ANC deputy president Jacob Zuma has described the controversy around him as a challenge to South Africa's Constitution.
The test was how these matters were being handled, he told Metro FM on Tuesday. "I'm saying that things that are happening are a challenge to our democracy, a challenge to our constitution, a challenge to our political maturity, a challenge to the understanding of the nation as a whole. How then do we then deal with the situation, I think, that's what I'm saying," he said. "And in no way can you have a country that doesn't go through challenges at a given time. I think the test is how do you address those issues in order to find an appropriate solution."
President Thabo Mbeki fired Zuma as SA's deputy president in July after he was found by Durban High Court to have had a generally corrupt relationship with his former financial adviser Schabir Shaik.
Source: News 24
Sunday, August 21, 2005
Monday, August 8, 2005
Pay hike for SA politicos
The Independent Commission for the Remuneration of Public Office Bearers has recommended that a hike of 5.75% be provided to South African elected politicians - including members of parliament and members of provincial legislatures and judges.
The commission - headed by Judge Dikgang Moseneke, who was recently appointed Deputy Chief Justice - said: "Having duly consulted as required by law, and having considered all relevant factors ...as well as other factors prescribed by applicable legislation, the commission recommends that the salaries, benefits and allowances of public office bearers be increased by 5,75% for the 2005/06 financial year, with effect from April 1 2005." The recommendations are made to President Thabo Mbeki in terms of the constitution.
The commission noted that it had considered annual and month-on-month CPIX figures. (Month-on-month CPIX for May 2005 was 3.9%).
Source: News 24
The commission - headed by Judge Dikgang Moseneke, who was recently appointed Deputy Chief Justice - said: "Having duly consulted as required by law, and having considered all relevant factors ...as well as other factors prescribed by applicable legislation, the commission recommends that the salaries, benefits and allowances of public office bearers be increased by 5,75% for the 2005/06 financial year, with effect from April 1 2005." The recommendations are made to President Thabo Mbeki in terms of the constitution.
The commission noted that it had considered annual and month-on-month CPIX figures. (Month-on-month CPIX for May 2005 was 3.9%).
Source: News 24
Ibrahim Ferrer, 78, Cuban Singer in 'Buena Vista Social Club,' Dies
Ibrahim Ferrer, the Cuban singer whose life included one of popular music's most triumphant second acts, died on Saturday in Havana. He was 78. The cause was multiple organ failure, his manager, Carmen Romero, announced.
Mr. Ferrer was at the center of the Buena Vista Social Club, a phenomenon that brought long-delayed international fame to a group of older Cuban musicians thanks to a Grammy-winning 1997 album produced by Ry Cooder and a subsequent film by Wim Wenders, both by that name. Besides offering American audiences a musician's-eye view of Cuba, the film set up Mr. Ferrer as a particularly sympathetic figure - tall, distinguished and lively, an excellent bolero singer who used space and silence in his relaxed elegant delivery to increase the drama, a man who had been rolled over by history and was now simply trying to enjoy an absurdly lucky situation.
At the time that he was enticed out of retirement to make the album, Mr. Ferrer was living on a small state pension and shining shoes in Havana for extra money.
He was not interested in recording anymore; he had retired from singing in 1991.
"An angel came and picked me up and said, 'Chico, come and do this record,' " he said in 1998. "I didn't want to do it, because I had given up on music."
Born in 1927 at a social club dance in the eastern city of Santiago de Cuba - his mother went into labor on a night out - Mr. Ferrer's first professional involvement with music came at age 13, a year after he became an orphan, when he joined a band, Los Jóvenes del Son.
Later he sang with groups that included Conjunto Sorpresa, the Orquesta Chepín Chovén (with which he had a local hit, "El Platanal de Bartolo," in 1955) and the Beny Moré orchestra, with which he was a background vocalist; in 1953 he began working with Pacho Alonso's band, Maravilla de Beltrán, in Santiago. The band later moved from Santiago to Havana and called itself Los Bocucos.
For most of his career Mr. Ferrer generally sang uptempo numbers, guarachas and sones, not the slow romantic boleros, even though he loved them. But his chance finally came on "The Buena Vista Social Club," when Mr. Cooder and Juan de Marcos González, the album's musical director, persuaded him to sing songs like "Dos Gardenias," which he had learned decades before when singing with Moré.
In 1998, the Cuban Egrem label released "Tierra Caliente," an album of older songs he had made with Los Bocucos. In 1999 the British World Circuit label (with Nonesuch in the United States) released Mr. Ferrer's first solo album, and in 2003 his second, "Buenos Hermanos"; both were produced by Mr. Cooder. In "Buenos Hermanos" Mr. Cooder took more artistic liberties, stirring the very un-Cuban accordion and the gospel singing group the Blind Boys of Alabama into the mix.
Though by this time he was in his 70's, Mr. Ferrer won a Latin Grammy for Best New Artist in 2000. "Buenos Hermanos" won a Grammy for Best Traditional Tropical Latin Album of 2003, but Mr. Ferrer was denied a visa to enter the United States for the awards ceremony last year.
His last performance in New York was in April 2003. He was on a European tour in the week leading up to his death.
Mr. Ferrer is survived by his wife, Caridad Díaz, 6 children, 14 grandchildren and 4 great-grandchildren, Ms. Romero said.
Source: New York Times
Mr. Ferrer was at the center of the Buena Vista Social Club, a phenomenon that brought long-delayed international fame to a group of older Cuban musicians thanks to a Grammy-winning 1997 album produced by Ry Cooder and a subsequent film by Wim Wenders, both by that name. Besides offering American audiences a musician's-eye view of Cuba, the film set up Mr. Ferrer as a particularly sympathetic figure - tall, distinguished and lively, an excellent bolero singer who used space and silence in his relaxed elegant delivery to increase the drama, a man who had been rolled over by history and was now simply trying to enjoy an absurdly lucky situation.
At the time that he was enticed out of retirement to make the album, Mr. Ferrer was living on a small state pension and shining shoes in Havana for extra money.
He was not interested in recording anymore; he had retired from singing in 1991.
"An angel came and picked me up and said, 'Chico, come and do this record,' " he said in 1998. "I didn't want to do it, because I had given up on music."
Born in 1927 at a social club dance in the eastern city of Santiago de Cuba - his mother went into labor on a night out - Mr. Ferrer's first professional involvement with music came at age 13, a year after he became an orphan, when he joined a band, Los Jóvenes del Son.
Later he sang with groups that included Conjunto Sorpresa, the Orquesta Chepín Chovén (with which he had a local hit, "El Platanal de Bartolo," in 1955) and the Beny Moré orchestra, with which he was a background vocalist; in 1953 he began working with Pacho Alonso's band, Maravilla de Beltrán, in Santiago. The band later moved from Santiago to Havana and called itself Los Bocucos.
For most of his career Mr. Ferrer generally sang uptempo numbers, guarachas and sones, not the slow romantic boleros, even though he loved them. But his chance finally came on "The Buena Vista Social Club," when Mr. Cooder and Juan de Marcos González, the album's musical director, persuaded him to sing songs like "Dos Gardenias," which he had learned decades before when singing with Moré.
In 1998, the Cuban Egrem label released "Tierra Caliente," an album of older songs he had made with Los Bocucos. In 1999 the British World Circuit label (with Nonesuch in the United States) released Mr. Ferrer's first solo album, and in 2003 his second, "Buenos Hermanos"; both were produced by Mr. Cooder. In "Buenos Hermanos" Mr. Cooder took more artistic liberties, stirring the very un-Cuban accordion and the gospel singing group the Blind Boys of Alabama into the mix.
Though by this time he was in his 70's, Mr. Ferrer won a Latin Grammy for Best New Artist in 2000. "Buenos Hermanos" won a Grammy for Best Traditional Tropical Latin Album of 2003, but Mr. Ferrer was denied a visa to enter the United States for the awards ceremony last year.
His last performance in New York was in April 2003. He was on a European tour in the week leading up to his death.
Mr. Ferrer is survived by his wife, Caridad Díaz, 6 children, 14 grandchildren and 4 great-grandchildren, Ms. Romero said.
Source: New York Times
Friday, August 5, 2005
Mauritania officers 'seize power'
Mauritanian army officers have announced the overthrow of the country's president and creation of a military council to rule the country. The council said it had ended the "totalitarian regime" of Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya, who is now in Niger. It named security chief Col Ely Ould Mohamed Vall as the new leader. There were street celebrations in the capital, Nouakchott, as troops controlled key points. African and world bodies condemned the action.The African Union said it "strongly condemns any seizure of power or any attempt to take power by force". United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan was "deeply troubled" by the reports, insisting political disagreements should be settled peacefully and democratically, a spokesman said.
President Olusegun Obasanjo of regional powerhouse Nigeria said "the days of tolerating military governance in our sub-region or anywhere" were "long gone". President Taya, attending the funeral of Saudi Arabia's King Fahd at the time, was flown to Niger's capital, Niamey. He was met by Niger President Mamadou Tandja before travelling on to a villa in Niamey, where officials say he may stay for several days, the Associated Press reports.
The national armed forces and security forces have unanimously decided to put a definitive end to the oppressive activities of the defunct authority. The new Military Council for Justice and Democracy said it would rule the West African state for a transitional period of two years, after which it would organise free and fair elections. Following the announcement on national radio, people took to the streets of Nouakchott in celebration, hooting their car horns. "I can hear the cars now and people running in the streets. People are celebrating," president Hassan Ahmed told the BBC's Focus on Africa programme.
Heavily armed forces surrounded state radio and television buildings as well as the presidential palace from 0500 GMT. State media broadcasts were cut and the airport closed. Some sporadic gunfire was heard at first, and there were unconfirmed reports of senior army officials being arrested. Shops immediately shut down and civil servants left their offices, said witnesses.
President Taya took power in a bloodless coup in December 1984 and has been re-elected three times since. Correspondents say he later made enemies among Islamists in the country, which is an Islamic republic. Critics accuse the government of using the US-led war on terror to crack down on Islamic opponents. Mr Taya has also prompted widespread opposition by establishing links with Israel. Earlier this year, nearly 200 people, including former President Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidallah, were put on trial for a series of alleged coup plots. Mauritania is deeply divided between three main groups - light-skinned Arabic-speakers, descendents of slaves and dark-skinned speakers of West African languages.
Source: BBC
Friday, July 15, 2005
Another angry protest in China
Social tensions in China are taking on an increasingly explosive form. A riot by 10,000 people triggered by a car accident in the city of Chizhou in Anhui province is the latest case to be reported. Around 3 p.m. on June 26, a Toyota sedan hit a teenage student as he was riding a bike. As the student and driver began to argue, three men emerged from the car and along with the driver began to beat up the student.
A group of taxi drivers tried to help the injured student, insisting on compensation from the driver, who is the owner of a local private hospital. In response, the driver ordered his thugs to attack the taxi drivers with knives. He openly boasted that, even if someone was killed, he would get away with the crime by paying a bribe of 300,000 yuan ($US36,000).
Police arrived on the scene but only escorted the driver and his thugs away. Onlookers were left stunned and angry. Many were outraged at the arrogance of the driver and the indifference of the police to ordinary working people. The incident reinforced their daily experience of the contempt of the newly rich and officialdom towards the lives of the poor.
Word of the incident soon spread to the working class suburbs of the city and by 6 p.m. thousands of people surrounded the local police station. They demanded the police hand over the driver and his thugs, who at that stage had not been charged with any offence, and then flipped over, smashed and torched the Toyota sedan and three police cars.
Firefighters who arrived on the scene quickly fled when confronted by the angry crowd. Police stepped in but were beaten back by the protesters hurling rocks and firecrackers. Power was cut off to the police station, windows broken and firecrackers were thrown inside. The protesters looted a nearby supermarket, partly owned by the Toyota driver. Around midnight, the provincial police chief arrived along with 700 paramilitary police officers in full riot gear and dispersed the protest.
In a press conference on June 28, the Chinese foreign ministry acknowledged that a riot had taken place and would be handled in “accordance with the law”. In reality, the police unleashed a reign of terror. Martial law was declared and house-to-house searches were conducted. The police arrested anyone without an ID card, urban residential permit or work permit, especially targeting rural migrant workers.
According to the Xinhua news agency, 10 people have been arrested. The city government issued an emergency statement, declaring that the protest was triggered by “a few illegal elements”—a crude attempt to stir up hostility towards “illegal” rural workers. Rural migrants to cities are required to hold a special permit and are routinely treated as second-class citizens by police and officials.
The angry eruption is a symptom of broad popular sentiment. Chizhou is typical of many Chinese cities in poverty-stricken, interior provinces such as Anhui. Unlike centres of economic boom like Shanghai, Chizhou and its 1.54 million inhabitants have very few opportunities.
