Dirty Apartheid Lies: SA's Murderous Arms Machine And The Bank That Cashed In (And Out)

Startling revelations and powerful evidence of grand corruption implicating politicians from PW Botha to Jacob Zuma, global banks and corporations was presented at The People's Tribunal on Saturday and Sunday.

Overseen by an esteemed panel including former Constitutional Court Justice Zac Yacoob, the Tribunal has been set up by civil society groups to hear evidence on corruption, capture and economic crime over the last 40 years in South Africa.

The Tribunal has, thus far, heard evidence of covert networks of politicians, state companies and corporations involved in the systemic violation of the United Nations' weapons embargo on South Africa during apartheid.

Standing as a witness, author of "Apartheid Guns and Money" Hennie van Vuuren emphasised the importance of bringing this evidence to light is in recognising the actors that contributed to the gross violation of human rights during apartheid. Beyond the pursuit of justice, he said, the goal is also to recognise how these crimes are connected.

Apartheid's murderous military machine

At the heart of the arms machine, he said, was South African state-owned arms company Armscor which bought (and sold) weapons from abroad in contravention of a compulsory U.N. embargo on trading arms with the country.

Almost all military expenditure, which amounted to approximately 28% of the country's budget at the time or half a trillion rand in today's value, passed through the company, he said.

But to oil this military machine -- which was created in response to the "appetite for the apartheid government's involvement in conflict locally and on the continent" -- the company needed to circumvent the compulsory global sanctions. In come the French.

Die Groot Krokodil's deathly French Kiss

Realising weapons couldn't be procured from Pretoria, then-Prime Minister PW Botha ('Die Groot Krokodil') took business abroad. For some a city of love, South Africa's government made Paris, France, its city of bloodlust.

The South African embassy in Paris housed what was called the tegniese raad (technical council) from which Armscor would strike it's deals, which van Vuuren said was not known until they began researching years ago.

"This was there base... from which they'd go around Europe doing deals, in some instances liaising with partners in Africa (like Zaire)... and perhaps even China," he said.

Even leading figures in the anti-apartheid movement who tried to expose these links had no idea what was happening in Paris. Documentary evidence, van Vuuren said, showed how French intelligence would have regular meetings with Armscor officials on a regular basis in the 1970s and 1980s. That heads of intelligence from France and South Africa were meeting suggests politicians in the upper echelons of France's government were well aware of sanctions being broken, he said.

Central to this relationship, he added, was French arms company Thompson CSF -- today Thales -- which documentary evidence showed met with PW Botha's minister of defence to co-develop sophisticated missile technology for use in apartheid South Africa's warmongering locally and abroad.

Demonstrating just how far into the present dodgy relations continued, Van Vuuren highlighted that the same company, Thales, is implicated in paying bribes to now President Jacob Zuma through his financial adviser (and now convicted fraudster) Schabir Shaik.

"These are the 783 counts of corruption, fraud and money laundering [Zuma] currently faces today," he said.

The two faces of the international community

The story of the apartheid government's circumvention of sanctions, however, was more than just a French love affair with the Broederbond.

More than 50 countries were involved in sanctions-busting in one way or another, he said. Most notably, every single country on the United Nation's Security Council -- those very nations tasked with policing the sanctions that were imposed -- were all involved to some extent, he said.

Others included many countries across Europe and, notably, Israel. Armscor, he said, created offices in Tel Aviv which was "active in ensuring the relationship with Israel in the procurement and co-development of weapons could take place with a large contingent of officials based there".

Many of these nations, he said, voiced public opposition to apartheid while secretly adding fuel to the fire.

How to bankroll a bloody regime

Another key player, this time a bank, was Kredietbank in Belgium and its Luxembourg subsidiary.

Professor Bonita Meyersfeld, an academic and former director of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies at Wits, reiterated the bank's role in aiding Armscor: firstly, through creating shell companies to help erase the trail of money and, secondly, in creating access to bank accounts.

Through accounts managed by the bank, money to purchase arms could be transferred from Pretoria to the ultimate recipients without raising any alarms. More simply, by setting up fake companies and chanelling money through them, the apartheid regime was able to oil its military machine without let or hindrance.

"Countries such as Belgium, France, Portugal and others were able to utilise private entities to enter into engagements with banks that very elegantly set up these shelf companies," she said.

"There'd be hundreds of these across the world where a corporate actor in the Global North would take funds, channel them through shelf companies and money would land up in SA which then went to Armscor (and vice versa)".

"These are not just AK47s -- an image incalcated in films -- but parts of machine guns, helipcopters, parts used to maintain and facilitate this crime against humanity," she said.

Like a spy novel, though, they occurred in the back rooms of the very embassies that stood against apartheid, she said.
Why does this matter today?

In detailing the secret flow of money for arms, Meyersfeld said the purpose is to shine a light on the fact that there remains an urgent need to create a global body to regulate the conduct of banks.

"The reality is there is no international entity that can hold banks to account for their compliance or their non-compliance with standards around international banking, and more importantly for the participation in criminal activity," she said.

Despite the "accountability vacuum," one option she said was to use the OECD National Contact Point (NCP) which hears complaints from individuals who claim corporations are guilty of human rights violations. OECD countries adhering to guidelines on multinational corporations are required to setup NCPs which provide a mediation and conciliation platform for resolving issues involving those companies, she said.

