THE latest intrigues about the abuse of intelligence services are not just tragic, they pose a serious risk to our democracy. Successive governments under both presidents Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma have involved our national intelligence services in fighting battles within the African National Congress (ANC). In Mbeki’s term the issue was that of his perceived rivals — Mathews Phosa, Tokyo Sexwale and Cyril Ramaphosa — being accused of plotting against him.
Then we had Zuma, the presidential candidate, getting access to national intelligence information to discredit his corruption charges as a political plot to prevent his ascent to the Presidency.
The latest saga extends the abuse to include perceived threats to the government by citizens who are seen as critics of the governing party, or its competitors in the next election. Citizens who are seen as critics are labelled agents of foreign, western powers. The risks this abuse poses to our democracy is significant enough for us as citizens to stand up and demand a stop to it.
First, the national intelligence services should be fully engaged in assessing the real risks to the security of the state — not that of the governing party. Our borders are insecure and our natural resources are being destroyed, as evidenced by the more than 500 rhinos killed this year alone by syndicates who act with impunity. Foreigners stream into our country without any restraint because of poor border policing. There are issues of crime intelligence to stem violent crime — especially in poor communities — that should be priorities instead of political intrigues.
Second, the quality of the intelligence reports themselves speak of lack of professionalism. How does it happen that our intelligence services do not know about the nature of the National Endowment for Democracy and its office holders? How can we feel safe with such blatant lack of knowledge about international affairs?
Third, the political culture that sees no distinction between the governing party, the president, the government and the state is a threat to the pillars of our constitutional democracy of human dignity, equality and freedom. Ours is a multi-party democracy that should encourage the freedom of association, expression and the free flow of ideas. The discrediting of citizens as agents of foreign powers violates their rights and undermines their responsibilities as active citizens who should hold those in public office accountable. Criminalising political competition poses a serious risk to our democracy.
Fourth, the abuse of national intelligence also undermines our international standing as a constitutional democracy on a continent that, with a few notable exceptions, has yet to demonstrate its capacity to sustain vibrant competitive multi-party democracies. The difficulties of running competitive credible elections and transitions from one party to another on our continent arise from the unwillingness of incumbent governing parties to accept the possibility of change.
We have seen it in Kenya’s 2007-08 elections. We saw it in Zimbabwe’s successive elections culminating in this year’s elections that could not be described by Southern African Development Community election monitors as "free and fair" but "free and peaceful." "Free and fair" is apparently too high a bar to reach. We seem to settle for only being grateful that there was peace. Are we, as African citizens, content to lower the bar when it comes to our expectations of the conduct of those in political office?
South African citizens opted for a constitutional democracy because we want to aim high. We believed — and still do — that our country is capable of becoming a great society in every sense of that word. Ours was to be a place that would be known for its respect for human dignity, promotion of equality of all in the law and freedom for all. Invading the privacy of citizens to pursue party political interests goes against the very spirit of our freedom struggle and the ideals that so many of our heroes of the struggle fought and died for.
Abuse of intelligence services is a serious form of corruption and a wasteful expenditure of resources that should be building schools and homes, running efficient and effective health services and protecting citizens from crime. We as citizens need to stand firm against the erosion of our constitutional democracy and insist on holding those responsible accountable. Our society deserves better.
It is up to each one of us to stand together to defend and promote integrity in public service. It is in our hands to stop this abuse.
Source: Business Day
Showing posts with label Thabo Mbeki. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Thabo Mbeki. Show all posts
Tuesday, August 20, 2013
Tuesday, October 23, 2012
Failing to Protect the Poor against Crime
South Africa continues to be a hazardous place for the Black poor. You don’t have to be a Marikana mineworker to die a death that is undignified, if not brutal and terrifying. The daily security concerns of the majority have never been further from the minds of politicians, who are either gripped with Mangaung mania, or – in the case of the DA - feverishly plotting the jingles and publicity stunts that they think will win them another metro city in the 2014 elections. COPE’s only recent claim to fame is its elderly MP who tried to open an aeroplane door in mid-flight, later escaping with a slap on the wrist after successfully arguing (with the support of the DA) that the combination of one alcoholic drink and one sleeping tablet made him lose his senses.
You know you are living in the most unequal country in the world when the mayor of a major metropolitan city can issue a self-congratulatory press statement – as the DA’s Patricia de Lille did recently – about the installation of less than 30 high-mast lights to be spread across numerous unlit informal settlements.
It is well known that in Cape Town’s townships and informal settlements, street lighting is almost non-existent, and as a result, that crime is rife. The complaint has been raised by residents at nearly every community meeting for years, no matter who organized the meeting or what else the meeting was supposed to be about. The DA likes to claim that communities vandalise every street light that ever gets installed but the truth is that street lighting has hardly been installed in the informal settlements and light bulbs are never replaced in the townships street lights. In Cape Town’s white suburbs, on the other hand, the DA city administration will send technicians out at 10pm to fix a streetlight bulb that died the same evening.
It emerged in a recent City of Cape Town press statement that poor, Black areas are not set to receive proper street lighting anytime soon. The DA city is instead going to rely on national government’s urban settlement development grant to install four lights here and there over the next two years. While the cost of keeping the streetlights on in white suburbs is part of the city’s normal budget, lighting the Black areas depends on donations.
The DA has already claimed that it is powerless to protect poor people on the Cape Flats from being caught in the crossfire between warring gangs, and that only the army would be able to do this. But with the re-emergence of necklacing in Khayelitsha as a community response to crime, the recent killings of four Cape Town metro police in the townships and the increase in the number of young people involved in violent gangs, it is clear that the DA is powerless on many more fronts and that things are unravelling fast in the “mother city”.
The concentration of public funds on white suburbs means the different races live totally different lives. White Capetonians can expect to wake up on the weekend and buy some beers for the night without incident. But for the past two Christmases, Khayelitsha residents have reported that police of all the different forces set up ad-hoc roadblocks on the pavements and ask residents returning from the bottle stores to show receipts for the beer they have purchased. If the residents have failed to keep their slips, or never got one, they are knocked around a bit and their alcohol confiscated. This is nothing to do with drinking in public but happens to ordinary people walking home after shopping.
More disturbingly, Black township residents are increasingly being subjected to the sight of public group killings, which increase the fear and insecurity in those areas. Several Khayelitsha residents vented their shock on Facebook just this past weekend at seeing groups of 14 year old youths killing each other in Makhaza Park.
"The park is full...it's blood everywhere. These boys are carrying weapons I have never seen in (my) life. This is too painful to see. We have been calling the police over and over but they haven't come," wrote one person. She later posted an update that two police had arrived, watched for a while and then left. "These kids are continuing", her desperate update read. Less than two hours later, another update read: "Sad to say, we have lost two young boys and others are injured...am numb".
Such horrific practices would be unthinkable in one of Cape Town’s white suburban parks. But in the townships, the government has allowed these incidents to become part of "normal" life.
It was only last week that Cape Town’s largest shack area, the Enkanini informal settlement, was provided with 452 electricity points – for 11 000 homes. How 24 families are going to share one power point is a mystery. The DA says another 2000 electricity connections will be turned on before May 2013 but that the rest of the electricity will be installed in phases. It is still not clear whether every home will eventually have its own electricity point or not. This informal settlement is situated in a highly urbanised city, which recently won the title of “World Design Capital”, yet its high school only got electricity last week!
Townships in the rest of the country are equally under-developed and crime plagued. Rural areas are also experiencing a spike in crime. The situation will continue to worsen rapidly until the DA and ANC abandon their practice of maintaining the living areas set up by apartheid’s Group Areas Act.
Unfortunately, this is unlikely to happen. The parties are two sides of the same coin. The ANC’s outdated neo-liberal economic policies were drawn up by the same international economists who wrote the policies of the DA. Successive ministers of Finance have focussed for 18 years now on pumping billions in public funds into tax breaks and incentives for overseas investors to set up factories that have never materialised.
Former president Thabo Mbeki said last week in a speech at Fort Hare university that South Africa was progressing “towards a costly disaster”, and was in a “dangerous and unacceptable situation of directionless and unguided national drift”.
This is rich coming from someone who, when he was in power, oversaw the arms deal; withheld anti-retroviral treatment from thousands of women living with HIV; set up the practice of wasting hundreds of millions of rands in public funds on hiring useless consultants for local and national government, and started the now defunct practice of paying retention bonuses to parastatal managers.
After 18 years, the DA and ANC have missed all opportunities to end apartheid in South Africa and improve the lives of the Black majority. The rapidly worsening situation, where more and more Black people are living without water, electricity, houses and schools as if in 17th century England, won’t be alleviated by either the DA or ANC. Their time has past.
Majavu is a writer concentrating on the rights of workers, oppressed people, the environment, anti-militarism and what makes a better world. She is currently studying for a Masters Degree in New Zealand.
Source: by Anna Majavu: SACSIS
You know you are living in the most unequal country in the world when the mayor of a major metropolitan city can issue a self-congratulatory press statement – as the DA’s Patricia de Lille did recently – about the installation of less than 30 high-mast lights to be spread across numerous unlit informal settlements.
It is well known that in Cape Town’s townships and informal settlements, street lighting is almost non-existent, and as a result, that crime is rife. The complaint has been raised by residents at nearly every community meeting for years, no matter who organized the meeting or what else the meeting was supposed to be about. The DA likes to claim that communities vandalise every street light that ever gets installed but the truth is that street lighting has hardly been installed in the informal settlements and light bulbs are never replaced in the townships street lights. In Cape Town’s white suburbs, on the other hand, the DA city administration will send technicians out at 10pm to fix a streetlight bulb that died the same evening.
It emerged in a recent City of Cape Town press statement that poor, Black areas are not set to receive proper street lighting anytime soon. The DA city is instead going to rely on national government’s urban settlement development grant to install four lights here and there over the next two years. While the cost of keeping the streetlights on in white suburbs is part of the city’s normal budget, lighting the Black areas depends on donations.
The DA has already claimed that it is powerless to protect poor people on the Cape Flats from being caught in the crossfire between warring gangs, and that only the army would be able to do this. But with the re-emergence of necklacing in Khayelitsha as a community response to crime, the recent killings of four Cape Town metro police in the townships and the increase in the number of young people involved in violent gangs, it is clear that the DA is powerless on many more fronts and that things are unravelling fast in the “mother city”.
The concentration of public funds on white suburbs means the different races live totally different lives. White Capetonians can expect to wake up on the weekend and buy some beers for the night without incident. But for the past two Christmases, Khayelitsha residents have reported that police of all the different forces set up ad-hoc roadblocks on the pavements and ask residents returning from the bottle stores to show receipts for the beer they have purchased. If the residents have failed to keep their slips, or never got one, they are knocked around a bit and their alcohol confiscated. This is nothing to do with drinking in public but happens to ordinary people walking home after shopping.
More disturbingly, Black township residents are increasingly being subjected to the sight of public group killings, which increase the fear and insecurity in those areas. Several Khayelitsha residents vented their shock on Facebook just this past weekend at seeing groups of 14 year old youths killing each other in Makhaza Park.
"The park is full...it's blood everywhere. These boys are carrying weapons I have never seen in (my) life. This is too painful to see. We have been calling the police over and over but they haven't come," wrote one person. She later posted an update that two police had arrived, watched for a while and then left. "These kids are continuing", her desperate update read. Less than two hours later, another update read: "Sad to say, we have lost two young boys and others are injured...am numb".
Such horrific practices would be unthinkable in one of Cape Town’s white suburban parks. But in the townships, the government has allowed these incidents to become part of "normal" life.
It was only last week that Cape Town’s largest shack area, the Enkanini informal settlement, was provided with 452 electricity points – for 11 000 homes. How 24 families are going to share one power point is a mystery. The DA says another 2000 electricity connections will be turned on before May 2013 but that the rest of the electricity will be installed in phases. It is still not clear whether every home will eventually have its own electricity point or not. This informal settlement is situated in a highly urbanised city, which recently won the title of “World Design Capital”, yet its high school only got electricity last week!
Townships in the rest of the country are equally under-developed and crime plagued. Rural areas are also experiencing a spike in crime. The situation will continue to worsen rapidly until the DA and ANC abandon their practice of maintaining the living areas set up by apartheid’s Group Areas Act.
Unfortunately, this is unlikely to happen. The parties are two sides of the same coin. The ANC’s outdated neo-liberal economic policies were drawn up by the same international economists who wrote the policies of the DA. Successive ministers of Finance have focussed for 18 years now on pumping billions in public funds into tax breaks and incentives for overseas investors to set up factories that have never materialised.
Former president Thabo Mbeki said last week in a speech at Fort Hare university that South Africa was progressing “towards a costly disaster”, and was in a “dangerous and unacceptable situation of directionless and unguided national drift”.
This is rich coming from someone who, when he was in power, oversaw the arms deal; withheld anti-retroviral treatment from thousands of women living with HIV; set up the practice of wasting hundreds of millions of rands in public funds on hiring useless consultants for local and national government, and started the now defunct practice of paying retention bonuses to parastatal managers.
After 18 years, the DA and ANC have missed all opportunities to end apartheid in South Africa and improve the lives of the Black majority. The rapidly worsening situation, where more and more Black people are living without water, electricity, houses and schools as if in 17th century England, won’t be alleviated by either the DA or ANC. Their time has past.
Majavu is a writer concentrating on the rights of workers, oppressed people, the environment, anti-militarism and what makes a better world. She is currently studying for a Masters Degree in New Zealand.
Source: by Anna Majavu: SACSIS
Sunday, August 26, 2012
South Africa: Political Elites
Although change was evident at all levels of society as South Africa began to dismantle apartheid during the 1990s, particularly dramatic changes were occurring in the country's political and social leadership. Not only were new leaders emerging on the national level, but shifts were also occurring within political organizations, as new political expectations and aspirations arose and as new demands were placed on political leaders at all levels.
Since 1948 the country's governing class, the political elite, had been dominated by Afrikaners. Afrikaners held most high positions in government, including the legislature, the judiciary, the cabinet, and the senior ranks of the military and security services. Afrikaners also came to dominate the larger community of leaders, the power elite, by assuming important roles in the civil service bureaucracy, and to a lesser extent in business, the universities, and the media. Afrikaner dominance was reinforced by the rules of apartheid, in large part because the government's security and intelligence services helped to enforce the rules of apartheid through other institutions.
In general, during the apartheid era, English-speaking whites were less important in the political and power elites. They played only secondary roles in most areas of government. English speakers were, nevertheless, prominent in commerce and industry, where the Afrikaners' success had lagged behind their political achievements, as is explained by Thompson and Prior. By the 1980s, English-speaking whites also held important positions in universities and the media, and in a few areas of government.
In the early 1990s, these political and power elites were evolving, as is demonstrated in the authoritative survey of elites, Who's Who in South African Politics, by the South African writer Shelagh Gastrow. Gastrow divided South Africa's dominant political leaders into four major categories: political leaders within the Afrikaner community, most associated with the NP; an older generation of black opposition leaders, most within the ANC; a younger generation of leaders emerging from the Black Consciousness Movement; and a new group of labor leaders who had risen to prominence as the trade union movement strengthened during the 1970s and 1980s. A fifth category might be added--according to South African political scientist Roger Southall, who reviewed Gastrow's book--the small number of white political leaders who attempted to reshape white politics along nonracial, democratic lines.
A subsequent revised edition of Gastrow's book identified 118 individuals--110 men and only eight women--as constituting South Africa's evolving political elite in 1992. Among the obvious changes occurring at that time was the emergence of formerly imprisoned, exiled, or banned opposition leaders, who had been released from prison or had been legally recognized since early 1990. They could then be legally quoted in the country's media, and their ideas were being widely disseminated. In addition, new challengers arose to replace formerly entrenched leaders, especially conservative blacks, coloureds, and Indians who had gained office through various forms of state patronage in the black homelands or in other institutions of government.
Changes were also occurring within the senior ranks of the organizations from which the country's new leaders had emerged. As the ANC, for example, was forced to cooperate with former opponents, especially the NP, in pursuing national goals, new alliances and friendships were formed, shaped in part by a pragmatic appraisal of the political realities of the time. In addition, former opposition groups--especially the ANC--began to revise their rhetoric from that of guerrilla opponents of government, or "states in exile," to adapt to their new positions of responsibility. The ANC's best educated, skilled technocrats, capable of managing governmental and other bureaucracies, were gaining particular prominence.
