor does anyone know how to stop it. With all these tangled conflicts and competing interests and motivations, figuring out a solution seems like an impossible task. Which, so far, is exactly what it’s proven to be. DM

Source: Daily Maverick

Land of Israel

The notion of the "Land of Israel", known in Hebrew as Eretz Yisrael (or Eretz Yisroel), has been important and sacred to the Jewish people since Biblical times. According to the Torah, God promised the land to the three Patriarchs of the Jewish people.^[33][34] On the basis of scripture, the period of the three Patriarchs has been placed somewhere in the early 2nd millennium BCE,^[35] and the first Kingdom of Israel was established around the 11th century BCE. Subsequent Israelite kingdoms and states ruled intermittently over the next four hundred years, and are known from various extra-biblical sources.^{[36][37][38][39]}

In 635 CE, the region, including Jerusalem, was conquered by the Arabs and was to remain under Muslim control for the next 1300 years.^[44] Control of the region transferred between the Umayyads,^[44] Abbasids,^[44] and Crusaders throughout the next six centuries,^[44] before being conquered by the Mamluk Sultanate, in 1260.^[45] In 1516, the region was conquered by the Ottoman Empire, and remained under Turkish rule until the 20th century.^[45]

The State of Israel, is a parliamentary republic in the Middle East, along the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. It borders Lebanon in the north, Syria in the northeast, Jordan and the West Bank in the east, Egypt and the Gaza Strip on the southwest, and the Gulf of Aqaba in the Red Sea to the south, and it contains geographically diverse features within its relatively small area.^[1][6] Israel is defined as a Jewish and Democratic State in its Basic Laws and is the world's only Jewish-majority state.^[7]
 
Following the adoption of a resolution by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 29 November 1947, recommending the adoption and implementation of the United Nations partition plan of Mandatory Palestine, on 14 May 1948 David Ben-Gurion, the Executive Head of the World Zionist Organization^[8] and president of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, declared the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz Israel, to be known as the State of Israel, a state independent upon the termination of the British Mandate for Palestine, 15th May, 1948.^[9][10][11] Neighboring Arab states invaded the next day in support of the Palestinian Arabs. Israel has since fought several wars with neighboring Arab states,^[12] in the course of which it has occupied the West Bank, Sinai Peninsula (between 1967-1982), Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights. Portions of these territories, including east Jerusalem, have been annexed by Israel, but the border with the neighboring West Bank has not yet been permanently defined.^{[neutrality is disputed][13][14][15][16][17]} Israel has signed peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, but efforts to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict have so far not resulted in peace.

Israel's financial centre is Tel Aviv,^[18] while Jerusalem is the country's most populous city and its capital (although not recognized internationally as such). The population of Israel, as defined by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, was estimated in 2012 to be 7,900,600 people, of whom 5,955,200 are Jewish. Arabs form the country's second-largest ethnic group with 1,627,900 people.^[3] The great majority of Israeli Arabs are settled-Muslims, with smaller but significant numbers of semi-settled Negev Bedouins and Arab Christians. Other minorities include various ethnic and ethno-religious denominations such as Druze, Circassians, Black Hebrew Israelites,^[19] Samaritans, Maronites and others.

Israel is a representative democracy with a parliamentary system, proportional representation and universal suffrage.^[20][21] The Prime Minister serves as head of government and the Knesset serves as Israel's unicameral legislative body. Israel has one of the highest life expectancies in the world.^[22] It is a developed country, an OECD member,^[23] and its economy, based on the nominal gross domestic product, was the 40th-largest in the world in 2011.^[24] Israel has the highest standard of living in the Middle East.^[25]

Upon independence in 1948, the new Jewish state was formally named Medinat Yisrael, or the State of Israel, after other proposed historical and religious names including Eretz Israel ("the Land of Israel"), Zion, and Judea, were considered and rejected.^[26] In the early weeks of independence, the government chose the term "Israeli" to denote a citizen of Israel, with the formal announcement made by Minister of Foreign Affairs Moshe Sharett.^[27]

The name Israel has historically been used, in common and religious usage, to refer to the biblical Kingdom of Israel or the entire Jewish nation.^[28] According to the Hebrew Bible the name "Israel" was given to the patriarch Jacob (Standard Yisraʾel, Isrāʾīl; Septuagint Greek: Ἰσραήλ Israēl; "struggle with God"^[29]) after he successfully wrestled with the angel of the Lord.^[30] Jacob's twelve sons became the ancestors of the Israelites, also known as the Twelve Tribes of Israel or Children of Israel. Jacob and his sons had lived in Canaan but were forced by famine to go into Egypt for four generations until Moses, a great-great grandson of Jacob,^[31] led the Israelites back into Canaan in the "Exodus". The earliest archaeological artifact to mention the word "Israel" is the Merneptah Stele of ancient Egypt (dated to the late 13th century BCE).^[32]

The area is also known as the Holy Land, being holy for all Abrahamic religions including Judaism, Christianity, Islam and the Bahá'í Faith. Prior to the 1948 Israeli Declaration of Independence, the whole region was known by various other names including Southern Syria, Syria Palestina, Kingdom of Jerusalem, Iudaea Province, Coele-Syria, Retjenu, Canaan and, particularly, Palestine.

The Bank of Israel was ranked first among central banks for its efficient functioning, up from the 8th place in 2009. Israel was also ranked as the worldwide leader in its supply of skilled manpower.^[278] The Bank of Israel holds $78 billion of foreign-exchange reserves.^[279]

Source: Wikipedia

'Egypt's Moment of Truth Has Arrived'

Freshly inaugurated Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi surprised his countrymen and the world on Sunday with a daring move to take back power from the strong grip of the military. In what has been widely seen as a well-timed, politically clever move, Morsi forced seven top-level officers into retirement, including Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi. The head of the old-guard military leadership, Tantawi effectively took charge of Egypt via the powerful military council following the fall of former dictator Hosni Mubarak last year. Then, just before Morsi, the country's first democratically elected president, took office on June 30, the military had most of his presidential powers removed.

But on Sunday Morsi's spokesman said that this constitutional declaration had been scrapped. The country now awaits the creation of a new constitution that will be approved via referendum, after which a new parliament will be elected.