The city’s economy is largely based around peasant agriculture and some remaining state-owned enterprises. Rural incomes have stagnated. According to the city government website, only 6,080 of the tens of thousands of laid-off workers have found jobs last year. The official unemployment rate in the city is 4 percent—widely considered to be a gross understatement.
The riot in Chizhou is only one of many spontaneous protests. A similar incident took place last October in Wangzhou city in Sichuan, another interior province. A government official viciously attacked a rural migrant worker who bumped into him in the street triggering a mass protest involving tens of thousands of people.
A recent demonstration reported by Radio Free Asia occurred on July 2 when more than 2,000 villagers stormed a local police station in Sangshang township, Fushan city, in southern Guangdong province. Protesters were demanding the release of four farmers, arrested on June 30 over a land dispute. Authorities sent in 600 police to break up the crowd. One woman was seriously injured and an American researcher filming the clash was arrested.
The land dispute dates back to 1992 when the village administration sold off 12.4 square kilometres of farmland to the neighbouring township behind the backs of farmers. When the township government attempted to claim the land in March, the angry farmers stopped the takeover.
At midnight on May 31, the township government dispatched thousands of police and heavy vehicles to destroy crops sown by the farmers worth some 8 million yuan ($US975,000). To head off a mass protest, the police used two electronic jamming devices to disrupt local telecommunications and set up roadblocks on major transport routes. Now, as many as 200 farmers guard the land day and night, ignoring threats that they would be forcibly removed if they remained.
Recently, in another confrontation between farmers and Chinese authorities in Shengyou in Hebei province, six farmers were killed and up to 100 others seriously injured. The protest, reported in “Peasant unrest continues in China”, was triggered by a dispute over land expropriated by the local government for a state-owned Guohua Dingzhou power plant.
A villager Niu Zhanzong managed to film the attack before he was knocked down, his camera smashed and his arm broken. “We hope the central government will come and investigate. We believe in the central party, but we don’t believe in the local police,” he said.
The film, however, was posted on the Washington Post website, provoking a nervous response from Beijing, which duly sacked the local Communist Party boss and local mayor. A construction contractor and 21 accomplices have been arrested for the killings.
Since then, the Hong Kong-based newspaper Apple Daily has indicated that the incident may involve the highest levels of Chinese bureaucracy. The man behind the efforts to drive the farmers off their land may well be none other than the son of Li Peng, the former Chinese Premier, who was directly responsible in 1989 for ordering troops to carry out the Tiananmen Square massacre.
Li’s family is notorious for corrupt profiteering in China’s power industry, effectively running some major state-owned plants as their private businesses. Li’s son, Li Xiaopeng, is the manager of the power station believed to behind the expulsion of the farmers.
The possible link between the Li Peng family and the violent attack on Shengyou farmers underscores the fact that, under the banner of market reform, the Chinese bureaucracy at all levels is accumulating private wealth at the expense of ordinary people. The further up the chain one goes, the greater the profits being accumulated.
In the 1990s, Beijing decreed that all provinces raise their own finances through taxes on farmers and small businesses. At the same time, provinces, cities and even townships are engaging in a cutthroat competition for investment and so are engaged in offering huge incentives to potential businesses. The net result is a relentless assault on the living standards of working people, already facing high levels of unemployment and poverty, and the ruthless use of the police to stamp out any sign of opposition.
Source: World Socialist Web
A group of taxi drivers tried to help the injured student, insisting on compensation from the driver, who is the owner of a local private hospital. In response, the driver ordered his thugs to attack the taxi drivers with knives. He openly boasted that, even if someone was killed, he would get away with the crime by paying a bribe of 300,000 yuan ($US36,000).
Police arrived on the scene but only escorted the driver and his thugs away. Onlookers were left stunned and angry. Many were outraged at the arrogance of the driver and the indifference of the police to ordinary working people. The incident reinforced their daily experience of the contempt of the newly rich and officialdom towards the lives of the poor.
Word of the incident soon spread to the working class suburbs of the city and by 6 p.m. thousands of people surrounded the local police station. They demanded the police hand over the driver and his thugs, who at that stage had not been charged with any offence, and then flipped over, smashed and torched the Toyota sedan and three police cars.
Firefighters who arrived on the scene quickly fled when confronted by the angry crowd. Police stepped in but were beaten back by the protesters hurling rocks and firecrackers. Power was cut off to the police station, windows broken and firecrackers were thrown inside. The protesters looted a nearby supermarket, partly owned by the Toyota driver. Around midnight, the provincial police chief arrived along with 700 paramilitary police officers in full riot gear and dispersed the protest.
In a press conference on June 28, the Chinese foreign ministry acknowledged that a riot had taken place and would be handled in “accordance with the law”. In reality, the police unleashed a reign of terror. Martial law was declared and house-to-house searches were conducted. The police arrested anyone without an ID card, urban residential permit or work permit, especially targeting rural migrant workers.
According to the Xinhua news agency, 10 people have been arrested. The city government issued an emergency statement, declaring that the protest was triggered by “a few illegal elements”—a crude attempt to stir up hostility towards “illegal” rural workers. Rural migrants to cities are required to hold a special permit and are routinely treated as second-class citizens by police and officials.
The angry eruption is a symptom of broad popular sentiment. Chizhou is typical of many Chinese cities in poverty-stricken, interior provinces such as Anhui. Unlike centres of economic boom like Shanghai, Chizhou and its 1.54 million inhabitants have very few opportunities.
The city’s economy is largely based around peasant agriculture and some remaining state-owned enterprises. Rural incomes have stagnated. According to the city government website, only 6,080 of the tens of thousands of laid-off workers have found jobs last year. The official unemployment rate in the city is 4 percent—widely considered to be a gross understatement.
The riot in Chizhou is only one of many spontaneous protests. A similar incident took place last October in Wangzhou city in Sichuan, another interior province. A government official viciously attacked a rural migrant worker who bumped into him in the street triggering a mass protest involving tens of thousands of people.
A recent demonstration reported by Radio Free Asia occurred on July 2 when more than 2,000 villagers stormed a local police station in Sangshang township, Fushan city, in southern Guangdong province. Protesters were demanding the release of four farmers, arrested on June 30 over a land dispute. Authorities sent in 600 police to break up the crowd. One woman was seriously injured and an American researcher filming the clash was arrested.
The land dispute dates back to 1992 when the village administration sold off 12.4 square kilometres of farmland to the neighbouring township behind the backs of farmers. When the township government attempted to claim the land in March, the angry farmers stopped the takeover.
At midnight on May 31, the township government dispatched thousands of police and heavy vehicles to destroy crops sown by the farmers worth some 8 million yuan ($US975,000). To head off a mass protest, the police used two electronic jamming devices to disrupt local telecommunications and set up roadblocks on major transport routes. Now, as many as 200 farmers guard the land day and night, ignoring threats that they would be forcibly removed if they remained.
Recently, in another confrontation between farmers and Chinese authorities in Shengyou in Hebei province, six farmers were killed and up to 100 others seriously injured. The protest, reported in “Peasant unrest continues in China”, was triggered by a dispute over land expropriated by the local government for a state-owned Guohua Dingzhou power plant.
A villager Niu Zhanzong managed to film the attack before he was knocked down, his camera smashed and his arm broken. “We hope the central government will come and investigate. We believe in the central party, but we don’t believe in the local police,” he said.
The film, however, was posted on the Washington Post website, provoking a nervous response from Beijing, which duly sacked the local Communist Party boss and local mayor. A construction contractor and 21 accomplices have been arrested for the killings.
Since then, the Hong Kong-based newspaper Apple Daily has indicated that the incident may involve the highest levels of Chinese bureaucracy. The man behind the efforts to drive the farmers off their land may well be none other than the son of Li Peng, the former Chinese Premier, who was directly responsible in 1989 for ordering troops to carry out the Tiananmen Square massacre.
Li’s family is notorious for corrupt profiteering in China’s power industry, effectively running some major state-owned plants as their private businesses. Li’s son, Li Xiaopeng, is the manager of the power station believed to behind the expulsion of the farmers.
The possible link between the Li Peng family and the violent attack on Shengyou farmers underscores the fact that, under the banner of market reform, the Chinese bureaucracy at all levels is accumulating private wealth at the expense of ordinary people. The further up the chain one goes, the greater the profits being accumulated.
In the 1990s, Beijing decreed that all provinces raise their own finances through taxes on farmers and small businesses. At the same time, provinces, cities and even townships are engaging in a cutthroat competition for investment and so are engaged in offering huge incentives to potential businesses. The net result is a relentless assault on the living standards of working people, already facing high levels of unemployment and poverty, and the ruthless use of the police to stamp out any sign of opposition.
Source: World Socialist Web
Tuesday, July 12, 2005
South Africa: Police Fire on Peaceful AIDS Protestors
The South African government should immediately investigate the police’s use of rubber bullets and teargas against peaceful HIV/AIDS demonstrators in Eastern Cape on Tuesday, Human Rights Watch said today.
In the Eastern Cape city of Queenstown, local members of the Treatment Action Campaign on Tuesday staged a peaceful demonstration to protest lack of progress on access to antiretroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS in the province.
Without warning, police assaulted the protestors and opened fire with rubber bullets and released teargas as people ran away. Forty people were injured and 10 were treated for gunshot wounds, according to the Treatment Action Campaign. None of the protestors was arrested or charged with any crime.
“It’s a shocking irony that people demonstrating for essential medicines should be met with rubber bullets and teargas,” said Jonathan Cohen, researcher with Human Rights Watch’s HIV/AIDS Program. “South Africa should be easing the suffering of people with AIDS, not violently dispersing peaceful demonstrations.”
There is no indication that the actions by the South African police met international standards for the appropriate use of force by police. The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provides that police shall, as far as possible, use nonviolent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms. Whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, police must exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offense and the legitimate objective to be achieved, and also minimize damage and injury.
Tuesday’s demonstration followed six months of failed negotiations between AIDS activists and local health authorities about access to antiretroviral treatment for persons with HIV/AIDS. In December, the Eastern Cape Health Department stopped providing treatment to new patients until further notice. The government referred patients already on treatment to Frontier Hospital in Queenstown, but activists say that hospital is treating fewer than 200 of an estimated 2,000 people in need. Since the hospital established a waiting list for treatment, more than 50 patients have died.
South Africa is home to about 5.3 million people living with HIV/AIDS. In November 2003 the government committed to providing 53,000 patients with free antiretroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS by March 2004. Even by March 2005, only about half that number were receiving treatment, according to the Treatment Action Campaign. Human rights organizations have criticized the slow progress of the provision of treatment and the South African government’s lack of commitment to HIV/AIDS treatment programs.
“South African AIDS activists did not resort to violence,” said Cohen. “Instead, their government did.”
Source: Human Rights Watch
In the Eastern Cape city of Queenstown, local members of the Treatment Action Campaign on Tuesday staged a peaceful demonstration to protest lack of progress on access to antiretroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS in the province.
Without warning, police assaulted the protestors and opened fire with rubber bullets and released teargas as people ran away. Forty people were injured and 10 were treated for gunshot wounds, according to the Treatment Action Campaign. None of the protestors was arrested or charged with any crime.
“It’s a shocking irony that people demonstrating for essential medicines should be met with rubber bullets and teargas,” said Jonathan Cohen, researcher with Human Rights Watch’s HIV/AIDS Program. “South Africa should be easing the suffering of people with AIDS, not violently dispersing peaceful demonstrations.”
There is no indication that the actions by the South African police met international standards for the appropriate use of force by police. The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provides that police shall, as far as possible, use nonviolent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms. Whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, police must exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offense and the legitimate objective to be achieved, and also minimize damage and injury.
Tuesday’s demonstration followed six months of failed negotiations between AIDS activists and local health authorities about access to antiretroviral treatment for persons with HIV/AIDS. In December, the Eastern Cape Health Department stopped providing treatment to new patients until further notice. The government referred patients already on treatment to Frontier Hospital in Queenstown, but activists say that hospital is treating fewer than 200 of an estimated 2,000 people in need. Since the hospital established a waiting list for treatment, more than 50 patients have died.
South Africa is home to about 5.3 million people living with HIV/AIDS. In November 2003 the government committed to providing 53,000 patients with free antiretroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS by March 2004. Even by March 2005, only about half that number were receiving treatment, according to the Treatment Action Campaign. Human rights organizations have criticized the slow progress of the provision of treatment and the South African government’s lack of commitment to HIV/AIDS treatment programs.
“South African AIDS activists did not resort to violence,” said Cohen. “Instead, their government did.”
Source: Human Rights Watch
South Africa: Police Fire on Peaceful AIDS Protestors
The South African government should immediately investigate the police’s use of rubber bullets and teargas against peaceful HIV/AIDS demonstrators in Eastern Cape on Tuesday, Human Rights Watch said today.