At the same time, a greater distance was developing between these educated elites and the less educated rank-and-file within their own organizations. In particular, there was a growing distance between the ANC and its radical youth wing in late 1994 and 1995. There was also a growing distance between the ANC leadership and their former ally, the South African Communist Party (SACP). Ties between these two organizations had not only been close in the past; their membership and leadership rolls had overlapped.
In some cases, the new elites appeared to have more in common with members of rival political organizations than with their organization's own members. Several new government leaders, for example, were drawn from traditional African elites--royal families, chiefs, and influential clans. President Mandela, while a university-trained lawyer, is also a descendant of a leading family among the Thembu (Tembu), a Xhosa subgroup. Like Mandela, the prominent Zulu leader and minister of home affairs, Mangosuthu (Gatsha) Buthelezi, is university-educated and the product of aristocratic origins. Buthelezi, a member of the Zulu royal family, is also a chief within the Buthelezi sub-group (also, "tribe") of the Zulu.
Other members of South Africa's new government also represent ethnic elites. For example, the minister of public enterprises in 1995, Stella Sigcau, is the daughter of a well-known Pondo paramount chief, Botha Sigcau. Stella Sigcau also had served as chief minister in the Transkei government during the early 1980s.
Many former ANC officials who were in government office in the mid-1990s had worked to overcome factional differences based on ethnicity during the apartheid era. Although the ANC is often stereotyped as "Xhosa-dominated," and a number of its officers are Xhosa, several ethnic groups have been represented in the ANC's senior ranks. Thomas Nkobi, treasurer general from 1973 through the early 1990s, represents a subgroup within the Zimbabwe-based Shona people. Former Secretary General Cyril Ramaphosa and National Working Committee member Sydney Mufamadi are Venda (VaVenda--see Ethnic Groups and Language, ch. 2). Ramaphosa's former deputy, Jacob Zuma, is one of several Zulu leaders who rose to prominence within the ANC. The ANC's former security and intelligence specialist, Patrick "Terror" Lekota, and former MK leader Joe Modise are Sotho (BaSotho). Several popular regional leaders are Tswana (BaTswana). In general, these leaders have rejected arguments that favored the use of ethnicity to define political factions.
Age differences appeared more divisive than ethnicity within the ANC during the early and the mid-1990s. There were heated debates over questions of political succession, as the ANC's aging leaders--many over the age of seventy--faced challenges from the generations below them. Nelson Mandela was seventy-five years old when he was elected president in 1994, and several other ANC leaders were more than seventy years of age. Their most likely successors--especially Mbeki, Ramaphosa, Zuma, and the ANC's former director of intelligence, "Mac" Maharaj--were roughly two decades younger. Some of the ANC's younger militants threatened revolt against senior party figures in the early months of the new government, as their demands for jobs, homes, and improved living standards continued to be unmet. Criticism of the "older generation" was fueled in late 1994 and early 1995, when the president's former wife, Winnie Mandela, clashed with the government and was ousted as a deputy minister, as she championed the grievances of the ANC's militant youth.
As the apartheid system was being dismantled, some members of the Afrikaner elite in government, the civil service, and the security services reacted with impressive flexibility. By adapting quickly to the new environment, many of them not only retained their valued positions in the bureaucracy but also won new respect from former adversaries. As the ANC assumed responsibility for the security establishment, the police, and the intelligence services, ANC leaders were often able to work closely and cooperatively with Afrikaners who had once been so effective in excluding blacks from the political process.
The shift in power and influence among the country's political elites had begun well before the April 1994 elections. An important arena in which this power shift occurred was that of the political negotiations concerning the interim constitution of 1993. During those negotiations, as difficult and unpromising as they sometimes appeared, then-governing whites began, some for the first time, to view their black counterparts as legitimate partners in the decision-making process. At the same time, many black leaders adjusted smoothly to the new climate of political tolerance.
More about the Government of South Africa.
Source: U.S. Library of Congress
Since 1948 the country's governing class, the political elite, had been dominated by Afrikaners. Afrikaners held most high positions in government, including the legislature, the judiciary, the cabinet, and the senior ranks of the military and security services. Afrikaners also came to dominate the larger community of leaders, the power elite, by assuming important roles in the civil service bureaucracy, and to a lesser extent in business, the universities, and the media. Afrikaner dominance was reinforced by the rules of apartheid, in large part because the government's security and intelligence services helped to enforce the rules of apartheid through other institutions.
In general, during the apartheid era, English-speaking whites were less important in the political and power elites. They played only secondary roles in most areas of government. English speakers were, nevertheless, prominent in commerce and industry, where the Afrikaners' success had lagged behind their political achievements, as is explained by Thompson and Prior. By the 1980s, English-speaking whites also held important positions in universities and the media, and in a few areas of government.
In the early 1990s, these political and power elites were evolving, as is demonstrated in the authoritative survey of elites, Who's Who in South African Politics, by the South African writer Shelagh Gastrow. Gastrow divided South Africa's dominant political leaders into four major categories: political leaders within the Afrikaner community, most associated with the NP; an older generation of black opposition leaders, most within the ANC; a younger generation of leaders emerging from the Black Consciousness Movement; and a new group of labor leaders who had risen to prominence as the trade union movement strengthened during the 1970s and 1980s. A fifth category might be added--according to South African political scientist Roger Southall, who reviewed Gastrow's book--the small number of white political leaders who attempted to reshape white politics along nonracial, democratic lines.
A subsequent revised edition of Gastrow's book identified 118 individuals--110 men and only eight women--as constituting South Africa's evolving political elite in 1992. Among the obvious changes occurring at that time was the emergence of formerly imprisoned, exiled, or banned opposition leaders, who had been released from prison or had been legally recognized since early 1990. They could then be legally quoted in the country's media, and their ideas were being widely disseminated. In addition, new challengers arose to replace formerly entrenched leaders, especially conservative blacks, coloureds, and Indians who had gained office through various forms of state patronage in the black homelands or in other institutions of government.
Changes were also occurring within the senior ranks of the organizations from which the country's new leaders had emerged. As the ANC, for example, was forced to cooperate with former opponents, especially the NP, in pursuing national goals, new alliances and friendships were formed, shaped in part by a pragmatic appraisal of the political realities of the time. In addition, former opposition groups--especially the ANC--began to revise their rhetoric from that of guerrilla opponents of government, or "states in exile," to adapt to their new positions of responsibility. The ANC's best educated, skilled technocrats, capable of managing governmental and other bureaucracies, were gaining particular prominence.
At the same time, a greater distance was developing between these educated elites and the less educated rank-and-file within their own organizations. In particular, there was a growing distance between the ANC and its radical youth wing in late 1994 and 1995. There was also a growing distance between the ANC leadership and their former ally, the South African Communist Party (SACP). Ties between these two organizations had not only been close in the past; their membership and leadership rolls had overlapped.
In some cases, the new elites appeared to have more in common with members of rival political organizations than with their organization's own members. Several new government leaders, for example, were drawn from traditional African elites--royal families, chiefs, and influential clans. President Mandela, while a university-trained lawyer, is also a descendant of a leading family among the Thembu (Tembu), a Xhosa subgroup. Like Mandela, the prominent Zulu leader and minister of home affairs, Mangosuthu (Gatsha) Buthelezi, is university-educated and the product of aristocratic origins. Buthelezi, a member of the Zulu royal family, is also a chief within the Buthelezi sub-group (also, "tribe") of the Zulu.
Other members of South Africa's new government also represent ethnic elites. For example, the minister of public enterprises in 1995, Stella Sigcau, is the daughter of a well-known Pondo paramount chief, Botha Sigcau. Stella Sigcau also had served as chief minister in the Transkei government during the early 1980s.
Many former ANC officials who were in government office in the mid-1990s had worked to overcome factional differences based on ethnicity during the apartheid era. Although the ANC is often stereotyped as "Xhosa-dominated," and a number of its officers are Xhosa, several ethnic groups have been represented in the ANC's senior ranks. Thomas Nkobi, treasurer general from 1973 through the early 1990s, represents a subgroup within the Zimbabwe-based Shona people. Former Secretary General Cyril Ramaphosa and National Working Committee member Sydney Mufamadi are Venda (VaVenda--see Ethnic Groups and Language, ch. 2). Ramaphosa's former deputy, Jacob Zuma, is one of several Zulu leaders who rose to prominence within the ANC. The ANC's former security and intelligence specialist, Patrick "Terror" Lekota, and former MK leader Joe Modise are Sotho (BaSotho). Several popular regional leaders are Tswana (BaTswana). In general, these leaders have rejected arguments that favored the use of ethnicity to define political factions.
Age differences appeared more divisive than ethnicity within the ANC during the early and the mid-1990s. There were heated debates over questions of political succession, as the ANC's aging leaders--many over the age of seventy--faced challenges from the generations below them. Nelson Mandela was seventy-five years old when he was elected president in 1994, and several other ANC leaders were more than seventy years of age. Their most likely successors--especially Mbeki, Ramaphosa, Zuma, and the ANC's former director of intelligence, "Mac" Maharaj--were roughly two decades younger. Some of the ANC's younger militants threatened revolt against senior party figures in the early months of the new government, as their demands for jobs, homes, and improved living standards continued to be unmet. Criticism of the "older generation" was fueled in late 1994 and early 1995, when the president's former wife, Winnie Mandela, clashed with the government and was ousted as a deputy minister, as she championed the grievances of the ANC's militant youth.
As the apartheid system was being dismantled, some members of the Afrikaner elite in government, the civil service, and the security services reacted with impressive flexibility. By adapting quickly to the new environment, many of them not only retained their valued positions in the bureaucracy but also won new respect from former adversaries. As the ANC assumed responsibility for the security establishment, the police, and the intelligence services, ANC leaders were often able to work closely and cooperatively with Afrikaners who had once been so effective in excluding blacks from the political process.
The shift in power and influence among the country's political elites had begun well before the April 1994 elections. An important arena in which this power shift occurred was that of the political negotiations concerning the interim constitution of 1993. During those negotiations, as difficult and unpromising as they sometimes appeared, then-governing whites began, some for the first time, to view their black counterparts as legitimate partners in the decision-making process. At the same time, many black leaders adjusted smoothly to the new climate of political tolerance.
More about the Government of South Africa.
Source: U.S. Library of Congress
Friday, August 24, 2012
Politicking among police
Concerns over the politicisation of the criminal justice system were first raised over the Mbeki administration's investigation of Jacob Zuma.
Now, under a Zuma presidency, concern has congealed into dread as his appointments to the prosecution service have injected political poison into the state's most sensitive independent organs.
First came the appointment of the hopelessly compromised Menzi Simelane as national director of public prosecutions. Then came Willem Heath's return to the Special Investigating Unit. His political agenda was so transparent he blurted it out in the media and had to go.
Next was Lawrence Mrwebi, chosen to head the Specialised Commercial Crime unit. Mrwebi is a fallible man who had been deeply embroiled in efforts to shut down the Scorpions.
In December last year, when Simelane was beginning to test his leash, the Supreme Court of Appeal declared his appointment invalid, allowing Zuma to appoint a stand-in candidate arguably as deeply partial as Heath: Nomgcobo Jiba.
In 2007 Jiba was suspended for her role in trying to procure the arrest of then-Gauteng Scorpions boss Gerrie Nel. Richard Mdluli came to her defence, alleging she had been assisting police with an intelligence-driven investigation of the Scorpions. The justice minister weighed in to query her case and after Zuma took power she was reinstated.
Intelligence
Since December last year, Jiba and Mrwebi have acted like a tag team to take on politically sensitive cases. In the Mdluli case, Mrwebi ordered the withdrawal of fraud charges, relying, in part, on undisclosed "intelligence".
Jiba followed that punch with the suspension of prosecutor Glynnis Breytenbach, who wanted to pursue charges against Mdluli and was central to a politically sensitive investigation of alleged fraud in the acquisition of mining rights at Sishen. Next came the withdrawal of charges against Zuma backers and KwaZulu-Natal MECs Mike Mabuyakhulu and Peggy Nkonyeni in the "amigos" corruption case.
Today we report on further damaging allegations of Mrwebi's meddling in a case whose implications are as yet obscure. All we know is the man Mrwebi allegedly tried to protect is someone whose business it was to know the dirty secrets of the National Prosecuting Authority's provincial office.
The poison is now at the heart of the system.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Now, under a Zuma presidency, concern has congealed into dread as his appointments to the prosecution service have injected political poison into the state's most sensitive independent organs.
First came the appointment of the hopelessly compromised Menzi Simelane as national director of public prosecutions. Then came Willem Heath's return to the Special Investigating Unit. His political agenda was so transparent he blurted it out in the media and had to go.
Next was Lawrence Mrwebi, chosen to head the Specialised Commercial Crime unit. Mrwebi is a fallible man who had been deeply embroiled in efforts to shut down the Scorpions.
In December last year, when Simelane was beginning to test his leash, the Supreme Court of Appeal declared his appointment invalid, allowing Zuma to appoint a stand-in candidate arguably as deeply partial as Heath: Nomgcobo Jiba.
In 2007 Jiba was suspended for her role in trying to procure the arrest of then-Gauteng Scorpions boss Gerrie Nel. Richard Mdluli came to her defence, alleging she had been assisting police with an intelligence-driven investigation of the Scorpions. The justice minister weighed in to query her case and after Zuma took power she was reinstated.
Intelligence
Since December last year, Jiba and Mrwebi have acted like a tag team to take on politically sensitive cases. In the Mdluli case, Mrwebi ordered the withdrawal of fraud charges, relying, in part, on undisclosed "intelligence".
Jiba followed that punch with the suspension of prosecutor Glynnis Breytenbach, who wanted to pursue charges against Mdluli and was central to a politically sensitive investigation of alleged fraud in the acquisition of mining rights at Sishen. Next came the withdrawal of charges against Zuma backers and KwaZulu-Natal MECs Mike Mabuyakhulu and Peggy Nkonyeni in the "amigos" corruption case.
Today we report on further damaging allegations of Mrwebi's meddling in a case whose implications are as yet obscure. All we know is the man Mrwebi allegedly tried to protect is someone whose business it was to know the dirty secrets of the National Prosecuting Authority's provincial office.
The poison is now at the heart of the system.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Friday, July 20, 2012
Bridging the African Union's divides
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's success at the AU will be measured by her ability to gain consensus among heads of state, writes Liesl Louw-Vaudran.
When the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was trying to cajole the rest of Africa into accepting his grand idea of a United States of Africa, it was rumoured that he offered Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma the job of prime minister if she would back him. At the time she was South Africa’s minister of foreign affairs.
A lot has changed since that summit in Accra, Ghana, in 2007 when a number of smaller African states gave in to Gaddafi’s bullying and buying of votes. Yet Dlamini-Zuma was duly elected as chairperson of the African Union Commission by a majority of heads of state at its 19th summit in Addis Ababa on July 15.
In effect, she will be the prime minister of an institution that aims to be the continental decision-making body. Of course, things are complicated because she will not be reporting to one executive president but to 54, give or take a few, depending on how many coups there have been on the continent.
The way South Africa lobbied for votes since the last unsuccessful bid for the position in January will not make her job any easier. Some countries are accusing South Africa of using the same tactics of which Gaddafi was guilty.
When she takes up office in Addis Ababa in three months’ time, her first task will have to be an attempt at some radical improvements at the commission – an institution bogged down by inefficiency, understaffing and underspending. Only 52% of posts are filled and the average underspending is 37%.
On this score she will probably do very well, or at least better than her predecessors. Walking into the AU Commission cannot be much worse than walking into the portfolio of home affairs in 2009.
For a while, Addis Ababa has been considered by diplomats to be a hardship post – a perception reinforced by the strain of working in a country with terrible phone infrastructure, restrictive laws and very little to offer expats.
The Anglophone and Francophone divide at the commission is also a reality – the men in boubous (robes) do not sit at the same lunch table as the East Africans in suits – but she will be able to use her skills as a South African to convince bureaucrats from diverse backgrounds to work together.
Despite what the rulebooks say, she will probably have to define her role and relationship with the heads of state as things go along. This she has to do with the rotating head of state who gets the position of AU chairperson for a year – a title often confused with that of the commission chairperson. Benin’s President Yayi Boni has this job at the moment and is doing it relatively well, but sometimes the AU chair is largely symbolic, especially when it is occupied by leaders such as Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Obiang Nguema, who filled this post last year.