Tantawi and his number two, Gen. Sami Anan, are set to be kept on as advisers in Morsi's government, and so far the military has not rebelled against the president's power play, which involved hiring younger officers as replacements. There was no "negative reaction" within the military, according to an anonymous official quoted by the official news agency on Sunday.

"I did not mean to send a negative message about anyone, but my aim was the benefit of this nation," Morsi said in a speech on Sunday. His spokesperson also said his decision aimed to "pump new blood into the military establishment in the interests of developing a new, modern state."

Celebration in Cairo

Morsi and his fellow Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood were not expected to act so quickly in removing the military from power, but the president appears to have taken advantage of a moment of weakness. The military has been embarrassed by its failure to thwart an attack by militants at the Sinai border that killed some 16 Egyptian guards, and has since launched a large deployment in the area.

Thousands of Morsi's supporters reportedly gathered in Cairo's Tahrir Square to celebrate his success. But on the international level, there is some concern that he could use his new power to create an Islamist state.

Reaction from officials in Washington to Morsi's military shake-up was calm, however. "We had expected President Morsi at some point to coordinate changes in the military leadership to name a new team," said US Defense Department press secretary George Little. The most important thing, US State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland added, is that both sides "keep working well together to advance the goals of the democratic transition in Egypt."

German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle expressed concern for the democratic future of Egypt, though. "These are fateful days for Egypt," he told daily Rheinische Post on Tuesday. "The future of the country will be decided by the citizens and the political institutions."

German media commentators on Tuesday praised Morsi's political skill, but expressed fears about the next steps he might take.

Conservative daily Die Welt writes:

"This is yet another development that is hard to interpret. It could be that, in a bid to gain better stature, Morsi has stepped out from behind the military's shadow and asserted the primacy of politics. That would be a first step in the necessary post-military state. But it could also be that Morsi is now beginning to remove the last big obstacle on the path to an Islamic government. Then the primacy of the military would be replaced by that of religion."

"But for the sake of the country, the region and the world, let's hope that Morsi is a brave man who can also show courage towards his own side in the same way he showed it towards the military. If this is the case, he has a balancing act ahead of him."

Conservative daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung writes:

"The Islamist appears to have handled the situation skilfully. … But much will depend on how Morsi exploits this new room to maneuver. He can lead Egypt into democracy, or he can choose further Islamization. The only certainty is that he must act."

"The expectations on the street are high. The Egyptians want a better future -- not tomorrow, but today. The first freely elected president will be measured by whether he can fulfil these expectations. But the revolution is taking place in fits and starts, and Egyptians' lives won't improve immediately this way."

Left-leaning daily Die Tageszeitung writes:

"The political disempowerment of the military leadership is the most important development for Egypt since the fall of Mubarak. President Mohammed Morsi has shown great skill. He managed to split the military leadership and get the members of the military council to participate in their own political displacement. Simultaneously, Morsi also had the dismissed generals highly decorated once again, effectively honoring them away."

"With this, he has made himself secure in two ways: The retired military men remain legally untouchable, an important step in ensuring that they wouldn't organize any resistance for a possible putsch. And, as the new presidential advisers, they are not allowed to leave the country without his permission. That means that legal steps against them can't be ruled out for the future. The fact that the military has remained quiet so far speaks to the president's elegant tactics."

Financial daily Handelsblatt writes:

"Egypt's moment of truth has arrived: Mohammed Morsi, Egypt's Islamist president, had done what was practically unthinkable, and removed the military from power. No one knows whether this volte-face in the power struggle will last or if it will spark retaliation from the military. But it was overdue if the most populous Arab country wants to move on more than a year after the fall of its long-time dictator Hosni Mubarak."

"Egypt is going under economically. … That's why the country desperately needs peace and stability, in addition to the fact that success in the Egyptian revolution would send a positive signal to the entire region. … But the danger that a brutal power struggle might break out between the old guard and the Muslim Brotherhood unfortunately can't be ruled out. That's why economic aid from the West is even more important to help stabilize the country. But so far there has been little more than a few encouraging words."

Source: Spiegel

Ahdaf Soueif: Protesters reclaim the spirit of Egypt

Egyptian novelist Ahdaf Soueif reflects on the determination of Egyptians, after the ousting of President Hosni Mubarak, to rebuild their country and reclaiming their national identity.

I have friends on anti-depressants who, over the last 20 days, forgot to take their pills and have now thrown them away.  Such is the effect of the Egyptian Revolution. On Friday night, Egypt partied. Chants and songs and drums and joy-cries rang out from Alexandria to Aswan. The defunct regime was only mentioned in reference to "we want our money back".

Otherwise, three chants were dominant - and very telling: One - "Lift your head up high, you're Egyptian" - was a response to how humiliated, how hopeless we'd been made to feel over the last four decades. The second was: "We'll get married, We'll have kids," and reflected the hopes of the millions whose desperate need for jobs and homes had been driving them to risk their lives to illegally cross the sea to Europe or the desert to Libya. The third chant was: "Everyone who loves Egypt, come and rebuild Egypt."

And on Saturday, they were as good as their word: they came and cleaned up after their revolution. Volunteers who arrived on Tahrir [Square] after mid-day found it spick and span, and started cleaning up other streets instead. I saw kids perched on the great lions of Qasr el-Nil Bridge buffing them up. I feel - and every parent will know what I mean - I feel that I need to keep my concentration trained on this baby, this newborn revolution - I need to hold it safe in my mind and my heart every second - until it grows and steadies a bit. Eighty million of us feel this way right now.

Eighty million at least - because the support we've been getting from the world has been phenomenal. There's been something different, something very special, about the quality of the attention the Egyptian revolution has attracted: it's been - personal. People everywhere have taken what's been happening here personally. And they've let us know. And those direct, positive and emotional messages we've been receiving have put the wind in our sails. We have a lot to learn very quickly. But we're working. And the people, everywhere, are with us.

In the week before the protesters achieved their goal, Ahdaf Soueif reflected on some of the humorous and poignant moments in Cairo's Tahrir Square. What is happening on the streets and squares of Egypt is extraordinary; it's nothing less than millions of people re-finding their voice - and using it. They're using it to demand the removal of Hosni Mubarak and his regime - with everything that that regime entails: the corrupt cabinet, the fraudulent parliament, the mutilated constitution and the brutal emergency laws. And this common, over-arching demand is being given increasingly creative and individual expression.