In the Eastern Cape city of Queenstown, local members of the Treatment Action Campaign on Tuesday staged a peaceful demonstration to protest lack of progress on access to antiretroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS in the province.
Without warning, police assaulted the protestors and opened fire with rubber bullets and released teargas as people ran away. Forty people were injured and 10 were treated for gunshot wounds, according to the Treatment Action Campaign. None of the protestors was arrested or charged with any crime.
“It’s a shocking irony that people demonstrating for essential medicines should be met with rubber bullets and teargas,” said Jonathan Cohen, researcher with Human Rights Watch’s HIV/AIDS Program. “South Africa should be easing the suffering of people with AIDS, not violently dispersing peaceful demonstrations.”
There is no indication that the actions by the South African police met international standards for the appropriate use of force by police. The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provides that police shall, as far as possible, use nonviolent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms. Whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, police must exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offense and the legitimate objective to be achieved, and also minimize damage and injury.
Tuesday’s demonstration followed six months of failed negotiations between AIDS activists and local health authorities about access to antiretroviral treatment for persons with HIV/AIDS. In December, the Eastern Cape Health Department stopped providing treatment to new patients until further notice. The government referred patients already on treatment to Frontier Hospital in Queenstown, but activists say that hospital is treating fewer than 200 of an estimated 2,000 people in need. Since the hospital established a waiting list for treatment, more than 50 patients have died.
South Africa is home to about 5.3 million people living with HIV/AIDS. In November 2003 the government committed to providing 53,000 patients with free antiretroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS by March 2004. Even by March 2005, only about half that number were receiving treatment, according to the Treatment Action Campaign. Human rights organizations have criticized the slow progress of the provision of treatment and the South African government’s lack of commitment to HIV/AIDS treatment programs.
“South African AIDS activists did not resort to violence,” said Cohen. “Instead, their government did.”
Source: Human Rights Watch
In the Eastern Cape city of Queenstown, local members of the Treatment Action Campaign on Tuesday staged a peaceful demonstration to protest lack of progress on access to antiretroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS in the province.
Without warning, police assaulted the protestors and opened fire with rubber bullets and released teargas as people ran away. Forty people were injured and 10 were treated for gunshot wounds, according to the Treatment Action Campaign. None of the protestors was arrested or charged with any crime.
“It’s a shocking irony that people demonstrating for essential medicines should be met with rubber bullets and teargas,” said Jonathan Cohen, researcher with Human Rights Watch’s HIV/AIDS Program. “South Africa should be easing the suffering of people with AIDS, not violently dispersing peaceful demonstrations.”
There is no indication that the actions by the South African police met international standards for the appropriate use of force by police. The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provides that police shall, as far as possible, use nonviolent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms. Whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, police must exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offense and the legitimate objective to be achieved, and also minimize damage and injury.
Tuesday’s demonstration followed six months of failed negotiations between AIDS activists and local health authorities about access to antiretroviral treatment for persons with HIV/AIDS. In December, the Eastern Cape Health Department stopped providing treatment to new patients until further notice. The government referred patients already on treatment to Frontier Hospital in Queenstown, but activists say that hospital is treating fewer than 200 of an estimated 2,000 people in need. Since the hospital established a waiting list for treatment, more than 50 patients have died.
South Africa is home to about 5.3 million people living with HIV/AIDS. In November 2003 the government committed to providing 53,000 patients with free antiretroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS by March 2004. Even by March 2005, only about half that number were receiving treatment, according to the Treatment Action Campaign. Human rights organizations have criticized the slow progress of the provision of treatment and the South African government’s lack of commitment to HIV/AIDS treatment programs.
“South African AIDS activists did not resort to violence,” said Cohen. “Instead, their government did.”
Source: Human Rights Watch
Friday, July 1, 2005
South African strike against unemployment and poverty
Hundreds of thousands of workers took part in a national one-day strike June 27 called by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) against unemployment and poverty. Some 30,000 people marched through Johannesburg, a similar number in Cape Town and tens of thousands in other cities throughout the country.
According to figures from employers’ organizations some 80 percent of gold miners joined the action, 70 percent of coal miners and 50 percent in the diamond and platinum sector. There were large contingents of textile workers on the marches as over 40,000 have lost their jobs since January 2003. DaimlerChrysler and Volkswagen were only able to carry out limited production, whilst the steel and engineering sector reported that large plants were closed with 20 percent of the industry affected.
Official unemployment stands at 26 percent, but if those who no longer bother to seek work because of the lack of prospects are included the figure is 41 percent. This is double the figure of 10 years ago. A quarter of workers in the formal sector and two thirds of workers in the informal sector, domestic and agricultural work earn less than US$150 a month. Approximately 4 million people out of a population of 44 million are living in extreme poverty, defined as less than US$1 a day.
The situation is made worse by the fact that some 5.3 million people are living with HIV/AIDS, with up to 500,000 people in need of immediate medication. Less than 1 percent of these are covered by the government’s antiretroviral treatment plan.
As well as the unemployment, poverty and AIDS situation, some 2-3 million people are without adequate housing. The government’s lack of response has prompted a growing number of protest demonstrations in the suburbs of the main cities.
Despite this worsening social disaster, President Thabo Mbeki has made clear that he intends to proceed with policies demanded by the financial elite and big business sector.
He recently sacked Deputy President Jacob Zuma, a veteran of the anti-apartheid struggle who is popular with the African National Congress (ANC) youth movement and the South African Communist Party (SACP). In Zuma’s place he has appointed Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, whose appointment has been welcomed by business interests. As minerals and energy minister, she was responsible for introducing free-market measures that have cost tens of thousands of jobs already in mining with even more to go. She is identified with the business wing of the party and is well thought of by the mining interests such as Anglo, Harmony and De Beers.
The ANC is due to discuss a new economic policy document at its national general council next week. “Some of the things suggested in the economics paper came as a shock to many ANC people,” said Minister of Arts and Culture Pallo Jordan. Speaking to the South African Mail and Guardian he said: “There will probably be very heated debate about it.”
The proposals involve waiving the minimum wage for young workers and making it easier for employers to sack them. Companies employing less than 200 workers would be exempted from some labour laws. This would exempt the vast majority of smaller firms. The ANC youth league complained that the proposals introduced “cheap labour by the back door.” The SACP said that the proposals “overwhelmingly represent an attack on existing worker rights.”
COSATU was obliged to call the strike and protest marches because of the mounting anger among South African workers and youth. Their aim was to let off steam and to prevent serious opposition to the ANC government’s free-market programme from emerging. COSATU has already shown its willingness to collaborate with the ANC leadership, despite its public façade of protesting. According to the South African Broadcasting Corporation, COSATU officials met with Mlambo-Ngcuka before the strike and indicated their willingness to call off future actions in response to more negotiations, but said it was too short notice to stop the recent action from going ahead.
Both COSATU and the SACP have been allied to the ANC since the days of the anti-apartheid struggle and have been loyal supporters of the government since it came to power. They have no alternative perspective to that of the government and have been partners in drawing up and implementing the very policies against which they are now protesting. Insofar as they have differences with the government, it is that they want a more nationalist approach to economic policy. COSATU is demanding that shops sell 75 percent locally made products and wants the government to put pressure on business to save jobs and buy local goods. A major plank of its campaign is for “safeguard measures to protect industries under threat from Chinese imports.” This kind of economic nationalism would pit South African workers against Chinese workers and working people internationally.
In his address to the demonstrators, COSATU Secretary Zwelinzima Vavi appealed to the ANC Freedom Charter, the fiftieth anniversary of which had been celebrated the previous day. He pointed out that the Charter promised work and security for all and that the country’s wealth would be shared by all the people of South Africa. Instead, he said, 11 years after majority rule was established there was growing inequality and a tiny minority still controls the country’s wealth.
He did not point out that the same charter, which was signed at Kliptown near Soweto in 1955, guaranteed the freedom to the very capitalist businesses that are sacking workers. Unemployment and poverty are the consequences of the capitalist programme that COSATU and the SACP have supported for half a century. The measures of amelioration that they hoped would be introduced by an ANC government depended on the existence of a relatively isolated national economy, in which certain reforms could be implemented. But the globalized economy has undermined the possibility of implementing national reformist programmes. Just across the border in Zimbabwe there is a very harsh example of what isolation from the world market means these days—an isolation imposed by the Western powers. In Zimbabwe 80 percent of the population is working in what is euphemistically called the informal sector. Hunger is rife and AIDS is spreading unchecked. In their different ways, Zimbabwe and South Africa express the total bankruptcy of the nationalist agenda.
Media reports and employers’ organisations have played down the response to the strike, but considering COSATU’s record of calling such token protests whilst remaining in an alliance with the ANC government, the turnout was large and reflects the growing anger of working people at the worsening position facing the mass of the population since the end of apartheid.
But the protesters need to make a serious assessment of the record and political perspective of the ANC. There is increasing talk of a split within the ANC between the business wing and the working class. This reflects the extreme tensions that are developing as the government implements its pro-business policies. But working people would no be better served by a left-wing split from the ANC, since the perspective of such a group would still be that of the capitalist programme on which the ANC was originally founded. What is needed is an entirely different perspective based on socialist internationalism.
Source: World Socialist Web Site
According to figures from employers’ organizations some 80 percent of gold miners joined the action, 70 percent of coal miners and 50 percent in the diamond and platinum sector. There were large contingents of textile workers on the marches as over 40,000 have lost their jobs since January 2003. DaimlerChrysler and Volkswagen were only able to carry out limited production, whilst the steel and engineering sector reported that large plants were closed with 20 percent of the industry affected.
Official unemployment stands at 26 percent, but if those who no longer bother to seek work because of the lack of prospects are included the figure is 41 percent. This is double the figure of 10 years ago. A quarter of workers in the formal sector and two thirds of workers in the informal sector, domestic and agricultural work earn less than US$150 a month. Approximately 4 million people out of a population of 44 million are living in extreme poverty, defined as less than US$1 a day.
The situation is made worse by the fact that some 5.3 million people are living with HIV/AIDS, with up to 500,000 people in need of immediate medication. Less than 1 percent of these are covered by the government’s antiretroviral treatment plan.
As well as the unemployment, poverty and AIDS situation, some 2-3 million people are without adequate housing. The government’s lack of response has prompted a growing number of protest demonstrations in the suburbs of the main cities.
Despite this worsening social disaster, President Thabo Mbeki has made clear that he intends to proceed with policies demanded by the financial elite and big business sector.
He recently sacked Deputy President Jacob Zuma, a veteran of the anti-apartheid struggle who is popular with the African National Congress (ANC) youth movement and the South African Communist Party (SACP). In Zuma’s place he has appointed Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, whose appointment has been welcomed by business interests. As minerals and energy minister, she was responsible for introducing free-market measures that have cost tens of thousands of jobs already in mining with even more to go. She is identified with the business wing of the party and is well thought of by the mining interests such as Anglo, Harmony and De Beers.
The ANC is due to discuss a new economic policy document at its national general council next week. “Some of the things suggested in the economics paper came as a shock to many ANC people,” said Minister of Arts and Culture Pallo Jordan. Speaking to the South African Mail and Guardian he said: “There will probably be very heated debate about it.”
The proposals involve waiving the minimum wage for young workers and making it easier for employers to sack them. Companies employing less than 200 workers would be exempted from some labour laws. This would exempt the vast majority of smaller firms. The ANC youth league complained that the proposals introduced “cheap labour by the back door.” The SACP said that the proposals “overwhelmingly represent an attack on existing worker rights.”
COSATU was obliged to call the strike and protest marches because of the mounting anger among South African workers and youth. Their aim was to let off steam and to prevent serious opposition to the ANC government’s free-market programme from emerging. COSATU has already shown its willingness to collaborate with the ANC leadership, despite its public façade of protesting. According to the South African Broadcasting Corporation, COSATU officials met with Mlambo-Ngcuka before the strike and indicated their willingness to call off future actions in response to more negotiations, but said it was too short notice to stop the recent action from going ahead.
Both COSATU and the SACP have been allied to the ANC since the days of the anti-apartheid struggle and have been loyal supporters of the government since it came to power. They have no alternative perspective to that of the government and have been partners in drawing up and implementing the very policies against which they are now protesting. Insofar as they have differences with the government, it is that they want a more nationalist approach to economic policy. COSATU is demanding that shops sell 75 percent locally made products and wants the government to put pressure on business to save jobs and buy local goods. A major plank of its campaign is for “safeguard measures to protect industries under threat from Chinese imports.” This kind of economic nationalism would pit South African workers against Chinese workers and working people internationally.