While no silver bullet, this would be one currently available option for "some semblance of accountability" in relation to Kredietbank, she said. Reputation damage, she said, could ultimately result in operations closing or at the least spark efforts at reparations in the absence of a global entity with real teeth.

Insisting on the necessity of global institutions or mechanisms to ensure justice, Meyersfeld said corporations had gotten off scot-free for too long.

"They may not hold the gun to the mineworker at the mine, but they are the ones providing the funds to do this," she said.

When they do, she added, corporate social responsibility projects in response are not enough:

"Corporates can be the agent of harm and the agent of good. But you can't bomb an economy, then build a school".

Source: Marc Davies - Huffington Post

Spying on political foes is an abuse of resources

THE latest intrigues about the abuse of intelligence services are not just tragic, they pose a serious risk to our democracy. Successive governments under both presidents Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma have involved our national intelligence services in fighting battles within the African National Congress (ANC). In Mbeki’s term the issue was that of his perceived rivals — Mathews Phosa, Tokyo Sexwale and Cyril Ramaphosa — being accused of plotting against him.

Then we had Zuma, the presidential candidate, getting access to national intelligence information to discredit his corruption charges as a political plot to prevent his ascent to the Presidency.

The latest saga extends the abuse to include perceived threats to the government by citizens who are seen as critics of the governing party, or its competitors in the next election. Citizens who are seen as critics are labelled agents of foreign, western powers. The risks this abuse poses to our democracy is significant enough for us as citizens to stand up and demand a stop to it.

First, the national intelligence services should be fully engaged in assessing the real risks to the security of the state — not that of the governing party. Our borders are insecure and our natural resources are being destroyed, as evidenced by the more than 500 rhinos killed this year alone by syndicates who act with impunity. Foreigners stream into our country without any restraint because of poor border policing. There are issues of crime intelligence to stem violent crime — especially in poor communities — that should be priorities instead of political intrigues.

Second, the quality of the intelligence reports themselves speak of lack of professionalism. How does it happen that our intelligence services do not know about the nature of the National Endowment for Democracy and its office holders? How can we feel safe with such blatant lack of knowledge about international affairs?

Third, the political culture that sees no distinction between the governing party, the president, the government and the state is a threat to the pillars of our constitutional democracy of human dignity, equality and freedom. Ours is a multi-party democracy that should encourage the freedom of association, expression and the free flow of ideas. The discrediting of citizens as agents of foreign powers violates their rights and undermines their responsibilities as active citizens who should hold those in public office accountable. Criminalising political competition poses a serious risk to our democracy.

Fourth, the abuse of national intelligence also undermines our international standing as a constitutional democracy on a continent that, with a few notable exceptions, has yet to demonstrate its capacity to sustain vibrant competitive multi-party democracies. The difficulties of running competitive credible elections and transitions from one party to another on our continent arise from the unwillingness of incumbent governing parties to accept the possibility of change.

We have seen it in Kenya’s 2007-08 elections. We saw it in Zimbabwe’s successive elections culminating in this year’s elections that could not be described by Southern African Development Community election monitors as "free and fair" but "free and peaceful." "Free and fair" is apparently too high a bar to reach. We seem to settle for only being grateful that there was peace. Are we, as African citizens, content to lower the bar when it comes to our expectations of the conduct of those in political office?

South African citizens opted for a constitutional democracy because we want to aim high. We believed — and still do — that our country is capable of becoming a great society in every sense of that word. Ours was to be a place that would be known for its respect for human dignity, promotion of equality of all in the law and freedom for all. Invading the privacy of citizens to pursue party political interests goes against the very spirit of our freedom struggle and the ideals that so many of our heroes of the struggle fought and died for.

Abuse of intelligence services is a serious form of corruption and a wasteful expenditure of resources that should be building schools and homes, running efficient and effective health services and protecting citizens from crime. We as citizens need to stand firm against the erosion of our constitutional democracy and insist on holding those responsible accountable. Our society deserves better.

It is up to each one of us to stand together to defend and promote integrity in public service. It is in our hands to stop this abuse.

Source: Business Day

South Africa 1960 – 1994

a) Political, economic and social factors contributing to the end of apartheid

The policy of total strategy or counter-revolution as it became known did not stop the anti-apartheid groups such as the ANC, PAC and UDF (United Democratic Front) from protesting for political and social equality for all races in South Africa. Poverty for blacks continued in the townships and homelands. Unemployment was on the rise due to sanctions, and education and housing were still of a third world standard.

The state of emergency failed to make South Africa safer for whites. Many whites were suffering loss of liberties under the censorship and rigid laws of the military state. Moreover, the ANC in exile continued to attack ‘soft targets’ in South Africa including shopping centres and post offices. Many whites were becoming disillusioned with apartheid and feeling the rejection of their society and culture by the rest of the world. Many Coloureds and Indians were becoming openly defiant of the white state demanding nothing short of full democracy for South Africa.

The United Democratic Front (UDF)

In 1983 a multi-racial party, the United Democratic Front was formed with the aim of uniting all resistance groups in the fight against apartheid. The UDF was highly successful because its members became a uniting force and it had many high profile members, including church leaders such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu. The UDF supporters also include ANC members such as Winnie Mandela. By 1985 the UDF gained over two million members and was a powerful force in demanding the immediate end to apartheid.

