ESKOM and the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa) have been granted the right to intervene in the Competition Tribunal’s hearings next week on the merger of the world’s largest commodity trader, Glencore, and mining group Xstrata.
Eskom has proposed that the tribunal impose conditions on the merger that could include measures such as ensuring the ratio of exports to domestic coal supply be kept constant after the merger, and that the merging parties agree to negotiate in good faith on long-term coal-supply contracts as these expire.
The utility says it does not want to stand in the way of the merger, but has to raise its concern about the future supply of coal for the domestic market.
Public hearings on the merger start on Monday.
The company says it has a public mandate to supply electricity to the entire country and is dependent on the right grade of coal at the appropriate time and at an affordable price to be able to deliver on its mandate.
In the absence of industrial policy that provides for the security of domestic supply before exports, the merger highlights Eskom’s vulnerability.
Eskom spokeswoman Hilary Joffe says: “The merged entity would account for approximately 15% of Eskom’s coal supply, with Glencore and Xstrata accounting for the bulk of the supply to the Majuba and Hendrina power stations and supplying smaller quantities to Duvha, Komati, Arnot and Matla power stations.”
Although it has secured the majority of its supply needs until 2018, Ms Joffe says Eskom needs to raise its concern about supply security beyond that.
Eskom indicated that it would propose additional conditions if necessary.
Xstrata is the world’s largest exporter of the type of coal used by power stations, and all of its mines and plants are in South Africa.
Glencore holds almost 34% of Xstrata and after this transaction — valued at $80bn — is approved, the miner will become a wholly owned subsidiary of Glencore.
It currently produces 27.4-million tons of saleable coal a year in South Africa, of which almost 30% is exported.
Source: Business Day
Showing posts with label Glencore. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Glencore. Show all posts
Friday, December 7, 2012
Zuma on nationalisation and working with Ramaphosa
PRESIDENT Jacob Zuma has welcomed the prospect of working with businessman Cyril Ramaphosa as his deputy, saying "it would not be the first time" that he has worked with the man who was once tipped to take over from Nelson Mandela as president of the African National Congress (ANC).
Mr Zuma is set to be re-elected to lead the ANC at the party’s elective congress in Mangaung later this month. However, his current deputy, Kgalema Motlanthe — who has been nominated by three provinces and the youth league for the position of party president — is likely to lose out to Mr Ramaphosa.
Mr Ramaphosa has garnered more than 1,800 nominations for the position of deputy president, while Mr Motlanthe has received about 160 nominations to retain his current position in the party.
In an interview with the UK’s Daily Telegraph published on Thursday, Mr Zuma praised Mr Ramaphosa when asked about the prospect of working with the business tycoon.
"It would not be the first time I worked with Cyril Ramaphosa. When he was the secretary-general, I was his deputy. So it would not be the first time, if he is elected," Mr Zuma told the paper.
He said that he was ready for a second term as president of the ANC.
The party’s elective conference in Mangaung will also be keenly watched by business — with the hope that economic policy will be clarified.
One of the burning issues up for possible debate is that of nationalisation of South Africa’s mines. Mr Zuma told the paper that the party would increase the pace of economic reform but would not "break" existing businesses to do so.
"Nationalisation is not the ANC policy," he said. "There are fundamental issues that need to be dealt with. It would be useful to do it quickly but we’ve got to balance things because we don’t want to break things in order to move forward."
Source: Business Day
Mr Zuma is set to be re-elected to lead the ANC at the party’s elective congress in Mangaung later this month. However, his current deputy, Kgalema Motlanthe — who has been nominated by three provinces and the youth league for the position of party president — is likely to lose out to Mr Ramaphosa.
Mr Ramaphosa has garnered more than 1,800 nominations for the position of deputy president, while Mr Motlanthe has received about 160 nominations to retain his current position in the party.
In an interview with the UK’s Daily Telegraph published on Thursday, Mr Zuma praised Mr Ramaphosa when asked about the prospect of working with the business tycoon.
"It would not be the first time I worked with Cyril Ramaphosa. When he was the secretary-general, I was his deputy. So it would not be the first time, if he is elected," Mr Zuma told the paper.
He said that he was ready for a second term as president of the ANC.
The party’s elective conference in Mangaung will also be keenly watched by business — with the hope that economic policy will be clarified.
One of the burning issues up for possible debate is that of nationalisation of South Africa’s mines. Mr Zuma told the paper that the party would increase the pace of economic reform but would not "break" existing businesses to do so.
"Nationalisation is not the ANC policy," he said. "There are fundamental issues that need to be dealt with. It would be useful to do it quickly but we’ve got to balance things because we don’t want to break things in order to move forward."
Source: Business Day
Wednesday, November 21, 2012
Davis ‘may lead exodus’ after Xstrata bonus snub
XSTRATA CEO Mick Davis might lead an exodus of the company’s top executives after its shareholders on Tuesday approved a $31bn merger with Glencore, but rejected a £144m management retention scheme that the miner’s directors had proposed.
The shareholder vote on the deal will bring the 10-month saga one step closer to its conclusion, uniting Xstrata’s output of copper, coal and nickel with Glencore’s marketing and trading expertise.
But the snubbing of the retention scheme prompted Xstrata chairman John Bond, who will be chairman of the combined group, to announce yesterday that he would step down once a replacement is found.
Mr Davis, who with his management team has grown Xstrata to a multibillion-dollar company from one worth just $500m in a decade, is expected to step down in six months in favour of Glencore’s Ivan Glasenberg.
Mr Davis has been tipped to replace outgoing Anglo American CEO Cynthia Carroll. He was asked during yesterday’s shareholder meeting in Zug, Switzerland, whether he would be starting another business or retiring.
"I have not yet decided what my future plans will be but certainly retirement will not be part of them," Mr Davis said.
The controversial management retention scheme for 70 top Xstrata managers was rejected by 78.4% of Xstrata shareholders voting on Tuesday.
Glencore Xstrata International, the new name for the company, will have interests in about 35 coal mines in Colombia, Africa and Australia, and account for about 10% of global seaborne exports of the fuel. It will be the world’s third-biggest producer of mined copper, the largest zinc miner and the biggest exporter of coal burnt by power stations.
The group will have about 11% of the 13-million-ton global zinc market and about 40% of the 1.9-million tons of the metal produced in Europe.
One large Xstrata shareholder, asset manager Knight Vinke, said at the meeting yesterday that it had no confidence in the "independence and robustness" of the board and had voted against the deal. "We are extremely concerned with regard to the ability of the board of the newly merged company to represent our interests," said David Trenchard, vice-chairman of Knight Vinke.
"Good governance must now take centre stage and we intend to broaden our discussions with fellow shareholders to ensure that this is the case."
But most Glencore shareholders backed the merger. At the meeting in Zug, which lasted just 12 minutes, over 99% of voting shareholders backed the deal.
The deal, announced in February, has already had more than its fair share of twists, with the original terms panned by shareholders — some of whom also took exception to retention payments for Xstrata executives.
Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund and Xstrata’s second-largest shareholder after Glencore said last week it would back the deal unreservedly. But the fund, which played a pivotal role, did not approve the controversial packages proposed for Xstrata’s key team.
In negotiations with Qatar, Mr Glasenberg insisted he become CE of the combined company rather than Mr Davis, who is expected to leave six months after the deal closes but can depart earlier if he wishes.
Glencore must also overcome European Commission concerns about potential competition problems the deal poses.
The trader has offered to sell Xstrata’s German zinc smelter, after its first solution was deemed insufficient by regulators.
Source: Business Day
The shareholder vote on the deal will bring the 10-month saga one step closer to its conclusion, uniting Xstrata’s output of copper, coal and nickel with Glencore’s marketing and trading expertise.
But the snubbing of the retention scheme prompted Xstrata chairman John Bond, who will be chairman of the combined group, to announce yesterday that he would step down once a replacement is found.
Mr Davis, who with his management team has grown Xstrata to a multibillion-dollar company from one worth just $500m in a decade, is expected to step down in six months in favour of Glencore’s Ivan Glasenberg.
Mr Davis has been tipped to replace outgoing Anglo American CEO Cynthia Carroll. He was asked during yesterday’s shareholder meeting in Zug, Switzerland, whether he would be starting another business or retiring.
"I have not yet decided what my future plans will be but certainly retirement will not be part of them," Mr Davis said.