In his address to the demonstrators, COSATU Secretary Zwelinzima Vavi appealed to the ANC Freedom Charter, the fiftieth anniversary of which had been celebrated the previous day. He pointed out that the Charter promised work and security for all and that the country’s wealth would be shared by all the people of South Africa. Instead, he said, 11 years after majority rule was established there was growing inequality and a tiny minority still controls the country’s wealth.
He did not point out that the same charter, which was signed at Kliptown near Soweto in 1955, guaranteed the freedom to the very capitalist businesses that are sacking workers. Unemployment and poverty are the consequences of the capitalist programme that COSATU and the SACP have supported for half a century. The measures of amelioration that they hoped would be introduced by an ANC government depended on the existence of a relatively isolated national economy, in which certain reforms could be implemented. But the globalized economy has undermined the possibility of implementing national reformist programmes. Just across the border in Zimbabwe there is a very harsh example of what isolation from the world market means these days—an isolation imposed by the Western powers. In Zimbabwe 80 percent of the population is working in what is euphemistically called the informal sector. Hunger is rife and AIDS is spreading unchecked. In their different ways, Zimbabwe and South Africa express the total bankruptcy of the nationalist agenda.
Media reports and employers’ organisations have played down the response to the strike, but considering COSATU’s record of calling such token protests whilst remaining in an alliance with the ANC government, the turnout was large and reflects the growing anger of working people at the worsening position facing the mass of the population since the end of apartheid.
But the protesters need to make a serious assessment of the record and political perspective of the ANC. There is increasing talk of a split within the ANC between the business wing and the working class. This reflects the extreme tensions that are developing as the government implements its pro-business policies. But working people would no be better served by a left-wing split from the ANC, since the perspective of such a group would still be that of the capitalist programme on which the ANC was originally founded. What is needed is an entirely different perspective based on socialist internationalism.
Source: World Socialist Web Site
Wednesday, June 29, 2005
Swedish nuclear power station leaks high levels of radioactive waste into Baltic
A nuclear power station at Forsmark, north of Stockholm, has leaked high levels of radioactive caesium into the Baltic Sea, reported Swedish Radio.
Measurements are 10 times greater than normal but the Swedish State Radiation Protection Authority said the levels are still well below the risk zone. The agency said it appears that storage tanks for low and medium-level radioactive wastes have corroded, and the wastes have leaked into the drainage system.
Swedes voted in a referendum in 1980 to phase out nuclear power, but the main political parties are currently at loggerheads over the country's nuclear future with some parties arguing for an extension to the life of existing power stations.
Source: Forbes
Measurements are 10 times greater than normal but the Swedish State Radiation Protection Authority said the levels are still well below the risk zone. The agency said it appears that storage tanks for low and medium-level radioactive wastes have corroded, and the wastes have leaked into the drainage system.
Swedes voted in a referendum in 1980 to phase out nuclear power, but the main political parties are currently at loggerheads over the country's nuclear future with some parties arguing for an extension to the life of existing power stations.
Source: Forbes
Wednesday, June 22, 2005
Profile: Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka
Since her appointment as minister of minerals and energy in 1999, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka has consistently won praise as one of the most effective ministers in the South African government.
Mining, for which she has carried political responsibility, remains a key sector within the South African economy, but also one that has been urgently in need of reform. The minister is admired for having steered the industry successfully through a time of change, increasing black South African participation in the sector without alienating foreign investors. Her achievements in government have been acknowledged with her promotion to the deputy presidency. As deputy president, she moves into the highest office ever occupied by a woman in South Africa, and her appointment is the latest step in President Thabo Mbeki's efforts to increase female representation in government.
It is only in the past few months that two incidents in particular have cast a shadow over her reputation. When environmental activists called for an investigation into the illness of workers at a nuclear installation, Ms Mlambo-Ngcuka responded by saying that South Africa needed laws to prevent organisations from "spreading panic" - a remark that angered defenders of free speech.
More recently, it emerged that her brother had benefited from a loan involving state money that was to have been used in a government oil transaction. The minister's office strongly denied any suggestions of wrong-doing, saying the loan had been repaid before the matter was made public. But any discontentment with her appointment is less likely to hinge on anything she has done than on the man to whom she is married. Her husband, Bulelani Ngcuka, is the former chief prosecutor who initiated an investigation into the financial affairs of sacked former Deputy President Jacob Zuma - the man she replaces.
In 2003, he angered Mr Zuma by publicly announcing that while there was a prima facie case against the then deputy president, there was insufficient evidence to convict him. Her appointment to the deputy presidency will inevitably leave Ms Mlambo-Ngcuka open to criticism from Mr Zuma's supporters who already believe - albeit without concrete evidence - that her husband was part of a conspiracy to get rid of the former deputy president.
Born in 1955, Phumzile Mlambo began her career as a schoolteacher, before moving into development work. Working both inside and outside South Africa during the apartheid years, she rose to political prominence after the unbanning of the ANC in 1990. She entered government as a deputy minister in 1996, and has headed the Minerals and Energy Ministry since Thabo Mbeki was elected president in 1999. Her appointment as deputy president does not automatically mean she will succeed Thabo Mbeki, but it certainly improves her chances of becoming Africa's first elected female head of state.
Source: BBC News
Mining, for which she has carried political responsibility, remains a key sector within the South African economy, but also one that has been urgently in need of reform. The minister is admired for having steered the industry successfully through a time of change, increasing black South African participation in the sector without alienating foreign investors. Her achievements in government have been acknowledged with her promotion to the deputy presidency. As deputy president, she moves into the highest office ever occupied by a woman in South Africa, and her appointment is the latest step in President Thabo Mbeki's efforts to increase female representation in government.
It is only in the past few months that two incidents in particular have cast a shadow over her reputation. When environmental activists called for an investigation into the illness of workers at a nuclear installation, Ms Mlambo-Ngcuka responded by saying that South Africa needed laws to prevent organisations from "spreading panic" - a remark that angered defenders of free speech.
More recently, it emerged that her brother had benefited from a loan involving state money that was to have been used in a government oil transaction. The minister's office strongly denied any suggestions of wrong-doing, saying the loan had been repaid before the matter was made public. But any discontentment with her appointment is less likely to hinge on anything she has done than on the man to whom she is married. Her husband, Bulelani Ngcuka, is the former chief prosecutor who initiated an investigation into the financial affairs of sacked former Deputy President Jacob Zuma - the man she replaces.
In 2003, he angered Mr Zuma by publicly announcing that while there was a prima facie case against the then deputy president, there was insufficient evidence to convict him. Her appointment to the deputy presidency will inevitably leave Ms Mlambo-Ngcuka open to criticism from Mr Zuma's supporters who already believe - albeit without concrete evidence - that her husband was part of a conspiracy to get rid of the former deputy president.
Born in 1955, Phumzile Mlambo began her career as a schoolteacher, before moving into development work. Working both inside and outside South Africa during the apartheid years, she rose to political prominence after the unbanning of the ANC in 1990. She entered government as a deputy minister in 1996, and has headed the Minerals and Energy Ministry since Thabo Mbeki was elected president in 1999. Her appointment as deputy president does not automatically mean she will succeed Thabo Mbeki, but it certainly improves her chances of becoming Africa's first elected female head of state.
Source: BBC News
Wednesday, June 15, 2005
Mass protests against housing shortages in South Africa
Mass protests have been taking place in the poverty-stricken neighbourhoods of Cape Town, Durban and Free State, South Africa, as well as in the country’s administrative capital, Pretoria.
The response of the African National Congress (ANC) government has been to denounce the protests as the work of a “secret force” which is fomenting trouble in an attempt to overthrow democracy. It called in the National Intelligence Agency to investigate, and charged 13 demonstrators from last year’s protest in Harrismith with sedition, a charge carrying a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment. President Thabo Mbeki threatened that the full force of the law will be used against the illegal protests and the Western Cape premier, Ebrahim Rasool, echoed his words.
Source: World Socialist Web
The response of the African National Congress (ANC) government has been to denounce the protests as the work of a “secret force” which is fomenting trouble in an attempt to overthrow democracy. It called in the National Intelligence Agency to investigate, and charged 13 demonstrators from last year’s protest in Harrismith with sedition, a charge carrying a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment. President Thabo Mbeki threatened that the full force of the law will be used against the illegal protests and the Western Cape premier, Ebrahim Rasool, echoed his words.
Source: World Socialist Web
Wednesday, June 1, 2005
The Curse of Gold
This 159-page report documents how local armed groups fighting for the control of gold mines and trading routes have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity using the profits from gold to fund their activities and buy weapons. The report provides details of how a leading gold mining company, AngloGold Ashanti, part of the international mining conglomerate Anglo American, developed links with one murderous armed group, the Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI), helping them to access the gold-rich mining site around the town of Mongbwalu in the northeastern Ituri district.
Source: Human Rights Watch
Source: Human Rights Watch
Friday, May 27, 2005
Most judges 'support change'
Moseneke, appearing before the commission after being nominated by President Thabo Mbeki to the post of deputy chief justice, took the opportunity to say that judges needed to be trusted. "If we appoint people as judges we should trust them" - otherwise it would create unnecessary levels of tension.
Moseneke, who ironically first went to work for an Afrikaner law firm, was later one of the founder members of the Black Lawyers Association. He was also a member of the technical committee which helped draft South Africa's interim constitution. "(It was) one of my privileges... quite a special moment... a fundamental vindication of what one stood for, what one was striving for."
Moseneke said he was "minding my own business" when he was approached by Pallo Jordan on behalf of former president Nelson Mandela to help transform the business sector. He helped restructure state enterprise Telkom before being head-hunted to lead pioneering black empowerment group Nail (New Africa Investment Limited).
When Mbeki called him to offer the position of deputy chief justice, Moseneke did not hesitate in accepting.
Source: News 24.com
Moseneke, who ironically first went to work for an Afrikaner law firm, was later one of the founder members of the Black Lawyers Association. He was also a member of the technical committee which helped draft South Africa's interim constitution. "(It was) one of my privileges... quite a special moment... a fundamental vindication of what one stood for, what one was striving for."
Moseneke said he was "minding my own business" when he was approached by Pallo Jordan on behalf of former president Nelson Mandela to help transform the business sector. He helped restructure state enterprise Telkom before being head-hunted to lead pioneering black empowerment group Nail (New Africa Investment Limited).
When Mbeki called him to offer the position of deputy chief justice, Moseneke did not hesitate in accepting.
Source: News 24.com
Friday, May 20, 2005
PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AGAINST TERRORIST AND RELATED ACTIVITIES ACT 33 OF 2004
The purpose Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorism and Related Activities Act is to provide for measures to prevent and combat terrorist and related activities; to provide for an offence of terrorism and other offences associated or connected with terrorist activities; to provide for Convention offences; to give effect to international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities; to provide for a mechanism to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions, which are binding on member States, in respect of terrorist and related activities; to provide for measures to prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities; to provide for investigative measures in respect of terrorist and related activities; and to provide for matters connected therewith.
WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa is a constitutional democracy where fundamental human rights, such as the right to life and free political activity, are constitutionally enshrined;
AND WHEREAS terrorist and related activities, in whichever form, are intended to achieve political and other aims in a violent or otherwise unconstitutional manner, and thereby undermine democratic rights and values and the Constitution;
AND WHEREAS terrorist and related activities are an international problem, which can only be effectively addressed by means of international co-operation;
AND WHEREAS the Government of the Republic of South Africa has committed itself in international fora such as the United Nations, the African Union and the Non-Aligned Movement, to the prevention and combating of terrorist and related activities;
AND WHEREAS the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373/2001, which is binding on all Member States of the United Nations, as well as the Convention for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted by the Organisation of African Unity, requires Member States to become Party to instruments, dealing with terrorist and related activities, as soon as possible;
AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa has already become Party to the following instruments of the United Nations:
(a) The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963. The Republic became a Party thereto, by accession on 26 May 1972;
(b) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 30 May 1972;
(c) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded at Montreal on 23 September 1971. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 30 May 1972;
(d) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 23 September 2003;
(e) the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 23 September 2003;
(f) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, adopted at Montreal on 24 February 1988. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 21 September 1998;
(g) the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, signed at Montreal on 1 March 1991. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 1 December 1999;
(h) the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 1 May 2003; and
(i) the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1999. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 1 May 2003;
AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa desires to become a Party to the following remaining instruments of the United Nations, not yet ratified or acceded to by the Republic:
(a) The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, adopted at Rome on 10 March 1988;
(b) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf, adopted at Rome on 10 March 1988; and
(c) the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna on 26 October 1979, and signed on behalf of the Republic on 18 May 1981;
AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa has become a Party by ratification, on 7 November 2002, to the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted by the Organisation of African Unity at Algiers on 14 July 1999;
AND WHEREAS the United Nations Security Council from time to time passes resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, requiring Member States to combat terrorist and related activities, including taking effective measures to prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities, and the freezing of funds, assets or economic resources of persons who commit terrorist and related activities;
AND WHEREAS our national laws do not meet all the international requirements relating to the prevention and combating of terrorist and related activities;
AND WHEREAS international law, and in particular international humanitarian law, including the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the said Charter recognizes acts committed in accordance with such international law during a struggle waged by peoples, including any action during an armed struggle, in the exercise or furtherance of their legitimate right to national liberation, self-determination and independence against colonialism, or occupation or aggression or domination by alien or foreign forces, as being excluded from terrorist activities;
AND REALISING the importance to enact appropriate domestic legislation necessary to implement the provisions of relevant international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities, to ensure that the jurisdiction of the courts of the Republic of South Africa enables them to bring to trial the perpetrators of terrorist and related activities; and to co-operate with and provide support and assistance to other States and relevant international and regional organisations to that end;
AND MINDFUL that the Republic, has since 1994, become a legitimate member of the community of nations and is committed to bringing to justice persons who commit such terrorist and related activities; and to carrying out its obligations in terms of the international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities.