Following the extensive battle to get Dlamini-Zuma elected, many are claiming that she will raise the profile of the AU. Certainly the drama between her and her predecessor, Jean Ping, has captured imaginations, but it will take much more than this to restore the credibility of the commission and of the AU. This is true of the union’s image internationally and among ordinary Africans.
Dlamini-Zuma will have the power and influence of South Africa behind her, but it will not always be an advantage given South Africa’s much-criticised Africa policy. Ping, also a former foreign minister, was unable to get heads of state to agree on almost anything and was decried for being weak.
Still, heads of state are unclear about how much power the commission chairperson should have. Former Mali president Alpha Omar Konaré clashed with many of his peers when he had this position. After his term ended the commission chair was again occupied by a minister, just as it was during the time of the Organisation of African Unity.
Consequently, when half of Africa’s heads of state at last year’s summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, decided to recognise the fledgling Libyan National Transitional Council and the other half – led by South Africa – refused to do so, Ping could not do much about it. The AU’s road map for Libya was completely ignored by Nato – a huge embarrassment for Africa.
Earlier this year, when some agreed with Malawi’s president that the International Criminal Court arrest warrant against Omar al-Bashir of Sudan should be respected and the other half wanted the 19th AU summit (that just took place) to be moved to Addis Ababa, Africa again looked hopelessly divided.
These divisions and the stalemate that preceded Sunday’s election made some analysts fear a total breakdown of the institution. Some advised that the AU should abandon efforts to model itself on the European Union, but rather look at a loose structure, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, leaving integration up to the regions.
For now, the AU’s reputation has been salvaged and there is real hope for a more efficient commission with Dlamini-Zuma at the helm.
A huge advantage for her is that she knows the AU commission very well. After all, she helped to implement its constitutive act in the early years after its creation in 2002.
“Your foreign minister doesn’t take no for an answer,” I remember a West African foreign minister telling me at an AU summit in Addis Ababa in 2003. It was during a marathon session on getting a resolution on gender parity pushed through the agenda.
At the time Dlamini-Zuma showed the same unwavering determination and work ethic she has become known for at home. It was not unusual for the media to be called to press briefings by Dlamini-Zuma at 2am or 3am to explain the latest AU decisions.
Ten years after its creation, things at the AU have not moved as quickly as what she and Thabo Mbeki, then her commander in chief, had envisioned. Funding remains a huge problem. More than half ($160-million) of its budget of $275-million for 2012 is paid for by external partners, mostly the European Union. An audit of the commission finalised in 2007 recommended vast reforms of it, but little of this has been implemented by Dlamini-Zuma’s predecessor.
An efficient AU will hugely improve its relations with international donors, especially now that this kind of money is getting scarce. Real action in solving peace and security issues will also improve the AU’s standing in the eyes of its citizens. But achieving credibility and raising the profile of the AU will ultimately depend not on the commission chairperson, but on the quality of leadership in its member states.
Source: Mail & Guardian
When the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was trying to cajole the rest of Africa into accepting his grand idea of a United States of Africa, it was rumoured that he offered Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma the job of prime minister if she would back him. At the time she was South Africa’s minister of foreign affairs.
A lot has changed since that summit in Accra, Ghana, in 2007 when a number of smaller African states gave in to Gaddafi’s bullying and buying of votes. Yet Dlamini-Zuma was duly elected as chairperson of the African Union Commission by a majority of heads of state at its 19th summit in Addis Ababa on July 15.
In effect, she will be the prime minister of an institution that aims to be the continental decision-making body. Of course, things are complicated because she will not be reporting to one executive president but to 54, give or take a few, depending on how many coups there have been on the continent.
The way South Africa lobbied for votes since the last unsuccessful bid for the position in January will not make her job any easier. Some countries are accusing South Africa of using the same tactics of which Gaddafi was guilty.
When she takes up office in Addis Ababa in three months’ time, her first task will have to be an attempt at some radical improvements at the commission – an institution bogged down by inefficiency, understaffing and underspending. Only 52% of posts are filled and the average underspending is 37%.
On this score she will probably do very well, or at least better than her predecessors. Walking into the AU Commission cannot be much worse than walking into the portfolio of home affairs in 2009.
For a while, Addis Ababa has been considered by diplomats to be a hardship post – a perception reinforced by the strain of working in a country with terrible phone infrastructure, restrictive laws and very little to offer expats.
The Anglophone and Francophone divide at the commission is also a reality – the men in boubous (robes) do not sit at the same lunch table as the East Africans in suits – but she will be able to use her skills as a South African to convince bureaucrats from diverse backgrounds to work together.
Despite what the rulebooks say, she will probably have to define her role and relationship with the heads of state as things go along. This she has to do with the rotating head of state who gets the position of AU chairperson for a year – a title often confused with that of the commission chairperson. Benin’s President Yayi Boni has this job at the moment and is doing it relatively well, but sometimes the AU chair is largely symbolic, especially when it is occupied by leaders such as Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Obiang Nguema, who filled this post last year.
Following the extensive battle to get Dlamini-Zuma elected, many are claiming that she will raise the profile of the AU. Certainly the drama between her and her predecessor, Jean Ping, has captured imaginations, but it will take much more than this to restore the credibility of the commission and of the AU. This is true of the union’s image internationally and among ordinary Africans.
Dlamini-Zuma will have the power and influence of South Africa behind her, but it will not always be an advantage given South Africa’s much-criticised Africa policy. Ping, also a former foreign minister, was unable to get heads of state to agree on almost anything and was decried for being weak.
Still, heads of state are unclear about how much power the commission chairperson should have. Former Mali president Alpha Omar Konaré clashed with many of his peers when he had this position. After his term ended the commission chair was again occupied by a minister, just as it was during the time of the Organisation of African Unity.
Consequently, when half of Africa’s heads of state at last year’s summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, decided to recognise the fledgling Libyan National Transitional Council and the other half – led by South Africa – refused to do so, Ping could not do much about it. The AU’s road map for Libya was completely ignored by Nato – a huge embarrassment for Africa.
Earlier this year, when some agreed with Malawi’s president that the International Criminal Court arrest warrant against Omar al-Bashir of Sudan should be respected and the other half wanted the 19th AU summit (that just took place) to be moved to Addis Ababa, Africa again looked hopelessly divided.
These divisions and the stalemate that preceded Sunday’s election made some analysts fear a total breakdown of the institution. Some advised that the AU should abandon efforts to model itself on the European Union, but rather look at a loose structure, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, leaving integration up to the regions.
For now, the AU’s reputation has been salvaged and there is real hope for a more efficient commission with Dlamini-Zuma at the helm.
A huge advantage for her is that she knows the AU commission very well. After all, she helped to implement its constitutive act in the early years after its creation in 2002.
“Your foreign minister doesn’t take no for an answer,” I remember a West African foreign minister telling me at an AU summit in Addis Ababa in 2003. It was during a marathon session on getting a resolution on gender parity pushed through the agenda.
At the time Dlamini-Zuma showed the same unwavering determination and work ethic she has become known for at home. It was not unusual for the media to be called to press briefings by Dlamini-Zuma at 2am or 3am to explain the latest AU decisions.
Ten years after its creation, things at the AU have not moved as quickly as what she and Thabo Mbeki, then her commander in chief, had envisioned. Funding remains a huge problem. More than half ($160-million) of its budget of $275-million for 2012 is paid for by external partners, mostly the European Union. An audit of the commission finalised in 2007 recommended vast reforms of it, but little of this has been implemented by Dlamini-Zuma’s predecessor.
An efficient AU will hugely improve its relations with international donors, especially now that this kind of money is getting scarce. Real action in solving peace and security issues will also improve the AU’s standing in the eyes of its citizens. But achieving credibility and raising the profile of the AU will ultimately depend not on the commission chairperson, but on the quality of leadership in its member states.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Monday, July 9, 2012
When will the political interference stop?
After President John F Kennedy was assassinated, Malcolm X famously said that the assassination was a case of the “chickens coming home to roost,” adding that “chickens coming home to roost never did make me sad; they’ve always made me glad.” In other words, he was implying that since the white man had used violence so often and so easily in America (especially against black Americans), it was just cosmic balance that the President would become a victim of violence.
Well, the chickens are coming home to roost big time with regard to the on-going political manipulation and abuse of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) by various political factions within the ANC. When a perception takes hold that the NPA will prosecute some and avoid prosecuting others solely on the basis of their political connections or on the basis of whether they belong to the faction associated with the incumbent President or not, the credibility of that institution is fatally compromised.
When newspapers then report allegations of flagrant political interference in decisions to prosecute politically connected politicians (as the Mail & Guardian again did on Friday), few well-informed people will read such reports with scepticism. After all, we know that the NPA has often made decisions in the past based on political rather on legal considerations (including in the case relating to the prosecution of President Zuma and then later, the dropping of charges against President Zuma).
It was exactly to prevent this sorry state of affairs, that the drafters of our Constitution included a provision in section 179(4) of the Constitution which states that: “National legislation must ensure that the prosecuting authority exercises its functions without fear, favour or prejudice”. Of course, politicians, including then President Thabo Mbeki and now President Jacob Zuma, do not like to focus on this section of the Constitution, instead pointing to section 179(6) of the Constitution to justify direct interference in the decisions of the NPA. This section states that: “The cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice must exercise final responsibility over the prosecuting authority”.
What the politicians choose to ignore is the following.
The Constitutional Court, in the First Certification Judgment, confirmed that despite this strange provision about the Minister having to exercise final responsibility for the NPA, the Constitution created an independent body in the following terms:
[Section] 179(4) provides that the national legislation must ensure that the prosecuting authority exercises its functions without fear, favour or prejudice. There is accordingly a constitutional guarantee of independence, and any legislation or executive action inconsistent therewith would be subject to constitutional control by the courts.
The politicians also conveniently ignore the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), in which it dealt with the need for the NPA to be independent while also taking cognisance of the need for the Minister to take final responsibility for the NPA in the following terms:
[T]he Constitution on the one hand vests the prosecutorial responsibility in the NPA while, on the other, it provides that the Minister must exercise final responsibility over it. These provisions may appear to conflict but, as the Namibian Supreme Court held in relation to comparable provisions in its Constitution, they are not incompatible. It held (I am using terms that conform with our Constitution) that although the Minister may not instruct the NPA to prosecute or to decline to prosecute or to terminate a pending prosecution, the Minister is entitled to be kept informed in respect of all prosecutions initiated or to be initiated which might arouse public interest or involve important aspects of legal or prosecutorial authority.
That is why the NPA Act requires members of the prosecuting authority to serve “impartially” and exercise, carry out or perform their powers, duties and functions “in good faith and without fear, favour or prejudice” and subject only to the Constitution and the law. The Act further provides that no one may interfere “improperly” with the NPA in the performance of its duties and functions (in section 32(1)(b) of the Act).
The Act confirms that the manner in which the Minister exercises final responsibility over the NPA is by obliging the NDPP, at the request of the Minister, to furnish the latter with information or a report with regard to any case and to provide the Minister with reasons for any decision taken. The Minister can ask for information, but cannot give any instructions or make any requests regarding the prosecution or non-prosecution of anybody (unless, of course, the Minister is intent on committing a criminal offence by “improperly” trying to influence the NPA).
Of course, problems around political interference in the work of the NPA and the corrupt influence of political loyalties on NPA decisions arise not only when the Minister tries to issue illegal and criminal instructions to the NPA (as former Minister Bridget Mbandla did when she sent a letter – drafted by Menzi Simelane – to former head of the NPA, Vusi Pikoli to stop the arrest of a crook who also happened to be the Police Commissioner ), but also when members in leadership positions inside the NPA stop acting in good faith and instead make decisions based purely on their own political loyalties and self-interest.
When they are willing to do the bidding of their political masters without being instructed to do so, or when they improperly follow the hints or instructions of the Minister or other member of the relevant political faction inside the ANC, they destroy the credibility of the NPA and directly undermine the Rule of Law by creating a situation in which some criminals are above the law because of the political protection they enjoy.
The allegations in the Mail & Guardian regarding the interference in the “Three Amigo’s” case as well as the allegations tha5t the disciplinary charges were brought against prosecutor Glynnis Breytenbach for what appears to be her rather enthusiastic pursuit of the company owned by President Zuma’s financial benefactors, the Gupta’s, or because of her pursuit of that bastion of probity and honesty, Richard Mdluli, illustrate the dangers of the political “capturing of the NPA rather well.
Even if all these allegations are false, given the past abuse of the NPA many people will think them credible or even true. They will think it is true because the chickens have truly come home to roost for the politically much abused and subverted NPA. Who on earth is ever going to believe the protestations of the NPA that there is no political interference when there is such strong proof of on-going political interference at the NPA? I know, I won’t.
It is ironic that President Zuma, who complained bitterly about the abuse of the NPA by the Thabo Mbeki faction when he was facing corruption charges has overseen the further erosion of trust in this institution. I guess it was bad when the other guys were doing it, but now that he is in charge the principles are slightly different to suite the politics. But I guess he will only realise how the chickens have ccome home to roost if he loses his bid for another term as ANC and South African President and again faces the possibility of having to explain to a judge why he took a bribe from Schabir Shaik.
Source: Constitutionally Speaking
Well, the chickens are coming home to roost big time with regard to the on-going political manipulation and abuse of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) by various political factions within the ANC. When a perception takes hold that the NPA will prosecute some and avoid prosecuting others solely on the basis of their political connections or on the basis of whether they belong to the faction associated with the incumbent President or not, the credibility of that institution is fatally compromised.
When newspapers then report allegations of flagrant political interference in decisions to prosecute politically connected politicians (as the Mail & Guardian again did on Friday), few well-informed people will read such reports with scepticism. After all, we know that the NPA has often made decisions in the past based on political rather on legal considerations (including in the case relating to the prosecution of President Zuma and then later, the dropping of charges against President Zuma).
It was exactly to prevent this sorry state of affairs, that the drafters of our Constitution included a provision in section 179(4) of the Constitution which states that: “National legislation must ensure that the prosecuting authority exercises its functions without fear, favour or prejudice”. Of course, politicians, including then President Thabo Mbeki and now President Jacob Zuma, do not like to focus on this section of the Constitution, instead pointing to section 179(6) of the Constitution to justify direct interference in the decisions of the NPA. This section states that: “The cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice must exercise final responsibility over the prosecuting authority”.
What the politicians choose to ignore is the following.
The Constitutional Court, in the First Certification Judgment, confirmed that despite this strange provision about the Minister having to exercise final responsibility for the NPA, the Constitution created an independent body in the following terms:
[Section] 179(4) provides that the national legislation must ensure that the prosecuting authority exercises its functions without fear, favour or prejudice. There is accordingly a constitutional guarantee of independence, and any legislation or executive action inconsistent therewith would be subject to constitutional control by the courts.
The politicians also conveniently ignore the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), in which it dealt with the need for the NPA to be independent while also taking cognisance of the need for the Minister to take final responsibility for the NPA in the following terms:
[T]he Constitution on the one hand vests the prosecutorial responsibility in the NPA while, on the other, it provides that the Minister must exercise final responsibility over it. These provisions may appear to conflict but, as the Namibian Supreme Court held in relation to comparable provisions in its Constitution, they are not incompatible. It held (I am using terms that conform with our Constitution) that although the Minister may not instruct the NPA to prosecute or to decline to prosecute or to terminate a pending prosecution, the Minister is entitled to be kept informed in respect of all prosecutions initiated or to be initiated which might arouse public interest or involve important aspects of legal or prosecutorial authority.
That is why the NPA Act requires members of the prosecuting authority to serve “impartially” and exercise, carry out or perform their powers, duties and functions “in good faith and without fear, favour or prejudice” and subject only to the Constitution and the law. The Act further provides that no one may interfere “improperly” with the NPA in the performance of its duties and functions (in section 32(1)(b) of the Act).
The Act confirms that the manner in which the Minister exercises final responsibility over the NPA is by obliging the NDPP, at the request of the Minister, to furnish the latter with information or a report with regard to any case and to provide the Minister with reasons for any decision taken. The Minister can ask for information, but cannot give any instructions or make any requests regarding the prosecution or non-prosecution of anybody (unless, of course, the Minister is intent on committing a criminal offence by “improperly” trying to influence the NPA).