The controversial management retention scheme for 70 top Xstrata managers was rejected by 78.4% of Xstrata shareholders voting on Tuesday.
Glencore Xstrata International, the new name for the company, will have interests in about 35 coal mines in Colombia, Africa and Australia, and account for about 10% of global seaborne exports of the fuel. It will be the world’s third-biggest producer of mined copper, the largest zinc miner and the biggest exporter of coal burnt by power stations.
The group will have about 11% of the 13-million-ton global zinc market and about 40% of the 1.9-million tons of the metal produced in Europe.
One large Xstrata shareholder, asset manager Knight Vinke, said at the meeting yesterday that it had no confidence in the "independence and robustness" of the board and had voted against the deal. "We are extremely concerned with regard to the ability of the board of the newly merged company to represent our interests," said David Trenchard, vice-chairman of Knight Vinke.
"Good governance must now take centre stage and we intend to broaden our discussions with fellow shareholders to ensure that this is the case."
But most Glencore shareholders backed the merger. At the meeting in Zug, which lasted just 12 minutes, over 99% of voting shareholders backed the deal.
The deal, announced in February, has already had more than its fair share of twists, with the original terms panned by shareholders — some of whom also took exception to retention payments for Xstrata executives.
Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund and Xstrata’s second-largest shareholder after Glencore said last week it would back the deal unreservedly. But the fund, which played a pivotal role, did not approve the controversial packages proposed for Xstrata’s key team.
In negotiations with Qatar, Mr Glasenberg insisted he become CE of the combined company rather than Mr Davis, who is expected to leave six months after the deal closes but can depart earlier if he wishes.
Glencore must also overcome European Commission concerns about potential competition problems the deal poses.
The trader has offered to sell Xstrata’s German zinc smelter, after its first solution was deemed insufficient by regulators.
Source: Business Day
Tuesday, September 4, 2012
Barclays makes £500m betting on food crisis
Barclays has made as much as half a billion pounds in two years from speculating on food staples such as wheat and soya, prompting allegations that banks are profiting handsomely from the global food crisis. Barclays is the UK bank with the greatest involvement in food commodity trading and is one of the three biggest global players, along with the US banking giants Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, research from the World Development Movement points out. Last week the trading giant Glencore was attacked for describing the global food crisis and price rises as a "good" business opportunity.
The extent of Barclays' involvement in food speculation comes to light as new figures from the World Bank show that global food prices hit an all-time high in July, with poor harvests in the US and Russia pushing up the average worldwide cost of staples by an unprecedented 10 per cent in a month. The extent of just one bank's involvement in agricultural markets will add to concerns that food speculation could help push basic prices so high that they trigger a wave of riots in the world's poorest countries, as staples drift out of their populations' reach.
Nor has the UK escaped rising food costs. Shop food prices have risen, on average, by 37.9 per cent in the past seven years, according to the Office for National Statistics, as the demands of an increasingly affluent and growing world population strain supply. Oils and fats have soared by 63 per cent in the UK during that period, fish prices by 50.9 per cent, bread and cereals by 36.7 per cent, meat 34.5 per cent and vegetables 41.3 per cent. In April, average UK food prices were 4.2 per cent higher than a year earlier.
Oxfam's private sector adviser, Rob Nash, said: "The food market is becoming a playground for investors rather than a market place for farmers. The trend of big investors betting on food prices is transforming food into a financial asset while exacerbating the risk of price spikes that hit the poor hardest."
The World Development Movement report estimates that Barclays made as much as £529m from its "food speculative activities" in 2010 and 2011. Barclays made up to £340m from food speculation in 2010, as the prices of agricultural commodities such as corn, wheat and soya were rising. The following year, the bank made a smaller sum – of up to £189m – as prices fell, WDM said.
The revenues that Barclays and other banks make from trading in everything from wheat and corn to coffee and cocoa, are expected to increase this year, with prices once again on the rise. Corn prices have risen by 45 per cent since the start of June, with wheat jumping by 30 per cent.
Barclays makes most of its "food-speculation" revenues by setting up and managing commodity funds that invest money from pension funds, insurance companies and wealthy individuals in a variety of agricultural products in return for fees and commissions. The bank claims not to invest its own money in such commodities.
Since deregulation allowed the creation of such funds in 2000, institutions such as Barclays have collectively channelled an astonishing $200bn (£126bn) of investment cash into agricultural commodities, according to the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
Barclays' dominance in commodities trading is thanks to its former chief executive Bob Diamond, who was Britain's best-paid banking boss until he was forced to resign last month following a £290m fine for attempting to manipulate the Libor interest rate. As boss of Barclays Capital he boosted trading in agricultural products.
Dealing with the reputational headache associated with high levels of food speculation will be yet another item in the already-bulging in-tray of Antony Jenkins, who was promoted to become Mr Diamond's replacement on Thursday.
Christine Haigh, policy and campaigns officer at the World Development Movement and one of the analysts behind the research, said: "No doubt the UK's biggest player in the commodities markets is hoping it will do better this year by cashing in on rising food prices. "Its behaviour risks fuelling a speculative bubble and contributing to hunger and poverty for millions of the world's poorest people."
Banks and hedge funds typically argue that speculation makes little or no difference to food prices and volatility and argue, correctly, that no definitive link has been proved. Barclays declined to comment on the amount of money it makes from trading in agricultural commodities yesterday.
The bank defended its actions, pointing out that trading in so-called futures contracts – an agreement to buy or sell a certain quantity of a product, at a given price on an agreed date – helped parties such as farmers and bakers to hedge against the risk of rising or falling prices. "Our clients include investment companies, food producers and consumers who, among other things, seek our help to manage risks."
Barclays also declined to comment on whether it thought large amounts of speculation pushed up prices and volatility. A spokesman said: "We recognise there is a perception held by some stakeholders that participation in agricultural futures markets by some participants can unduly influence the prices of commodities. As a result, we continue to carefully monitor market trends and any research produced on this subject," a spokesman said."
Barclays Capital analysts admitted in a note to clients in February that speculation did push up prices. Barclays said: "The second key driver is that commodity investors have begun allocating to commodities again after beginning 2012 heavily underexposed to the sector." The other drivers were the "health of the global economy" and "weather and geopolitics".
Source: The Independent
The extent of Barclays' involvement in food speculation comes to light as new figures from the World Bank show that global food prices hit an all-time high in July, with poor harvests in the US and Russia pushing up the average worldwide cost of staples by an unprecedented 10 per cent in a month. The extent of just one bank's involvement in agricultural markets will add to concerns that food speculation could help push basic prices so high that they trigger a wave of riots in the world's poorest countries, as staples drift out of their populations' reach.
Nor has the UK escaped rising food costs. Shop food prices have risen, on average, by 37.9 per cent in the past seven years, according to the Office for National Statistics, as the demands of an increasingly affluent and growing world population strain supply. Oils and fats have soared by 63 per cent in the UK during that period, fish prices by 50.9 per cent, bread and cereals by 36.7 per cent, meat 34.5 per cent and vegetables 41.3 per cent. In April, average UK food prices were 4.2 per cent higher than a year earlier.
Oxfam's private sector adviser, Rob Nash, said: "The food market is becoming a playground for investors rather than a market place for farmers. The trend of big investors betting on food prices is transforming food into a financial asset while exacerbating the risk of price spikes that hit the poor hardest."
The World Development Movement report estimates that Barclays made as much as £529m from its "food speculative activities" in 2010 and 2011. Barclays made up to £340m from food speculation in 2010, as the prices of agricultural commodities such as corn, wheat and soya were rising. The following year, the bank made a smaller sum – of up to £189m – as prices fell, WDM said.
The revenues that Barclays and other banks make from trading in everything from wheat and corn to coffee and cocoa, are expected to increase this year, with prices once again on the rise. Corn prices have risen by 45 per cent since the start of June, with wheat jumping by 30 per cent.
Barclays makes most of its "food-speculation" revenues by setting up and managing commodity funds that invest money from pension funds, insurance companies and wealthy individuals in a variety of agricultural products in return for fees and commissions. The bank claims not to invest its own money in such commodities.