Source: SABINET
WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa is a constitutional democracy where fundamental human rights, such as the right to life and free political activity, are constitutionally enshrined;
AND WHEREAS terrorist and related activities, in whichever form, are intended to achieve political and other aims in a violent or otherwise unconstitutional manner, and thereby undermine democratic rights and values and the Constitution;
AND WHEREAS terrorist and related activities are an international problem, which can only be effectively addressed by means of international co-operation;
AND WHEREAS the Government of the Republic of South Africa has committed itself in international fora such as the United Nations, the African Union and the Non-Aligned Movement, to the prevention and combating of terrorist and related activities;
AND WHEREAS the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373/2001, which is binding on all Member States of the United Nations, as well as the Convention for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted by the Organisation of African Unity, requires Member States to become Party to instruments, dealing with terrorist and related activities, as soon as possible;
AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa has already become Party to the following instruments of the United Nations:
(a) The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963. The Republic became a Party thereto, by accession on 26 May 1972;
(b) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 30 May 1972;
(c) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded at Montreal on 23 September 1971. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 30 May 1972;
(d) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 23 September 2003;
(e) the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 23 September 2003;
(f) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, adopted at Montreal on 24 February 1988. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 21 September 1998;
(g) the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, signed at Montreal on 1 March 1991. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 1 December 1999;
(h) the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 1 May 2003; and
(i) the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1999. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 1 May 2003;
AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa desires to become a Party to the following remaining instruments of the United Nations, not yet ratified or acceded to by the Republic:
(a) The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, adopted at Rome on 10 March 1988;
(b) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf, adopted at Rome on 10 March 1988; and
(c) the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna on 26 October 1979, and signed on behalf of the Republic on 18 May 1981;
AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa has become a Party by ratification, on 7 November 2002, to the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted by the Organisation of African Unity at Algiers on 14 July 1999;
AND WHEREAS the United Nations Security Council from time to time passes resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, requiring Member States to combat terrorist and related activities, including taking effective measures to prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities, and the freezing of funds, assets or economic resources of persons who commit terrorist and related activities;
AND WHEREAS our national laws do not meet all the international requirements relating to the prevention and combating of terrorist and related activities;
AND WHEREAS international law, and in particular international humanitarian law, including the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the said Charter recognizes acts committed in accordance with such international law during a struggle waged by peoples, including any action during an armed struggle, in the exercise or furtherance of their legitimate right to national liberation, self-determination and independence against colonialism, or occupation or aggression or domination by alien or foreign forces, as being excluded from terrorist activities;
AND REALISING the importance to enact appropriate domestic legislation necessary to implement the provisions of relevant international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities, to ensure that the jurisdiction of the courts of the Republic of South Africa enables them to bring to trial the perpetrators of terrorist and related activities; and to co-operate with and provide support and assistance to other States and relevant international and regional organisations to that end;
AND MINDFUL that the Republic, has since 1994, become a legitimate member of the community of nations and is committed to bringing to justice persons who commit such terrorist and related activities; and to carrying out its obligations in terms of the international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities.
Source: SABINET
PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AGAINST TERRORIST AND RELATED ACTIVITIES ACT 33 OF 2004
The purpose of the PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AGAINST TERRORIST AND RELATED ACTIVITIES ACT 33 OF 2004 is to provide for measures to prevent and combat terrorist and related activities; to provide for an offence of terrorism and other offences associated or connected with terrorist activities; to provide for Convention offences; to give effect to international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities; to provide for a mechanism to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions, which are binding on member States, in respect of terrorist and related activities; to provide for measures to prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities; to provide for investigative measures in respect of terrorist and related activities; and to provide for matters connected therewith.
PREAMBLE
WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa is a constitutional democracy where fundamental human rights, such as the right to life and free political activity, are constitutionally enshrined;
AND WHEREAS terrorist and related activities, in whichever form, are intended to achieve political and other aims in a violent or otherwise unconstitutional manner, and thereby undermine democratic rights and values and the Constitution;
AND WHEREAS terrorist and related activities are an international problem, which can only be effectively addressed by means of international co-operation;
AND WHEREAS the Government of the Republic of South Africa has committed itself in international fora such as the United Nations, the African Union and the Non-Aligned Movement, to the prevention and combating of terrorist and related activities;
AND WHEREAS the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373/2001, which is binding on all Member States of the United Nations, as well as the Convention for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted by the Organisation of African Unity, requires Member States to become Party to instruments, dealing with terrorist and related activities, as soon as possible;
AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa has already become Party to the following instruments of the United Nations:
(a) The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963. The Republic became a Party thereto, by accession on 26 May 1972;
(b) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 30 May 1972;
(c) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded at Montreal on 23 September 1971. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 30 May 1972;
(d) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 23 September 2003;
(e) the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 23 September 2003;
(f) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, adopted at Montreal on 24 February 1988. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 21 September 1998;
(g) the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, signed at Montreal on 1 March 1991. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 1 December 1999;
(h) the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 1 May 2003; and
(i) the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1999. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 1 May 2003;
AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa desires to become a Party to the following remaining instruments of the United Nations, not yet ratified or acceded to by the Republic:
(a) The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, adopted at Rome on 10 March 1988;
(b) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf, adopted at Rome on 10 March 1988; and
(c) the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna on 26 October 1979, and signed on behalf of the Republic on 18 May 1981;
AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa has become a Party by ratification, on 7 November 2002, to the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted by the Organisation of African Unity at Algiers on 14 July 1999;
AND WHEREAS the United Nations Security Council from time to time passes resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, requiring Member States to combat terrorist and related activities, including taking effective measures to prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities, and the freezing of funds, assets or economic resources of persons who commit terrorist and related activities;
AND WHEREAS our national laws do not meet all the international requirements relating to the prevention and combating of terrorist and related activities;
AND WHEREAS international law, and in particular international humanitarian law, including the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the said Charter recognizes acts committed in accordance with such international law during a struggle waged by peoples, including any action during an armed struggle, in the exercise or furtherance of their legitimate right to national liberation, self-determination and independence against colonialism, or occupation or aggression or domination by alien or foreign forces, as being excluded from terrorist activities;
AND REALISING the importance to enact appropriate domestic legislation necessary to implement the provisions of relevant international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities, to ensure that the jurisdiction of the courts of the Republic of South Africa enables them to bring to trial the perpetrators of terrorist and related activities; and to co-operate with and provide support and assistance to other States and relevant international and regional organisations to that end;
AND MINDFUL that the Republic, has since 1994, become a legitimate member of the community of nations and is committed to bringing to justice persons who commit such terrorist and related activities; and to carrying out its obligations in terms of the international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities, [the act is therefore promolgated].
Tuesday, May 10, 2005
Inmates appear in court after escape attempt
The trial of three convicted criminals who staged a daring escape attempt in 2004 during a visit by the minister of correctional services was on Monday postponed after the one accused unexpectedly ended the mandate of his lawyer.
Klaas Ndlovu, 32, and Jacob Kgatlane, 29, indicated in August that they would plead guilty. But the Pretoria regional court on Monday had to postpone the case at the last minute after Kgatlane decided to apply for another Legal Aid lawyer. Preparations were ready for their trial to be separated from co-accused Matthews Sithole, 34, who indicated he would plead not guilty.
The men are accused of escaping from C-Max prison in May. In the process they allegedly assaulted prison warder Thomas Malamathso when he refused to open a door for them. They are also accused of assaulting inmate George Mbonani and warder Jacobus Hatting by hitting them with the butt of a firearm.
The three prisoners then allegedly kidnapped warder Johannes Phaladi by dragging him from his office to his vehicle where they apparently stole the car. In addition, they are charged with the illegal possession of a .38 Special calibre Rossi Model revolver and five rounds of ammunition. Sithole was sent to C-Max in November 1998. He was serving a 66-year sentence for murdering a warder at the Venda Prison.
Kgatlane was moved to C-Max in August 2001 due to his involvement in gang unrest at Odi prison. He was serving three years for the illegal possession of a firearm. Ndlovu was in C-Max since October 2002 doing a four-year sentence for escaping from police custody. The case was postponed to May 30.
Source: IoL
Klaas Ndlovu, 32, and Jacob Kgatlane, 29, indicated in August that they would plead guilty. But the Pretoria regional court on Monday had to postpone the case at the last minute after Kgatlane decided to apply for another Legal Aid lawyer. Preparations were ready for their trial to be separated from co-accused Matthews Sithole, 34, who indicated he would plead not guilty.
The men are accused of escaping from C-Max prison in May. In the process they allegedly assaulted prison warder Thomas Malamathso when he refused to open a door for them. They are also accused of assaulting inmate George Mbonani and warder Jacobus Hatting by hitting them with the butt of a firearm.
The three prisoners then allegedly kidnapped warder Johannes Phaladi by dragging him from his office to his vehicle where they apparently stole the car. In addition, they are charged with the illegal possession of a .38 Special calibre Rossi Model revolver and five rounds of ammunition. Sithole was sent to C-Max in November 1998. He was serving a 66-year sentence for murdering a warder at the Venda Prison.
Kgatlane was moved to C-Max in August 2001 due to his involvement in gang unrest at Odi prison. He was serving three years for the illegal possession of a firearm. Ndlovu was in C-Max since October 2002 doing a four-year sentence for escaping from police custody. The case was postponed to May 30.
Source: IoL
Tuesday, May 3, 2005
The ANC's Oilgate
A Mail & Guardian investigation into covert party funding has revealed how R11-million of public money was diverted to African National Congress coffers ahead of the 2004 elections. In what may be the biggest political funding scandal since 1994, the M&G has established that South Africa's state oil company, PetroSA, irregularly paid R15-million to Imvume Management -- a company closely tied to the ANC -- at a time when the party was desperate for funds to fight elections. The M&G possesses bank statements and has seen other forensic evidence proving that Imvume transferred the lion's share of this to the ANC within days. PetroSA this week said it was unaware of this. The ANC denied impropriety and said it was not obliged to discuss its funders.
The scheme unfolded in two stages. First, PetroSA management bent over backwards to pay Imvume the money as an advance for the procurement of oil condensate. Then, when Imvume diverted the funds to the ANC instead of paying its own foreign suppliers, PetroSA had to cover the shortfall by paying the same amount again. A multimillion-rand hole remains in the parastatalis books. PetroSA has gone through the motions to recover the debt by suing Imvume -- but most of it remains outstanding. The effect of the entire transaction was that PetroSA, and ultimately the taxpayer, subsidised the ruling party's election campaign: a blatant abuse of public resources.
Imvume's role as an ANC "front company" first emerged in February last year when the M&G exposed its oil dealings with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Imvume principal Sandi Majali obtained lucrative crude oil allocations from that regime when he travelled to Iraq with top ANC officials between 2000 and 2002. More recently, Imvume described its boss as ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe's "economic adviser".
But it was the diversion of the Petro-SA money four months ahead of the 2004 elections that is now lifting the lid on the funding scandal. The deal puts the spotlight on PetroSA's management, which approved the payment; Imvume boss Majali, who asked for the advance and then issued the cheques to the ANC; and Motlanthe, who was Majali's ANC patron. Imvume, now unable to pay its debts, was once the empowerment pin-up of the oil industry. The contract that caused all the trouble was awarded by PetroSA to Imvume on October 15 2002 -- the day President Thabo Mbeki publicly launched PetroSA as the national oil company.