The atmosphere on Tahrir Square is like - well, imagine a fair, where the product under scrutiny is politics, economics, governance, history and the law. Circles of people sit on what's left of the grass to talk, friends stroll arm-in-arm discussing, marchers go by chanting and singing, bands play old protest favourites and new-minted anthems. People carry home-made placards with their own messages.

The most common, of course is "Irhal!" ("Depart!"). But with the days passing, I've seen more impatient ones like "Irhal, my arm's hurting", "Irhal, I really need a shower", "Irhal, I can't find another joke", "Irhal means leave", and others. One man has outlined a huge airliner on the ground with used paper cups and keeps everyone out of its outlines because the plane's ready to whisk Mubarak away.
A huge sheet of plastic pockets has been hung up and the pockets are speedily filling with caricatures.

This revolution is so organic, so personal, so real, it has exploded reservoirs of creativity in everybody taking part. Each person coming to the square brings something: medical supplies for the field clinics which are still treating the people damaged by Mr Mubarak's police and thug militias, blankets for the thousands spending the night, cartons of water, biscuits. Teams of young volunteers collect litter. The resulting piles are labelled "National Democratic Party".

This is not to say that all is well with us. The government has, for the moment, withdrawn its police and its thug militias and the army sits on the periphery of Tahrir Square - to protect us. But the army has now put up barbed wire to narrow the entrances and exits and they're trying to move their tanks further into the square. When the young people lay down in front of the tanks Sunday night, they fired volleys of shots into the air and dragged away three young men and beat them. The situation was diffused when a well-liked public figure intervened.

This is what we older revolutionaries are doing - putting everything we have at the service of the brave young people who have cleared a space from which we can all join the effort to reclaim our state. Tahrir has become our civic space where leftists and liberals and Muslim Brotherhood discuss and sing and eat together. The other cities and towns of Egypt have sent popular delegations. The consensus is that the consensus will come out of Tahrir. And one thing that Tahrir has already given us is a sense of who we are.

People are actually articulating: "They said we were divided, extreme, ignorant, fanatic - well here we are: diverse, inclusive, hospitable, generous, sophisticated, creative and witty." In Philip Pullman's Northern Lights, the aim of the evil guys is to sever children from their spirits so releasing the energy needed by the government. Well, that's a brilliant metaphor for what we feel has been happening to us in Egypt. We were being deliberately severed from everything we hold dear, in the service of keeping the region subservient to American and Israeli interests.

And the only Egyptians to gain anything by this were the members and cronies of the regime who amassed spectacular wealth at the material, moral and emotional expense of their fellow-citizens. On Sunday in Tahrir, Christian masses were celebrated and Muslim prayers were said. We all prayed together for the young people killed by the regime since 25 January and before. Later, there was a wedding, and later still magicians and acrobats and small camp fires.

This enormous revolution that is happening in our streets and our homes is the Egyptian people reclaiming their state, their heritage, their voice, their personality.

Be with us.

Ahdaf Soueif is an Egyptian novelist and political and cultural commentator, who lives with her children in Cairo and London.

Source: BBC News

CIA rendition flights stopped by Swedish military

An acute diplomatic crisis broke out between the United States and Sweden in 2006 when Swedish authorities put a stop to CIA rendition flights, according to the latest revelation from Wikileaks.

Daily Svenska Dagbladet wrote Sunday that Swedish Military Intelligence posed as airport personnel and boarded one of the two controversial extraordinary rendition flights during a stopover at Stockholm’s Arlanda International Airport. The suspected prisoner transfers were confirmed.

A few days before the incident US charge d’affaires at the American Embassy in Stockholm, Steven V. Noble, was summoned by the Swedish Foreign Ministry and questioned about the planned stopover. The Swedish military also set down rules for stopovers.

Steven V. Noble wrote in cables reveled by WkiLeaks that the Swedish government reacted strongly because rules had not been followed.

A spokesperson from Säpo, Swedish police Intelligence Service, confirmed parts the newspaper report, adding that there have been no more extraordinary rendition flights landing in Sweden since.

The U.S. rendition of two Egyptians from Sweden in 2001 was exposed a year later by an investigative TV pogramme and slammed by Swedish officials, international organizations and human rights groups after reports the prisoners were abused.

Ahmed Agiza and Muhammad al-Zery, two Egyptians who had been seeking asylum in Sweden, were arrested by Swedish police in December 2001. They were taken to Bromma airport in Stockholm, had their clothes cut from their bodies, suppositories inserted in their anuses and in diapers, overall, handcuffs and chains put on an executive jet with American registration N379P with a crew of masked men.

They were flown to Egypt, where they were imprisoned, beaten, and tortured according to reports by Swedish investigative pogramme "Kalla fakta". The Swedish ambassador visited them only six weeks later.

In 2008 AL Zery was awarded 500 000 dollars in damages by the Swedish government for the wrongful treatment he received in Sweden and the subsequent torture in Egypt.

Source: The Swedish Wire

Tension rising in Middle East: Could Israel attack Iran and why?

On August 21 the Bushehr nuclear power plant was officially launched. This marked a new stage in Iran's disputed nuclear programme. In the days preceding this event, former US ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, was quoted around the world as saying: "Israel has days to strike Bushehr" and further "diplomatically" hinted, “If Israel was right to destroy the Osiraq reactor [Iraqi nuclear reactor bombed by Israel in 1981], is it right to allow this one to continue? You can’t have it both ways.”

Shortly after American/Israeli Jeffry Goldberg – one of the most influential journalists on matters of Israel – wrote an article in The Atlantic called "The Point of No Return". In his article he also highlights the unavailability of an Israeli strike against Iran.

Amidst the so called Middle-East "peace negotiations" – a pathetic and hopeless attempt to divide the Palestinian territories between different rulers and their stooges – tension is rising in the Middle East. We are living in a period of great instability on a global level. In the Middle East this is especially reflected in the inability of US imperialism to be able to control the situation.