Since deregulation allowed the creation of such funds in 2000, institutions such as Barclays have collectively channelled an astonishing $200bn (£126bn) of investment cash into agricultural commodities, according to the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
Barclays' dominance in commodities trading is thanks to its former chief executive Bob Diamond, who was Britain's best-paid banking boss until he was forced to resign last month following a £290m fine for attempting to manipulate the Libor interest rate. As boss of Barclays Capital he boosted trading in agricultural products.
Dealing with the reputational headache associated with high levels of food speculation will be yet another item in the already-bulging in-tray of Antony Jenkins, who was promoted to become Mr Diamond's replacement on Thursday.
Christine Haigh, policy and campaigns officer at the World Development Movement and one of the analysts behind the research, said: "No doubt the UK's biggest player in the commodities markets is hoping it will do better this year by cashing in on rising food prices. "Its behaviour risks fuelling a speculative bubble and contributing to hunger and poverty for millions of the world's poorest people."
Banks and hedge funds typically argue that speculation makes little or no difference to food prices and volatility and argue, correctly, that no definitive link has been proved. Barclays declined to comment on the amount of money it makes from trading in agricultural commodities yesterday.
The bank defended its actions, pointing out that trading in so-called futures contracts – an agreement to buy or sell a certain quantity of a product, at a given price on an agreed date – helped parties such as farmers and bakers to hedge against the risk of rising or falling prices. "Our clients include investment companies, food producers and consumers who, among other things, seek our help to manage risks."
Barclays also declined to comment on whether it thought large amounts of speculation pushed up prices and volatility. A spokesman said: "We recognise there is a perception held by some stakeholders that participation in agricultural futures markets by some participants can unduly influence the prices of commodities. As a result, we continue to carefully monitor market trends and any research produced on this subject," a spokesman said."
Barclays Capital analysts admitted in a note to clients in February that speculation did push up prices. Barclays said: "The second key driver is that commodity investors have begun allocating to commodities again after beginning 2012 heavily underexposed to the sector." The other drivers were the "health of the global economy" and "weather and geopolitics".
Source: The Independent
Monday, August 3, 2009
Protector mulls challenge to Oilgate ruling
Public Protector Lawrence Mushwana is considering appealing against a high court judgement setting aside his 2005 report on the so-called "Oilgate" scandal, his office said on Monday.
"The Public Protector is currently considering legal advice regarding a possible appeal against the setting aside of the report by the high court and will take a decision in this regard in due course," a spokesperson for his office said in a statement.
The scandal involved the alleged irregular payment of R15-million by PetroSA to Imvume Management, which had claimed it needed bridging finance to pay oil-supply company Glencore for a shipment of oil four days from harbour. However, Imvume failed to pay Glencore, and PetroSA had to pay another R15-million directly to Glencore. Part of the first payment -- R11-million -- was allegedly used for the ANC's 2004 election campaign. In his report, Mushwana found no evidence of wrongdoing in the scandal. He determined that the ANC and Imvume were not public entities and therefore did not perform public functions and as such were not part of government.
"We look forward to a more thorough investigation of the Oilgate saga by the Public Protector, and to the prospect of genuine accountability for the abuse of public money for party political purposes uncovered by our reporting," The high court ruling said.
Source: Mail & Guardian
"The Public Protector is currently considering legal advice regarding a possible appeal against the setting aside of the report by the high court and will take a decision in this regard in due course," a spokesperson for his office said in a statement.
The scandal involved the alleged irregular payment of R15-million by PetroSA to Imvume Management, which had claimed it needed bridging finance to pay oil-supply company Glencore for a shipment of oil four days from harbour. However, Imvume failed to pay Glencore, and PetroSA had to pay another R15-million directly to Glencore. Part of the first payment -- R11-million -- was allegedly used for the ANC's 2004 election campaign. In his report, Mushwana found no evidence of wrongdoing in the scandal. He determined that the ANC and Imvume were not public entities and therefore did not perform public functions and as such were not part of government.
"We look forward to a more thorough investigation of the Oilgate saga by the Public Protector, and to the prospect of genuine accountability for the abuse of public money for party political purposes uncovered by our reporting," The high court ruling said.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Tuesday, May 3, 2005
The ANC's Oilgate
A Mail & Guardian investigation into covert party funding has revealed how R11-million of public money was diverted to African National Congress coffers ahead of the 2004 elections. In what may be the biggest political funding scandal since 1994, the M&G has established that South Africa's state oil company, PetroSA, irregularly paid R15-million to Imvume Management -- a company closely tied to the ANC -- at a time when the party was desperate for funds to fight elections. The M&G possesses bank statements and has seen other forensic evidence proving that Imvume transferred the lion's share of this to the ANC within days. PetroSA this week said it was unaware of this. The ANC denied impropriety and said it was not obliged to discuss its funders.
The scheme unfolded in two stages. First, PetroSA management bent over backwards to pay Imvume the money as an advance for the procurement of oil condensate. Then, when Imvume diverted the funds to the ANC instead of paying its own foreign suppliers, PetroSA had to cover the shortfall by paying the same amount again. A multimillion-rand hole remains in the parastatalis books. PetroSA has gone through the motions to recover the debt by suing Imvume -- but most of it remains outstanding. The effect of the entire transaction was that PetroSA, and ultimately the taxpayer, subsidised the ruling party's election campaign: a blatant abuse of public resources.
Imvume's role as an ANC "front company" first emerged in February last year when the M&G exposed its oil dealings with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Imvume principal Sandi Majali obtained lucrative crude oil allocations from that regime when he travelled to Iraq with top ANC officials between 2000 and 2002. More recently, Imvume described its boss as ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe's "economic adviser".
But it was the diversion of the Petro-SA money four months ahead of the 2004 elections that is now lifting the lid on the funding scandal. The deal puts the spotlight on PetroSA's management, which approved the payment; Imvume boss Majali, who asked for the advance and then issued the cheques to the ANC; and Motlanthe, who was Majali's ANC patron. Imvume, now unable to pay its debts, was once the empowerment pin-up of the oil industry. The contract that caused all the trouble was awarded by PetroSA to Imvume on October 15 2002 -- the day President Thabo Mbeki publicly launched PetroSA as the national oil company.
Under the contract, Imvume -- with the backing of Swiss-based resource trader Glencore International -- was to supply PetroSA with regular cargoes of condensate, a feedstock for PetroSA's Mossel Bay gas-to-liquid fuels plant. A number of condensate cargoes were delivered to Mossel Bay during 2003. The standard contractual procedure was for PetroSA to pay Imvume the full cargo price no later than 30 days after the bill of lading date (the date the cargo was loaded for shipment to Mossel Bay). Once it received payment from PetroSA, Imvume would immediately pay it on to Glencore, which sourced the cargo on international markets. Glencore paid Imvume a commission. But in December 2003 the pattern was broken, and PetroSA has confirmed that standard procedure was departed from. The bill of lading date for that cargo was December 6 2003, meaning PetroSA's payment for the cargo -- worth $10-million (about R65-million) -- was due on January 5 2004. But Imvume's Majali asked PetroSA for an advance of R15-million (just more than $2-million of the $10-million) which was paid even before the cargo was discharged on December 22. PetroSA paid the advance into a different account to that usually used by Imvume for the contract.
Evidence in the M&G's possession confirms that Imvume Management's corporate account was credited with R15-million a day later, on December 19. And the M&G has seen forensic proof that within the next four days, Imvume's Majali issued a series of four cheques to the ANC -- for R4-million, R3-million and R2-million (twice). These cheques, totalling R11-million, were all transacted on December 23. This week Majali and Imvume did not dispute that the money was paid to the ANC, but claimed their support for the party was a "private affair".
The transfers to the ANC came four months before the elections, held on April 14 2004. A number of sources have described the party's financial straits around that time, claiming it had a bank overdraft typically running at more than R100-million. When payment for the cargo became due to Glencore on January 5, Imvume failed to pay the company the R15-million advance -- and, effectively, also withheld another R3-million from the balance owed. Glencore turned to PetroSA for what it was owed, eventually threatening in February not to offload the next cargo. PetroSA agreed to cover the shortfall of R18-million, for fear that the Mossel Bay plant would run out of feedstock, leading to greater losses. Effectively, PetroSA paid R18-million twice -- once to Imvume, and once to Imvume's supplier.