Under the contract, Imvume -- with the backing of Swiss-based resource trader Glencore International -- was to supply PetroSA with regular cargoes of condensate, a feedstock for PetroSA's Mossel Bay gas-to-liquid fuels plant. A number of condensate cargoes were delivered to Mossel Bay during 2003. The standard contractual procedure was for PetroSA to pay Imvume the full cargo price no later than 30 days after the bill of lading date (the date the cargo was loaded for shipment to Mossel Bay). Once it received payment from PetroSA, Imvume would immediately pay it on to Glencore, which sourced the cargo on international markets. Glencore paid Imvume a commission. But in December 2003 the pattern was broken, and PetroSA has confirmed that standard procedure was departed from. The bill of lading date for that cargo was December 6 2003, meaning PetroSA's payment for the cargo -- worth $10-million (about R65-million) -- was due on January 5 2004. But Imvume's Majali asked PetroSA for an advance of R15-million (just more than $2-million of the $10-million) which was paid even before the cargo was discharged on December 22. PetroSA paid the advance into a different account to that usually used by Imvume for the contract.
Evidence in the M&G's possession confirms that Imvume Management's corporate account was credited with R15-million a day later, on December 19. And the M&G has seen forensic proof that within the next four days, Imvume's Majali issued a series of four cheques to the ANC -- for R4-million, R3-million and R2-million (twice). These cheques, totalling R11-million, were all transacted on December 23. This week Majali and Imvume did not dispute that the money was paid to the ANC, but claimed their support for the party was a "private affair".
The transfers to the ANC came four months before the elections, held on April 14 2004. A number of sources have described the party's financial straits around that time, claiming it had a bank overdraft typically running at more than R100-million. When payment for the cargo became due to Glencore on January 5, Imvume failed to pay the company the R15-million advance -- and, effectively, also withheld another R3-million from the balance owed. Glencore turned to PetroSA for what it was owed, eventually threatening in February not to offload the next cargo. PetroSA agreed to cover the shortfall of R18-million, for fear that the Mossel Bay plant would run out of feedstock, leading to greater losses. Effectively, PetroSA paid R18-million twice -- once to Imvume, and once to Imvume's supplier.
PetroSA maintains that the special circumstances of the empowerment environment largely excuse the actions of its management. It also denies that there was pressure from either the Minerals and Energy Ministry or the ANC to approve the advance to Imvume. Circumstances, however, suggest that empowerment is not a sufficient explanation and that Imvume's ANC links played a role. These links were no secret in oil trading circles. A businessman active in the sector told the M&G last year: "It was talked about when they got tenders ... that it was an ANC company ... I certainly understand that ANC fundraising has a keen interest."
The advance payment to Imvume was irregular in that it was a departure from standard procedures. PetroSA maintains procurement policy allows for advance payments, but admits it "should have checked" whether the money was going into the usual account. When the transaction with Imvume blew up in its face, PetroSA continued treating the company with kid gloves.
On February 23 last year, four days after PetroSA had been forced to settle Imvume's debt with Glencore, Majali signed an acknowledgement of debt to PetroSA, agreeing to repay the R18-million plus interest within 90 days. He also ceded his company's revenue stream as security. But Imvume paid nothing in terms of that agreement. Court records show more than a month passed after the expiry of the 90-day term before PetroSA issued a letter of demand. (See "PetroSA vs Imvume Management" download box on top right of this article for full documents).
PetroSA's choice of lawyer employed to pursue the demand raises further questions about PetroSA's seriousness of purpose. The lawyer, Leslie Mkhabela, was previously Imvume's own attorney and still has a business relationship with Majali via their common interest in Forever Resorts Aventura, the privatised state leisure company. This raises conflict-of-interest questions. Mkhabela maintained this week that this was not a problem as he had disclosed his business relationship with Majali to PetroSA. The agreement signed between Mkhize and Majali was still not enforced. Instead new terms, much more favourable to Imvume, were agreed between PetroSA chief executive Sipho Mkhize and Majali in September last year. Now PetroSA waived any claim to interest and agreed that Imvume could repay the capital amount in monthly instalments over four and a half years. But again, in February this year and after paying only R1,33-million, Imvume defaulted, court papers show.
PetroSA took off the kid gloves for a little while, filing an application for summary judgement in the Johannesburg High Court. But the matter was postponed twice, and on a third court date -- May 3 this year -- PetroSA removed the matter from the roll. PetroSA this week claimed that this was to allow Imvume to remain operational, which would give PetroSA a better chance eventually to recoup the debt. The ANC this week threatened legal action against the M&G without confirming or denying the flow of money to it. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the ANC knew exactly where the funding was coming from. Between 2000 and 2002, when Majali was trading in oil allocations from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the ANC's Motlanthe repeatedly accompanied him to that country. ANC treasurer general Mendi Msimang also went along on at least one occasion. It is rumoured that the relationship between Majali and Motlanthe has cooled recently, but an Imvume brochure last year still described Majali as "economic adviser to the secretary general of the ANC". Describing the company's "winning formula", the brochure said Imvume had "access and influence on economic policy".
How they responded ...
PETROSA
The cornerstone of this deal is the policy adopted by PetroSA, which is a national initiative, black economic empowerment (BEE). PetroSA has a mandate to introduce hitherto disadvantaged South Africans into the oil and gas industry. PetroSA had a choice: to continue business as usual and exclude historically disadvantaged South Africans from the mainstream economy and prolong, if not propagate, the two-economies concept, or use our procurement muscle to bring fundamental change to the industry.
To procure a raw material referred to as condensate, the requirement was that the preferred supplier must have a South African partner who qualifies as a BEE candidate. This in effect introduced a major shift in the industry. We deliberately signed deals with the historically disadvantaged party to ensure that they were not "brought along" to the deal, but in fact they were the "principal partner" in the deal.
# On the [High Court] case PetroSA brought against Imvume PetroSA suspended the case due to the fact that if Imvume were liquidated, there would be very little proceeds flowing into PetroSA from that exercise. Imvume is much better off remaining operational for PetroSA to be able to recoup the total sum owed to PetroSA as well as interest and the legal costs.
# On Leslie Mkhabela [PetroSA's choice of lawyer to sue Imvume]
Mkhabela assured PetroSA of the following: he acted on behalf of Imvume during 2002/03. He later decided to resign from their business. While he acted for Imvume, he was invited into a consortium that submitted a bid for the Aventura Resort in exchange for his services. He retains no personal friendship with Imvume.
# On PetroSA's actions and internal inquiry
At the request of Imvume, PetroSA effected a pre-payment into an account different from the normal account. We changed the account without considering that there may be negative ramifications. PetroSA has since tightened the controls around channels of communication and instruction from vendors on payments. PetroSA in its enquiry has not found any wrongdoing by any individual or individuals within PetroSA or external to PetroSA with line of sight to PetroSA. All the procedures and processes were followed. PetroSA honoured the letter of the contract. At times we assist suppliers to better deliver to PetroSA where possible. The procurement policy at PetroSA allows for payments of this nature.
# On the double payment
Glencore held the product. Even though PetroSA did not have a contract with them, they had a ship in the harbour with our product. As we had already paid, PetroSA had to make a decision; to either pay them and deal with Imvume later -- this would cost us $2,8-million -- or refuse to pay and have our refinery cease operating for a minimum of 40 days, at the cost of $1-million daily. The PetroSA board ratified the decision.
Conclusion
It is the intention of PetroSA to recoup all the funds involved in this dispute. A liquidated Imvume would not generate the required proceeds for PetroSA. This would lead to an outright loss. PetroSA needs Imvume to pay back the money owed to PetroSA.
BARRY AARON & ASSOCIATES (lawyers for Majali and Imvume):
Our clients have requested us to record that Imvume had legitimately withheld payment in the sum of $2,8-million from Glencore against receipt of the expected commission on the profit-sharing arrangement in relation to Imvume's contract with PetroSA.
The withholding of this payment was not contested by Glencore until immediately prior to delivery of the next shipment, which it then refused to offload until such time as the shortfall (as Glencore perceived it) on the previous shipment had been paid. This resulted in PetroSA effecting payment of the shortfall and Imvume executing the acknowledgement [of debt] in favour of PetroSA.
The issue of commission from Glencore remains unresolved. Imvume expected to repay PetroSA from anticipated funds and separately resolve the issue with Glencore. Unfortunately, the anticipated funds did not materialise. Imvume has concluded arrangements with PetroSA for repayment. Imvume intends honouring its obligations to PetroSA. Our clients have no objection to fair investigative journalism and comment. [The M&G] however continues to harass our clients in an ongoing witch-hunt. [The M&G] appears to have accessed Imvume's private and confidential records, including (in particular) its banking records, constituting an invasion of our clients' rights to privacy, conduct way beyond the norms of responsible or acceptable investigative journalism. Our clients are a private businessman and a private company respectively, engaging in the legitimate pursuit of their activities. Their business activities and support for the ANC are their private affair. [The M&G] is sabotaging and subverting a legitimate black empowerment initiative.
MNMR Attorneys (for the ANC and Kgalema Motlanthe)
The short time period provided for comment demonstrates that the M&G will not give proper consideration to our clients' submissions. We wish to note that following the recent decision of the Cape high court in the Idasa matter, our clients are not obliged to discuss donations received by it from any person. Even if it were so, our clients would have no obligation and would not always have the ability or means to verify the identity of the sources of all donations made to it. We record, however, that our clients deny any insinuation that they acted in any corrupt, illegal or improper manner. Our clients will not hesitate to protect their rights should the M&G publish the defamatory material contemplated in [your] e-mail.
Source: Mail & Guardian
The scheme unfolded in two stages. First, PetroSA management bent over backwards to pay Imvume the money as an advance for the procurement of oil condensate. Then, when Imvume diverted the funds to the ANC instead of paying its own foreign suppliers, PetroSA had to cover the shortfall by paying the same amount again. A multimillion-rand hole remains in the parastatalis books. PetroSA has gone through the motions to recover the debt by suing Imvume -- but most of it remains outstanding. The effect of the entire transaction was that PetroSA, and ultimately the taxpayer, subsidised the ruling party's election campaign: a blatant abuse of public resources.
Imvume's role as an ANC "front company" first emerged in February last year when the M&G exposed its oil dealings with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Imvume principal Sandi Majali obtained lucrative crude oil allocations from that regime when he travelled to Iraq with top ANC officials between 2000 and 2002. More recently, Imvume described its boss as ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe's "economic adviser".
But it was the diversion of the Petro-SA money four months ahead of the 2004 elections that is now lifting the lid on the funding scandal. The deal puts the spotlight on PetroSA's management, which approved the payment; Imvume boss Majali, who asked for the advance and then issued the cheques to the ANC; and Motlanthe, who was Majali's ANC patron. Imvume, now unable to pay its debts, was once the empowerment pin-up of the oil industry. The contract that caused all the trouble was awarded by PetroSA to Imvume on October 15 2002 -- the day President Thabo Mbeki publicly launched PetroSA as the national oil company.
Under the contract, Imvume -- with the backing of Swiss-based resource trader Glencore International -- was to supply PetroSA with regular cargoes of condensate, a feedstock for PetroSA's Mossel Bay gas-to-liquid fuels plant. A number of condensate cargoes were delivered to Mossel Bay during 2003. The standard contractual procedure was for PetroSA to pay Imvume the full cargo price no later than 30 days after the bill of lading date (the date the cargo was loaded for shipment to Mossel Bay). Once it received payment from PetroSA, Imvume would immediately pay it on to Glencore, which sourced the cargo on international markets. Glencore paid Imvume a commission. But in December 2003 the pattern was broken, and PetroSA has confirmed that standard procedure was departed from. The bill of lading date for that cargo was December 6 2003, meaning PetroSA's payment for the cargo -- worth $10-million (about R65-million) -- was due on January 5 2004. But Imvume's Majali asked PetroSA for an advance of R15-million (just more than $2-million of the $10-million) which was paid even before the cargo was discharged on December 22. PetroSA paid the advance into a different account to that usually used by Imvume for the contract.
Evidence in the M&G's possession confirms that Imvume Management's corporate account was credited with R15-million a day later, on December 19. And the M&G has seen forensic proof that within the next four days, Imvume's Majali issued a series of four cheques to the ANC -- for R4-million, R3-million and R2-million (twice). These cheques, totalling R11-million, were all transacted on December 23. This week Majali and Imvume did not dispute that the money was paid to the ANC, but claimed their support for the party was a "private affair".
The transfers to the ANC came four months before the elections, held on April 14 2004. A number of sources have described the party's financial straits around that time, claiming it had a bank overdraft typically running at more than R100-million. When payment for the cargo became due to Glencore on January 5, Imvume failed to pay the company the R15-million advance -- and, effectively, also withheld another R3-million from the balance owed. Glencore turned to PetroSA for what it was owed, eventually threatening in February not to offload the next cargo. PetroSA agreed to cover the shortfall of R18-million, for fear that the Mossel Bay plant would run out of feedstock, leading to greater losses. Effectively, PetroSA paid R18-million twice -- once to Imvume, and once to Imvume's supplier.