Of course, problems around political interference in the work of the NPA and the corrupt influence of political loyalties on NPA decisions arise not only when the Minister tries to issue illegal and criminal instructions to the NPA (as former Minister Bridget Mbandla did when she sent a letter – drafted by Menzi Simelane – to former head of the NPA, Vusi Pikoli to stop the arrest of a crook who also happened to be the Police Commissioner ), but also when members in leadership positions inside the NPA stop acting in good faith and instead make decisions based purely on their own political loyalties and self-interest.
When they are willing to do the bidding of their political masters without being instructed to do so, or when they improperly follow the hints or instructions of the Minister or other member of the relevant political faction inside the ANC, they destroy the credibility of the NPA and directly undermine the Rule of Law by creating a situation in which some criminals are above the law because of the political protection they enjoy.
The allegations in the Mail & Guardian regarding the interference in the “Three Amigo’s” case as well as the allegations tha5t the disciplinary charges were brought against prosecutor Glynnis Breytenbach for what appears to be her rather enthusiastic pursuit of the company owned by President Zuma’s financial benefactors, the Gupta’s, or because of her pursuit of that bastion of probity and honesty, Richard Mdluli, illustrate the dangers of the political “capturing of the NPA rather well.
Even if all these allegations are false, given the past abuse of the NPA many people will think them credible or even true. They will think it is true because the chickens have truly come home to roost for the politically much abused and subverted NPA. Who on earth is ever going to believe the protestations of the NPA that there is no political interference when there is such strong proof of on-going political interference at the NPA? I know, I won’t.
It is ironic that President Zuma, who complained bitterly about the abuse of the NPA by the Thabo Mbeki faction when he was facing corruption charges has overseen the further erosion of trust in this institution. I guess it was bad when the other guys were doing it, but now that he is in charge the principles are slightly different to suite the politics. But I guess he will only realise how the chickens have ccome home to roost if he loses his bid for another term as ANC and South African President and again faces the possibility of having to explain to a judge why he took a bribe from Schabir Shaik.
Source: Constitutionally Speaking
Thursday, April 19, 2012
How Poor Leadership Undermines the Work of the South African Police Service
The South African Constitution places the South African Police Service (SAPS) in the frontline against crime and obliges it ‘to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property.’ At one level, this has been taken seriously and in the last decade the SAPS has expanded to a huge organisation of more than 194 000 people, including approximately 160 000 trained police officials and around 34 000 civilian support staff. Its budget for 2012/13 is R62,5 billion, which represents 65,3% of the total criminal justice budget. However, in order for the police to be effective against crime, it has to ensure that the public has confidence in it. This will only occur if the SAPS leadership consists of men and women who are highly skilled professionals with the appropriate expertise and whose integrity is beyond reproach.
The question is whether the current state of leadership in the SAPS is able to ensure that the SAPS becomes the type of professional police agency that will be respected by all people.
There can be little doubt that the many examples of senior officers being implicated in criminal activity and corruption is eroding both public trust and police morale. Furthermore, it is demonstrative of the extent to which effective leadership is lacking in the SAPS. The leadership problem starts with who is appointed as the most senior and the most powerful police officer, the National Commissioner of Police. The previous national commissioner of the SAPS, Jackie Selebi, who had no experience in policing when he was appointed by then President Thabo Mbeki, made many poor decisions regarding the structure of the SAPS, for example closing down important specialised units. In 2010 he was convicted on a charge of corruption and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. In July 2009 Bheki Cele was appointed by President Jacob Zuma and like his predecessor, was not a career policeman, having previously served as a politician in the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government.
Cele soon gained media prominence more for his often tactless, and some may argue, irresponsible public utterances than for his police leadership qualities. In 2011 the South African Police Union (SAPU) publicly accused him of nepotism, after the appointment of close family members and friends to senior positions in the police. These allegations followed shortly after the release of the report by the Public Protector in February 2011 into alleged irregularities relating to the leasing of office accommodation for the SAPS. The Public Protector found, inter alia, that Cele’s conduct in this regard was ‘improper, unlawful and amounted to maladministration’. In October 2011, almost eight months after the release of the report, President Zuma announced Cele’s suspension and the appointment of a Board of Inquiry to investigate, amongst others, whether he acted ‘corruptly or dishonestly or with an undeclared conflict of interest in relation to the two leases (police offices in Pretoria and Durban). The Board concluded its inquiry in the first week of April 2012 and the country now waits for its findings into whether Cele is fit to hold the position of SAPS National Commissioner.
The consequences of poor choice of leadership in the SAPS over the years are becoming abundantly clear. Allegations of ongoing irregularities relating to the business of the SAPS’ Supply Chain Management prompted President Zuma to request the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) to investigate possible corruption in the allocation of contracts handled by this division in August 2010. This investigation is not yet concluded, but since it began its work, three generals connected to Supply Chain Management took early retirement and another is currently suspended.
The Crime Intelligence Division has also for many years been fraught with allegations and reports of criminal conduct and abuse of power. For example, Mulangi Mphego, head of the division during Selebi’s term of office, was accused of various unlawful activities such as interfering with a key state witness, Glen Agliotti, during Selebi’s corruption investigation. This led to criminal charges being laid against Mphego and his subsequent resignation in 2009.
He was succeeded by the now infamous Lieutenant General Richard Mdluli, who appears to be protected at the highest level given that criminal charges of murder and corruption have been controversially withdrawn in spite of a large amount of evidence against him. Additionally, investigations into a substantial number of separate allegations of Mdluli’s involvement in corruption into misuse of the SAPS Secret Service Account have inexplicably been shut down.
A further example of how poor leadership at the highest levels is undermining the SAPS can be found with the sudden closure of the apparently successful Cato Manor Organised Crime Unit in Durban in March 2012. Members of the Cato Manor Unit were as recently as February 2012 praised by a judge in the Pongola High Court for their professional work on the case involving the ‘KZN-26’ gang, notorious for cash-in-transit heists, robberies and murder. This followed sensational claims made by a police officer charged with corruption that the unit was operating as a ‘hit squad.’ The unit was quickly closed down without the allegations against its members being properly investigated first. Of concern was that a notice of intended suspension was served on the provincial Head of the Hawks, Major General Johan Booysen to whom they ultimately report
The closing down of the unit and attempts at suspending Booysen must be viewed against the background of corruption and fraud charges being investigated by the Hawks against a prominent Durban businessman, Thoshan Panday. According to media reports the corruption charge followed the alleged attempt by Panday and Colonel Navin Madhoe from the SAPS KwaZulu-Natal Supply Chain Management in Durban to bribe Booysen with R2 million to assist Panday with the withdrawal of the fraud charges against him. It has been reported that KwaZulu-Natal SAPS Provincial Commissioner Monnye Ngobeni, had tried to halt the investigation into Panday. She became a subject of the Hawks investigations after it emerged that Panday had paid for her husband’s birthday celebration. Interestingly, the NPA declined to prosecute her, alleging that there was ‘insufficient evidence’ to prove that there was corruption involved in her relationship with Panday. Furthermore, the Sunday Tribune reported a link between Edward Zuma, a son of President Zuma, and Thoshan Panday. Apparently, Edward Zuma unsuccessfully attempted to exert pressure on Booysen to release a R15 million payment that was allegedly owed to Zuma by Panday and had been frozen as part of a criminal investigation.
Booysen successfully fought his suspension by approaching the Labour Court, which ruled that he had been unfairly suspended. However, the court order was ignored by powerful figures in the SAPS who went ahead with the suspension regardless. Booysen was then forced to approach the Labour Court a second time to have the suspension overturned once again and is back at work but facing an uncertain future.
Ongoing problems at the highest levels of the SAPS are starting to take its toll on station level police men and women. On 10 April 2012 The Star published an article titled, ‘Stress, frustration, wreck police force’, that pointed out how allegations of mismanagement at the highest levels has tarnished the image of the police and how it complicates the lives of ordinary police members. The negative impact of bad leadership on the morale of police members cannot be separated. A police service suffering from poor leadership and low morale cannot effectively perform its mandate. The situation has clearly deteriorated to the point where the credibility of police leadership at both a political and operational level have been so severely undermined that external intervention is sorely needed. The Minister of Police who would ordinarily be responsible for addressing leadership problems, now stands accused of interfering to protect Mdluli while also irregularly benefiting from the Secret Service Account to the tune of R195 000 for renovations to his private residence and lying about it to the media.
The ISS reiterates its call for a judicial commission of inquiry with strong powers of investigation and subpoena and the necessary resources to allow it to independently and authoritatively probe the allegations of corruption, their underlying causes and then to make practical recommendations for corrective measures. It is unfair to expect the many hardworking, honest men and women in uniform to place their lives on the line when those at the helm of the organisation have lost credibility.
Source: ISS
The question is whether the current state of leadership in the SAPS is able to ensure that the SAPS becomes the type of professional police agency that will be respected by all people.
There can be little doubt that the many examples of senior officers being implicated in criminal activity and corruption is eroding both public trust and police morale. Furthermore, it is demonstrative of the extent to which effective leadership is lacking in the SAPS. The leadership problem starts with who is appointed as the most senior and the most powerful police officer, the National Commissioner of Police. The previous national commissioner of the SAPS, Jackie Selebi, who had no experience in policing when he was appointed by then President Thabo Mbeki, made many poor decisions regarding the structure of the SAPS, for example closing down important specialised units. In 2010 he was convicted on a charge of corruption and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. In July 2009 Bheki Cele was appointed by President Jacob Zuma and like his predecessor, was not a career policeman, having previously served as a politician in the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government.
Cele soon gained media prominence more for his often tactless, and some may argue, irresponsible public utterances than for his police leadership qualities. In 2011 the South African Police Union (SAPU) publicly accused him of nepotism, after the appointment of close family members and friends to senior positions in the police. These allegations followed shortly after the release of the report by the Public Protector in February 2011 into alleged irregularities relating to the leasing of office accommodation for the SAPS. The Public Protector found, inter alia, that Cele’s conduct in this regard was ‘improper, unlawful and amounted to maladministration’. In October 2011, almost eight months after the release of the report, President Zuma announced Cele’s suspension and the appointment of a Board of Inquiry to investigate, amongst others, whether he acted ‘corruptly or dishonestly or with an undeclared conflict of interest in relation to the two leases (police offices in Pretoria and Durban). The Board concluded its inquiry in the first week of April 2012 and the country now waits for its findings into whether Cele is fit to hold the position of SAPS National Commissioner.
The consequences of poor choice of leadership in the SAPS over the years are becoming abundantly clear. Allegations of ongoing irregularities relating to the business of the SAPS’ Supply Chain Management prompted President Zuma to request the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) to investigate possible corruption in the allocation of contracts handled by this division in August 2010. This investigation is not yet concluded, but since it began its work, three generals connected to Supply Chain Management took early retirement and another is currently suspended.
The Crime Intelligence Division has also for many years been fraught with allegations and reports of criminal conduct and abuse of power. For example, Mulangi Mphego, head of the division during Selebi’s term of office, was accused of various unlawful activities such as interfering with a key state witness, Glen Agliotti, during Selebi’s corruption investigation. This led to criminal charges being laid against Mphego and his subsequent resignation in 2009.
He was succeeded by the now infamous Lieutenant General Richard Mdluli, who appears to be protected at the highest level given that criminal charges of murder and corruption have been controversially withdrawn in spite of a large amount of evidence against him. Additionally, investigations into a substantial number of separate allegations of Mdluli’s involvement in corruption into misuse of the SAPS Secret Service Account have inexplicably been shut down.
A further example of how poor leadership at the highest levels is undermining the SAPS can be found with the sudden closure of the apparently successful Cato Manor Organised Crime Unit in Durban in March 2012. Members of the Cato Manor Unit were as recently as February 2012 praised by a judge in the Pongola High Court for their professional work on the case involving the ‘KZN-26’ gang, notorious for cash-in-transit heists, robberies and murder. This followed sensational claims made by a police officer charged with corruption that the unit was operating as a ‘hit squad.’ The unit was quickly closed down without the allegations against its members being properly investigated first. Of concern was that a notice of intended suspension was served on the provincial Head of the Hawks, Major General Johan Booysen to whom they ultimately report
The closing down of the unit and attempts at suspending Booysen must be viewed against the background of corruption and fraud charges being investigated by the Hawks against a prominent Durban businessman, Thoshan Panday. According to media reports the corruption charge followed the alleged attempt by Panday and Colonel Navin Madhoe from the SAPS KwaZulu-Natal Supply Chain Management in Durban to bribe Booysen with R2 million to assist Panday with the withdrawal of the fraud charges against him. It has been reported that KwaZulu-Natal SAPS Provincial Commissioner Monnye Ngobeni, had tried to halt the investigation into Panday. She became a subject of the Hawks investigations after it emerged that Panday had paid for her husband’s birthday celebration. Interestingly, the NPA declined to prosecute her, alleging that there was ‘insufficient evidence’ to prove that there was corruption involved in her relationship with Panday. Furthermore, the Sunday Tribune reported a link between Edward Zuma, a son of President Zuma, and Thoshan Panday. Apparently, Edward Zuma unsuccessfully attempted to exert pressure on Booysen to release a R15 million payment that was allegedly owed to Zuma by Panday and had been frozen as part of a criminal investigation.
Booysen successfully fought his suspension by approaching the Labour Court, which ruled that he had been unfairly suspended. However, the court order was ignored by powerful figures in the SAPS who went ahead with the suspension regardless. Booysen was then forced to approach the Labour Court a second time to have the suspension overturned once again and is back at work but facing an uncertain future.
Ongoing problems at the highest levels of the SAPS are starting to take its toll on station level police men and women. On 10 April 2012 The Star published an article titled, ‘Stress, frustration, wreck police force’, that pointed out how allegations of mismanagement at the highest levels has tarnished the image of the police and how it complicates the lives of ordinary police members. The negative impact of bad leadership on the morale of police members cannot be separated. A police service suffering from poor leadership and low morale cannot effectively perform its mandate. The situation has clearly deteriorated to the point where the credibility of police leadership at both a political and operational level have been so severely undermined that external intervention is sorely needed. The Minister of Police who would ordinarily be responsible for addressing leadership problems, now stands accused of interfering to protect Mdluli while also irregularly benefiting from the Secret Service Account to the tune of R195 000 for renovations to his private residence and lying about it to the media.
The ISS reiterates its call for a judicial commission of inquiry with strong powers of investigation and subpoena and the necessary resources to allow it to independently and authoritatively probe the allegations of corruption, their underlying causes and then to make practical recommendations for corrective measures. It is unfair to expect the many hardworking, honest men and women in uniform to place their lives on the line when those at the helm of the organisation have lost credibility.
Source: ISS
Wednesday, April 11, 2012
Crime Intelligence Head Saga Reveals a Growing Threat to the Rule of Law in South Africa
For the past few weeks, South Africans have been subjected to a number of disturbing media reports alleging political interference to cover up corruption affecting the highest levels of the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). That these ongoing allegations have not been dealt with in an accountable and transparent manner bodes badly for the future of the country’s criminal justice system. The saga of this disturbing episode also sheds light on the nature of an emerging threat to the rule of law in South Africa.
Two months after Jacob Zuma was sworn in as president of South Africa on 9 May 2009, Richard Mdluli, was appointed as the national Head of the SAPS Crime Intelligence Division in the post of a Lieutenant-General. This placed him in one of the most powerful positions in the SAPS allowing him to oversee and direct the state’s capacity to gather both real-time and historical information on virtually any individual in the country. It then emerged that Mdluli’s appointment had been irregular as it was the result of inappropriate political interference. The SAPS Act of 1995 (chapter 4, section 6) requires that the National Commissioner appoint the deputy national and divisional commissioners. However, then Acting National Commissioner at the time, Lieutenant-General Tim Williams, revealed that Mdluli, was appointed by a panel consisting solely of four cabinet members without any police officials or experts on crime intelligence being present.
The Mail and Guardian has reported that Mdluli was appointed to this position because he assisted President Jacob Zuma escape various criminal charges. In particular, Mduli was alleged to have played a key role in the illegal leaking of confidential crime intelligence tape recordings to Zuma’s criminal defence lawyers. The tapes purported to be of the then NPA’s Head of the Directorate of Special operations (also known as the Scorpions) Leonard McCarthy allegedly discussing when to reinstate charges of corruption, money laundering, fraud and racketeering against Zuma with the ex-head of the NPA Bulelani Nguka. These tapes were made while Mdluli was the head of SAPS Crime Intelligence in the Gauteng Province and was allegedly paying a leading role in a police campaign to derail the corruption investigation and prosecution against then SAPS National Commissioner, Jackie Selebi.