The gradual reforms of the Botha government, delivered no real change in South Africa, only cosmetic changes. South Africa could not change and embrace the modern world while apartheid existed. Many white South Africans and politicians began to feel that apartheid was like ‘living on the back of a tiger and they needed to find a way off without being eaten’.1

b) International factors contributing to the end of apartheid

By 1988 the cost of running the military state was staggering and the economic performance of South Africa was poor. Sanctions had driven the economy into recession; ‘sanction busting’ was failing to fix the problem. South Africa was unable to obtain foreign loans or foreign investment. 2

The impact of the Free Mandela Campaign, sporting sanctions, severe international criticism, military and technical equipment embargos and isolation by other African nations in the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) was crippling South Africa. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 removed the Communist threat which underpinned the existence of apartheid since the end of the Second World War. Festering social, political and economic grievances in all sectors of the South African population left the preservation of apartheid completely untenable by the start of 1990s.

c) Problems facing the National Party and the ANC in the transition to democracy in South Africa

In 1984 during townships riots, P.W. Botha declared, ‘I’m giving you a final warning; one man, one vote in this country is out-that is never!”.3 In 1989 after a mild stroke and the failure of Total Strategy, he resigned as President of South Africa. Botha was replaced by F.W.de Klerk.

On 2 February 1990, de Klerk opened Parliament, and in his maiden speech as President began dismantling the apartheid state. He rescinded the ban on the ANC, the PAC, the South African Communist Party and thirty other political organizations. He freed political prisoners and suspended the death sentence. On the 11 of November de Klerk released Nelson Mandela from prison4. South Africa would have one man one vote.

The transition to democracy was a challenging task. Some historians have called it a ‘miracle’. Both the National Party and the ANC struggled to keep South Africa from sliding into civil war in the early 1990s. Meetings were held to lay out South Africa’s new Democracy entitled A Convention for Democratic South Africa (CODESSA). It was in the CODESSA meetings, that the National Party and the ANC debated their differing visions of democracy. CODESSA 1 ended when the ANC walked out of negotiations5. Finally CODESSA II was able to pave the way for a new constitution and a national election.

Problems facing the National Party

• The traditional rulers of South Africa wanted to hold to power as long as possible. They wanted ‘one man, one vote’ to eventuate slowly to protect the white minority.
  
  
• Right Wing extremists’ elements including the AWB (Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging) vowed to prevent free elections and assassinate Nelson Mandela. They also wanted to create an Afrikaner homeland.
  
  
• Other white extremists were also letting off bombs and interrupting official democracy meetings such as CODESSA.

Problems facing the ANC

The ANC faced a number of difficulties:

• First in dealing with the National Party and with other anti-apartheid parties, especially Inkatha (a political organisation made up of Zulus from the Natal Province)
  
  
• The ANC wanted one person, one vote multiracial democracy immediately, and many of its members were understandably anxious to embrace democracy for the first time.
  
  
• In Natal/KwaZulu Province Chief Buthelezi of Inkatha refused to have anything to do with constitutional negotiations and savage violence between ANC members and Inkatha broke out. This included the assassination of Chris Hani, a national hero of the ANC and member of the South Africa Communist Party. Only a prompt appeal to the nation by Mandela averted a massive reaction.

• The ANC seemed to be losing control of its political base. Many feared that extremist whites were supplying Inkatha with weapons and instigating the fighting between rival black political groups, to prevent South Africa’s march towards democracy.

South Africa’s first democratic Election 27th April 1994

South Africans of all races turned out determined to vote in their first non-racial election on the 27th of April 1994. People lined up in long queues which stretched for miles to cast their historic ballot. The ANC won the election and Nelson Mandela, after spending almost three decades in jail, became President of a free South Africa, F.W. de Klerk became the Deputy President.

At his inauguration as President on the vast lawn of the Union Building in Pretoria Mandela said:

‘Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by another… The sun will never set on so glorious a human achievement. Let freedom reign. God bless Africa’.6

Source: NSW HSC Online http://hsc.csu.edu.au © NSW Department of Education and Communities, and Charles Sturt University, 2011

P. W. Botha, Defender of Apartheid, Is Dead at 90

P. W. Botha, the South African leader who struggled vainly to preserve apartheid rule in a tide of domestic racial violence and global condemnation, died yesterday at his home in South Africa. He was 90. His death was reported by The South African Press Association in Cape Town, quoting the security staff at Mr. Botha’s home on the southern Cape coast.

Mr. Botha was a combative, irascible son of a well-to-do Afrikaner farm family who dropped out of college to work for the right-wing National Party, then rose through the ranks of South Africa’s political establishment, gaining a reputation as the “Old Crocodile” for his ability to charm, outwit and crush his opponents.

In 1978, Mr. Botha became prime minister and proceeded to engineer the creation of a new Constitution, one that held out the promise of limited reform of apartheid policies. When the Constitution came into effect in 1984, Mr. Botha became president. “We must adapt or die,” Mr. Botha told his constituents after becoming prime minister.

As opposition to apartheid spread, Mr. Botha’s room to maneuver shrank. “He was caught in a bind between wanting to show the international community that he was not inflexible, and not wishing to appear weak within his own country,” the journalist Allister Sparks wrote in his 1995 account of the end of apartheid, “Tomorrow Is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa’s Road to Change.”