PetroSA maintains that the special circumstances of the empowerment environment largely excuse the actions of its management. It also denies that there was pressure from either the Minerals and Energy Ministry or the ANC to approve the advance to Imvume. Circumstances, however, suggest that empowerment is not a sufficient explanation and that Imvume's ANC links played a role. These links were no secret in oil trading circles. A businessman active in the sector told the M&G last year: "It was talked about when they got tenders ... that it was an ANC company ... I certainly understand that ANC fundraising has a keen interest."
The advance payment to Imvume was irregular in that it was a departure from standard procedures. PetroSA maintains procurement policy allows for advance payments, but admits it "should have checked" whether the money was going into the usual account. When the transaction with Imvume blew up in its face, PetroSA continued treating the company with kid gloves.
On February 23 last year, four days after PetroSA had been forced to settle Imvume's debt with Glencore, Majali signed an acknowledgement of debt to PetroSA, agreeing to repay the R18-million plus interest within 90 days. He also ceded his company's revenue stream as security. But Imvume paid nothing in terms of that agreement. Court records show more than a month passed after the expiry of the 90-day term before PetroSA issued a letter of demand. (See "PetroSA vs Imvume Management" download box on top right of this article for full documents).
PetroSA's choice of lawyer employed to pursue the demand raises further questions about PetroSA's seriousness of purpose. The lawyer, Leslie Mkhabela, was previously Imvume's own attorney and still has a business relationship with Majali via their common interest in Forever Resorts Aventura, the privatised state leisure company. This raises conflict-of-interest questions. Mkhabela maintained this week that this was not a problem as he had disclosed his business relationship with Majali to PetroSA. The agreement signed between Mkhize and Majali was still not enforced. Instead new terms, much more favourable to Imvume, were agreed between PetroSA chief executive Sipho Mkhize and Majali in September last year. Now PetroSA waived any claim to interest and agreed that Imvume could repay the capital amount in monthly instalments over four and a half years. But again, in February this year and after paying only R1,33-million, Imvume defaulted, court papers show.
PetroSA took off the kid gloves for a little while, filing an application for summary judgement in the Johannesburg High Court. But the matter was postponed twice, and on a third court date -- May 3 this year -- PetroSA removed the matter from the roll. PetroSA this week claimed that this was to allow Imvume to remain operational, which would give PetroSA a better chance eventually to recoup the debt. The ANC this week threatened legal action against the M&G without confirming or denying the flow of money to it. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the ANC knew exactly where the funding was coming from. Between 2000 and 2002, when Majali was trading in oil allocations from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the ANC's Motlanthe repeatedly accompanied him to that country. ANC treasurer general Mendi Msimang also went along on at least one occasion. It is rumoured that the relationship between Majali and Motlanthe has cooled recently, but an Imvume brochure last year still described Majali as "economic adviser to the secretary general of the ANC". Describing the company's "winning formula", the brochure said Imvume had "access and influence on economic policy".
How they responded ...
PETROSA
The cornerstone of this deal is the policy adopted by PetroSA, which is a national initiative, black economic empowerment (BEE). PetroSA has a mandate to introduce hitherto disadvantaged South Africans into the oil and gas industry. PetroSA had a choice: to continue business as usual and exclude historically disadvantaged South Africans from the mainstream economy and prolong, if not propagate, the two-economies concept, or use our procurement muscle to bring fundamental change to the industry.
To procure a raw material referred to as condensate, the requirement was that the preferred supplier must have a South African partner who qualifies as a BEE candidate. This in effect introduced a major shift in the industry. We deliberately signed deals with the historically disadvantaged party to ensure that they were not "brought along" to the deal, but in fact they were the "principal partner" in the deal.
# On the [High Court] case PetroSA brought against Imvume PetroSA suspended the case due to the fact that if Imvume were liquidated, there would be very little proceeds flowing into PetroSA from that exercise. Imvume is much better off remaining operational for PetroSA to be able to recoup the total sum owed to PetroSA as well as interest and the legal costs.
# On Leslie Mkhabela [PetroSA's choice of lawyer to sue Imvume]
Mkhabela assured PetroSA of the following: he acted on behalf of Imvume during 2002/03. He later decided to resign from their business. While he acted for Imvume, he was invited into a consortium that submitted a bid for the Aventura Resort in exchange for his services. He retains no personal friendship with Imvume.
# On PetroSA's actions and internal inquiry
At the request of Imvume, PetroSA effected a pre-payment into an account different from the normal account. We changed the account without considering that there may be negative ramifications. PetroSA has since tightened the controls around channels of communication and instruction from vendors on payments. PetroSA in its enquiry has not found any wrongdoing by any individual or individuals within PetroSA or external to PetroSA with line of sight to PetroSA. All the procedures and processes were followed. PetroSA honoured the letter of the contract. At times we assist suppliers to better deliver to PetroSA where possible. The procurement policy at PetroSA allows for payments of this nature.
# On the double payment
Glencore held the product. Even though PetroSA did not have a contract with them, they had a ship in the harbour with our product. As we had already paid, PetroSA had to make a decision; to either pay them and deal with Imvume later -- this would cost us $2,8-million -- or refuse to pay and have our refinery cease operating for a minimum of 40 days, at the cost of $1-million daily. The PetroSA board ratified the decision.
Conclusion
It is the intention of PetroSA to recoup all the funds involved in this dispute. A liquidated Imvume would not generate the required proceeds for PetroSA. This would lead to an outright loss. PetroSA needs Imvume to pay back the money owed to PetroSA.
BARRY AARON & ASSOCIATES (lawyers for Majali and Imvume):
Our clients have requested us to record that Imvume had legitimately withheld payment in the sum of $2,8-million from Glencore against receipt of the expected commission on the profit-sharing arrangement in relation to Imvume's contract with PetroSA.
The withholding of this payment was not contested by Glencore until immediately prior to delivery of the next shipment, which it then refused to offload until such time as the shortfall (as Glencore perceived it) on the previous shipment had been paid. This resulted in PetroSA effecting payment of the shortfall and Imvume executing the acknowledgement [of debt] in favour of PetroSA.
The issue of commission from Glencore remains unresolved. Imvume expected to repay PetroSA from anticipated funds and separately resolve the issue with Glencore. Unfortunately, the anticipated funds did not materialise. Imvume has concluded arrangements with PetroSA for repayment. Imvume intends honouring its obligations to PetroSA. Our clients have no objection to fair investigative journalism and comment. [The M&G] however continues to harass our clients in an ongoing witch-hunt. [The M&G] appears to have accessed Imvume's private and confidential records, including (in particular) its banking records, constituting an invasion of our clients' rights to privacy, conduct way beyond the norms of responsible or acceptable investigative journalism. Our clients are a private businessman and a private company respectively, engaging in the legitimate pursuit of their activities. Their business activities and support for the ANC are their private affair. [The M&G] is sabotaging and subverting a legitimate black empowerment initiative.
MNMR Attorneys (for the ANC and Kgalema Motlanthe)
The short time period provided for comment demonstrates that the M&G will not give proper consideration to our clients' submissions. We wish to note that following the recent decision of the Cape high court in the Idasa matter, our clients are not obliged to discuss donations received by it from any person. Even if it were so, our clients would have no obligation and would not always have the ability or means to verify the identity of the sources of all donations made to it. We record, however, that our clients deny any insinuation that they acted in any corrupt, illegal or improper manner. Our clients will not hesitate to protect their rights should the M&G publish the defamatory material contemplated in [your] e-mail.
Source: Mail & Guardian
The ANC's Oilgate
A Mail & Guardian investigation into covert party funding has revealed how R11-million of public money was diverted to African National Congress coffers ahead of the 2004 elections. In what may be the biggest political funding scandal since 1994, the M&G has established that South Africa's state oil company, PetroSA, irregularly paid R15-million to Imvume Management -- a company closely tied to the ANC -- at a time when the party was desperate for funds to fight elections.
The M&G possesses bank statements and has seen other forensic evidence proving that Imvume transferred the lion's share of this to the ANC within days. PetroSA this week said it was unaware of this. The ANC denied impropriety and said it was not obliged to discuss its funders. The scheme unfolded in two stages. First, PetroSA management bent over backwards to pay Imvume the money as an advance for the procurement of oil condensate. Then, when Imvume diverted the funds to the ANC instead of paying its own foreign suppliers, PetroSA had to cover the shortfall by paying the same amount again.
A multimillion-rand hole remains in the parastatalis books. PetroSA has gone through the motions to recover the debt by suing Imvume -- but most of it remains outstanding. The effect of the entire transaction was that PetroSA, and ultimately the taxpayer, subsidised the ruling party's election campaign: a blatant abuse of public resources. Imvume's role as an ANC "front company" first emerged in February last year when the M&G exposed its oil dealings with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Imvume principal Sandi Majali obtained lucrative crude oil allocations from that regime when he travelled to Iraq with top ANC officials between 2000 and 2002. More recently, Imvume described its boss as ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe's "economic adviser".
The transaction in a nutshell
But it was the diversion of the Petro-SA money four months ahead of the 2004 elections that is now lifting the lid on the funding scandal. The deal puts the spotlight on PetroSA's management, which approved the payment; Imvume boss Majali, who asked for the advance and then issued the cheques to the ANC; and Motlanthe, who was Majali's ANC patron. Imvume, now unable to pay its debts, was once the empowerment pin-up of the oil industry.
The contract that caused all the trouble was awarded by PetroSA to Imvume on October 15 2002 -- the day President Thabo Mbeki publicly launched PetroSA as the national oil company. Under the contract, Imvume -- with the backing of Swiss-based resource trader Glencore International -- was to supply PetroSA with regular cargoes of condensate, a feedstock for PetroSA's Mossel Bay gas-to-liquid fuels plant. A number of condensate cargoes were delivered to Mossel Bay during 2003. The standard contractual procedure was for PetroSA to pay Imvume the full cargo price no later than 30 days after the bill of lading date (the date the cargo was loaded for shipment to Mossel Bay).
Once it received payment from PetroSA, Imvume would immediately pay it on to Glencore, which sourced the cargo on international markets. Glencore paid Imvume a commission. But in December 2003 the pattern was broken, and PetroSA has confirmed that standard procedure was departed from. The bill of lading date for that cargo was December 6 2003, meaning PetroSA's payment for the cargo -- worth $10-million (about R65-million) -- was due on January 5 2004. But Imvume's Majali asked PetroSA for an advance of R15-million (just more than $2-million of the $10-million) which was paid even before the cargo was discharged on December 22. PetroSA paid the advance into a different account to that usually used by Imvume for the contract.
Evidence in the M&G's possession confirms that Imvume Management's corporate account was credited with R15-million a day later, on December 19. And the M&G has seen forensic proof that within the next four days, Imvume's Majali issued a series of four cheques to the ANC -- for R4-million, R3-million and R2-million (twice). These cheques, totalling R11-million, were all transacted on December 23. This week Majali and Imvume did not dispute that the money was paid to the ANC, but claimed their support for the party was a "private affair".
The transfers to the ANC came four months before the elections, held on April 14 2004. A number of sources have described the party's financial straits around that time, claiming it had a bank overdraft typically running at more than R100-million. When payment for the cargo became due to Glencore on January 5, Imvume failed to pay the company the R15-million advance -- and, effectively, also withheld another R3-million from the balance owed.
Glencore turned to PetroSA for what it was owed, eventually threatening in February not to offload the next cargo. PetroSA agreed to cover the shortfall of R18-million, for fear that the Mossel Bay plant would run out of feedstock, leading to greater losses. Effectively, PetroSA paid R18-million twice -- once to Imvume, and once to Imvume's supplier. PetroSA maintains that the special circumstances of the empowerment environment largely excuse the actions of its management. It also denies that there was pressure from either the Minerals and Energy Ministry or the ANC to approve the advance to Imvume.
Circumstances, however, suggest that empowerment is not a sufficient explanation and that Imvume's ANC links played a role. These links were no secret in oil trading circles. A businessman active in the sector told the M&G last year: "It was talked about when they got tenders ... that it was an ANC company ... I certainly understand that ANC fundraising has a keen interest."
The advance payment to Imvume was irregular in that it was a departure from standard procedures. PetroSA maintains procurement policy allows for advance payments, but admits it "should have checked" whether the money was going into the usual account. When the transaction with Imvume blew up in its face, PetroSA continued treating the company with kid gloves.