Out of this crisis Iran is presently emerging as a more powerful player in the Middle East. At the same time Israel is feeling pressure both strategically in the region but also to an increasing degree from its masses who have started to become numb to the hysterical military propaganda. Contradictions are building up in the Middle East and sooner or later they will have to be solved in one way or another. One thing is clear, the turbulence and instability seen hitherto is nothing compared with what is being prepared for the future.

Destruction of "equilibrium" in the Middle East

In 2003 US president George Bush started the war in Iraq. A hopelessly short-sighted adventure, that was supposed to put an end to “terrorism”, “restore democracy” and consolidate and manifest the domination of US imperialism in the region and globally. Instead, what the war in Iraq managed was to further destabilise the whole region bringing with it nothing but further misery for the downtrodden masses. The US army immediately revealed itself to be nothing but an occupation force, swiftly alienating the mass of the population. At the same time the offensive displayed the limits of US imperialism.

The War in Iraq could never have been won. Simply to maintain a most fragile “stability” the Americans needed the help of Iran and Syria who have considerable influence in the country. At the same time the once powerful Iraqi military apparatus, the only counterweight to the Iranian army, has been completely shattered.

With the dismantling of Saddam’s army, a vacuum was opened not only within Iraq itself but in the whole of the Middle East. In 2006 the 1.5m-strong armed forces of Iran were described, by General John Abizaid, chief of the US Central Command, to be "the most powerful military force in the region, except for the United States of America, [and Israel]". This situation poses a serious imbalance of forces in the Middle East, an imbalance that is acquiring a logic of its own.

But now Iraq itself is beyond its control. Huge sectarian rifts have opened up and are widening. The withdrawal of US combat forces in August has further increased this instability, but the US did not have any other options. The presence of US forces in Iraq was draining the US treasury of more than 2 billion dollars a week. In a crisis situation with millions losing their jobs in the US, this drain enormously increased the general alienation of US workers and youth to the war. There was no way any government could endure such an immense drain of resources for so long, neither from a political nor an economic point of view. (However, although “combat forces” have been withdrawn, some 50,000 US troops still remain in Iraq and are planned to stay until the end of 2011 to “advise” Iraqi forces and “protect” US interests.)

But to withdraw fully the US needs the cooperation of Iran (and Syria) who control important militia forces in Iraq and who through these could cause great chaos and instability. On top of this Iran has also displayed several times how it could even use regular Iranian ground forces to intervene in Iraq. Last December Iranian troops temporarily occupied well No 4 at the al Fakkah oil field, about 320km south-east of Baghdad. Although the troops withdrew shortly after the occupation – they only withdrew from the well, but remain on official Iraqi soil to this day – they met no resistance either from US or Iraqi troops. Also in the north there have been several incidents of Iranian troops moving into Iraqi soil ("in chase of terrorists") without Iraqi officials being able to seriously challenge their actions, because through its involvement in Iraqi politics and with its control over important sectarian armed forces Iran could create further chaos and instability. Herein lies the dilemma of the US.

Apart from its influence in Iraq, other factors are also acting as an insurance policy against an attack for Iran. Firstly Iran through the Qods forces of the IRGC controls many groups internationally that could put pressure on the US and its allies through terrorist actions and open warfare. The most important are the Hezbollah forces in Lebanon who control vast areas of that small but strategically important country. They have the capability of striking inside Israel, a close ally of the US and also hitherto a (if not the) dominant force in the Middle East.

Last but not least Iran has a large influence in the Persian Gulf and could, potentially, temporarily block the strait of Hormuz where more than 40% of the world’s crude oil has to pass in order to reach the world markets. Such an action, even for a short period, would have a very negative effect on the world economy that is already in a fragile state. Stratfor – the US-based strategic intelligence institute – claims that even in a best case scenario it would take at least one month to remove such a block. Besides bringing the world economy to its knees, such a block would also be a big threat against all the Gulf states, many of whom have already been severely hurt by the world economic crisis, and who all depend heavily on oil sales.

Before the US invaded Iraq the Iraqi army was acting as a counterweight to Iran and a guarantee against the threats that Iran posed, but now with the disintegration of Iraqi society the counterweight is hard to see.

The nuclear programme

It is in this context that Iran's nuclear programme acquires even more significance. For years Iran have been finalising the first phases of its nuclear facilities. Despite Ahmadinejad’s denials of the fact, it is clear to all that Iran's nuclear programme is not solely for civilian use. It would be probable and wise for the regime not to choose to completely finish this process, but to leave the project at an almost finished stage like in Japan and thus using all the strategic benefits and concessions of nuclear armament without paying the high price of protecting the bomb from hostile elements.

The history of nuclear weapons has shown that, besides allowing their owners to force concessions out of their neighbours, they also drastically complicate an attack on the nations who own them. As well as reducing the chance of other countries meddling and trying to dictate their internal affairs. The fact that the US has not yet been able to challenge the weak and rotten state apparatus in South Korea is partly a proof of this.

Of course, all the US cries against a nuclear Iran are purely hysterical and hypocritical in nature. For years Israel has used the strategic advantages of nuclear weapons to bully many Middle Eastern countries without any complaints from the US. Until now Israel has had the only nuclear arsenal in the region, but if Iran were to change the nuclear balance of forces the whole situation in the Middle East would further tilt to Iran's favour. It would weaken Israeli imperialism and strengthen Iran's position.

In this sense the opening of the Bushehr nuclear reactor on 21 August was a big provocation to Israel (and indirectly to all the countries of the Middle East and the US who is further threatened to lose influence and domination over these.)

Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, and a former CIA man with considerable diplomatic experience, recently put it like this:

“Israel now faces the biggest-ever challenge to its monopoly on the bomb in the Middle East from Iran. For Israel, Tehran is a dangerous opponent, close and threatening. There is a virtually unanimous consensus in Israel that Iran cannot be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons. From left to right, Israelis see an existential threat to their very survival. Current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu argued at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Forum in Jerusalem in 2007 that Iran is a “crazy,” even suicidal, state that will be prepared to sacrifice millions of its own citizens in a nuclear exchange with Israel.