Yet for a while Mr. Botha’s methods seemed to belie Alexis de Toqueville’s dictum that “the most perilous moment for bad government is when it seeks to mend its ways.” Mr. Botha was re-elected in 1987. Two years later, as opposition to his intransigent style grew within his own party, the president suffered a stroke and resigned. He was succeeded by F. W. de Klerk, who legalized opposition parties, freed Mr. Mandela and other political prisoners, and made the agreements that eventually brought apartheid down.

Source: New York Times

Pretoria's Words: 'Extrajudicial Killing'

Following are excerpts from the final report issued by South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission today:

Primary Finding

On the basis of the evidence available to it, the primary finding of the Commission is that:

The predominant portion of gross violations of human rights was committed by the former state through its security and law-enforcement agencies.

Moreover, the South African state in the period from the late 1970's to early 1990's became involved in activities of a criminal nature when, amongst other things, it knowingly planned, undertook, condoned and covered up the commission of unlawful acts, including the extrajudicial killing of political opponents and others, inside and outside South Africa.

In pursuit of these unlawful activities, the state acted in collusion with certain other political groupings, most notably the Inkatha Freedom Party (I.F.P.). . . .

Certain members of the State Security Council (the state President, Minister of Defense, Minister of Law and Order, and heads of security forces) did foresee that the use of words such as ''take out,'' ''wipe out,'' ''eradicate,'' and ''eliminate'' would result in the killing of political opponents.

P. W. Botha

During the period that he presided as head of state (1978-1989) according to submissions made to and findings made by the Commission, gross violations of human rights and other unlawful acts were perpetrated on a wide scale by members of the South African Defense Force, including:

The deliberate unlawful killing and attempted killing of persons opposed to the policies of the Government, within and outside South Africa.

The widespread use of torture and other forms of severe ill treatment against such persons.

The forcible abduction of such persons where were resident in neighboring countries.

Covert logistical and financial assistance to organizations opposed to the ideology of the A.N.C. . . .

Inkatha

The Commission finds that in 1986, the South African Defense Forces (S.A.D.F.) conspired with Inkatha to provide the latter with a covert, offensive paramilitary unit (or ''hit squad'') to be deployed illegally against persons and organizations perceived to be opposed to both the South African Government and Inkatha. . . The Commission finds . . . that the deployment of the paramilitary unit in KwaZulu led to gross violations of human rights, including killing, attempted killing and severe ill treatment. The Commission finds the following people, among others, accountable for such violations: Mr. P. W. Botha, Gen. Magnus Malan, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. . . .

The A.N.C.

While it was A.N.C. policy that the loss of civilian life should be ''avoided,'' there were instances where members of its security forces perpetrated gross violations of human rights in that the distinction between military and civilian targets was blurred in certain armed actions, such as the 1983 Church Street bombing of the South African Air Force headquarters. . . . In the course of the armed struggle, the A.N.C., through its security forces, undertook military operations which, though intended for military or security force targets, sometimes went awry for a variety of reasons, including poor intelligence and reconnaissance. The consequences in these cases, such as the Magoo's Bar and Durban Esplanade bombings, were gross violations of human rights in respect of the injuries to and loss of lives of civilians.

Individuals who defected to the state and became informers and/or members who became state witnesses in political trials . . . were often labeled by the A.N.C. as collaborators and regarded as legitimate targets to be killed. The commission does not condone the legitimization of such individuals as military targets and finds that the extrajudicial killings of such individuals constituted gross violations of human rights.

The commission finds that, in the 1980's in particular, a number of gross violations were perpetrated not by direct members of the A.N.C. or those operating under its formal command, but by civilians who saw themselves as A.N.C. supporters. In this regard, the Commission finds that the A.N.C. is morally and politically accountable for creating a climate in which such supporters believed their actions to be legitimate. . . .

A.N.C. Camps

The Commission finds that suspected ''agents'' were routinely subjected to torture and other forms of severe ill treatment and that there were cases of such individuals being charged and convicted by tribunals without proper regard to due process, sentenced to death and executed.

Winnie Mandela

The Commission finds that Ms. Madikizela-Mandela was central to the establishment and formation of the Mandela United Football Club, which later developed into a private vigilante unit. . . . The Commission finds that those who opposed Ms. Madkizela-Mandela and the Mandela United Football Club, or dissented from them, were branded as informers and killed. The Commission finds that Ms. Madikizela-Mandela . . . is accountable, politically and morally for the gross violations of human rights committed by the Mandela United Football Club.

The Commission finds further that Mrs. Madikizela-Mandela herself was responsible for committing such gross violations of human rights.

Source: New York Times

De Klerk Becomes Pretoria President

F. W. de Klerk was sworn in today as Acting President of South Africa and said that the country was about to enter an era of change. Mr. de Klerk reaffirmed his promises to phase out white rule and involve blacks in talks about South Africa's future, but without submitting whites to what he has called majority domination. ''There is no doubt that we stand on the threshold of a new era in South and southern Africa,'' Mr. de Klerk, the National Party leader, said in a prepared statement. ''History, I believe, offers us a unique opportunity for peaceful solutions.'' Expected to Be President

Mr. de Klerk is widely expected to become President if the National Party wins the parliamentary elections on Sept. 6, as seems probable. The low-key inauguration, in the presidential wing of the Union Buildings, was attended only by his wife, Marike, other Cabinet ministers and a few dozen journalists. At a news conference afterward, Mr. de Klerk paid tribute to his predecessor, P. W. Botha, who resigned on Monday after losing a confrontation with Mr. de Klerk and other members of his Cabinet. Mr. Botha refused to appoint a successor, so Mr. de Klerk was unanimously chosen by his colleagues to fill the vacancy.