The tapes were later used by then acting National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) Mokotedi Mpshe to controversially withdraw 783 criminal charges against Zuma paving his way to assume the position of President of the Republic of South Africa. Zuma, through his spokesperson has denied that he had anything to do with the appointment of Mdluli.
During September of 2011, Mdluli was investigated by the elite Directorate of Priority Crime Investigations (also known as the Hawks) and charged with separate cases of murder and corruption. During his bail hearing Mdluli argued that the charges against him were motivated by a political conspiracy against him because he was seen as close to Zuma. To support this claim, he handed as evidence before the court a ‘ground intelligence report’, providing details about various senior ANC politicians. The report claimed that these leaders had held a meeting to discuss removing Zuma as party president at the upcoming 2012 ANC National Conference. Mdluli also handed to the court a letter he had written to Zuma requesting his assistance dated 11 November 2011, claiming that the criminal charges were as a result of a conspiracy against him by junior intelligence officers who had been aligned to previous president Thabo Mbeki.
The evidence before the court in Mdluli’s bail hearing, raises the concern that either most powerful SAPS Divisional Head or other officers were abusing their official police position and state resources with regards to internal matters of the ruling political party. A month after President Zuma received Mdluli’s letter, the NPA controversially withdrew the criminal charges against Mdluli and forwarded the docket to the Inspector General of Intelligence, Faith Radebe.
What made this a particularly controversial decision is that the NPA had commissioned an independent legal opinion, which found that there was sufficient evidence to criminally prosecute Mdluli. Moreover, the Mail and Guardian reported on a letter written by Radebe, on 19 March 2012 that stated, “We are of the opinion that the reasons advanced by the NPA in support of the withdrawal of the criminal charges are inaccurate and legally flawed. We therefore recommend that this matter be referred back to the NPA for the institution of criminal charges.”
The NPA refused to recharge Mdluli, stating that in their opinion there was insufficient evidence to charge him. This in spite of various recommendations to the contrary. Unfortunately, the NPA is already under a cloud following a range of controversial appointments to the senior echelons of the agency. The Supreme Court of Appeal unanimously ruled that President Zuma’s appointment of Menzi Simelane as the NDPP, was “irrational” considering the substantial evidence available that he was not a fit and proper person for this important position. Nevertheless, Zuma then appointed another tainted individual as the acting NDPP, Advocate Nomgcobo Jiba. Jiba’s credibility had been severely undermined following her suspension from the NPA pending a disciplinary hearing on charges of unprofessional conduct, dishonesty, fraud and bringing the NPA into disrepute in December 2007. This was in relation to her role in assisting the police obtain a warrant of arrest against Advocate Gerrie Nel, the lead prosecutor in the Selebi corruption case.
This attempt to interfere in the Selebi case was slammed by the High Court. Although suspended, Jiba had managed stay the disciplinary hearing against her by launching various court applications. During one of these legal challenges, Mduli had testified as a character witness on her behalf. Eventually, those leading the charges against her left the NPA and she was allowed to keep her job in a settlement in which she paid the NPAs costs. Current concerns about the credibility of the acting NDPP are that Jiba may feel a substantial degree of indebtedness to Zuma. Not only had Zuma overlooked Jiba’s chequered past when he appointed her to head the NPA, but he also used his presidential authority to expunge her husband’s, 2005 criminal conviction for stealing R193 000 from a clients trust while he was a practicing attorney.
In addition to the criminal charges against Mdluli, a subsequent separate internal SAPS Crime Intelligence investigation found evidence alleging that he was directly implicated in widespread theft and corruption involving the SAPS Secret Services Account. Allegations in the report included that Mdluli had irregularly employed at least 23 family members and friends, misused state vehicles, safe houses and state funds for his own benefit in addition to a range of other corrupt activities. Many were surprised when it was reported that the head of the Hawks, Lieutenant-General Anwar Dramat, had suddenly halted all criminal investigations into Mdluli and other members of the SAPS Crime Intelligence Division, allegedly on instruction from the current Acting National Commissioner, General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi.
The City Press then published a report alleging that Mkhwanazi had received an instruction from the Minister of Police Nathi Mthethwa, to cease all investigations into Mdluli and to reinstate him to the SAPS National Head of Crime Intelligence. This past weekend, the City Press reported that that the Minister of Police himself is alleged to have illegally benefited from the Secret Service Account which was used to pay for R195 500 worth of renovations to the Ministers private residence. The Minister has publicly denied all allegations and stated that he would be requesting that the Auditor-General investigate these allegations.
Richard Mdluli is now back in his post with a large number of serious allegations hanging over his head, and the heads of the NDPP and the Minister of Police. All processes to examine any evidence supporting the allegations in an open and accountable manner have been halted without adequate explanation. The only official statement from the SAPS is that this is an internal matter and no further comment will be forthcoming.
The many honest, hard working police men and women who place their lives on the line fighting crime need to trust that those leading them are beyond reproach. Similarly, those who take to the courts each day to prosecute criminals in the interest of justice need to feel pride in their institution and what it represents. The only way to sort through the various allegations affecting those that are meant to lead the criminal justice system is for an independent judicial commission of inquiry to test the evidence behind the allegations in a transparent and fair manner. In this way, those that may have abused their positions can be identified and measures taken to prevent reoccurrence. This will restore faith in the criminal justice system. However, if these allegations are left unchallenged it will severely damage public trust in those in charge of the criminal justice system, and then without a doubt, the principle of the rule of law in South Africa is in deep trouble.
Source: ISS
Two months after Jacob Zuma was sworn in as president of South Africa on 9 May 2009, Richard Mdluli, was appointed as the national Head of the SAPS Crime Intelligence Division in the post of a Lieutenant-General. This placed him in one of the most powerful positions in the SAPS allowing him to oversee and direct the state’s capacity to gather both real-time and historical information on virtually any individual in the country. It then emerged that Mdluli’s appointment had been irregular as it was the result of inappropriate political interference. The SAPS Act of 1995 (chapter 4, section 6) requires that the National Commissioner appoint the deputy national and divisional commissioners. However, then Acting National Commissioner at the time, Lieutenant-General Tim Williams, revealed that Mdluli, was appointed by a panel consisting solely of four cabinet members without any police officials or experts on crime intelligence being present.
The Mail and Guardian has reported that Mdluli was appointed to this position because he assisted President Jacob Zuma escape various criminal charges. In particular, Mduli was alleged to have played a key role in the illegal leaking of confidential crime intelligence tape recordings to Zuma’s criminal defence lawyers. The tapes purported to be of the then NPA’s Head of the Directorate of Special operations (also known as the Scorpions) Leonard McCarthy allegedly discussing when to reinstate charges of corruption, money laundering, fraud and racketeering against Zuma with the ex-head of the NPA Bulelani Nguka. These tapes were made while Mdluli was the head of SAPS Crime Intelligence in the Gauteng Province and was allegedly paying a leading role in a police campaign to derail the corruption investigation and prosecution against then SAPS National Commissioner, Jackie Selebi.
The tapes were later used by then acting National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) Mokotedi Mpshe to controversially withdraw 783 criminal charges against Zuma paving his way to assume the position of President of the Republic of South Africa. Zuma, through his spokesperson has denied that he had anything to do with the appointment of Mdluli.
During September of 2011, Mdluli was investigated by the elite Directorate of Priority Crime Investigations (also known as the Hawks) and charged with separate cases of murder and corruption. During his bail hearing Mdluli argued that the charges against him were motivated by a political conspiracy against him because he was seen as close to Zuma. To support this claim, he handed as evidence before the court a ‘ground intelligence report’, providing details about various senior ANC politicians. The report claimed that these leaders had held a meeting to discuss removing Zuma as party president at the upcoming 2012 ANC National Conference. Mdluli also handed to the court a letter he had written to Zuma requesting his assistance dated 11 November 2011, claiming that the criminal charges were as a result of a conspiracy against him by junior intelligence officers who had been aligned to previous president Thabo Mbeki.
The evidence before the court in Mdluli’s bail hearing, raises the concern that either most powerful SAPS Divisional Head or other officers were abusing their official police position and state resources with regards to internal matters of the ruling political party. A month after President Zuma received Mdluli’s letter, the NPA controversially withdrew the criminal charges against Mdluli and forwarded the docket to the Inspector General of Intelligence, Faith Radebe.
What made this a particularly controversial decision is that the NPA had commissioned an independent legal opinion, which found that there was sufficient evidence to criminally prosecute Mdluli. Moreover, the Mail and Guardian reported on a letter written by Radebe, on 19 March 2012 that stated, “We are of the opinion that the reasons advanced by the NPA in support of the withdrawal of the criminal charges are inaccurate and legally flawed. We therefore recommend that this matter be referred back to the NPA for the institution of criminal charges.”
The NPA refused to recharge Mdluli, stating that in their opinion there was insufficient evidence to charge him. This in spite of various recommendations to the contrary. Unfortunately, the NPA is already under a cloud following a range of controversial appointments to the senior echelons of the agency. The Supreme Court of Appeal unanimously ruled that President Zuma’s appointment of Menzi Simelane as the NDPP, was “irrational” considering the substantial evidence available that he was not a fit and proper person for this important position. Nevertheless, Zuma then appointed another tainted individual as the acting NDPP, Advocate Nomgcobo Jiba. Jiba’s credibility had been severely undermined following her suspension from the NPA pending a disciplinary hearing on charges of unprofessional conduct, dishonesty, fraud and bringing the NPA into disrepute in December 2007. This was in relation to her role in assisting the police obtain a warrant of arrest against Advocate Gerrie Nel, the lead prosecutor in the Selebi corruption case.
This attempt to interfere in the Selebi case was slammed by the High Court. Although suspended, Jiba had managed stay the disciplinary hearing against her by launching various court applications. During one of these legal challenges, Mduli had testified as a character witness on her behalf. Eventually, those leading the charges against her left the NPA and she was allowed to keep her job in a settlement in which she paid the NPAs costs. Current concerns about the credibility of the acting NDPP are that Jiba may feel a substantial degree of indebtedness to Zuma. Not only had Zuma overlooked Jiba’s chequered past when he appointed her to head the NPA, but he also used his presidential authority to expunge her husband’s, 2005 criminal conviction for stealing R193 000 from a clients trust while he was a practicing attorney.
In addition to the criminal charges against Mdluli, a subsequent separate internal SAPS Crime Intelligence investigation found evidence alleging that he was directly implicated in widespread theft and corruption involving the SAPS Secret Services Account. Allegations in the report included that Mdluli had irregularly employed at least 23 family members and friends, misused state vehicles, safe houses and state funds for his own benefit in addition to a range of other corrupt activities. Many were surprised when it was reported that the head of the Hawks, Lieutenant-General Anwar Dramat, had suddenly halted all criminal investigations into Mdluli and other members of the SAPS Crime Intelligence Division, allegedly on instruction from the current Acting National Commissioner, General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi.
The City Press then published a report alleging that Mkhwanazi had received an instruction from the Minister of Police Nathi Mthethwa, to cease all investigations into Mdluli and to reinstate him to the SAPS National Head of Crime Intelligence. This past weekend, the City Press reported that that the Minister of Police himself is alleged to have illegally benefited from the Secret Service Account which was used to pay for R195 500 worth of renovations to the Ministers private residence. The Minister has publicly denied all allegations and stated that he would be requesting that the Auditor-General investigate these allegations.
Richard Mdluli is now back in his post with a large number of serious allegations hanging over his head, and the heads of the NDPP and the Minister of Police. All processes to examine any evidence supporting the allegations in an open and accountable manner have been halted without adequate explanation. The only official statement from the SAPS is that this is an internal matter and no further comment will be forthcoming.
The many honest, hard working police men and women who place their lives on the line fighting crime need to trust that those leading them are beyond reproach. Similarly, those who take to the courts each day to prosecute criminals in the interest of justice need to feel pride in their institution and what it represents. The only way to sort through the various allegations affecting those that are meant to lead the criminal justice system is for an independent judicial commission of inquiry to test the evidence behind the allegations in a transparent and fair manner. In this way, those that may have abused their positions can be identified and measures taken to prevent reoccurrence. This will restore faith in the criminal justice system. However, if these allegations are left unchallenged it will severely damage public trust in those in charge of the criminal justice system, and then without a doubt, the principle of the rule of law in South Africa is in deep trouble.
Source: ISS
Tuesday, March 20, 2012
SCA orders NPA to hand over record of Zuma charges
The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld an attempt by the Democratic Alliance on Tuesday for access to the records that led to the suspension of criminal charges against President Jacob Zuma in 2009. The DA wanted a review of the decision, by then acting National Director of Public Prosecutions Mokotedi Mpshe, to drop charges against Zuma before he was elected president. The DA had called on the National Prosecuting Authority to produce the record of proceedings that led to the decision.
The court held that Mpshe's decision on April 6 2009, to discontinue the prosecution of Zuma on corruption charges, would be subject to review. The SCA ruled that Mpshe should hand over the record to the registrar of the Supreme Court of Appeal within 14 days. The record should, however, exclude written representations made on behalf of Zuma and any consequent memoranda or reports prepared in response, or oral representations, if their production would breach confidentiality agreements.
The SCA further held that the record should consist of the documents and material relevant to the review, including those before Mpshe when he made his decision. NPA spokesperson Mthunzi Mhaga said it would study the judgment to determine the next legal steps. "We wish to state that we still stand by advocate Mpshe's decision and remind all that these were preliminary issues with no direct impact on his decision not to prosecute."
In 2009, Mpshe halted Zuma's prosecution on fraud and corruption charges. At the time, the NPA said it was "neither possible nor desirable" to continue with the prosecution citing an "abuse of process". Mpshe pointed to telephone recordings between former NPA head Bulelani Ngcuka and former head of the Directorate of Special Operations Leonard McCarthy, discussing the timing of recharging Zuma. The conversations allegedly took place shortly before the ANC's historic Polokwane elective conference in December 2007, where Zuma defeated Thabo Mbeki in the race for the party's presidency. As such, the case against Zuma was deemed to be politically motivated. "It's not so much the prosecution itself but the legal process that is tainted," Mpshe said at the time.
However, the DA argued that the decision was unconstitutional and invalid and wants the charges to be revisited. When the matter went before the SCA, constitutional and legal expert Pierre de Vos told the Mail & Guardian that even if the SCA ruled in the DA's favour, it would be a long road for the opposition to follow if they decide to pursue the matter. "There is no law stating a person facing criminal charges can't become president, so Zuma's presidency can't immediately be threatened. It will also take a long time for before anything substantive comes of this as the SCA will send this back to the high court and the case could be delayed until it is no longer relevant," said De Vos.
However, the DA said at the time that its case was not only about challenging Zuma's fitness for office but also upholding the independence of the NPA and the judiciary as a whole.
Source: Mail & Guardian
The court held that Mpshe's decision on April 6 2009, to discontinue the prosecution of Zuma on corruption charges, would be subject to review. The SCA ruled that Mpshe should hand over the record to the registrar of the Supreme Court of Appeal within 14 days. The record should, however, exclude written representations made on behalf of Zuma and any consequent memoranda or reports prepared in response, or oral representations, if their production would breach confidentiality agreements.
The SCA further held that the record should consist of the documents and material relevant to the review, including those before Mpshe when he made his decision. NPA spokesperson Mthunzi Mhaga said it would study the judgment to determine the next legal steps. "We wish to state that we still stand by advocate Mpshe's decision and remind all that these were preliminary issues with no direct impact on his decision not to prosecute."
In 2009, Mpshe halted Zuma's prosecution on fraud and corruption charges. At the time, the NPA said it was "neither possible nor desirable" to continue with the prosecution citing an "abuse of process". Mpshe pointed to telephone recordings between former NPA head Bulelani Ngcuka and former head of the Directorate of Special Operations Leonard McCarthy, discussing the timing of recharging Zuma. The conversations allegedly took place shortly before the ANC's historic Polokwane elective conference in December 2007, where Zuma defeated Thabo Mbeki in the race for the party's presidency. As such, the case against Zuma was deemed to be politically motivated. "It's not so much the prosecution itself but the legal process that is tainted," Mpshe said at the time.