“Though other Israeli leaders are more cautious, even they are strongly determined to keep Israel’s monopoly on nuclear weapons. Ephraim Sneh, former deputy defense minister and a much-decorated retired general in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), notes that ‘the most salient strategic threat to Israel’s existence is Iran.’ They fear Israel’s strategic room for maneuver in the region would be constrained by an Iranian nuclear deterrent. The success of Hezbollah and Hamas in the last few years has only added to Israeli concern. (The National Interest - August 24, 2010)

The Iranian dilemma

It is clear that as far as the general balance of power goes in the Middle East Iran has emerged strengthened. But the Iranian regime is not in full control of this process. The regime is actually forced to be more aggressive in foreign politics as it attempts to regain a social base by diverting the attention of the masses towards an external enemy and thus uniting the many factions within the state.The provocations of Messrs Ahmadinejad and others also flow from a strong necessity.

From Lebanon Hezbollah is always poking at Israel. In early August Lt-Col Harariof of the Israeli army was killed during a small episode of gun-fighting on the border between Lebanon and Israel.

The question of Iran is explosive. At the same time in recent years the Ahmadinejad regime has increasingly tried to spread influence in the Middle East and the African continent. Last year, former parliament speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nori said, that Bahrain was Iran’s 14th province. A statement that displays the ambitions and also the influence of the regime in regard to Bahrain, one of the leading financial centres of the Middle East.

Last year Mr Ahmadinejad visited mainly Christian Kenya, being joyously welcomed in the port of Mombasa, on the Muslim-inhabited coast. He struck a deal to export 4million tonnes of crude oil to Kenya a year, to open direct flights between Tehran and Nairobi, the two capitals, and to grant scholarships for study in Iran. Wherever Iran has embassies it also sets up cultural centres. Iran has also been trying to use its oil to get into Uganda. Zimbabwe’s president, Robert Mugabe, has also been courted, along with sub-Saharan Africa’s diplomatic and economic giant, South Africa. South Africa has been one of Iran’s doughtiest supporters at the UN, abstaining on a resolution to condemn Iran’s human rights violations and arguing against further embargoes and sanctions over Iran’s nuclear plans.

Of course the amount of “aid” that Iran gives Africa – and the amount of influence it consequently has – is still small compared with the sums Americans and Europeans give out, let alone China. But the important fact lies in the constant attacks against the political and economic influence of other countries, including Israel – especially in an economic situation where the markets all over the world have shrunk and where room for economic manoeuvrability is narrowing.

As a side note we should remember that, as a result of Iran’s African activity, Israel has been trying to push its way back into the continent. In September Israel’s foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, made Israel’s first high level mission to Africa for decades, visiting Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda. Countering Iran’s influence was plainly one reason behind the trip.

On top of this there are of course the constant verbal and demagogic attacks of Ahmadinejad against Israel. These acts are indeed seen as a threat by the monstrous military state apparatus of Israeli that has based its legitimacy increasingly on its ability to crush the smallest obstacles with brute military force.

But the question is also as to whether the Ahmadinejad regime has any other choice. The revolutionary situation that opened up last year between the elections and Ashura has destabilised the regime which is now increasingly splitting. Although the splits between the reformists and hardliners are still present, the most important splits at present are opening up within the camp of the hardliners.

There is not one day that goes by without new splits and contradictions surfacing within this faction. The monstrous bureaucratic machine is devouring itself from within with factional infighting and corridor "back-stabbing". There is only one thing that these factions within the faction can agree upon, and that is the need for unity, as any serious crack in the higher echelons may give more room for the mass struggle to develop. But in the current situation a lasting unity within the regime is not possible. At the same time no faction or layer is strong enough to consolidate its power. Centrifugal forces are ripping the whole fabric of the apparatus apart. In this context Ahmadinejad’s demagogic (and hypocritical) so called anti-imperialism is a powerful tool, used to divert the attention of the masses, creating/preserving a social base and pushing for unity within his own ranks. Especially in a situation where war is on the agenda it could become an even more powerful tool.

This situation is also the source of a massive drain of support from key layers that used to back the regime but who are now beginning to move into opposition. This is perfectly exemplified with the latest strike in the Bazaar and the continuing defections of diplomats.

At the same time there are the economic factors pushing the regime. The Iranian economy is under enormous pressure. Although trustworthy figures are almost impossible to find, it is clear to everyone that the Iranian economy is in a deep crisis. The claims by the administration, that Iran has miraculously become self-sufficient in any major industry, should at best be seen as a joke.

Iran is not close to being self-sufficient. According to Professor at Northeastern University, U.S, Kamran Dadkhah, Iran needs investments worth $46.5 billion to build new refineries and increase production of oil products. So far, Iran has invested $8.2 billion in this sector within the fourth development programme. Over $6.3 billion is required to maintain and expand existing production. Over $2.1 billion has been invested. Of course Dadkhah could be exaggerating in order to serve other interests, but his estimates are still more accurate than the claims that Iran does not need to import gasoline.

The present character of the world economic crisis more than anything reveals how interconnected all economies are and how deep the international division of labour has developed within capitalism. The tax hikes and attacks on state subsidised basic consumer goods in the last years are signs of this contraction in the economy.

The regime is increasingly running out of options. It has to go on the offensive, either against its own people or beyond its borders. The crisis and the sanctions are having a big impact on the Iranian economy and Iran is forced to turn outwards in search of markets and supplies where possible. And even when it finds these, in China for instance, it will have to pay more for the same commodities and services.

The regime does not have a united line or a plan for the situation. There are some parts of the regime that pull towards accommodation with US imperialism while others argue that they should search for new markets. This conflict is not just between the “reformist” and the “hardline” factions, but also within both these factions. This was clearly displayed a month ago when the administration tried to open up negotiations with the US and Khamenei attacked them saying there would be no negotiations.

The Israeli dilemma

At the same time tensions are also rising within Israel. For years the question of growing poverty and misery has been leading to internal tensions. The Israeli elite have used the question of Palestine as a big diversion and to some extent this has worked. But the result has been that, 1) the state and military apparatus have placed their legitimacy on the might of their military and 2) sections of the masses are becoming numb to the constant warmongering.

Israel was created, supposedly, to provide a safe haven for Jews. The ideology of the state is Zionism, which attempts to bind together all Jews living in Israel across class lines. The state has justified its existence on the grounds that it is the sole protector of the people of Israel. On this basis the regime has demanded loyalty and has been able to suppress internal criticism. In this respect Iran’s nuclear programme is a great provocation, especially after the humiliating defeat in Lebanon in 2006 and the failure to destroy Hamas with the massive military campaign in Gaza in 2008.