PetroSA maintains that the special circumstances of the empowerment environment largely excuse the actions of its management. It also denies that there was pressure from either the Minerals and Energy Ministry or the ANC to approve the advance to Imvume. Circumstances, however, suggest that empowerment is not a sufficient explanation and that Imvume's ANC links played a role. These links were no secret in oil trading circles. A businessman active in the sector told the M&G last year: "It was talked about when they got tenders ... that it was an ANC company ... I certainly understand that ANC fundraising has a keen interest."
The advance payment to Imvume was irregular in that it was a departure from standard procedures. PetroSA maintains procurement policy allows for advance payments, but admits it "should have checked" whether the money was going into the usual account. When the transaction with Imvume blew up in its face, PetroSA continued treating the company with kid gloves.
On February 23 last year, four days after PetroSA had been forced to settle Imvume's debt with Glencore, Majali signed an acknowledgement of debt to PetroSA, agreeing to repay the R18-million plus interest within 90 days. He also ceded his company's revenue stream as security. But Imvume paid nothing in terms of that agreement. Court records show more than a month passed after the expiry of the 90-day term before PetroSA issued a letter of demand. (See "PetroSA vs Imvume Management" download box on top right of this article for full documents).
PetroSA's choice of lawyer employed to pursue the demand raises further questions about PetroSA's seriousness of purpose. The lawyer, Leslie Mkhabela, was previously Imvume's own attorney and still has a business relationship with Majali via their common interest in Forever Resorts Aventura, the privatised state leisure company. This raises conflict-of-interest questions. Mkhabela maintained this week that this was not a problem as he had disclosed his business relationship with Majali to PetroSA. The agreement signed between Mkhize and Majali was still not enforced. Instead new terms, much more favourable to Imvume, were agreed between PetroSA chief executive Sipho Mkhize and Majali in September last year. Now PetroSA waived any claim to interest and agreed that Imvume could repay the capital amount in monthly instalments over four and a half years. But again, in February this year and after paying only R1,33-million, Imvume defaulted, court papers show.
PetroSA took off the kid gloves for a little while, filing an application for summary judgement in the Johannesburg High Court. But the matter was postponed twice, and on a third court date -- May 3 this year -- PetroSA removed the matter from the roll. PetroSA this week claimed that this was to allow Imvume to remain operational, which would give PetroSA a better chance eventually to recoup the debt. The ANC this week threatened legal action against the M&G without confirming or denying the flow of money to it. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the ANC knew exactly where the funding was coming from. Between 2000 and 2002, when Majali was trading in oil allocations from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the ANC's Motlanthe repeatedly accompanied him to that country. ANC treasurer general Mendi Msimang also went along on at least one occasion. It is rumoured that the relationship between Majali and Motlanthe has cooled recently, but an Imvume brochure last year still described Majali as "economic adviser to the secretary general of the ANC". Describing the company's "winning formula", the brochure said Imvume had "access and influence on economic policy".
How they responded ...
PETROSA
The cornerstone of this deal is the policy adopted by PetroSA, which is a national initiative, black economic empowerment (BEE). PetroSA has a mandate to introduce hitherto disadvantaged South Africans into the oil and gas industry. PetroSA had a choice: to continue business as usual and exclude historically disadvantaged South Africans from the mainstream economy and prolong, if not propagate, the two-economies concept, or use our procurement muscle to bring fundamental change to the industry.
To procure a raw material referred to as condensate, the requirement was that the preferred supplier must have a South African partner who qualifies as a BEE candidate. This in effect introduced a major shift in the industry. We deliberately signed deals with the historically disadvantaged party to ensure that they were not "brought along" to the deal, but in fact they were the "principal partner" in the deal.
# On the [High Court] case PetroSA brought against Imvume PetroSA suspended the case due to the fact that if Imvume were liquidated, there would be very little proceeds flowing into PetroSA from that exercise. Imvume is much better off remaining operational for PetroSA to be able to recoup the total sum owed to PetroSA as well as interest and the legal costs.
# On Leslie Mkhabela [PetroSA's choice of lawyer to sue Imvume]
Mkhabela assured PetroSA of the following: he acted on behalf of Imvume during 2002/03. He later decided to resign from their business. While he acted for Imvume, he was invited into a consortium that submitted a bid for the Aventura Resort in exchange for his services. He retains no personal friendship with Imvume.
# On PetroSA's actions and internal inquiry
At the request of Imvume, PetroSA effected a pre-payment into an account different from the normal account. We changed the account without considering that there may be negative ramifications. PetroSA has since tightened the controls around channels of communication and instruction from vendors on payments. PetroSA in its enquiry has not found any wrongdoing by any individual or individuals within PetroSA or external to PetroSA with line of sight to PetroSA. All the procedures and processes were followed. PetroSA honoured the letter of the contract. At times we assist suppliers to better deliver to PetroSA where possible. The procurement policy at PetroSA allows for payments of this nature.
# On the double payment
Glencore held the product. Even though PetroSA did not have a contract with them, they had a ship in the harbour with our product. As we had already paid, PetroSA had to make a decision; to either pay them and deal with Imvume later -- this would cost us $2,8-million -- or refuse to pay and have our refinery cease operating for a minimum of 40 days, at the cost of $1-million daily. The PetroSA board ratified the decision.
Conclusion
It is the intention of PetroSA to recoup all the funds involved in this dispute. A liquidated Imvume would not generate the required proceeds for PetroSA. This would lead to an outright loss. PetroSA needs Imvume to pay back the money owed to PetroSA.
BARRY AARON & ASSOCIATES (lawyers for Majali and Imvume):
Our clients have requested us to record that Imvume had legitimately withheld payment in the sum of $2,8-million from Glencore against receipt of the expected commission on the profit-sharing arrangement in relation to Imvume's contract with PetroSA.
The withholding of this payment was not contested by Glencore until immediately prior to delivery of the next shipment, which it then refused to offload until such time as the shortfall (as Glencore perceived it) on the previous shipment had been paid. This resulted in PetroSA effecting payment of the shortfall and Imvume executing the acknowledgement [of debt] in favour of PetroSA.
The issue of commission from Glencore remains unresolved. Imvume expected to repay PetroSA from anticipated funds and separately resolve the issue with Glencore. Unfortunately, the anticipated funds did not materialise. Imvume has concluded arrangements with PetroSA for repayment. Imvume intends honouring its obligations to PetroSA. Our clients have no objection to fair investigative journalism and comment. [The M&G] however continues to harass our clients in an ongoing witch-hunt. [The M&G] appears to have accessed Imvume's private and confidential records, including (in particular) its banking records, constituting an invasion of our clients' rights to privacy, conduct way beyond the norms of responsible or acceptable investigative journalism. Our clients are a private businessman and a private company respectively, engaging in the legitimate pursuit of their activities. Their business activities and support for the ANC are their private affair. [The M&G] is sabotaging and subverting a legitimate black empowerment initiative.
MNMR Attorneys (for the ANC and Kgalema Motlanthe)
The short time period provided for comment demonstrates that the M&G will not give proper consideration to our clients' submissions. We wish to note that following the recent decision of the Cape high court in the Idasa matter, our clients are not obliged to discuss donations received by it from any person. Even if it were so, our clients would have no obligation and would not always have the ability or means to verify the identity of the sources of all donations made to it. We record, however, that our clients deny any insinuation that they acted in any corrupt, illegal or improper manner. Our clients will not hesitate to protect their rights should the M&G publish the defamatory material contemplated in [your] e-mail.
Source: Mail & Guardian
The scheme unfolded in two stages. First, PetroSA management bent over backwards to pay Imvume the money as an advance for the procurement of oil condensate. Then, when Imvume diverted the funds to the ANC instead of paying its own foreign suppliers, PetroSA had to cover the shortfall by paying the same amount again. A multimillion-rand hole remains in the parastatalis books. PetroSA has gone through the motions to recover the debt by suing Imvume -- but most of it remains outstanding. The effect of the entire transaction was that PetroSA, and ultimately the taxpayer, subsidised the ruling party's election campaign: a blatant abuse of public resources.
Imvume's role as an ANC "front company" first emerged in February last year when the M&G exposed its oil dealings with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Imvume principal Sandi Majali obtained lucrative crude oil allocations from that regime when he travelled to Iraq with top ANC officials between 2000 and 2002. More recently, Imvume described its boss as ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe's "economic adviser".