Mr. de Klerk said Mr. Botha's ''greatest gift to South Africa'' was that ''he has put our country on the road to fundamental reform, that he successfully started pulling South Africa out of its dead-end streets and that he guided us in the direction of a totally new dispensation.'' A Contrast in Tone Mr. de Klerk's magnanimity contrasted conspicuously with the tone of Mr. Botha's address on Monday night, when he complained that his Cabinet ministers were ignoring him and that Mr. de Klerk was to travel to Zambia to meet President Kenneth D. Kaunda without his permission. Mr. Botha met with Mr. Kaunda in April 1982. Mr. de Klerk told reporters today that his new responsibilities might preclude the visit to Zambia. But tonight, it was disclosed that he had written President Kaunda, saying that he and Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha would meet the Zambian leader as scheduled in Livingston on Aug. 28. The Foreign Minister's office released the text of a letter that Mr. Kaunda had written earlier assuring President Botha that he did not mean to undercut him but wanted to meet Mr. de Klerk as a person who would occupy a leadership position in the region.

In response to another question, Mr. de Klerk also said that Nelson R. Mandela, South Africa's best-known political prisoner, would not be released before a President was chosen by the electoral college on Sept. 14, a day after the new Parliament is to be convened. Mr. de Klerk said he should not ''in any way whatsoever try to arrange the future'' in his temporary capacity. Frosty Relations Since February Political analysts here said that President Botha, in taking his leave of politics, had tried to hurt Mr. de Klerk and the National Party by sowing doubts about their motives among the white electorate. Mr. de Klerk replaced Mr. Botha as party leader in February after Mr. Botha suffered a stroke, and their relations have been frosty since.

The reaction today of the South African press and public to Mr. Botha's resignation appeared to be one of relief. Business Day, the country's leading financial newspaper, said that ''seldom, if ever, has this country had a leader more widely detested,'' and added, ''It is well that he is gone.'' But one political analyst noted that Mr. Botha still commanded respect among some traditional National Party constituencies and that some whites might vote for the opposition, the right-wing Conservative Party, if they felt the retiring President had been ill used by his party. When a reporter asked Mr. de Klerk about his plans, he replied, ''We want to build a new South Africa in which all people will participate in decisions affecting their lives at all levels of government, but in such a way that no one group amongst the diversity which we have in South Africa will be in a position to dominate others.''

Source: New York Times

Botha, Rebuffed by His Party, Quits South Africa Presidency

P. W. Botha quit under pressure tonight as South Africa's President, complaining that his Cabinet ministers were ignoring him. His announcement, delivered in a disjointed and rambling address in Afrikaans on national television, followed a Cabinet meeting this morning in which the 73-year-old Mr. Botha lost a confrontation he had forced with F. W. de Klerk, his successor as leader of the governing National Party.

At issue was Mr. de Klerk's right to travel to Zambia later this month to meet President Kenneth D. Kaunda without getting Mr. Botha's approval first. But this was overshadowed by a wide perception among politicians, journalists and ordinary South Africans that the President had been trying to undercut Mr. de Klerk since the latter succeeded him as National Party leader about six months ago. President Botha said he would not approve Mr. de Klerk's trip to Zambia because President Kaunda has given refuge to the outlawed African National Congress, which is seeking to overthrow the white Government in Pretoria, and has encouraged foreign pressure on South Africa. ''I am of the opinion that it is inopportune to meet with President Kaunda at this stage,'' Mr. Botha said.

The President announced his resignation 23 days before the next parliamentary elections, which are the toughest the National Party has faced since it came to power in 1948. Mr. de Klerk has been trying to rally the party against its opponents, the right-wing Conservative Party and the liberal Democratic Party, in what has so far been a lackluster campaign for control of the white house of Parliament, and thus the Government. Had Mr. de Klerk not stood up to Mr. Botha today, his credibility as the leader of a party under fire would have been compromised and the likelihood of becoming the next President diminished. In his remarks, Mr. Botha disclosed that Mr. de Klerk and his allies proposed at today's Cabinet meeting that the President, who suffered a stroke in January, retire on grounds of ill health. Mr. Botha said he replied that could not leave ''with such a lie. It is evident to me that after all these years of my best efforts for the National Party and for the Government of this country as well as the security of this country, I am being ignored by ministers in my Cabinet,'' the South African President said. ''I consequently have no choice other than to announce my resignation.''

Mr. Botha, who submitted his resignation to Chief Justice Michael Corbett, did not name a successor. Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha, who is not related to the President, indicated in a television interview tonight that Mr. de Klerk would be sworn in on Tuesday. The South African Constitution says that a Cabinet minister chosen by his colleagues may be acting President. It is expected that Mr. de Klerk will be elected President after the elections on Sept. 6. In a television interview after President Botha's announcement, Mr. de Klerk and Foreign Minister Botha took polite exception to the President's remarks. ''We are sad that a man who has done so much for his country has to retire under these unhappy circumstances,'' Mr. de Klerk said. Effects on Nation's Politics

He confirmed that the Cabinet ministers had suggested that Mr. Botha resign on grounds of poor health. ''We felt that his state of health justified this,'' Mr. de Klerk said, reinforcing a public perception that the stroke had affected the President more than he admitted. It appears likely that the National Party will win the election, but with a smaller majority in Parliament. The resignation was expected to help the party by reinforcing the image it is cultivating as a force for evolutionary change in South Africa.