In 2009 Israel had military expenditure to the tune of $14.3 billion. That is 7% of GDP - a ratio that is even higher than that of the US and fifth globally. On top of this massive drain of resources the country has been in an almost constant state of war mobilisation and two monstrous wars have been waged with no victory, leaving only a massive trail of blood behind it.

Especially the lack of any real victory is playing a big role. It is no secret to anyone that Hamas and Hezbollah have not come out of these wars weakened, on the contrary. In fact, increasingly, Israel is forced to lift the economic blockade on Gaza in order to offset the activities that go on through the smuggling tunnels between Gaza and Egypt.

Also the constant provocations of Ahmadinejad are playing a very undermining role – especially for the powerful military establishment. The Israeli masses have started to become tired of this caste that cannot succeed in any of its own aims and aspirations, let alone help the masses succeed in theirs. Although this process is still at an embryonic state it is nonetheless significant and, most importantly, it is narrowing the room for the regime to manoeuvre. The class divide is widening and class struggle will take a sharper character in the future.

In a March poll, published in The Times, Israelis were asked to name the "most urgent problem" facing Israel. Just 8% of Israeli Jews cited the conflict with the Palestinians, putting it fifth behind education, crime, national security and poverty.

According to the OECD, poverty in Israel is more widespread than in any other OECD country. Almost one in five people in Israel live in poverty – i.e. in a household with income less than half of the national average. A number of factors are behind this, but one of the most important is that many people in Israel don’t have jobs: about 40% of people of working age have no jobs, compared to about 33% in OECD countries. 23% of all elderly are currently living below the poverty line and according to Haaretz, at the end of 2008, in Jerusalem, 48 percent of Jewish and 74 percent of non-Jewish children where defined as poor.

Also, according to a special report on healthcare spending published by the Central Bureau of Statistics, the burden of family spending on healthcare has increased sharply in the last 10 years, while government investment pulled back. From 2000 to 2009, a family's average outlay on healthcare shot up from NIS 339 a month to NIS 633.

These figures are even more striking – especially in the eyes of dissatisfied Israelis – when they are compared to economic growth which is now at 4.1% (almost at the 4.7% level of the pre-crisis period).

The pressures flowing from this polarisation of society are also increasingly being reflected as tensions at the top. Although still small, serious divisions are taking shape within the ruling circles of Israel, within Mossad, the Knesset and even within the government.

Avigdor Lieberman (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and his populist and right-wing nationalist Yisrael Beiteinu party are heavily openly promoting an aggressive non-conciliatory policy towards Palestine – that is, to use brute force to beat the people of Palestine into submission – and Ehud Barak (Minister of Defence) from the Labour Party, reflecting the interests of the US, is supporting the opposite policy of "dialogue" – that is, to strike a deal with Fatah and maybe even Hamas to beat the people of Palestine into submission for them. This conflict has been the source of some trouble for Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who has had to balance to a certain degree between the two parties. Splits and divisions like these have a tendency to undermine the legitimacy and authority of a government.

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf

But it is not only the Israeli regime that is facing new trouble. George Friedman from Stratfor writes the following:

“The country most concerned about Iran is not Israel, but Saudi Arabia. The Saudis recall the result of the last strategic imbalance in the region, when Iraq, following its armistice with Iran, proceeded to invade Kuwait, opening the possibility that its next intention was to seize the northeastern oil fields of Saudi Arabia. In that case, the United States intervened. Given that the United States is now withdrawing from Iraq, intervention following withdrawal would be politically difficult unless the threat to the United States was clear. More important, the Iranians might not give the Saudis the present Saddam Hussein gave them by seizing Kuwait and then halting. They might continue. They certainly have the military capacity to try.

“In a real sense, the Iranians would not have to execute such a military operation in order to gain the benefits. The simple imbalance of forces would compel the Saudis and others in the Persian Gulf to seek a political accommodation with the Iranians. Strategic domination of the Persian Gulf does not necessarily require military occupation — as the Americans have abundantly demonstrated over the past 40 years. It merely requires the ability to carry out those operations."

Although Stratfor has a tendency to overestimate pure military capacity, i.e. amount of arms, men etc., as opposed to internal economic, social and political contradictions, there are certainly many truths in the above lines.

The position of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries has become more precarious since the fall of Saddam. Subsequently an unheard of arms race has started in the Gulf. Military expenditure is rising exponentially. Of the top 12 countries in the world using the largest percentages of their GDP on military spending, 8 are in the Middle East (and most of those around the Gulf).

In the last few weeks the US has initiated an arms deal worth $60 billion. This is the largest US arms deal ever. The Israeli government, which has often sought to block arms transactions with Arab states in the past (and just recently objected to a new Russian sale of cruise missiles to Syria), has yet to utter a peep of protest.

The situation is the same in the Gulf countries where US arms sales have escalated.US defence sales to the Gulf region more than doubled, from $US19 billion in 2001-04 to $US40 billion in 2005-08. There is no reason to think that this process has weakened since 2008.

The pressure on all these states is mounting, both economically and socially. Since the beginning of the economic crisis these countries have been in a very weak situation spilling over into the beginnings of political crisis. The room for concessions to external players is very little. In August for instance there was an, albeit small, demonstration of 200 against unemployment in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia – a very significant development in this country, considering the lack of genuine democratic rights, and also a reflection of the rising unemployment, that is estimated to be around 20% of the native population.
Could there be an attack against Iran?

From all the above we can see that tensions are rising across the Middle East. The balance of power is shifting in Iran’s direction, but the other regimes in the region cannot simply accept this growing strength of Iran. It is clear that the contradictions must be solved at some point; it is in this context that a layer within the US and Israeli elite is contemplating an attack. Again George Friedman from Stratfor writes:

“...an Israeli strike against Iran without U.S. involvement difficult to imagine....(...)[there are] three counters [to an attack against Iran]. One [is] Hezbollah, which is the least potent of the three from the American perspective. The other two are Iraq and Hormuz. If the Iraqis were able to form a government that boxed in pro-Iranian factions in a manner similar to how Hezbollah is being tentatively contained, then the second Iranian counter would be weakened. That would ‘just’ leave the major issue — Hormuz.