But it was the diversion of the Petro-SA money four months ahead of the 2004 elections that is now lifting the lid on the funding scandal. The deal puts the spotlight on PetroSA's management, which approved the payment; Imvume boss Majali, who asked for the advance and then issued the cheques to the ANC; and Motlanthe, who was Majali's ANC patron. Imvume, now unable to pay its debts, was once the empowerment pin-up of the oil industry. The contract that caused all the trouble was awarded by PetroSA to Imvume on October 15 2002 -- the day President Thabo Mbeki publicly launched PetroSA as the national oil company.
Under the contract, Imvume -- with the backing of Swiss-based resource trader Glencore International -- was to supply PetroSA with regular cargoes of condensate, a feedstock for PetroSA's Mossel Bay gas-to-liquid fuels plant. A number of condensate cargoes were delivered to Mossel Bay during 2003. The standard contractual procedure was for PetroSA to pay Imvume the full cargo price no later than 30 days after the bill of lading date (the date the cargo was loaded for shipment to Mossel Bay). Once it received payment from PetroSA, Imvume would immediately pay it on to Glencore, which sourced the cargo on international markets. Glencore paid Imvume a commission. But in December 2003 the pattern was broken, and PetroSA has confirmed that standard procedure was departed from. The bill of lading date for that cargo was December 6 2003, meaning PetroSA's payment for the cargo -- worth $10-million (about R65-million) -- was due on January 5 2004. But Imvume's Majali asked PetroSA for an advance of R15-million (just more than $2-million of the $10-million) which was paid even before the cargo was discharged on December 22. PetroSA paid the advance into a different account to that usually used by Imvume for the contract.
Evidence in the M&G's possession confirms that Imvume Management's corporate account was credited with R15-million a day later, on December 19. And the M&G has seen forensic proof that within the next four days, Imvume's Majali issued a series of four cheques to the ANC -- for R4-million, R3-million and R2-million (twice). These cheques, totalling R11-million, were all transacted on December 23. This week Majali and Imvume did not dispute that the money was paid to the ANC, but claimed their support for the party was a "private affair".
The transfers to the ANC came four months before the elections, held on April 14 2004. A number of sources have described the party's financial straits around that time, claiming it had a bank overdraft typically running at more than R100-million. When payment for the cargo became due to Glencore on January 5, Imvume failed to pay the company the R15-million advance -- and, effectively, also withheld another R3-million from the balance owed. Glencore turned to PetroSA for what it was owed, eventually threatening in February not to offload the next cargo. PetroSA agreed to cover the shortfall of R18-million, for fear that the Mossel Bay plant would run out of feedstock, leading to greater losses. Effectively, PetroSA paid R18-million twice -- once to Imvume, and once to Imvume's supplier.
PetroSA maintains that the special circumstances of the empowerment environment largely excuse the actions of its management. It also denies that there was pressure from either the Minerals and Energy Ministry or the ANC to approve the advance to Imvume. Circumstances, however, suggest that empowerment is not a sufficient explanation and that Imvume's ANC links played a role. These links were no secret in oil trading circles. A businessman active in the sector told the M&G last year: "It was talked about when they got tenders ... that it was an ANC company ... I certainly understand that ANC fundraising has a keen interest."
The advance payment to Imvume was irregular in that it was a departure from standard procedures. PetroSA maintains procurement policy allows for advance payments, but admits it "should have checked" whether the money was going into the usual account. When the transaction with Imvume blew up in its face, PetroSA continued treating the company with kid gloves.
On February 23 last year, four days after PetroSA had been forced to settle Imvume's debt with Glencore, Majali signed an acknowledgement of debt to PetroSA, agreeing to repay the R18-million plus interest within 90 days. He also ceded his company's revenue stream as security. But Imvume paid nothing in terms of that agreement. Court records show more than a month passed after the expiry of the 90-day term before PetroSA issued a letter of demand. (See "PetroSA vs Imvume Management" download box on top right of this article for full documents).
PetroSA's choice of lawyer employed to pursue the demand raises further questions about PetroSA's seriousness of purpose. The lawyer, Leslie Mkhabela, was previously Imvume's own attorney and still has a business relationship with Majali via their common interest in Forever Resorts Aventura, the privatised state leisure company. This raises conflict-of-interest questions. Mkhabela maintained this week that this was not a problem as he had disclosed his business relationship with Majali to PetroSA. The agreement signed between Mkhize and Majali was still not enforced. Instead new terms, much more favourable to Imvume, were agreed between PetroSA chief executive Sipho Mkhize and Majali in September last year. Now PetroSA waived any claim to interest and agreed that Imvume could repay the capital amount in monthly instalments over four and a half years. But again, in February this year and after paying only R1,33-million, Imvume defaulted, court papers show.
PetroSA took off the kid gloves for a little while, filing an application for summary judgement in the Johannesburg High Court. But the matter was postponed twice, and on a third court date -- May 3 this year -- PetroSA removed the matter from the roll. PetroSA this week claimed that this was to allow Imvume to remain operational, which would give PetroSA a better chance eventually to recoup the debt. The ANC this week threatened legal action against the M&G without confirming or denying the flow of money to it. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the ANC knew exactly where the funding was coming from. Between 2000 and 2002, when Majali was trading in oil allocations from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the ANC's Motlanthe repeatedly accompanied him to that country. ANC treasurer general Mendi Msimang also went along on at least one occasion. It is rumoured that the relationship between Majali and Motlanthe has cooled recently, but an Imvume brochure last year still described Majali as "economic adviser to the secretary general of the ANC". Describing the company's "winning formula", the brochure said Imvume had "access and influence on economic policy".
How they responded ...
PETROSA
The cornerstone of this deal is the policy adopted by PetroSA, which is a national initiative, black economic empowerment (BEE). PetroSA has a mandate to introduce hitherto disadvantaged South Africans into the oil and gas industry. PetroSA had a choice: to continue business as usual and exclude historically disadvantaged South Africans from the mainstream economy and prolong, if not propagate, the two-economies concept, or use our procurement muscle to bring fundamental change to the industry.
To procure a raw material referred to as condensate, the requirement was that the preferred supplier must have a South African partner who qualifies as a BEE candidate. This in effect introduced a major shift in the industry. We deliberately signed deals with the historically disadvantaged party to ensure that they were not "brought along" to the deal, but in fact they were the "principal partner" in the deal.
# On the [High Court] case PetroSA brought against Imvume PetroSA suspended the case due to the fact that if Imvume were liquidated, there would be very little proceeds flowing into PetroSA from that exercise. Imvume is much better off remaining operational for PetroSA to be able to recoup the total sum owed to PetroSA as well as interest and the legal costs.
# On Leslie Mkhabela [PetroSA's choice of lawyer to sue Imvume]
Mkhabela assured PetroSA of the following: he acted on behalf of Imvume during 2002/03. He later decided to resign from their business. While he acted for Imvume, he was invited into a consortium that submitted a bid for the Aventura Resort in exchange for his services. He retains no personal friendship with Imvume.
# On PetroSA's actions and internal inquiry
At the request of Imvume, PetroSA effected a pre-payment into an account different from the normal account. We changed the account without considering that there may be negative ramifications. PetroSA has since tightened the controls around channels of communication and instruction from vendors on payments. PetroSA in its enquiry has not found any wrongdoing by any individual or individuals within PetroSA or external to PetroSA with line of sight to PetroSA. All the procedures and processes were followed. PetroSA honoured the letter of the contract. At times we assist suppliers to better deliver to PetroSA where possible. The procurement policy at PetroSA allows for payments of this nature.
# On the double payment
Glencore held the product. Even though PetroSA did not have a contract with them, they had a ship in the harbour with our product. As we had already paid, PetroSA had to make a decision; to either pay them and deal with Imvume later -- this would cost us $2,8-million -- or refuse to pay and have our refinery cease operating for a minimum of 40 days, at the cost of $1-million daily. The PetroSA board ratified the decision.
Conclusion
It is the intention of PetroSA to recoup all the funds involved in this dispute. A liquidated Imvume would not generate the required proceeds for PetroSA. This would lead to an outright loss. PetroSA needs Imvume to pay back the money owed to PetroSA.
BARRY AARON & ASSOCIATES (lawyers for Majali and Imvume):
Our clients have requested us to record that Imvume had legitimately withheld payment in the sum of $2,8-million from Glencore against receipt of the expected commission on the profit-sharing arrangement in relation to Imvume's contract with PetroSA.