The change in leadership is unlikely to immediately affect the situation of the black majority, which is excluded from the parliamentary elections. Though Mr. de Klerk is perceived as more enlightened than President Botha, he still supports the basic concept of racially separate groups and has promised that an end to white control will not lead to domination by the black majority. It was an ignominious finish to the career of a politician who began as a National Party organizer 54 years ago. Mr. Botha was elected to Parliament in 1948. He became Defense Minister in 1966, Prime Minister in 1978 and President in 1984 under a new constitution that combined the duties of heads of state and government. For a decade, he was simultaneously the National Party leader.

Under his rule, the South African Army became the most powerful military force in Africa. But Mr. Botha also promised political change and expanded the whites-only Parliament to include smaller chambers representing South Africans of mixed race and of Asian descent. After the President suffered his stroke on Jan. 18, his aides described it as a mild one. But Mr. Botha sent a letter to National Party members of Parliament on Feb. 2, announcing that he was stepping down as National Party leader, though not as President, and asking them to choose a successor. The legislators elected Mr. de Klerk.

Mr. Botha, who was understood to have preferred Finance Minister Barend du Plessis, never publicly congratulated Mr. de Klerk. And he remained as President, in a position to block any decisions by Mr. de Klerk. Old Scores Settled But Mr. de Klerk quickly won the loyalty of the party's members of Parliament, who had chafed under Mr. Botha's sometimes autocratic leadership. After Mr. Kaunda announced last Thursday that he would meet Mr. de Klerk, President Botha called a special Cabinet meeting for today to discuss the offer. Mr. de Klerk outflanked him by getting the backing of the other Cabinet ministers.

The President, in objecting to Mr. de Klerk's plans to meet President Kaunda, made no mention of his own meeting with the Zambian leader on South Africa's frontier with Botswana on April 30, 1982, when Mr. Kaunda was, if anything, even less sympathetic toward Pretoria. But his portrayal of Mr. de Klerk's pending trip to Zambia as unpatriotic did not seem likely to scuttle it, unless President Kaunda chooses to take umbrage at Mr. Botha's criticism or Mr. de Klerk decides it would hurt the party in the coming elections. Foreign Minister Botha observed that ''in every other African state except Lesotho and Swaziland, there is an A.N.C. presence.''

Source: New York Times

South Africa's Tide Shifts

Nelson Mandela holds the keys. He is South Africa's true jailer, and the country's white leaders his prisoners. That is the pronounced significance of Mr. Mandela's visit from prison to President Pieter W. Botha and the trek of Frederik W. de Klerk, Mr. Botha's heir-in-waiting, to the capitals of Europe. Soon Mr. de Klerk will visit Washington. A major U.S. initiative is possible.

Mr. Mandela's tea with President Botha need not mean his imminent release from detention after 26 years. Nor does his recent family birthday party in prison, his comparatively comfortable accommodations there and the attention being paid to him and his movements by all South Africans. Nevertheless, the gradual shift of Mr. Mandela, 71, from antihero to hero, is intended by the white-minority Government to confer a new legitimacy on him and, according to a recent speech by Mr. de Klerk, also on the African National Congress, Mr. Mandela's exiled and banned guerrilla movememt.

Mr. Botha, Mr. de Klerk and most other white political leaders now know that Mr. Mandela and the A.N.C. are essential to any solution of South Africa's color crisis. Mr. Botha wanted, in the last three months of his tenure as President, to measure the mettle of his foremost adversary. He and Mr. de Klerk at last well appreciate that he must be released. But when? And how? To free Mr. Mandela before the national election on Sept. 6 (from which black voters are excluded), would adversely affect the fortunes of Mr. de Klerk's ruling National Party. Mr. Botha might release him during those few weeks after the election when he is still in power, before turning the presidency over to Mr. de Klerk. But a new government would be ill-equipped to deal with the tumultuous result. Moreover, the National Party is also intensely interested in the results of the Constituent Assembly election in neighboring Namibia. The election there will be held Nov. 1, and the National Party hopes to obtain as many votes as possible for the white-led Democratic Turnhalle Alliance in its competition with the South West Africa People's Organization. Although there is a conference of Commonwealth heads in late October, and Mr. Mandela's release would prevent any renewed threat of sanctions and gain South Africa the backing of Britain, the impact of such a release on the Namibian election would prove more decisive for South Africa. For these reasons, and because Mr. de Klerk will, understandably, want carefully to prepare South Africa for Mr. Mandela's release, the beginning of the end of apartheid is not yet at hand.

The fact that white South Africa courts Mr. Mandela, may even be negotiating at a low level with the A.N.C. and hardly tries to prevent large delegations from making the trek to Lusaka, Zambia, to meet and be impressed by the A.N.C. leaders, adds excitement and new hope to those who seek peace in South Africa. Certainly the African National Congress, having largely shed its rampant Marxism in the post-Gorbachev era, is ready to help plan South Africa's future with whites. Both sides are studying constitutional options anew. Once Mr. Mandela is free, other political prisoners are released and the A.N.C. unbanned, then the guerilla movement, internal African opponents of apartheid and the Government will be able to negotiate.