“The problem with Hormuz is that the United States cannot tolerate any risk there. The only way to control that risk is to destroy Iranian naval capability before airstrikes on nuclear targets take place. Since many of the Iranian mine layers would be small boats, this would mean an extensive air campaign and special operations forces raids against Iranian ports designed to destroy anything that could lay mines, along with any and all potential mine-storage facilities, anti-ship missile emplacements, submarines and aircraft. Put simply, any piece of infrastructure within a few miles of any port would need to be eliminated. The risk to Hormuz cannot be eliminated after the attack on nuclear sites. It must be eliminated before an attack on the nuclear sites. And the damage must be overwhelming. (...)

“This opening gambit would necessarily attack Iran’s command-and-control, air-defense and offensive air capabilities as well as maritime capabilities. This would sequence with an attack on the nuclear capabilities and could be extended into a prolonged air campaign targeting Iran’s ground forces.

“Far from the less-than-rewarding task of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, going after Iran would be the kind of war the United States excels at fighting. No conventional land invasion, no boots-on-the-ground occupation, just a very thorough bombing campaign."

Added to all the above is the fact that US and Israeli interests do not always overlap.

At present the Obama administration would like to avoid war with Iran, as it needs the Iranian regime on board to help maintain some semblance of stability in Iraq. However, when the chips are down it is Israel that is the most reliable ally of US imperialism in the region and therefore the US could be forced to engage in a mission backing the Israeli generals or, at the very least, tacitly allow Israel to act. Especially if the Israelis chose to attack, leaving the Hormuz strait vulnerable, the US could be forced to support the attack so as to clear the threat to the strait. The point is that the Zionist regime follows its own interests that are based on the situation in Israel and not always on what Washington dictates. For the Israeli regime it is a matter of protecting the legitimacy and strategic position of the regime, while for the US administration it is a matter of protecting US interests, especially in Iraq, by attempting to stabilize the region as a whole, which means lowering the level of armed conflict.

Apart from these revealing considerations there have also been reports of Saudi Arabia having conducted tests to stand down its air defences to enable Israeli jets to make a bombing raid on Iran’s nuclear facilities. But no matter how and by whom such an attack would be carried out, it should be noted that this is not a new method in the Middle East. In 1981 Israel made a surprise air strike that destroyed an Iraqi nuclear reactor under construction in Osirak. Also in 2007 Israel conducted an airstrike on an allegedly secret nuclear installation in Syria.

But an attack is not the only topic on the agenda for US imperialism. The strategists of capital are actually split when it comes to the question as to how to approach Iran. One camp argues that an attack is inevitable, and that preparations should be made immediately. The other camp argues that Iran's new position should be accepted, but that it should be held in check by massively arming Israel (even with the US strengthening Israel’s nuclear arsenal) and the Gulf nations.

The truth is that both camps are right and wrong at the same time. The tensions between the rulers of the Middle East are rising to an unheard of level. At some point one of the players will have to make a move that could spin off into some kind of military confrontation. Especially the trigger-happy Israeli military establishment could be pressured to act – an act that would bring with it catastrophic consequences for the world economy and even more for the masses of the Middle East.

But from this the Iranian regime would probably even recuperate militarily quite fast. In this sense it is not even clear that an attack would be successful from the point of view of any party, but could still happen since none of the regimes can afford to show weakness or back down.

At the same time it is clear that the balance of power has shifted and that Iran - in any state - will play a more prominent role in the future of the Middle East. But to think that such a future is going to be stable, or just more stable than now is utopian. The present massive arms race in the region speaks for itself.
Effects of an attack on the revolutionary process in Iran

Although the mass movement in Iran has presently receded, the regime is still fragile. It has lost huge layers of support. This is in fact the main reason for its constant splitting. An attack from the US or Israel would be seen by the masses as an act to beat the country into submission to US and Israeli imperialism – thus it would cut through the developments that started last year. In this sense the regime would utilise the situation to regain control of the country and maybe even settle some scores.

But this development would only be temporary. Wars tend to bring to the fore all the contradictions that have built up in society. Iran would be no exception. After an initial period of withdrawal the mass movement would come to the fore once more and the deterioration of the regime would increase once more.

In the 1980s Khomeini used the war against Iraq to streamline the regime and to consolidate its power by physically destroying all opposition, but the situation is very different today. Besides the fact that the character of a hypothetical war today would be different in all manners, there is another factor. In the 1980s mass opposition was fragmented and the mass movement was on the ebb. Today the core who led the mass movement, with all its flaws, weaknesses and disorganisation, is the only undivided force in the country and, contrary to the regime, they have not received any decisive blows.

Besides this, the regime is hopelessly tangled up in a thousand wrangling cliques and factions, with a chronic and unsolvable deadlock that is presently dragging down the whole apparatus and that is not going to go away.

A consolidation of reaction in Iran would only become real after a long historical process with a series of decisive defeats for the masses. The regime could try to use a war to inflict such a defeat, but it is far from certain that it would succeed in the present conditions. Lenin explained that war – after an initial period with disorientation of the masses and the spread of patriotism etc, – at a later stage could become a powerful impulse for revolutionary explosions. Such development would not be unlikely in Iran.

The future only brings more instability

The fact is that American, Israeli, Saudi and Iranian strategists – as well as the many do-gooders – can think from here until eternity of a solution to bring “peace and stability” to the Middle East, but none of their “solutions” will do anything but add to and deepen the already existing instability. As long as the laws of capitalism govern the Middle East, no lasting peace can be reached.

For the rulers of the region this may even be tolerable. Maybe their faces, titles and headwear might change from time to time, but in general they will continue with their luxurious lifestyles as parasites leeching off the masses. But for the masses the situation will only become worse, as they will have to pay for the adventures of their rulers - if they accept at all that this is their destiny!

Unfortunately for the elite there is no evidence that this is the case. Already now most the regimes are hanging by a thread. For years the rulers have used questions of nationality and religion to confuse the masses and keep them in check, but the situation is changing. The fault lines are increasingly transcending national and religious lines and mass movements are taking shape everywhere acquiring a clearer class character.

