Thursday, September 13, 1990

Preventing Genocide in Liberia

Until the 1980's, Liberia's main divide was between indigenous people and the Americo-Liberians, descended from freed U.S. slaves. Mr. Doe's bloody coup ended the old elite's dominance. Power and patronage flowed instead to the Krahn. That favoritism, along with the regime's brutality and incompetence, sparked opposition from other ethnic groups, like the Gio and the Mano. One rebel leader, Prince Johnson, is from the Gio. His rival, Charles Taylor, is an Americo-Liberian.

The U.S. cannot be proud of its own early association with the Doe dictatorship. The Reagan Administration convinced itself that Mr. Doe could provide a strategic bulwark against Communist advance. It ignored abundant evidence of official misdeeds and popular discontent and made Liberia the largest per capita recipient of U.S. aid in sub-Saharan Africa. Congress finally cut back American support after 1985. When Mr. Doe's enemies began closing in on him earlier this year, the Bush Administration rightly resisted his pleas for help.

Instead, a peacekeeping force was raised from the 16-member Economic Community of West African States. With 5,000 Liberian civilians dead and 400,000 refugees streaming over the borders, neighboring states feared chaos. Yet the force's arrival last month touched off reprisals against foreigners and fears of a wider war.

Those concerns remain valid. President Doe's murder has not ended Liberia's ordeal. The prospect of ethnic genocide compels preventive action. From Sri Lanka to the Balkans, political opportunists have exploited ethnic rivalries in the quest for short-term advantage. Too often, their efforts have drowned their countries in blood. For taking risks to prevent the worst, West Africa's peacekeepers deserve the world's appreciation, and support.

Source: New York Times

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