That scenario, once a fantasy, is now - according to the representatives of the Government and A.N.C. -very much closer at hand than at any time since 1948. No one believes the National Party wants to give up all its power, but a weariness of combat and miserable economic forecasts impel change. South Africa has severe balance of payments problems, high inflation, a falling index of business confidence and little room for maneuver. Only a political settlement can permit a return to positive rates of growth. Mr. de Klerk will come to power knowing that Mr. Mandela's freedom and negotiations with the A.N.C. are the costs of prosperity.

When Mr. de Klerk visits Washington this month to see Secretary of State James Baker, many Congressmen and perhaps President Bush, he can be reminded how much the U.S. wants to see a negotiated settlement. More than that, Mr. Baker or Mr. Bush can offer to convene and preside over a Camp David session for South Africa. It might even make sense for President Bush to offer to preside with Mikhael Gorbachev, who also wants a negotiated peace in South Africa. The African National Congress is ready to talk, and so might whites be also willing to talk, realistically in a prestigious setting about their future in a united South Africa.

Source: New York Times

MOZAMBICAN PRESIDENT DIES IN AIR CRASH IN SOUTH AFRICA

President Samora M. Machel, leader of Mozambique since it won independence from Portugal in 1975, was killed Sunday night in a plane crash in South Africa, the Pretoria Government announced today. The cause of the crash, on a flight from Lusaka, Zambia, to Maputo, Mozambique, was not known. The Mozambican authorities, who withheld a formal announcement while they debated the succession and other issues, confirmed Mr. Machel's death about 24 hours after the crash.

The 53-year-old President was an important figure among African leaders opposed to apartheid. His death coincided with increasing strains in Mozambique's relationship with South Africa after the virtual collapse of a 1984 nonaggression pact. Mr. Machel led a Marxist Government but was far from being an ideologue who followed a strict Marxist-Leninist line, and in recent years he seemed above all a pragmatic nationalist. The South African authorities said at least 26 people, including President Machel, had been killed in the crash. Ten people survived, one of them thought to be a Soviet pilot.

South Africa, which is backing Mozambican rebels seeking President Machel's overthrow, made no mention of possible sabotage or attack when it announced the Mozambican leader's death in a brief statement from the office of President P. W. Botha. But the South African Government, eager to avoid accusations that it played a role in the crash, said foreign aviation experts would be welcome to assist in any investigations. Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha invited Mozambican representatives to inspect the crash site.

President Machel was returning from northern Zambia, where he had met the Presidents of Zambia, Angola and Zaire. Both the African National Congress, the most prominent of the organizations seeking the overthrow of apartheid, and the official Zambian press agency sought to implicate South Africa and the Mozambican rebels in Mr. Machel's death. Alfred Nzo, general secretary of the congress, said in Copenhagen that the crash was a ''deliberately committed crime'' by South Africa or its Mozambican allies.

The Mozambican leader's Soviet-made TU-134 twin-engine jet crashed in a hilly, remote area of Transvaal Province, near South Africa's borders with Swaziland and Mozambique. The crash site was a few miles from Komatipoort, the border town in which Mr. Machel signed the nonaggression accord with P. W. Botha, then Prime Minister, in 1984. South African newspapers asserted that the plane had strayed over South African territory in bad weather. Foreign Minister Botha said the aircraft crashed a few hundred yards inside South African territory after apparently running into difficulties in Mozambican airspace. The South African Bureau for Information said those killed included two leading Mozambican officials, Transport Minister Luis Maria Alcantara Santos and Deputy Foreign Minister Jose Carlos Lopo.

Mozambican rebels based in Lisbon said Defense Minister Alberto Joaquim Chipande had been killed in the crash, but there was no independent confirmation of the report. A Zairean diplomat was also reported killed. The first word of the crash came from Foreign Minister Botha, who announced on the South African state radio that an unidentified aircraft flying from Lusaka to Maputo had crashed in the border area. Shortly afterward, the state-run Mozambican radio broke into its programs to announce that Mr. Machel had not returned on schedule from Zambia and that an air crash in South Africa was under investigation. The radio began to play solemn music.

Marcelino dos Santos, a Politburo member and the Secretary of Parliament, urged Mozambicans to remain calm and ''keep vigilant in order to neutralize any enemy action to provoke instability and any criminal behavior.'' The appeal seemed to reflect official fears that the Mozambique National Resistance, a South African-backed rebel group that has claimed major successes in recent weeks, might try to press a perceived advantage. Foreign Minister Botha, touring the crash site, told reporters, ''Without Machel, one is concerned that conflict will escalate.''

President Machel's powerful personality made him the unchallenged leader of the Mozambique Liberation Front, or Frelimo, a Marxist group that is the country's only legal political movement. Mr. dos Santos, along with Foreign Minister Joaquim Alberto Chissano and Prime Minister Mario Machungo, are said by analysts in Maputo to be likely contenders for Mozambique's presidency. Mr. Machel signed a nonaggression pact with South Africa on March 16, 1984, in the hope that his withdrawal of support for the African National Congress would, under the terms of the treaty, end Pretoria's support for the Mozambique National Resistance. From the outset, the security accord has encountered problems. Mozambique has accused South Africa of continuing to support the rebels, while Pretoria has accused Mozambique of renewing its backing for guerrillas of the African National Congress.