The withholding of this payment was not contested by Glencore until immediately prior to delivery of the next shipment, which it then refused to offload until such time as the shortfall (as Glencore perceived it) on the previous shipment had been paid. This resulted in PetroSA effecting payment of the shortfall and Imvume executing the acknowledgement [of debt] in favour of PetroSA.
The issue of commission from Glencore remains unresolved. Imvume expected to repay PetroSA from anticipated funds and separately resolve the issue with Glencore. Unfortunately, the anticipated funds did not materialise. Imvume has concluded arrangements with PetroSA for repayment. Imvume intends honouring its obligations to PetroSA. Our clients have no objection to fair investigative journalism and comment. [The M&G] however continues to harass our clients in an ongoing witch-hunt. [The M&G] appears to have accessed Imvume's private and confidential records, including (in particular) its banking records, constituting an invasion of our clients' rights to privacy, conduct way beyond the norms of responsible or acceptable investigative journalism. Our clients are a private businessman and a private company respectively, engaging in the legitimate pursuit of their activities. Their business activities and support for the ANC are their private affair. [The M&G] is sabotaging and subverting a legitimate black empowerment initiative.
MNMR Attorneys (for the ANC and Kgalema Motlanthe)
The short time period provided for comment demonstrates that the M&G will not give proper consideration to our clients' submissions. We wish to note that following the recent decision of the Cape high court in the Idasa matter, our clients are not obliged to discuss donations received by it from any person. Even if it were so, our clients would have no obligation and would not always have the ability or means to verify the identity of the sources of all donations made to it. We record, however, that our clients deny any insinuation that they acted in any corrupt, illegal or improper manner. Our clients will not hesitate to protect their rights should the M&G publish the defamatory material contemplated in [your] e-mail.
Source: Mail & Guardian
The ANC's Oilgate
A Mail & Guardian investigation into covert party funding has revealed how R11-million of public money was diverted to African National Congress coffers ahead of the 2004 elections. In what may be the biggest political funding scandal since 1994, the M&G has established that South Africa's state oil company, PetroSA, irregularly paid R15-million to Imvume Management -- a company closely tied to the ANC -- at a time when the party was desperate for funds to fight elections.
The M&G possesses bank statements and has seen other forensic evidence proving that Imvume transferred the lion's share of this to the ANC within days. PetroSA this week said it was unaware of this. The ANC denied impropriety and said it was not obliged to discuss its funders. The scheme unfolded in two stages. First, PetroSA management bent over backwards to pay Imvume the money as an advance for the procurement of oil condensate. Then, when Imvume diverted the funds to the ANC instead of paying its own foreign suppliers, PetroSA had to cover the shortfall by paying the same amount again.
A multimillion-rand hole remains in the parastatalis books. PetroSA has gone through the motions to recover the debt by suing Imvume -- but most of it remains outstanding. The effect of the entire transaction was that PetroSA, and ultimately the taxpayer, subsidised the ruling party's election campaign: a blatant abuse of public resources. Imvume's role as an ANC "front company" first emerged in February last year when the M&G exposed its oil dealings with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Imvume principal Sandi Majali obtained lucrative crude oil allocations from that regime when he travelled to Iraq with top ANC officials between 2000 and 2002. More recently, Imvume described its boss as ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe's "economic adviser".
The transaction in a nutshell
But it was the diversion of the Petro-SA money four months ahead of the 2004 elections that is now lifting the lid on the funding scandal. The deal puts the spotlight on PetroSA's management, which approved the payment; Imvume boss Majali, who asked for the advance and then issued the cheques to the ANC; and Motlanthe, who was Majali's ANC patron. Imvume, now unable to pay its debts, was once the empowerment pin-up of the oil industry.
The contract that caused all the trouble was awarded by PetroSA to Imvume on October 15 2002 -- the day President Thabo Mbeki publicly launched PetroSA as the national oil company. Under the contract, Imvume -- with the backing of Swiss-based resource trader Glencore International -- was to supply PetroSA with regular cargoes of condensate, a feedstock for PetroSA's Mossel Bay gas-to-liquid fuels plant. A number of condensate cargoes were delivered to Mossel Bay during 2003. The standard contractual procedure was for PetroSA to pay Imvume the full cargo price no later than 30 days after the bill of lading date (the date the cargo was loaded for shipment to Mossel Bay).
Once it received payment from PetroSA, Imvume would immediately pay it on to Glencore, which sourced the cargo on international markets. Glencore paid Imvume a commission. But in December 2003 the pattern was broken, and PetroSA has confirmed that standard procedure was departed from. The bill of lading date for that cargo was December 6 2003, meaning PetroSA's payment for the cargo -- worth $10-million (about R65-million) -- was due on January 5 2004. But Imvume's Majali asked PetroSA for an advance of R15-million (just more than $2-million of the $10-million) which was paid even before the cargo was discharged on December 22. PetroSA paid the advance into a different account to that usually used by Imvume for the contract.
Evidence in the M&G's possession confirms that Imvume Management's corporate account was credited with R15-million a day later, on December 19. And the M&G has seen forensic proof that within the next four days, Imvume's Majali issued a series of four cheques to the ANC -- for R4-million, R3-million and R2-million (twice). These cheques, totalling R11-million, were all transacted on December 23. This week Majali and Imvume did not dispute that the money was paid to the ANC, but claimed their support for the party was a "private affair".
The transfers to the ANC came four months before the elections, held on April 14 2004. A number of sources have described the party's financial straits around that time, claiming it had a bank overdraft typically running at more than R100-million. When payment for the cargo became due to Glencore on January 5, Imvume failed to pay the company the R15-million advance -- and, effectively, also withheld another R3-million from the balance owed.
Glencore turned to PetroSA for what it was owed, eventually threatening in February not to offload the next cargo. PetroSA agreed to cover the shortfall of R18-million, for fear that the Mossel Bay plant would run out of feedstock, leading to greater losses. Effectively, PetroSA paid R18-million twice -- once to Imvume, and once to Imvume's supplier. PetroSA maintains that the special circumstances of the empowerment environment largely excuse the actions of its management. It also denies that there was pressure from either the Minerals and Energy Ministry or the ANC to approve the advance to Imvume.
Circumstances, however, suggest that empowerment is not a sufficient explanation and that Imvume's ANC links played a role. These links were no secret in oil trading circles. A businessman active in the sector told the M&G last year: "It was talked about when they got tenders ... that it was an ANC company ... I certainly understand that ANC fundraising has a keen interest."
The advance payment to Imvume was irregular in that it was a departure from standard procedures. PetroSA maintains procurement policy allows for advance payments, but admits it "should have checked" whether the money was going into the usual account. When the transaction with Imvume blew up in its face, PetroSA continued treating the company with kid gloves.
On February 23 last year, four days after PetroSA had been forced to settle Imvume's debt with Glencore, Majali signed an acknowledgement of debt to PetroSA, agreeing to repay the R18-million plus interest within 90 days. He also ceded his company's revenue stream as security. But Imvume paid nothing in terms of that agreement. Court records show more than a month passed after the expiry of the 90-day term before PetroSA issued a letter of demand. (See "PetroSA vs Imvume Management" download box on top right of this article for full documents).
PetroSA's choice of lawyer employed to pursue the demand raises further questions about PetroSA's seriousness of purpose. The lawyer, Leslie Mkhabela, was previously Imvume's own attorney and still has a business relationship with Majali via their common interest in Forever Resorts Aventura, the privatised state leisure company. This raises conflict-of-interest questions.
Mkhabela maintained this week that this was not a problem as he had disclosed his business relationship with Majali to PetroSA. The agreement signed between Mkhize and Majali was still not enforced. Instead new terms, much more favourable to Imvume, were agreed between PetroSA chief executive Sipho Mkhize and Majali in September last year.
Now PetroSA waived any claim to interest and agreed that Imvume could repay the capital amount in monthly instalments over four and a half years. But again, in February this year and after paying only R1,33-million, Imvume defaulted, court papers show.
PetroSA took off the kid gloves for a little while, filing an application for summary judgement in the Johannesburg High Court. But the matter was postponed twice, and on a third court date -- May 3 this year -- PetroSA removed the matter from the roll. PetroSA this week claimed that this was to allow Imvume to remain operational, which would give PetroSA a better chance eventually to recoup the debt.