However, the DA argued that the decision was unconstitutional and invalid and wants the charges to be revisited. When the matter went before the SCA, constitutional and legal expert Pierre de Vos told the Mail & Guardian that even if the SCA ruled in the DA's favour, it would be a long road for the opposition to follow if they decide to pursue the matter. "There is no law stating a person facing criminal charges can't become president, so Zuma's presidency can't immediately be threatened. It will also take a long time for before anything substantive comes of this as the SCA will send this back to the high court and the case could be delayed until it is no longer relevant," said De Vos.
However, the DA said at the time that its case was not only about challenging Zuma's fitness for office but also upholding the independence of the NPA and the judiciary as a whole.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Sunday, February 19, 2012
Mbeki: $50-billion illegally exported from Africa annually
An estimated $50-billion is exported out of the African continent illegally every year, former president Thabo Mbeki said on Saturday. "This money is exported illegally instead of being invested in the continent," he said. Mbeki was speaking at the launch of a United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (Uneca) high level panel in Johannesburg. The panel, chaired by Mbeki, would investigate illicit and financial flows of finance out of the continent.
Mbeki said the loss needed to be addressed before it undermined the prospect of Africa's development. "Almost $25-billion comes in to the continent. That means it loses twice the capital it receives in financial assistance," he said. "The panel will study the flow of money and understand how it is done. The African continent will expect the panel to provide practical measures to stop the flow." He said it would take a year for the panel to complete its investigation. "This is a matter of vital importance to the continent. In the end [the investigation] should result in action taken by the continent and individual countries," he said. "As a panel, we have no punitive measures. The panel will make proposals to those with punitive power and explain how it [the flow of money] is done."
He said the panel would provide sufficient information about the different methods of the outflow. This would include over-invoicing and under-pricing of exports and money laundering strategies.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Mbeki said the loss needed to be addressed before it undermined the prospect of Africa's development. "Almost $25-billion comes in to the continent. That means it loses twice the capital it receives in financial assistance," he said. "The panel will study the flow of money and understand how it is done. The African continent will expect the panel to provide practical measures to stop the flow." He said it would take a year for the panel to complete its investigation. "This is a matter of vital importance to the continent. In the end [the investigation] should result in action taken by the continent and individual countries," he said. "As a panel, we have no punitive measures. The panel will make proposals to those with punitive power and explain how it [the flow of money] is done."
He said the panel would provide sufficient information about the different methods of the outflow. This would include over-invoicing and under-pricing of exports and money laundering strategies.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Saturday, February 18, 2012
Zuma 'disconnected from reality' on corruption: DA
President Jacob Zuma's remarks about corruption show he is "completely disconnected from reality", the Democratic Alliance says.In his reply on Thursday to debate on his state of the nation address, Zuma said "most of the corruption you read about in the media is exposed as a result of the work of government and its agencies", DA spokesman Dion George said. "These are the words of a president who is completely disconnected from reality."
South Africa's major corruption scandals had not been broken by government, but by the media, and the opposition. These included the arms deal, to which former president Thabo Mbeki, Zuma, and then defence minister Joe Modise were all linked, he said. Another was the so-called travelgate scandal, involving a number of high ranking ANC MPs misusing parliamentary travel vouchers. George said others included the so-called oilgate scandal, which traced the involvement of an ANC-linked company in diverting money from a state contract to the coffers of the ANC. There was also the SA Police Service lease scandal, in which former public works minister Gwen-Mahlangu Nkabinde and suspended national police commissioner Bheki Cele were involved. Another was the Chancellor House/Hitachi controversy, which saw the ANC's front company landing lucrative contracts with the state.
"Nowhere is the government's attitude towards exposing corruption more clear than in its determination to see the Protection of State Information Bill pushed through Parliament in its current form," George said. Should this law be passed, journalists and whistle-blowers who reported on what government deemed secret would face up to 25 years in prison. It would be illegal to expose corruption and serious crime and the poorest of the poor would continue to lose out as government resources were redirected away from service delivery. "Government is not the last line of defence against corruption. The media and the opposition are."
This was why the DA continued to fight against the bill as it currently stood, and would fight for a strengthened public interest override to ensure that ordinary citizens and the media retained the right to know, George said. On Thursday, Zuma told the National Assembly South Africa was the only country with a "programme" to fight corruption. Zuma said it was "important to emphasise that most of the corruption you read about in the media is exposed as a result of the work of government and its agencies".
Amid laughter from opposition benches, he continued: "What we should remember is that South Africa is the only country that has a programme to fight corruption. It's not being fought anywhere else."
Source: Times Live
South Africa's major corruption scandals had not been broken by government, but by the media, and the opposition. These included the arms deal, to which former president Thabo Mbeki, Zuma, and then defence minister Joe Modise were all linked, he said. Another was the so-called travelgate scandal, involving a number of high ranking ANC MPs misusing parliamentary travel vouchers. George said others included the so-called oilgate scandal, which traced the involvement of an ANC-linked company in diverting money from a state contract to the coffers of the ANC. There was also the SA Police Service lease scandal, in which former public works minister Gwen-Mahlangu Nkabinde and suspended national police commissioner Bheki Cele were involved. Another was the Chancellor House/Hitachi controversy, which saw the ANC's front company landing lucrative contracts with the state.
"Nowhere is the government's attitude towards exposing corruption more clear than in its determination to see the Protection of State Information Bill pushed through Parliament in its current form," George said. Should this law be passed, journalists and whistle-blowers who reported on what government deemed secret would face up to 25 years in prison. It would be illegal to expose corruption and serious crime and the poorest of the poor would continue to lose out as government resources were redirected away from service delivery. "Government is not the last line of defence against corruption. The media and the opposition are."
This was why the DA continued to fight against the bill as it currently stood, and would fight for a strengthened public interest override to ensure that ordinary citizens and the media retained the right to know, George said. On Thursday, Zuma told the National Assembly South Africa was the only country with a "programme" to fight corruption. Zuma said it was "important to emphasise that most of the corruption you read about in the media is exposed as a result of the work of government and its agencies".
Amid laughter from opposition benches, he continued: "What we should remember is that South Africa is the only country that has a programme to fight corruption. It's not being fought anywhere else."
Source: Times Live
Tuesday, February 14, 2012
Let justice, fairness be our guide
We should make sure that even if the ANC does not give President Jacob Zuma a second party term in December, the party should under no circumstances be allowed to cut short his presidency. As torturous as this might be, principle should trounce passions. In the past week, the demise of ANC Youth League president Julius Malema was widely celebrated. When ANC bigwig Cyril Ramaphosa - who chairs the party's national disciplinary committee of appeals - confirmed the youth leader's guilt and sentence on Saturday, there was a collective sigh of relief from Constantia to Khutsong. Finally, the Mario Balotelli of our politics had been red-carded. One might argue that this was rightly so.
Like Mbeki, Malema has done a lot of harm to the country. It is therefore easy to understand why we are all inclined to ululate as he is blindfolded and led to the raised platform where he will hang until his neck breaks. Except for the fact that he swears by the skull and crossbones that symbolise the venerable 75-year-old South African institution called Orlando Pirates, Malema has no saving graces.
I had hoped against all hope that the honourable men and women on the ANC's appeals committee would rise above self-interest politics and allow their integrity to dictate their decision-making. At this juncture, as the comrades are wont to say, we should pause and ask ourselves if it is right and proper that Malema should be executed in this fashion for the sake of political expediency.
No doubt the country will be a much better place without Malema on newspaper front pages and at the top of broadcast bulletins every other day. His divisive verbosity will not be missed. Investors will nod. Ministers and policy-makers will no longer have to waste their breath explaining that nationalisation is not official policy but one young man's thoughts in the bath. Minority interest groups will have to find a new bogey. Farmers will not see Robert Mugabe on their doorsteps. The cantankerous chief from Ulundi will be less concerned that his grandchildren will be recruited into the ANC against his will. Hellen Zille and Lindiwe Mazibuko will be subjected to fewer insults. Mazibuko can make her tea and Zille can inject herself with botox with gay abandon. South Africans will not be subjected to to the sewer rhetoric that Malema had reduced political discourse to. Most crucially, Zuma's re-election strategists will sleep easier and plan better for the ANC's Mangaung elective conference. (That is all, of course, assuming that Malema is finished, which is far from conclusive at this point. Like Mgqumeni of Nquthu, Malema might rise from the dead and wow the masses again.)
But is the imminent execution right and proper? Is the elevation of political short-term gain above principle the right thing for a country that is trying to deepen and entrench a democratic culture? This lowly newspaperman thinks not.
Let's just take a cold look at the sins Malema is said to have committed against the ANC. As leader of the ANC Youth League, he led the charge against Botswana's governing party. He called for regime change in that country, labelling Ian Khama's government a puppet of Western imperialism. He did not call for a military overthrow of the government, but rather the unification of opposition forces for the democratic removal of the Botswana Democratic Party. By the way the "D" part of the party's name is almost as appropriate as North Korea's depiction of itself as democratic.
Now many in the ANC - including the secretary-general, members of the national executive and officials of other party structures - have pronounced themselves on foreign policy issues. Be it Zimbabwe, Israel, Swaziland or Tibet, we have heard differing views from individual members of the ANC leadership. Having read the national disciplinary committee's reasoning on the matter, I am still none the wiser as to why Botswana should be a holy cow, other than the fact that it has more cattle than human beings in its sovereign territory.
Malema's other serious offence was the unfavourable comparison of Zuma's leadership to that of Mbeki. Now what, pray thee, is the crime comparing the talents of the country's leaders? How are we to grow if we do not publicly share our views on the respective qualities of those who lead us? It would be a travesty if we were to create a culture where South Africans - and ANC functionaries in particular - were not able to evaluate the contribution of leaders to the development of our republic and our world. There were many other pots, spoons and saucers (euphimistically known as charges) thrown at Malema during a process in which the kangaroo court label can be deemed apt. It is a process that, as much as we may resent Malema, we will live to regret.
Rather than rushing to execute Malema, the ANC and the country should take some lessons from his rise and fall. In the rise of Malema, we should take care not to empower a demagogue to occupy centre stage in our discourse. Malema the hero and Malema the ogre were not the creation of the media and the South African public. The ANC gave birth to him, fattened him and unleashed him on an unsuspecting nation. It suited Zuma and his leadership to have an uncontrollable bloodhound to take on their opponents and external opponents. He was empowered to be the Malema that he was. The more despicable he became the more useful he was. Not once did the ANC give a care about the negative effect he was having on our body politic or the damage he was doing to our international standing. In its centenary introspections, the ANC should give careful thought to how it creates and nurtures monsters such as Malema.
Those outside the ANC should also think about how we deal with the monsters that the governing party creates. Do we empower the monsters by demonising and fearing them? Do we in the media give undue attention to the monsters that the ANC or any other societal force creates? Do we have a choice? Having done so, the ANC and the country should think seriously about the place of principle in our public discourse and the conduct of our politics.
We should make sure that no matter how much we resent, hate and fear an individual, these emotions should never compromise our commitment to justice and fairness.
Principle should always be our guide. Yesterday it was Mbeki. Today it is Malema. Tomorrow? ...
Written by Mondli Makhanya, editor-in-chief of Avusa Media newspapers
Source: The Sowetan
Monday, February 6, 2012
Malema verdict might not be something to celebrate
It is understandable that members of the chattering classes as well as other members of the public (including many rank and file members of the ANC yearning for a, perhaps mythical, simpler time when ANC Youth League members behaved properly and listened to their elders) on Saturday applauded the verdict of the ANC National Disciplinary Committee of Appeal (NDCA) which confirmed the guilty verdict against Julius Malema.
It could not have hurt that the verdict was delivered by a confident and in charge Cyril Ramaphosa, who reminded us again why so many of us have regretted the fact that he lost out to Thabo Mbeki when Mandela’s ANC had to appoint a Deputy President and why some of us still wistfully wonder what might have been if he had become our President instead of either Thabo Mbeki or Jacob Zuma.
Although some newspaper editors might miss Malema (given the fact that he has the ability to make news and sell newspapers), most of us might feel slightly relieved that this hypocritical demagogue has been dealt with so effectively and seemingly so decisively by the ANC senior leadership.
Yet, there is something about the way in which Jacob Zuma and Gwede Mantashe managed to clip Malema’s wings that sits uneasy with me. If they could do it to him, I wonder, could they do it to anyone else – including every single one of us who are members of the chattering classes and sometimes mock or criticise our dancing and singing President and every single ANC member who fails to toe the party line or who speaks out against the abuse of power or incompetence by some members of the leadership?
Is there not just a whiff of Stalinism about the way in which Zuma and Matashe got rid of a political enemy? Can we expect the pictures to be airbrushed next so that Malema will disappear completely from official ANC history?
Recall that Malema was convicted on three charges, two of them having been confirmed by the NDCA. First, he was convicted of contravening Rule 25.5 (1) of the ANC Constitution “by behaving in such a way as to provoke serious divisions or a breakdown of unity in the organisation”. His sin was that he addressed a press conference on 31 July 2011 at the conclusion of an ANC Youth League NEC meeting where he said amongst other things “in the past we know President Mbeki used that agenda very well …. The African agenda is no longer a priority and we think that there is a temptation by the coloniser and the imperialist to want to recolonise Africa in a different but sophisticated way and President Mbeki stood directly opposed to that type of conduct.”
The NDC found that through his utterances Malema sought to portray the ANC government and its leadership under President Zuma in a negative light which therefore had the potential to sow division and disunity in the ANC. The NDCA confirmed the reasoning of the NDC. The implications of this verdict are rather stark. Any ANC member who now suggests that an out of favour former President may have done some good and that he might have been better than an incumbent leader can now be kicked out of the Party for contravening Rule 25.5(1). If this principle had been applied consistently in the past, Mbeki would have been able to get rid of Zuma and most of his opponents long before the votes were counted at Polokwane. To his credit, he never used such tactics against them.
The verdict comes perilously close to suggesting that no ANC member will henceforth be allowed ever to criticise the incumbent ANC leadership in public. This is a rather handy precedent to set if one intends to stand for a second (or third) term in office or if one wishes to “manage” future leadership elections. To my mind the ruling on this point seems profoundly undemocratic and deeply dangerous and both ANC members and other members of the public should feel more than a bit worried about this move. One should not confuse approval for the outcome of this case (silencing Malema) with what is good for the ANC and South Africa and if one does, one underestimates the possible ruthlessness of the current bunch of ANC leaders aiming to secure a second term for themselves at Mangaung.
Malema was also convicted of contravening Rule 25.5 (c) of the Constitution of the ANC by behaving in such a way as to bring the organisation into disrepute. This was done for ostensibly slightly more plausible reasons, namely because he addressed a press conference on 31 July 2011 by making announcements amongst others:
* That the Botswana leadership of government poses a serious threat to Africa so we need a progressive government in Botswana;
* We are not going to sit with neighbours that conduct themselves like that. Botswana is in full co-operation with imperialists and the government is undermining the African agenda;
* The ANC Youth League would establish a Botswana Command Team which would work towards uniting all opposition forces in Botswana to oppose the puppet regime of Botswana led by the Botswana Democratic Party.
Now, imagine, for a moment that the statement did not relate to Botswana but to Zimbabwe and that Zwelenzima Vavi had made it and not Malema. Imagine Vavi had said that Robert Mugabe and his Zanu-PF had ruined Zimbabwe and that Cosatu would mobilise ANC members to oppose the murderous regime in Zimbabwe and to unite opposition forces in that country to try and oust Mugabe. If the Zuma and Mantashe had then proceeded to discipline Vavi and if he was then suspended from the ANC, would we all be cheering this on as we are doing with the Malema case?
Surely ordinary ANC members (yes, also those who helped to get rid of Thabo Mbeki at Polokwane, ostensibly because of his dictatorial tendencies) should feel more than a bit uncomfortable by the manner in which Malema had been dealt with? I ask again: will there be other casualties and will the same principles be used to get rid of other opponents who do not shut up? Will they go after Matthews Phosa? Will they go after Kgalema Motlanthe if he ever grew a backbone and actually indicated that he was interested in presidency of the ANC? Will they go after our charming, but arch-opportunist, Tokyo Sexwale, for showing rather too much ambition?