Of course there is the movement in Iran, that has only temporarily receded, but it is clear that it will resurface on a higher level sooner or later. But also in other countries the class struggle is becoming sharper. In Turkey we saw the impressive struggle of the Tekel factory workers that managed to put immense pressure on the government. In Saudi Arabia as we also noted earlier there is growing discontent – with significant cracks in a hitherto very polished surface. In the West Bank the PFLP have bowed to immense pressure from below and have had to withdraw from the executive of the ruling PLO because of their deals with US and Israeli imperialism. And even in Israel, at some stage, we will see mass opposition to the regime that is exhausting its options to buy social peace with the pretext of "national security."

The most important situation, besides Iran, is developing in Egypt, one of the key countries in the region from the point of view of the class struggle. In the absence of genuine national mass organisations, Mohammad Elbaradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency and now outsider in the corridors of the Egyptian power struggle, is striving to become a focal point in opposition to the Mubarak regime and gain some kind of momentum, promoting a boycott of the parliamentary elections on a democratic programme aimed at the workers and poor. With all probability he has started something that he will not be able to control in the future.

All these developments will deepen and seriously affect each other in the next period. If Israel or the US attacks Iran it would correctly be seen by the masses as yet another imperialist attempt to beat the Middle East into submission. This would only further enrage the masses that are fed up with US imperialism and their stooges. It would be a further impulse for the masses to cease being used as pawns in the Middle East and enter the game as players. Once this happens no one will be able to resist and all the pathetic manoeuvres and corridor deals of the rotten regimes will be swept away.

The masses of the Middle East have shown time and time again that they are willing to rise and sacrifice everything to break loose from the shackles of capitalism and its never ending horrors. The only solutions to their miseries are to be found in a socialist society where the resources of the region are controlled by the workers and poor. Until that day comes, peace will only be a superficial and volatile concept.

The main problem is not the strength of capitalism, nor the willingness to struggle and sacrifice of the workers and poor. The main problem is the lack of a mass revolutionary leadership, based on the ideas of Marxism. A leadership that is rooted not in the narrow circles of the "left", but that is firmly tied to the mass of workers and poor in all neighbourhoods from Tehran to Cairo and that takes its starting point from the realities that exist on the ground.

The forces of revolutionary Marxism are still too weak to play this role, but there has never been a better time for building our forces than now. All the contradictions of the system are becoming obvious to all with the masses in a state of turmoil. But in order to reap during the revolutionary events of the future we must sow now. We must build a strong nucleus that is able to intervene in the mass movements of the future and give them direction. If we succeed – and we most certainly will – there will be plenty of opportunities to win over the masses and provide that leadership that is required if we are to sweep away the rotten regimes in the region and with them the whole rotten system of capitalism. This would then be replaced with a Socialist Federation of the Middle East where the resources of the region would be used by its peoples to develop society to unprecedented levels and out of the dead end of capitalist wars and savagery.

Source: In defence of Marxism: the website of the International Marxist Tendency
Written by Hamid Alizadeh Wednesday, 01 December 2010

Policemen arrested for gunning down hawker in Bruma

Two policemen and a civilian were expected to appear in the Johannesburg Magistrate’s Court on Monday for allegedly killing an Egyptian hawker at the Bruma flea market, police said. “They will appear in court today [Monday],” said Captain Julia Claassen.

She said a 28-year-old man was arrested on Friday morning while an inspector from the Germiston flying squad and a constable from Nigel police station were nabbed on Thursday. The hawker, identified as Nabil Hasaballa, 32, was killed on Thursday at his Bruma flea market stall.

The policemen allegedly threatened to arrest him without any reason and a scuffle ensued. One of the men then shot Hasaballa dead. Claassen said the police were still searching for a fourth man.

Meanwhile, members of the Arab Associations Union were planning to stage a protest march outside court on Monday. “There is a great deal of anger in the Arab community in South Africa because of this incident. We believe it is unacceptable that an innocent man is handcuffed by police and then shot at point-blank range in a market in front of many people, and for no reason whatsoever,” said a statement released by the organisation. “Our march will demand that the perpetrators not be given bail and be given the maximum sentences for their brutal crime. We trust the judicial system, and we believe that justice will be served. We must show the world that we can fight crime together.”

Source: Business Day

Deadly Gunfire at Gaza Protest on Egypt Border

An anti-Egypt rally in southern Gaza turned deadly on Wednesday when demonstrators rushed the border fence and stoned Egyptian troops on the other side, leading to an exchange of gunfire and the death of an Egyptian soldier. Nine Egyptian soldiers and a dozen Palestinians were wounded from stones and gunfire, witnesses and medics said.

It was the most serious Palestinian-Egyptian violence along the closed Gaza border since Israel’s short-lived invasion more than a year ago, and reflected rising tensions between Gaza’s Hamas rulers and the Egyptian government, which, like Israel, appears determined to keep Gaza isolated. The demonstration, organized by Hamas, protested Egypt’s refusal to allow international aid and solidarity missions into Gaza as well as Egypt’s construction of an underground barrier to obstruct smuggler tunnels. Those tunnels supply both goods and arms to Hamas and Gaza. As Hamas leaders gave speeches, young men climbed the border fence and threw rocks at the Egyptians, witnesses and police reported, and Palestinian police officers shot in the air to control the crowd, though to little avail. Egyptian troops then shot from their side. “Two Palestinians were instantly wounded from five bullets,” a witness said.

The Egyptian forces also tear-gassed demonstrators who waved Hamas and Turkish flags, witnesses said. A Palestinian aid convoy was stopped by Egypt in the northern Sinai city of El Arish and included Turkish activists. The group, called Viva Palestina, consisted of 500 people, including Americans, British and Jordanians. It had scuffled earlier with Egyptian security officials in El Arish. Dozens were hurt. A compromise was reached and part of the convoy was en route into Gaza by nightfall. “The area is calm now and the situation on the border is stable,” said Ihab al-Ghussein, spokesman for the Hamas Interior Ministry, at a news conference in Gaza City.

The Egyptian soldier who was killed was in an observation tower 100 yards from the demonstration’s stage, witnesses said. Dr. Ahmed Shehada of Abu Yousef al-Najjar Hospital in Rafah, said it had taken in 12 wounded Palestinians, “most of them hit by gunshots.”

Source: New York Times