The ANC this week threatened legal action against the M&G without confirming or denying the flow of money to it. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the ANC knew exactly where the funding was coming from. Between 2000 and 2002, when Majali was trading in oil allocations from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the ANC's Motlanthe repeatedly accompanied him to that country. ANC treasurer general Mendi Msimang also went along on at least one occasion.
It is rumoured that the relationship between Majali and Motlanthe has cooled recently, but an Imvume brochure last year still described Majali as "economic adviser to the secretary general of the ANC". Describing the company's "winning formula", the brochure said Imvume had "access and influence on economic policy".
How they responded ...
PETROSA
The cornerstone of this deal is the policy adopted by PetroSA, which is a national initiative, black economic empowerment (BEE). PetroSA has a mandate to introduce hitherto disadvantaged South Africans into the oil and gas industry. PetroSA had a choice: to continue business as usual and exclude historically disadvantaged South Africans from the mainstream economy and prolong, if not propagate, the two-economies concept, or use our procurement muscle to bring fundamental change to the industry.
To procure a raw material referred to as condensate, the requirement was that the preferred supplier must have a South African partner who qualifies as a BEE candidate. This in effect introduced a major shift in the industry. We deliberately signed deals with the historically disadvantaged party to ensure that they were not "brought along" to the deal, but in fact they were the "principal partner" in the deal.
# On the [High Court] case PetroSA brought against Imvume PetroSA suspended the case due to the fact that if Imvume were liquidated, there would be very little proceeds flowing into PetroSA from that exercise. Imvume is much better off remaining operational for PetroSA to be able to recoup the total sum owed to PetroSA as well as interest and the legal costs.
# On Leslie Mkhabela [PetroSA's choice of lawyer to sue Imvume]
Mkhabela assured PetroSA of the following: he acted on behalf of Imvume during 2002/03. He later decided to resign from their business. While he acted for Imvume, he was invited into a consortium that submitted a bid for the Aventura Resort in exchange for his services. He retains no personal friendship with Imvume.
# On PetroSA's actions and internal inquiry
At the request of Imvume, PetroSA effected a pre-payment into an account different from the normal account. We changed the account without considering that there may be negative ramifications. PetroSA has since tightened the controls around channels of communication and instruction from vendors on payments. PetroSA in its enquiry has not found any wrongdoing by any individual or individuals within PetroSA or external to PetroSA with line of sight to PetroSA. All the procedures and processes were followed. PetroSA honoured the letter of the contract. At times we assist suppliers to better deliver to PetroSA where possible. The procurement policy at PetroSA allows for payments of this nature.
# On the double payment
Glencore held the product. Even though PetroSA did not have a contract with them, they had a ship in the harbour with our product. As we had already paid, PetroSA had to make a decision; to either pay them and deal with Imvume later -- this would cost us $2,8-million -- or refuse to pay and have our refinery cease operating for a minimum of 40 days, at the cost of $1-million daily. The PetroSA board ratified the decision.
# Conclusion
It is the intention of PetroSA to recoup all the funds involved in this dispute. A liquidated Imvume would not generate the required proceeds for PetroSA. This would lead to an outright loss. PetroSA needs Imvume to pay back the money owed to PetroSA.
BARRY AARON & ASSOCIATES (lawyers for Majali and Imvume):
Our clients have requested us to record that Imvume had legitimately withheld payment in the sum of $2,8-million from Glencore against receipt of the expected commission on the profit-sharing arrangement in relation to Imvume's contract with PetroSA.
The withholding of this payment was not contested by Glencore until immediately prior to delivery of the next shipment, which it then refused to offload until such time as the shortfall (as Glencore perceived it) on the previous shipment had been paid. This resulted in PetroSA effecting payment of the shortfall and Imvume executing the acknowledgement [of debt] in favour of PetroSA.
The issue of commission from Glencore remains unresolved. Imvume expected to repay PetroSA from anticipated funds and separately resolve the issue with Glencore. Unfortunately, the anticipated funds did not materialise. Imvume has concluded arrangements with PetroSA for repayment. Imvume intends honouring its obligations to PetroSA. Our clients have no objection to fair investigative journalism and comment. [The M&G] however continues to harass our clients in an ongoing witch-hunt. [The M&G] appears to have accessed Imvume's private and confidential records, including (in particular) its banking records, constituting an invasion of our clients' rights to privacy, conduct way beyond the norms of responsible or acceptable investigative journalism. Our clients are a private businessman and a private company respectively, engaging in the legitimate pursuit of their activities. Their business activities and support for the ANC are their private affair. [The M&G] is sabotaging and subverting a legitimate black empowerment initiative.
MNMR Attorneys (for the ANC and Kgalema Motlanthe)
The short time period provided for comment demonstrates that the M&G will not give proper consideration to our clients' submissions. We wish to note that following the recent decision of the Cape high court in the Idasa matter, our clients are not obliged to discuss donations received by it from any person. Even if it were so, our clients would have no obligation and would not always have the ability or means to verify the identity of the sources of all donations made to it. We record, however, that our clients deny any insinuation that they acted in any corrupt, illegal or improper manner. Our clients will not hesitate to protect their rights should the M&G publish the defamatory material contemplated in [your] e-mail.
Source: Mail & Guardian
The M&G possesses bank statements and has seen other forensic evidence proving that Imvume transferred the lion's share of this to the ANC within days. PetroSA this week said it was unaware of this. The ANC denied impropriety and said it was not obliged to discuss its funders. The scheme unfolded in two stages. First, PetroSA management bent over backwards to pay Imvume the money as an advance for the procurement of oil condensate. Then, when Imvume diverted the funds to the ANC instead of paying its own foreign suppliers, PetroSA had to cover the shortfall by paying the same amount again.
A multimillion-rand hole remains in the parastatalis books. PetroSA has gone through the motions to recover the debt by suing Imvume -- but most of it remains outstanding. The effect of the entire transaction was that PetroSA, and ultimately the taxpayer, subsidised the ruling party's election campaign: a blatant abuse of public resources. Imvume's role as an ANC "front company" first emerged in February last year when the M&G exposed its oil dealings with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Imvume principal Sandi Majali obtained lucrative crude oil allocations from that regime when he travelled to Iraq with top ANC officials between 2000 and 2002. More recently, Imvume described its boss as ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe's "economic adviser".
The transaction in a nutshell
But it was the diversion of the Petro-SA money four months ahead of the 2004 elections that is now lifting the lid on the funding scandal. The deal puts the spotlight on PetroSA's management, which approved the payment; Imvume boss Majali, who asked for the advance and then issued the cheques to the ANC; and Motlanthe, who was Majali's ANC patron. Imvume, now unable to pay its debts, was once the empowerment pin-up of the oil industry.
The contract that caused all the trouble was awarded by PetroSA to Imvume on October 15 2002 -- the day President Thabo Mbeki publicly launched PetroSA as the national oil company. Under the contract, Imvume -- with the backing of Swiss-based resource trader Glencore International -- was to supply PetroSA with regular cargoes of condensate, a feedstock for PetroSA's Mossel Bay gas-to-liquid fuels plant. A number of condensate cargoes were delivered to Mossel Bay during 2003. The standard contractual procedure was for PetroSA to pay Imvume the full cargo price no later than 30 days after the bill of lading date (the date the cargo was loaded for shipment to Mossel Bay).
Once it received payment from PetroSA, Imvume would immediately pay it on to Glencore, which sourced the cargo on international markets. Glencore paid Imvume a commission. But in December 2003 the pattern was broken, and PetroSA has confirmed that standard procedure was departed from. The bill of lading date for that cargo was December 6 2003, meaning PetroSA's payment for the cargo -- worth $10-million (about R65-million) -- was due on January 5 2004. But Imvume's Majali asked PetroSA for an advance of R15-million (just more than $2-million of the $10-million) which was paid even before the cargo was discharged on December 22. PetroSA paid the advance into a different account to that usually used by Imvume for the contract.
Evidence in the M&G's possession confirms that Imvume Management's corporate account was credited with R15-million a day later, on December 19. And the M&G has seen forensic proof that within the next four days, Imvume's Majali issued a series of four cheques to the ANC -- for R4-million, R3-million and R2-million (twice). These cheques, totalling R11-million, were all transacted on December 23. This week Majali and Imvume did not dispute that the money was paid to the ANC, but claimed their support for the party was a "private affair".