And should this not all be read against the background of the pending suspension of a senior NPA prosecutor, reportedly because she refused to drop charges against crime intelligence boss Richard Mdluli who is said to enjoy protection from “right at the top”? Remember that last year a secret report prepared by Mduli was leaked to the newspaper and that this report claimed that various ANC leaders met in January 2010 in Estcourt, KwaZulu-Natal to plot the ouster of Jacob Zuma. (Why crime intelligence was involved in such a story is unclear as it is perfectly legal in a democracy for political contenders within a party to plot against each other – as long as they use only legal means.)
Key members of the group that is said to have met are KwaZulu-Natal provincial premier Zweli Mkhize and Human Settlements Minister Tokyo Sexwale.
Remember also that the Secrecy Bill has just as much if not more to do with attempts by the intelligence agencies (firmly under the control of Zuma and Mantashe) to protect their agents and to prevent any exposure of their – legal or illegal – activities which we now know (thanks to Mduli) also focus on the succession race inside the ANC.
It might be that Malema is a special case and that the extraordinary precedent set by this disciplinary case against Malema will not be used against other critics of the current ANC leadership or against anyone who dares to show any ambition to take over the job of President or Secretary General of the ANC. But do not count on it.
Source: Constitutionally Speaking
It could not have hurt that the verdict was delivered by a confident and in charge Cyril Ramaphosa, who reminded us again why so many of us have regretted the fact that he lost out to Thabo Mbeki when Mandela’s ANC had to appoint a Deputy President and why some of us still wistfully wonder what might have been if he had become our President instead of either Thabo Mbeki or Jacob Zuma.
Although some newspaper editors might miss Malema (given the fact that he has the ability to make news and sell newspapers), most of us might feel slightly relieved that this hypocritical demagogue has been dealt with so effectively and seemingly so decisively by the ANC senior leadership.
Yet, there is something about the way in which Jacob Zuma and Gwede Mantashe managed to clip Malema’s wings that sits uneasy with me. If they could do it to him, I wonder, could they do it to anyone else – including every single one of us who are members of the chattering classes and sometimes mock or criticise our dancing and singing President and every single ANC member who fails to toe the party line or who speaks out against the abuse of power or incompetence by some members of the leadership?
Is there not just a whiff of Stalinism about the way in which Zuma and Matashe got rid of a political enemy? Can we expect the pictures to be airbrushed next so that Malema will disappear completely from official ANC history?
Recall that Malema was convicted on three charges, two of them having been confirmed by the NDCA. First, he was convicted of contravening Rule 25.5 (1) of the ANC Constitution “by behaving in such a way as to provoke serious divisions or a breakdown of unity in the organisation”. His sin was that he addressed a press conference on 31 July 2011 at the conclusion of an ANC Youth League NEC meeting where he said amongst other things “in the past we know President Mbeki used that agenda very well …. The African agenda is no longer a priority and we think that there is a temptation by the coloniser and the imperialist to want to recolonise Africa in a different but sophisticated way and President Mbeki stood directly opposed to that type of conduct.”
The NDC found that through his utterances Malema sought to portray the ANC government and its leadership under President Zuma in a negative light which therefore had the potential to sow division and disunity in the ANC. The NDCA confirmed the reasoning of the NDC. The implications of this verdict are rather stark. Any ANC member who now suggests that an out of favour former President may have done some good and that he might have been better than an incumbent leader can now be kicked out of the Party for contravening Rule 25.5(1). If this principle had been applied consistently in the past, Mbeki would have been able to get rid of Zuma and most of his opponents long before the votes were counted at Polokwane. To his credit, he never used such tactics against them.
The verdict comes perilously close to suggesting that no ANC member will henceforth be allowed ever to criticise the incumbent ANC leadership in public. This is a rather handy precedent to set if one intends to stand for a second (or third) term in office or if one wishes to “manage” future leadership elections. To my mind the ruling on this point seems profoundly undemocratic and deeply dangerous and both ANC members and other members of the public should feel more than a bit worried about this move. One should not confuse approval for the outcome of this case (silencing Malema) with what is good for the ANC and South Africa and if one does, one underestimates the possible ruthlessness of the current bunch of ANC leaders aiming to secure a second term for themselves at Mangaung.
Malema was also convicted of contravening Rule 25.5 (c) of the Constitution of the ANC by behaving in such a way as to bring the organisation into disrepute. This was done for ostensibly slightly more plausible reasons, namely because he addressed a press conference on 31 July 2011 by making announcements amongst others:
* That the Botswana leadership of government poses a serious threat to Africa so we need a progressive government in Botswana;
* We are not going to sit with neighbours that conduct themselves like that. Botswana is in full co-operation with imperialists and the government is undermining the African agenda;
* The ANC Youth League would establish a Botswana Command Team which would work towards uniting all opposition forces in Botswana to oppose the puppet regime of Botswana led by the Botswana Democratic Party.
Now, imagine, for a moment that the statement did not relate to Botswana but to Zimbabwe and that Zwelenzima Vavi had made it and not Malema. Imagine Vavi had said that Robert Mugabe and his Zanu-PF had ruined Zimbabwe and that Cosatu would mobilise ANC members to oppose the murderous regime in Zimbabwe and to unite opposition forces in that country to try and oust Mugabe. If the Zuma and Mantashe had then proceeded to discipline Vavi and if he was then suspended from the ANC, would we all be cheering this on as we are doing with the Malema case?
Surely ordinary ANC members (yes, also those who helped to get rid of Thabo Mbeki at Polokwane, ostensibly because of his dictatorial tendencies) should feel more than a bit uncomfortable by the manner in which Malema had been dealt with? I ask again: will there be other casualties and will the same principles be used to get rid of other opponents who do not shut up? Will they go after Matthews Phosa? Will they go after Kgalema Motlanthe if he ever grew a backbone and actually indicated that he was interested in presidency of the ANC? Will they go after our charming, but arch-opportunist, Tokyo Sexwale, for showing rather too much ambition?
And should this not all be read against the background of the pending suspension of a senior NPA prosecutor, reportedly because she refused to drop charges against crime intelligence boss Richard Mdluli who is said to enjoy protection from “right at the top”? Remember that last year a secret report prepared by Mduli was leaked to the newspaper and that this report claimed that various ANC leaders met in January 2010 in Estcourt, KwaZulu-Natal to plot the ouster of Jacob Zuma. (Why crime intelligence was involved in such a story is unclear as it is perfectly legal in a democracy for political contenders within a party to plot against each other – as long as they use only legal means.)
Key members of the group that is said to have met are KwaZulu-Natal provincial premier Zweli Mkhize and Human Settlements Minister Tokyo Sexwale.
Remember also that the Secrecy Bill has just as much if not more to do with attempts by the intelligence agencies (firmly under the control of Zuma and Mantashe) to protect their agents and to prevent any exposure of their – legal or illegal – activities which we now know (thanks to Mduli) also focus on the succession race inside the ANC.
It might be that Malema is a special case and that the extraordinary precedent set by this disciplinary case against Malema will not be used against other critics of the current ANC leadership or against anyone who dares to show any ambition to take over the job of President or Secretary General of the ANC. But do not count on it.
Source: Constitutionally Speaking
Friday, March 4, 2011
Gaddafi: the despot who would be king
ADEKEYE ADEBAJO: LIBYA - Mar 04 2011 16:57
Events in Libya suggest that the end of the regime of the world's longest-ruling autocrat, Muammar Gaddafi, is near. It is worth tracing the life and times of this eccentric despot.After seizing power in an act of regicide against King Idriss in 1969, Gaddafi initially modelled his rule on that of Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, the celebrated champion of pan-Arabism. Overcome by emotion, Gaddafi fainted twice during Nasser's funeral in Cairo in 1970.
As the martyred South African liberation heroine Ruth First noted in an insightful 1974 study titled Libya: The Elusive Revolution, the contradictions of Gaddafi's revolution were many.
He simultaneously pursued a social revolution and a revival of Islamic fundamentalism; 11 young soldiers held power while claiming to represent a mass-based popular revolution; the Libyan leader condemned the corruption of the monarchical ancien régime while cutting lucrative deals with global oil cartels; and Gaddafi's traditional, religious approach led him to live in a Bedouin tent and criticise Western decadence, even as he relied on its technology and companies to finance his domestic revolution and foreign adventures.
Gaddafi's Green Book of 1975 rejected liberal democracy in favour of what he described as direct democracy through "popular committees", though these were accused of terrorising the population. In his early rule the Libyan leader achieved some social progress through his oil wealth and 1,5-million foreigners flocked to his country from Africa and the Middle East.
In the politics of the Maghreb Gaddafi's role was mercurial. Just before his country took over the presidency of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in 2003, the Libyan leader said: "It's time to put the union in the freezer." A year later Tripoli announced that it was leaving the AMU after the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation offered rapid reaction training to Maghrebi states. Only pleas from Morocco and Tunisia prevented Gaddafi from carrying out his threat.
'Diplomatically isolated'
Gaddafi would prove equally controversial south of the Sahara. He became diplomatically isolated in Africa after his 1980 military intervention in Chad, losing support among his peers for supporting dissident groups against "neocolonial" regimes on the continent.
Gaddafi sent troops to bolster the regime of brutal Ugandan autocrat and fellow Muslim, General Idi Amin, between 1972 and 1979. In the 1980s the self-styled Libyan revolutionary provided military training to the warlords of two of West Africa's most vicious rebel groups in the 1990s: Liberia's Charles Taylor and Sierra Leone's Foday Sankoh. He also reportedly trained and armed Tuareg rebels who triggered a conflict in northern Mali in 1990.
Gaddafi would eventually swap his pan-Arab robes for Pan-African garments in anger at the lack of Arab support for Libya after Western-inspired United Nations economic and travel sanctions were imposed on Tripoli in 1992. By contrast with the muted Arab response, strong black African backing was offered in his hour of need. Indeed, the sanctions on Tripoli were eventually lifted in 1999 with the help of Nelson Mandela, who mediated with Washington and London. Former president Thabo Mbeki famously did not get on with Gaddafi, while Jacob Zuma appears to have attempted to appease him.
Gaddafi sought to become the heir of Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah's pan-African vision. He was the moving force behind the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union (AU), hosting several meetings in his home town of Sirte. At the AU summit in Ghana in 2007, Gaddafi championed a "United States of Africa" with an all-African army, a common monetary union, as well as a central bank. But the eccentric "brother leader's" vision was, like Nkrumah's, rejected by most African leaders.
Gaddafi also used his oil wealth to buy influence within the AU by paying the debts of member states. With strong leaders like Mbeki and Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo having left the political stage Gaddafi finally became chair of the AU for the first time in January 2009. This was largely a wasted year, as the Libyan leader continued to pursue his quixotic federalist dreams without the support of African leaders. As AU chair, Gaddafi was also accused of coddling fellow military putschists in Guinea, Mauritania, and Madagascar.
As his four-decade autocratic reign appears to be coming to an ignominious end, Gaddafi, the self-proclaimed "King of Kings", seems to be drifting into delusional madness.
Having toppled a monarch to promote social justice, he recently compared his 41-year rule with that of Britain's Queen Elizabeth II, wondering why similar protests were not being raised about her long reign.
Coming from a lower social class, Gaddafi had always aspired to greatness and coveted King Idriss's crown. A social climber and arriviste, he donned ill-fitting borrowed royal robes to which his birth did not entitle him. As the fin de régime approaches, the Libyan despot appears to be a poor parody of the very system that he toppled.
Dr Adekeye Adebajo is executive director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, and author of The Curse of Berlin: Africa After the Cold War
Source: Mail & Guardian Online
Thursday, December 16, 2010
Analysis: Zuma vs Zapiro is possibly much more than just another court case
What does the SA prez possibly stand to gain from what seems like a case he is bound to lose? But looked at through the eyes of his supporters maybe – just maybe – it’s not about this specific case at all, but about the little media legislation they are so desperate to push through.
Even by our standards, in the third quarter of 2008 South Africa was another country. Thabo Mbeki was running things, technically, and merrily ignoring requests to attend ANC national executive committee meetings because he was meeting minor Chinese dignitaries. Julius Malema was too busy living to suggest killing for anyone, and Jacob Zuma was addressed as just plain mister. The main political action of the day had been a Mail & Guardian headline in which Gwede Mantashe had labelled some Constitutional Court judges as “counter-revolutionaries”. The political slogan was about “political solutions” to legal problems. Turns out those slogans were right in the end.
The reason we bring this up, is that this was all before the Nicolson Judgment. No legal person put their neck out and predicted Zuma would win that case, but the ANC was on a roll. They were going all out for Zuma. Heck, even Zwelinzima Vavi loved him at the time. In this context Zapiro published that cartoon. At the time, it seemed the ANC was literally ganging up against the judiciary. The wagons were being circled.
It was a pretty normal Sunday though when I first saw the cartoon. It literally took my breath away. It was so good, so funny, hit the nail on the head, and yes, it was offensive. In a way, that was probably the point. At the time, it seemed as if something offensive was imminent and Zapiro had found a way to capture that. But I couldn’t resist calling the ANC and asking what they felt. Jessie Duarte was their spokeswoman at the time. I remember the conversation clearly - she had seen it, she was a little angry about it, and hell yes, she’d say something about it, on tape. As always, she gave a good soundbite, and I filed it for the next morning’s Eyewitness News bulletins. It seemed a minor story.
The next morning, it ran on the 6am bulletin, and suddenly the world went into overdrive. Callers, outrage, laughter, anger, frustration, the usual stuff of talk radio, just at a much higher level. The fact is the cartoon had summed up the emotion of the time. It wouldn’t have been so powerful otherwise. It called a spade a spade and perhaps that’s why so many people were so angry.
Now it looks as if we’re going to have a nice big national argument about this cartoon again. And there are times when I wonder if I did the right thing in phoning Duarte. I’m not saying this cartoon wouldn’t have been a big thing otherwise. I just wonder if this is really an argument for which we as a country are ready.
You may think I’m being slightly alarmist. After all, the law is clearly on Zapiro’s side. We would be very surprised if any judge in the country saw things Zuma’s way. The Human Rights Commission (which has a few people on it who know their way around the ANC’s deployment committee) have already ruled in favour of Zapiro. There’s the defence of opinion, of satire and of course, freedom of speech. There’s even the old defence of “jest”, which makes us wonder if you’re allowed to be hugely insulting to a politician, so long as it’s funny. Which would mean to call Julius Malema ugly might be illegal, but to suggest he laughed like a stuffed hyena may not.
But all of this could be missing the point. The fact is this national argument about the limits of freedom of speech is not going to be won on the iPads of the chatterati. It’s not even about what they think. It’s a battle that will be fought in Esselen Park, at Luthuli House, and crucially, at ANC branch meetings. Those meetings are not occupied by people who worry too much about the legal definition of offense. They are more likely to be angered afresh by the cartoon.
We’ve argued for some time now that the media has not presented its case well on this score. That for many people in this country it could appear that newspapers and websites and radio stations simply offend because they can, that they really are controlled by people who want to offend the democratically elected leaders of this country. Imagine how you might feel if someone drew Nelson Mandela with something as rude as that showerhead. Now imagine being a Zuma supporter and seeing that piece of brass literally four times a week.
Now your leader is suing. He’s doing what he thinks he should. But then he loses. And, in your view, that means there’s a problem with the law. And possibly with the judges as well. How can it be that someone can be so rude, so deliberately offensive to the president? Surely you should respect the president of your country? So then it’s obvious that the way to fix this is to bring in the media appeals tribunal.
You may think we’re being a little paranoid. But this case has the potential to be far more damaging than a simple little legal skirmish. It’s easy to see it being used to whip up popular sentiment against the commercial media. We should all watch it very carefully indeed. Happy 2011.
Source: Daily Maverick
Even by our standards, in the third quarter of 2008 South Africa was another country. Thabo Mbeki was running things, technically, and merrily ignoring requests to attend ANC national executive committee meetings because he was meeting minor Chinese dignitaries. Julius Malema was too busy living to suggest killing for anyone, and Jacob Zuma was addressed as just plain mister. The main political action of the day had been a Mail & Guardian headline in which Gwede Mantashe had labelled some Constitutional Court judges as “counter-revolutionaries”. The political slogan was about “political solutions” to legal problems. Turns out those slogans were right in the end.
The reason we bring this up, is that this was all before the Nicolson Judgment. No legal person put their neck out and predicted Zuma would win that case, but the ANC was on a roll. They were going all out for Zuma. Heck, even Zwelinzima Vavi loved him at the time. In this context Zapiro published that cartoon. At the time, it seemed the ANC was literally ganging up against the judiciary. The wagons were being circled.