Source: New York Times

Free at Last, Zimbabwe Now Must Face Difficult Choices

The Union Jack was lowered at Government House Thursday as the bugler played last post. At midnight, before a cheering crowd, Prince Charles handed over the formal documents of sovereignty. The nation of Zimbabwe was born.

They are familiar ceremonies. Forty-two times, starting with India in 1947, what was once a British territory has become independent but for Commonwealth ties. For both Zimbabwe and Britain, however, last week's events carried more than the usual weight of symbolism. Years of bitterness and death preceded the outcome peacefully celebrated. And much now depends - not only for Zimbabwe but for Britain and the West generally - on whether the new country can overcome that past.

Two basic facts underly Zimbabwe's bloody past and uncertain furture. In population it is an obverwhelmingly black country: about 7 million blacks and 230 000 whites. But white farmers and businessmen and investors created th economy of what used to be Rhodesia - with black labor - and whited held all the economic and political power. After seven years of war and a much longer political struggle, the majority has gained political power. A great question for the future is whether the power can and will be used to sustain the economy.

Robert Mugabe and his government, for example, face an immediate decision on the fundamental matter of food prices. The price of staples was kept low in Rhodesia, for political resons, by the white Government of Ian D Smith and the interim regime of Bishop Abel T Muzorewa. Corn for meal, the most basic item in Southern Africa, still sells here for less than half the price in neighboring Zambia. The subsidy on corn alone is said to cist the Government nearly $40 miilion a year. The hidden economi costs are even greter. With prices held artificially low, tribal villages have realised that it costs them more to grow their food by traditional methods than to buy it. So more and more have gone to townsm to try to fins work and send money home. Five years ago, the large peasant sector of the economy produced more food than it needed. Today it buys a third of what it consumes.

Zimbabwe urgently needs to make its peasant agriculture more productive. But the political cost of letting prices rise to increase productivity would put a burden on the masses who voted the Mugabe Government into office. That is the kind of anguishing choice that will have to be made by the Government again and again. Zimbabwe's advantage is that it is not another desperate third world nation. It has the potential for economic take-off. The country's large white-owned farms boast some of the most productive agriculture in the world, for example. While neighboring Mozambique and Zambia have had to depend on food imports, sometimes coming close to bare cupboards, Rhodesia fed itself. Under the right conditions, Zimbabwe's grain surpluses could help the whole region. As for industry, the world learned during 15 years of trying to supress the white rebellion with sanctions how ingenious Rhodesians could be in supplying their own needs. Andrew Young, in Salisbury las week as a member of the American delegation for the independence celebrations, remarked ironically on the high quality of the workmanship in the modern hotel here the delegates stayed. "if they could build this during sanctions," he said, "maybe they could give us soe advice ..."

Unlike many newly independent countries, Zimbabwe has a reservoir of human skills o which to draw. The white population, small as it is, includes crucial technical and managerial experts. But there is also a black professional and middle class. The country has had an integrated university for years, and there are large numbers of black graduates.

Prime Minister Mugabe has made a particular effort so far to reassure white Zimbaweans and potential investors from abroad. even before independence he emphasized that, though he calls himself a Marxist, he did not want to 'disrupt the economy' by early nationalisation. On the night of independence, he made a moving appeal to blacks to treat white fairly. "It could never be a correct justification," be said, "that because the whites oppressed us yesterday when they had power, the blacks must oppress them today because they have power. An evil remains an evil ... Our majority rule cold easily turn into inhuman rule if we opressed, persecuted or harassed those who do not look or think like the majority of us."

Anothe reasurance to whites, at the moment of independence, was the atmosphere of friendliness between Mr Mugabe and the British Government. In light of history, this was one of the most amazing aspects of an amazing week. The British were humiliatingly powerless when Ian Smith led Rhodesia into unilateral independence in 1965. That was in part because Rhodesia had been a self-governing territory since 1923. The Bristish Prime Minister in 1965 and for years afterward, Harold Wilson, was also singularly unable to marshal effective diplomacy against the Smith regime. The black nationalist movements, including Mr Mugabe's, always suspected that British governments were not so much unable as unwilling to take firm action against their white kith and kin in Rhodesia. The suspicions deepened when a Conservative Government under Margaret Thatcher took office. When Lord Carrigton, the Foreign Secretary, convened the Rhodesian conference in London last fall, Mr Mugabe was highly skeptical. At one point a Mugabe spokesman said the British cease-fire proposals were "a pot fathered by Mrs Thatcher in concubinage with Satan Botha" (Prime Minister PW Botha of South Africa).

The hostility and suspicion carried over into the election run by the British Governor, Lord Soames. Mr Mugabe held out some of his troops, beleiving that the British would deny him the fruits of political victory. There were botter recriminations on both sides about alleged violations of the cease-fire accords. Then, just before the election, the two men met alone together for the first time - and something happened. Aides say each came out of that meeting believing in the other's bona fides. In the days after his sweeping victory, Mr Mugabe sought the Governor's advice, and urged him to stay longer. "I must admit," Mr Mugabe said of Lord Soames in his independence speech, "that I was one of those who originally never trusted him, and yet I have now ended up not only implicitly trusting but fondly loving him as well. He is indeed a great man, through whom it has been possible, within the short period I have been Prime Minister, to organize substantial aid from Britain and other countries."

Robert Mugabe is not looking for Christopher Soames, then, but to the west. That is another reason why Zimbabwe means so much to so many.

Source: New York Times