The transfers to the ANC came four months before the elections, held on April 14 2004. A number of sources have described the party's financial straits around that time, claiming it had a bank overdraft typically running at more than R100-million. When payment for the cargo became due to Glencore on January 5, Imvume failed to pay the company the R15-million advance -- and, effectively, also withheld another R3-million from the balance owed.
Glencore turned to PetroSA for what it was owed, eventually threatening in February not to offload the next cargo. PetroSA agreed to cover the shortfall of R18-million, for fear that the Mossel Bay plant would run out of feedstock, leading to greater losses. Effectively, PetroSA paid R18-million twice -- once to Imvume, and once to Imvume's supplier. PetroSA maintains that the special circumstances of the empowerment environment largely excuse the actions of its management. It also denies that there was pressure from either the Minerals and Energy Ministry or the ANC to approve the advance to Imvume.
Circumstances, however, suggest that empowerment is not a sufficient explanation and that Imvume's ANC links played a role. These links were no secret in oil trading circles. A businessman active in the sector told the M&G last year: "It was talked about when they got tenders ... that it was an ANC company ... I certainly understand that ANC fundraising has a keen interest."
The advance payment to Imvume was irregular in that it was a departure from standard procedures. PetroSA maintains procurement policy allows for advance payments, but admits it "should have checked" whether the money was going into the usual account. When the transaction with Imvume blew up in its face, PetroSA continued treating the company with kid gloves.
On February 23 last year, four days after PetroSA had been forced to settle Imvume's debt with Glencore, Majali signed an acknowledgement of debt to PetroSA, agreeing to repay the R18-million plus interest within 90 days. He also ceded his company's revenue stream as security. But Imvume paid nothing in terms of that agreement. Court records show more than a month passed after the expiry of the 90-day term before PetroSA issued a letter of demand. (See "PetroSA vs Imvume Management" download box on top right of this article for full documents).
PetroSA's choice of lawyer employed to pursue the demand raises further questions about PetroSA's seriousness of purpose. The lawyer, Leslie Mkhabela, was previously Imvume's own attorney and still has a business relationship with Majali via their common interest in Forever Resorts Aventura, the privatised state leisure company. This raises conflict-of-interest questions.
Mkhabela maintained this week that this was not a problem as he had disclosed his business relationship with Majali to PetroSA. The agreement signed between Mkhize and Majali was still not enforced. Instead new terms, much more favourable to Imvume, were agreed between PetroSA chief executive Sipho Mkhize and Majali in September last year.
Now PetroSA waived any claim to interest and agreed that Imvume could repay the capital amount in monthly instalments over four and a half years. But again, in February this year and after paying only R1,33-million, Imvume defaulted, court papers show.
PetroSA took off the kid gloves for a little while, filing an application for summary judgement in the Johannesburg High Court. But the matter was postponed twice, and on a third court date -- May 3 this year -- PetroSA removed the matter from the roll. PetroSA this week claimed that this was to allow Imvume to remain operational, which would give PetroSA a better chance eventually to recoup the debt.
The ANC this week threatened legal action against the M&G without confirming or denying the flow of money to it. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the ANC knew exactly where the funding was coming from. Between 2000 and 2002, when Majali was trading in oil allocations from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the ANC's Motlanthe repeatedly accompanied him to that country. ANC treasurer general Mendi Msimang also went along on at least one occasion.
It is rumoured that the relationship between Majali and Motlanthe has cooled recently, but an Imvume brochure last year still described Majali as "economic adviser to the secretary general of the ANC". Describing the company's "winning formula", the brochure said Imvume had "access and influence on economic policy".
How they responded ...
PETROSA
The cornerstone of this deal is the policy adopted by PetroSA, which is a national initiative, black economic empowerment (BEE). PetroSA has a mandate to introduce hitherto disadvantaged South Africans into the oil and gas industry. PetroSA had a choice: to continue business as usual and exclude historically disadvantaged South Africans from the mainstream economy and prolong, if not propagate, the two-economies concept, or use our procurement muscle to bring fundamental change to the industry.
To procure a raw material referred to as condensate, the requirement was that the preferred supplier must have a South African partner who qualifies as a BEE candidate. This in effect introduced a major shift in the industry. We deliberately signed deals with the historically disadvantaged party to ensure that they were not "brought along" to the deal, but in fact they were the "principal partner" in the deal.
# On the [High Court] case PetroSA brought against Imvume PetroSA suspended the case due to the fact that if Imvume were liquidated, there would be very little proceeds flowing into PetroSA from that exercise. Imvume is much better off remaining operational for PetroSA to be able to recoup the total sum owed to PetroSA as well as interest and the legal costs.
# On Leslie Mkhabela [PetroSA's choice of lawyer to sue Imvume]
Mkhabela assured PetroSA of the following: he acted on behalf of Imvume during 2002/03. He later decided to resign from their business. While he acted for Imvume, he was invited into a consortium that submitted a bid for the Aventura Resort in exchange for his services. He retains no personal friendship with Imvume.
# On PetroSA's actions and internal inquiry
At the request of Imvume, PetroSA effected a pre-payment into an account different from the normal account. We changed the account without considering that there may be negative ramifications. PetroSA has since tightened the controls around channels of communication and instruction from vendors on payments. PetroSA in its enquiry has not found any wrongdoing by any individual or individuals within PetroSA or external to PetroSA with line of sight to PetroSA. All the procedures and processes were followed. PetroSA honoured the letter of the contract. At times we assist suppliers to better deliver to PetroSA where possible. The procurement policy at PetroSA allows for payments of this nature.
# On the double payment
Glencore held the product. Even though PetroSA did not have a contract with them, they had a ship in the harbour with our product. As we had already paid, PetroSA had to make a decision; to either pay them and deal with Imvume later -- this would cost us $2,8-million -- or refuse to pay and have our refinery cease operating for a minimum of 40 days, at the cost of $1-million daily. The PetroSA board ratified the decision.
# Conclusion
It is the intention of PetroSA to recoup all the funds involved in this dispute. A liquidated Imvume would not generate the required proceeds for PetroSA. This would lead to an outright loss. PetroSA needs Imvume to pay back the money owed to PetroSA.
BARRY AARON & ASSOCIATES (lawyers for Majali and Imvume):
Our clients have requested us to record that Imvume had legitimately withheld payment in the sum of $2,8-million from Glencore against receipt of the expected commission on the profit-sharing arrangement in relation to Imvume's contract with PetroSA.
The withholding of this payment was not contested by Glencore until immediately prior to delivery of the next shipment, which it then refused to offload until such time as the shortfall (as Glencore perceived it) on the previous shipment had been paid. This resulted in PetroSA effecting payment of the shortfall and Imvume executing the acknowledgement [of debt] in favour of PetroSA.
The issue of commission from Glencore remains unresolved. Imvume expected to repay PetroSA from anticipated funds and separately resolve the issue with Glencore. Unfortunately, the anticipated funds did not materialise. Imvume has concluded arrangements with PetroSA for repayment. Imvume intends honouring its obligations to PetroSA. Our clients have no objection to fair investigative journalism and comment. [The M&G] however continues to harass our clients in an ongoing witch-hunt. [The M&G] appears to have accessed Imvume's private and confidential records, including (in particular) its banking records, constituting an invasion of our clients' rights to privacy, conduct way beyond the norms of responsible or acceptable investigative journalism. Our clients are a private businessman and a private company respectively, engaging in the legitimate pursuit of their activities. Their business activities and support for the ANC are their private affair. [The M&G] is sabotaging and subverting a legitimate black empowerment initiative.
MNMR Attorneys (for the ANC and Kgalema Motlanthe)
The short time period provided for comment demonstrates that the M&G will not give proper consideration to our clients' submissions. We wish to note that following the recent decision of the Cape high court in the Idasa matter, our clients are not obliged to discuss donations received by it from any person. Even if it were so, our clients would have no obligation and would not always have the ability or means to verify the identity of the sources of all donations made to it. We record, however, that our clients deny any insinuation that they acted in any corrupt, illegal or improper manner. Our clients will not hesitate to protect their rights should the M&G publish the defamatory material contemplated in [your] e-mail.
Source: Mail & Guardian
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