It was a pretty normal Sunday though when I first saw the cartoon. It literally took my breath away. It was so good, so funny, hit the nail on the head, and yes, it was offensive. In a way, that was probably the point. At the time, it seemed as if something offensive was imminent and Zapiro had found a way to capture that. But I couldn’t resist calling the ANC and asking what they felt. Jessie Duarte was their spokeswoman at the time. I remember the conversation clearly - she had seen it, she was a little angry about it, and hell yes, she’d say something about it, on tape. As always, she gave a good soundbite, and I filed it for the next morning’s Eyewitness News bulletins. It seemed a minor story.
The next morning, it ran on the 6am bulletin, and suddenly the world went into overdrive. Callers, outrage, laughter, anger, frustration, the usual stuff of talk radio, just at a much higher level. The fact is the cartoon had summed up the emotion of the time. It wouldn’t have been so powerful otherwise. It called a spade a spade and perhaps that’s why so many people were so angry.
Now it looks as if we’re going to have a nice big national argument about this cartoon again. And there are times when I wonder if I did the right thing in phoning Duarte. I’m not saying this cartoon wouldn’t have been a big thing otherwise. I just wonder if this is really an argument for which we as a country are ready.
You may think I’m being slightly alarmist. After all, the law is clearly on Zapiro’s side. We would be very surprised if any judge in the country saw things Zuma’s way. The Human Rights Commission (which has a few people on it who know their way around the ANC’s deployment committee) have already ruled in favour of Zapiro. There’s the defence of opinion, of satire and of course, freedom of speech. There’s even the old defence of “jest”, which makes us wonder if you’re allowed to be hugely insulting to a politician, so long as it’s funny. Which would mean to call Julius Malema ugly might be illegal, but to suggest he laughed like a stuffed hyena may not.
But all of this could be missing the point. The fact is this national argument about the limits of freedom of speech is not going to be won on the iPads of the chatterati. It’s not even about what they think. It’s a battle that will be fought in Esselen Park, at Luthuli House, and crucially, at ANC branch meetings. Those meetings are not occupied by people who worry too much about the legal definition of offense. They are more likely to be angered afresh by the cartoon.
We’ve argued for some time now that the media has not presented its case well on this score. That for many people in this country it could appear that newspapers and websites and radio stations simply offend because they can, that they really are controlled by people who want to offend the democratically elected leaders of this country. Imagine how you might feel if someone drew Nelson Mandela with something as rude as that showerhead. Now imagine being a Zuma supporter and seeing that piece of brass literally four times a week.
Now your leader is suing. He’s doing what he thinks he should. But then he loses. And, in your view, that means there’s a problem with the law. And possibly with the judges as well. How can it be that someone can be so rude, so deliberately offensive to the president? Surely you should respect the president of your country? So then it’s obvious that the way to fix this is to bring in the media appeals tribunal.
You may think we’re being a little paranoid. But this case has the potential to be far more damaging than a simple little legal skirmish. It’s easy to see it being used to whip up popular sentiment against the commercial media. We should all watch it very carefully indeed. Happy 2011.
Source: Daily Maverick
Tuesday, December 14, 2010
M&G wins bid for 'secret' Zim report
The Mail & Guardian has again won in its bid to obtain a confidential report on the 2002 Zimbabwe presidential election at the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Bloemfontein on Tuesday. President Jacob Zuma's office appealed against the June 2010 judgement in the North Gauteng High Court which ordered the government to release the report to the M&G.
In what was widely hailed as a victory in the struggle for state transparency in South Africa, Acting Judge S Sapire then ordered the government to hand over the report within 10 days. As the deadline was due to expire, the Presidency announced that it would seek leave to appeal. However it is likely that the Presidency will again try to appeal the ruling at the Constitutional Court. The information being fought for is a 2002 report compiled by judges Dikgang Moseneke and Sisi Khampepe -- acting as special envoys to Zimbabwe -- for then-president Thabo Mbeki.
The M&G contends that the report is of public interest, given the widespread view that the 2002 Zimbabwe election, culminating in a victory for President Robert Mugabe, was marred by vote-rigging, intimidation, violence and fraud. When the Presidency rebuffed the M&G's initial attempts to gain access to the report, the newspaper lodged an application under the Promotion of Access to Information Act.
M&G editor Nic Dawes said on Tuesday: "In the most limited sense the judgement is important because it will provide us all with a much better understanding of what was going on in Zimbabwe ahead of the enormously controversial 2002 elections and what our president Mbeki was told about those circumstances by two senior judges. "Perhaps more importantly, the judgement sets out crucial constitutional principals of freedom of information and limits to the power of the state. What it makes crystal clear is that it's simply not good enough for government officials to assert they believe that information should be kept secret. They need to justify such decisions on the basis of genuine evidence and a proper understanding of the constitutional and legal framework. In that sense this is a victory for all South Africans."
Access to the report was also critical as it speaks to the separation of powers between the judiciary and executive, Dawes said. "If these judges went there to conduct an independent inquiry into those constitutional and legal questions than clearly that ought to be public information," said Dawes. "If they went there as representatives of [then] president Mbeki that would raise very serious questions of the separation of powers."
Mbeki sent the judges to the neighbouring state to obtain information on the constitutional and legal problems emerging in Zimbabwe at the time of the 2002 elections. Mbeki's office and the Zimbabwean government facilitated the mission. One of the purposes which Mbeki intended to put the report to was that of formulating policy and taking decisions pertaining to the situation in Zimbabwe. The M&G argued that although some years have passed since the report was compiled and submitted, it remained a matter of great public interest and importance for several reasons.
It was submitted that the report may provide important information relevant to the question whether the 2002 Zimbabwean Presidential elections were "stolen". Whether or not that was so was a matter of importance to an accurate contemporary historical record of the region. It was also submitted that it was central to the legitimacy of the continuation in the presidential office in Zimbabwe of the present incumbent Mugabe.
In court papers, the newspaper argued that with new elections coming up in Zimbabwe it was important to see whether Mugabe continued to hold office by virtue of alleged illegalities and irregularities stretching back to at least 2002.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Commentary by Pierre de Vos on his blog Constitutionally Speaking can be found here.
In what was widely hailed as a victory in the struggle for state transparency in South Africa, Acting Judge S Sapire then ordered the government to hand over the report within 10 days. As the deadline was due to expire, the Presidency announced that it would seek leave to appeal. However it is likely that the Presidency will again try to appeal the ruling at the Constitutional Court. The information being fought for is a 2002 report compiled by judges Dikgang Moseneke and Sisi Khampepe -- acting as special envoys to Zimbabwe -- for then-president Thabo Mbeki.
The M&G contends that the report is of public interest, given the widespread view that the 2002 Zimbabwe election, culminating in a victory for President Robert Mugabe, was marred by vote-rigging, intimidation, violence and fraud. When the Presidency rebuffed the M&G's initial attempts to gain access to the report, the newspaper lodged an application under the Promotion of Access to Information Act.
M&G editor Nic Dawes said on Tuesday: "In the most limited sense the judgement is important because it will provide us all with a much better understanding of what was going on in Zimbabwe ahead of the enormously controversial 2002 elections and what our president Mbeki was told about those circumstances by two senior judges. "Perhaps more importantly, the judgement sets out crucial constitutional principals of freedom of information and limits to the power of the state. What it makes crystal clear is that it's simply not good enough for government officials to assert they believe that information should be kept secret. They need to justify such decisions on the basis of genuine evidence and a proper understanding of the constitutional and legal framework. In that sense this is a victory for all South Africans."
Access to the report was also critical as it speaks to the separation of powers between the judiciary and executive, Dawes said. "If these judges went there to conduct an independent inquiry into those constitutional and legal questions than clearly that ought to be public information," said Dawes. "If they went there as representatives of [then] president Mbeki that would raise very serious questions of the separation of powers."
Mbeki sent the judges to the neighbouring state to obtain information on the constitutional and legal problems emerging in Zimbabwe at the time of the 2002 elections. Mbeki's office and the Zimbabwean government facilitated the mission. One of the purposes which Mbeki intended to put the report to was that of formulating policy and taking decisions pertaining to the situation in Zimbabwe. The M&G argued that although some years have passed since the report was compiled and submitted, it remained a matter of great public interest and importance for several reasons.
It was submitted that the report may provide important information relevant to the question whether the 2002 Zimbabwean Presidential elections were "stolen". Whether or not that was so was a matter of importance to an accurate contemporary historical record of the region. It was also submitted that it was central to the legitimacy of the continuation in the presidential office in Zimbabwe of the present incumbent Mugabe.
In court papers, the newspaper argued that with new elections coming up in Zimbabwe it was important to see whether Mugabe continued to hold office by virtue of alleged illegalities and irregularities stretching back to at least 2002.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Commentary by Pierre de Vos on his blog Constitutionally Speaking can be found here.
Corruption SA - the almost irresistible tsunami
The common solution to the perennial conundrum of what happens when the “Unstoppable Force” hits the “Immovable Object” is that either the force must stop or the object must move. In the fight against Africa’s greatest evil, the big question is whether corruption is unstoppable and/or immovable. “Political hyenas” has to be SA's political phrase of the year. In grown-up politics, at any rate. “Bloody agent” may appeal to the younger types, but the fact is this year has really been dominated by one overarching issue: Corruption.
2010 is the year in which the fight against corruption gained a public and popular political hero, Zwelinzima Vavi. It’s also the year when those who may be corrupt, those who may be hyenas, started to make their own presence felt, started to use their considerable power. This is an issue that will probably dominate 2011, and will definitely become a big issue in the ANC’s big year in 2012.
It’s very easy to claim that this is all Jacob Zuma’s fault. He’s the President, and hell, it’s not like he’s clean himself. The full story of how exactly he escaped having to answer questions under oath about those “loans” from Schabir Shaik is in itself possibly a corruption story of the highest order. But the person (Mokotedi Mpshe) who made the final decision is now a judge himself, so we’ll probably never know the full full extent of it.
And having a head of state with that perception around him doesn’t make the fight against corruption any easier. Just look at the SABC. The man who ran it, Dali Mpofu does many a wrong thing, gets sacked and walks away with millions. Other people, in the lower echelons of the corporation are only human if they think well, I’ll just start my own company and start to bill the corporation as well. The same dynamic could easily affect our traffic cops and councillors. Hell, if he’s doing it, why not? And it doesn’t matter if Zuma actually did anything wrong or not; it’s the perception that matters.
But as easy as that would be, the fact is that corruption is a much bigger issue than just one man. Corruption, the hyenas, now have a momentum behind them that sometimes looks well nigh unstoppable. And that momentum started long before Zuma, it started almost before Mbeki. The fact is that capitalists, the filthy lucre-ites, got their dirty fingers into the ANC, and those vulnerable to such an approach, probably even before Nelson Mandela took his oath of office.
The real question now though is: Has this momentum become irresistible? Or is it a one tsunami that can be tamed? Most societies have a type of momentum to them that moves in ebbs and flows. Prohibition and alcohol abstinence took hold of the US for a while, and then let go its grip. Some countries in Eastern Europe flirted, very painfully, with hard-core socialism as a sort of foreplay to communism, before changing their minds. Here, capitalism still wins and as a result most of the rich are still white. The trends that gather momentum quickly and strongly are those that appeal to our baser instincts. Most people want to get rich, thus the “Clever Boys of the Alliance” (the SACP) have such a difficult fight on their hands.
Corruption, of course, appeals to a very base instinct, which makes it very difficult to fight. In most places, what seems to work is a division of power. That gift the US gave to the world of checks and balances is the one silver bullet we know of that fights corruption with some success. Not total success mind you, but close enough for us. And therein lies the problem. Our checks and balances are weaker than they should be: the ANC’s deployment committee has seen to that. The balance between the minister who sets policy and the government mandarin who is supposed to implement it is gone.
Nowhere is this more stark than in this year’s appointment by Zuma of Menzi Simelane to the post of national director of public prosecutors. By his own admission (during the Ginwala Commission) he is not someone who believes the National Prosecuting Authority should be entirely independent of the justice ministry. (The judge who ruled he couldn’t find the appointment was unlawful, only pointed out there was no evidence Zuma even thought about appointing someone else.)
The fact is that those who claim to be keen on fighting corruption, in which, based on their public statements, we have to include the likes of Zuma, Gwede Mantashe and the rest of the ANC’s top six, are not giving us any proof of real commitment. Time and time again these people have defended the ANC’s deployment policy, and time and time again they have claimed to be fighting corruption. The two are mutually exclusive.
The fact is, to quote Kofi Annan, “Anything is possible, if only we have the political will”. The ANC, at the moment, doesn’t appear to us, to have that level of political will. And without the ANC behind you, you are not going to change the momentum of this country very easily. In fact, it may be impossible.
Source: Daily Maverick
2010 is the year in which the fight against corruption gained a public and popular political hero, Zwelinzima Vavi. It’s also the year when those who may be corrupt, those who may be hyenas, started to make their own presence felt, started to use their considerable power. This is an issue that will probably dominate 2011, and will definitely become a big issue in the ANC’s big year in 2012.
It’s very easy to claim that this is all Jacob Zuma’s fault. He’s the President, and hell, it’s not like he’s clean himself. The full story of how exactly he escaped having to answer questions under oath about those “loans” from Schabir Shaik is in itself possibly a corruption story of the highest order. But the person (Mokotedi Mpshe) who made the final decision is now a judge himself, so we’ll probably never know the full full extent of it.
And having a head of state with that perception around him doesn’t make the fight against corruption any easier. Just look at the SABC. The man who ran it, Dali Mpofu does many a wrong thing, gets sacked and walks away with millions. Other people, in the lower echelons of the corporation are only human if they think well, I’ll just start my own company and start to bill the corporation as well. The same dynamic could easily affect our traffic cops and councillors. Hell, if he’s doing it, why not? And it doesn’t matter if Zuma actually did anything wrong or not; it’s the perception that matters.
But as easy as that would be, the fact is that corruption is a much bigger issue than just one man. Corruption, the hyenas, now have a momentum behind them that sometimes looks well nigh unstoppable. And that momentum started long before Zuma, it started almost before Mbeki. The fact is that capitalists, the filthy lucre-ites, got their dirty fingers into the ANC, and those vulnerable to such an approach, probably even before Nelson Mandela took his oath of office.
The real question now though is: Has this momentum become irresistible? Or is it a one tsunami that can be tamed? Most societies have a type of momentum to them that moves in ebbs and flows. Prohibition and alcohol abstinence took hold of the US for a while, and then let go its grip. Some countries in Eastern Europe flirted, very painfully, with hard-core socialism as a sort of foreplay to communism, before changing their minds. Here, capitalism still wins and as a result most of the rich are still white. The trends that gather momentum quickly and strongly are those that appeal to our baser instincts. Most people want to get rich, thus the “Clever Boys of the Alliance” (the SACP) have such a difficult fight on their hands.
Corruption, of course, appeals to a very base instinct, which makes it very difficult to fight. In most places, what seems to work is a division of power. That gift the US gave to the world of checks and balances is the one silver bullet we know of that fights corruption with some success. Not total success mind you, but close enough for us. And therein lies the problem. Our checks and balances are weaker than they should be: the ANC’s deployment committee has seen to that. The balance between the minister who sets policy and the government mandarin who is supposed to implement it is gone.
Nowhere is this more stark than in this year’s appointment by Zuma of Menzi Simelane to the post of national director of public prosecutors. By his own admission (during the Ginwala Commission) he is not someone who believes the National Prosecuting Authority should be entirely independent of the justice ministry. (The judge who ruled he couldn’t find the appointment was unlawful, only pointed out there was no evidence Zuma even thought about appointing someone else.)
The fact is that those who claim to be keen on fighting corruption, in which, based on their public statements, we have to include the likes of Zuma, Gwede Mantashe and the rest of the ANC’s top six, are not giving us any proof of real commitment. Time and time again these people have defended the ANC’s deployment policy, and time and time again they have claimed to be fighting corruption. The two are mutually exclusive.
The fact is, to quote Kofi Annan, “Anything is possible, if only we have the political will”. The ANC, at the moment, doesn’t appear to us, to have that level of political will. And without the ANC behind you, you are not going to change the momentum of this country very easily. In fact, it may be impossible.
Source: Daily Maverick
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)