On February 23 last year, four days after PetroSA had been forced to settle Imvume's debt with Glencore, Majali signed an acknowledgement of debt to PetroSA, agreeing to repay the R18-million plus interest within 90 days. He also ceded his company's revenue stream as security. But Imvume paid nothing in terms of that agreement. Court records show more than a month passed after the expiry of the 90-day term before PetroSA issued a letter of demand. (See "PetroSA vs Imvume Management" download box on top right of this article for full documents).
PetroSA's choice of lawyer employed to pursue the demand raises further questions about PetroSA's seriousness of purpose. The lawyer, Leslie Mkhabela, was previously Imvume's own attorney and still has a business relationship with Majali via their common interest in Forever Resorts Aventura, the privatised state leisure company. This raises conflict-of-interest questions.
Mkhabela maintained this week that this was not a problem as he had disclosed his business relationship with Majali to PetroSA. The agreement signed between Mkhize and Majali was still not enforced. Instead new terms, much more favourable to Imvume, were agreed between PetroSA chief executive Sipho Mkhize and Majali in September last year.
Now PetroSA waived any claim to interest and agreed that Imvume could repay the capital amount in monthly instalments over four and a half years. But again, in February this year and after paying only R1,33-million, Imvume defaulted, court papers show.
PetroSA took off the kid gloves for a little while, filing an application for summary judgement in the Johannesburg High Court. But the matter was postponed twice, and on a third court date -- May 3 this year -- PetroSA removed the matter from the roll. PetroSA this week claimed that this was to allow Imvume to remain operational, which would give PetroSA a better chance eventually to recoup the debt.
The ANC this week threatened legal action against the M&G without confirming or denying the flow of money to it. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the ANC knew exactly where the funding was coming from. Between 2000 and 2002, when Majali was trading in oil allocations from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the ANC's Motlanthe repeatedly accompanied him to that country. ANC treasurer general Mendi Msimang also went along on at least one occasion.
It is rumoured that the relationship between Majali and Motlanthe has cooled recently, but an Imvume brochure last year still described Majali as "economic adviser to the secretary general of the ANC". Describing the company's "winning formula", the brochure said Imvume had "access and influence on economic policy".
How they responded ...
PETROSA
The cornerstone of this deal is the policy adopted by PetroSA, which is a national initiative, black economic empowerment (BEE). PetroSA has a mandate to introduce hitherto disadvantaged South Africans into the oil and gas industry. PetroSA had a choice: to continue business as usual and exclude historically disadvantaged South Africans from the mainstream economy and prolong, if not propagate, the two-economies concept, or use our procurement muscle to bring fundamental change to the industry.
To procure a raw material referred to as condensate, the requirement was that the preferred supplier must have a South African partner who qualifies as a BEE candidate. This in effect introduced a major shift in the industry. We deliberately signed deals with the historically disadvantaged party to ensure that they were not "brought along" to the deal, but in fact they were the "principal partner" in the deal.
# On the [High Court] case PetroSA brought against Imvume PetroSA suspended the case due to the fact that if Imvume were liquidated, there would be very little proceeds flowing into PetroSA from that exercise. Imvume is much better off remaining operational for PetroSA to be able to recoup the total sum owed to PetroSA as well as interest and the legal costs.
# On Leslie Mkhabela [PetroSA's choice of lawyer to sue Imvume]
Mkhabela assured PetroSA of the following: he acted on behalf of Imvume during 2002/03. He later decided to resign from their business. While he acted for Imvume, he was invited into a consortium that submitted a bid for the Aventura Resort in exchange for his services. He retains no personal friendship with Imvume.
# On PetroSA's actions and internal inquiry
At the request of Imvume, PetroSA effected a pre-payment into an account different from the normal account. We changed the account without considering that there may be negative ramifications. PetroSA has since tightened the controls around channels of communication and instruction from vendors on payments. PetroSA in its enquiry has not found any wrongdoing by any individual or individuals within PetroSA or external to PetroSA with line of sight to PetroSA. All the procedures and processes were followed. PetroSA honoured the letter of the contract. At times we assist suppliers to better deliver to PetroSA where possible. The procurement policy at PetroSA allows for payments of this nature.
# On the double payment
Glencore held the product. Even though PetroSA did not have a contract with them, they had a ship in the harbour with our product. As we had already paid, PetroSA had to make a decision; to either pay them and deal with Imvume later -- this would cost us $2,8-million -- or refuse to pay and have our refinery cease operating for a minimum of 40 days, at the cost of $1-million daily. The PetroSA board ratified the decision.
# Conclusion
It is the intention of PetroSA to recoup all the funds involved in this dispute. A liquidated Imvume would not generate the required proceeds for PetroSA. This would lead to an outright loss. PetroSA needs Imvume to pay back the money owed to PetroSA.
BARRY AARON & ASSOCIATES (lawyers for Majali and Imvume):
Our clients have requested us to record that Imvume had legitimately withheld payment in the sum of $2,8-million from Glencore against receipt of the expected commission on the profit-sharing arrangement in relation to Imvume's contract with PetroSA.
The withholding of this payment was not contested by Glencore until immediately prior to delivery of the next shipment, which it then refused to offload until such time as the shortfall (as Glencore perceived it) on the previous shipment had been paid. This resulted in PetroSA effecting payment of the shortfall and Imvume executing the acknowledgement [of debt] in favour of PetroSA.
The issue of commission from Glencore remains unresolved. Imvume expected to repay PetroSA from anticipated funds and separately resolve the issue with Glencore. Unfortunately, the anticipated funds did not materialise. Imvume has concluded arrangements with PetroSA for repayment. Imvume intends honouring its obligations to PetroSA. Our clients have no objection to fair investigative journalism and comment. [The M&G] however continues to harass our clients in an ongoing witch-hunt. [The M&G] appears to have accessed Imvume's private and confidential records, including (in particular) its banking records, constituting an invasion of our clients' rights to privacy, conduct way beyond the norms of responsible or acceptable investigative journalism. Our clients are a private businessman and a private company respectively, engaging in the legitimate pursuit of their activities. Their business activities and support for the ANC are their private affair. [The M&G] is sabotaging and subverting a legitimate black empowerment initiative.
MNMR Attorneys (for the ANC and Kgalema Motlanthe)
The short time period provided for comment demonstrates that the M&G will not give proper consideration to our clients' submissions. We wish to note that following the recent decision of the Cape high court in the Idasa matter, our clients are not obliged to discuss donations received by it from any person. Even if it were so, our clients would have no obligation and would not always have the ability or means to verify the identity of the sources of all donations made to it. We record, however, that our clients deny any insinuation that they acted in any corrupt, illegal or improper manner. Our clients will not hesitate to protect their rights should the M&G publish the defamatory material contemplated in [your] e-mail.
Source: Mail & Guardian
The M&G possesses bank statements and has seen other forensic evidence proving that Imvume transferred the lion's share of this to the ANC within days. PetroSA this week said it was unaware of this. The ANC denied impropriety and said it was not obliged to discuss its funders. The scheme unfolded in two stages. First, PetroSA management bent over backwards to pay Imvume the money as an advance for the procurement of oil condensate. Then, when Imvume diverted the funds to the ANC instead of paying its own foreign suppliers, PetroSA had to cover the shortfall by paying the same amount again.
A multimillion-rand hole remains in the parastatalis books. PetroSA has gone through the motions to recover the debt by suing Imvume -- but most of it remains outstanding. The effect of the entire transaction was that PetroSA, and ultimately the taxpayer, subsidised the ruling party's election campaign: a blatant abuse of public resources. Imvume's role as an ANC "front company" first emerged in February last year when the M&G exposed its oil dealings with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Imvume principal Sandi Majali obtained lucrative crude oil allocations from that regime when he travelled to Iraq with top ANC officials between 2000 and 2002. More recently, Imvume described its boss as ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe's "economic adviser".
The transaction in a nutshell
But it was the diversion of the Petro-SA money four months ahead of the 2004 elections that is now lifting the lid on the funding scandal. The deal puts the spotlight on PetroSA's management, which approved the payment; Imvume boss Majali, who asked for the advance and then issued the cheques to the ANC; and Motlanthe, who was Majali's ANC patron. Imvume, now unable to pay its debts, was once the empowerment pin-up of the oil industry.
The contract that caused all the trouble was awarded by PetroSA to Imvume on October 15 2002 -- the day President Thabo Mbeki publicly launched PetroSA as the national oil company. Under the contract, Imvume -- with the backing of Swiss-based resource trader Glencore International -- was to supply PetroSA with regular cargoes of condensate, a feedstock for PetroSA's Mossel Bay gas-to-liquid fuels plant. A number of condensate cargoes were delivered to Mossel Bay during 2003. The standard contractual procedure was for PetroSA to pay Imvume the full cargo price no later than 30 days after the bill of lading date (the date the cargo was loaded for shipment to Mossel Bay).
Once it received payment from PetroSA, Imvume would immediately pay it on to Glencore, which sourced the cargo on international markets. Glencore paid Imvume a commission. But in December 2003 the pattern was broken, and PetroSA has confirmed that standard procedure was departed from. The bill of lading date for that cargo was December 6 2003, meaning PetroSA's payment for the cargo -- worth $10-million (about R65-million) -- was due on January 5 2004. But Imvume's Majali asked PetroSA for an advance of R15-million (just more than $2-million of the $10-million) which was paid even before the cargo was discharged on December 22. PetroSA paid the advance into a different account to that usually used by Imvume for the contract.
Evidence in the M&G's possession confirms that Imvume Management's corporate account was credited with R15-million a day later, on December 19. And the M&G has seen forensic proof that within the next four days, Imvume's Majali issued a series of four cheques to the ANC -- for R4-million, R3-million and R2-million (twice). These cheques, totalling R11-million, were all transacted on December 23. This week Majali and Imvume did not dispute that the money was paid to the ANC, but claimed their support for the party was a "private affair".
The transfers to the ANC came four months before the elections, held on April 14 2004. A number of sources have described the party's financial straits around that time, claiming it had a bank overdraft typically running at more than R100-million. When payment for the cargo became due to Glencore on January 5, Imvume failed to pay the company the R15-million advance -- and, effectively, also withheld another R3-million from the balance owed.
Glencore turned to PetroSA for what it was owed, eventually threatening in February not to offload the next cargo. PetroSA agreed to cover the shortfall of R18-million, for fear that the Mossel Bay plant would run out of feedstock, leading to greater losses. Effectively, PetroSA paid R18-million twice -- once to Imvume, and once to Imvume's supplier. PetroSA maintains that the special circumstances of the empowerment environment largely excuse the actions of its management. It also denies that there was pressure from either the Minerals and Energy Ministry or the ANC to approve the advance to Imvume.
Circumstances, however, suggest that empowerment is not a sufficient explanation and that Imvume's ANC links played a role. These links were no secret in oil trading circles. A businessman active in the sector told the M&G last year: "It was talked about when they got tenders ... that it was an ANC company ... I certainly understand that ANC fundraising has a keen interest."
The advance payment to Imvume was irregular in that it was a departure from standard procedures. PetroSA maintains procurement policy allows for advance payments, but admits it "should have checked" whether the money was going into the usual account. When the transaction with Imvume blew up in its face, PetroSA continued treating the company with kid gloves.
On February 23 last year, four days after PetroSA had been forced to settle Imvume's debt with Glencore, Majali signed an acknowledgement of debt to PetroSA, agreeing to repay the R18-million plus interest within 90 days. He also ceded his company's revenue stream as security. But Imvume paid nothing in terms of that agreement. Court records show more than a month passed after the expiry of the 90-day term before PetroSA issued a letter of demand. (See "PetroSA vs Imvume Management" download box on top right of this article for full documents).
PetroSA's choice of lawyer employed to pursue the demand raises further questions about PetroSA's seriousness of purpose. The lawyer, Leslie Mkhabela, was previously Imvume's own attorney and still has a business relationship with Majali via their common interest in Forever Resorts Aventura, the privatised state leisure company. This raises conflict-of-interest questions.
Mkhabela maintained this week that this was not a problem as he had disclosed his business relationship with Majali to PetroSA. The agreement signed between Mkhize and Majali was still not enforced. Instead new terms, much more favourable to Imvume, were agreed between PetroSA chief executive Sipho Mkhize and Majali in September last year.
Now PetroSA waived any claim to interest and agreed that Imvume could repay the capital amount in monthly instalments over four and a half years. But again, in February this year and after paying only R1,33-million, Imvume defaulted, court papers show.
PetroSA took off the kid gloves for a little while, filing an application for summary judgement in the Johannesburg High Court. But the matter was postponed twice, and on a third court date -- May 3 this year -- PetroSA removed the matter from the roll. PetroSA this week claimed that this was to allow Imvume to remain operational, which would give PetroSA a better chance eventually to recoup the debt.
The ANC this week threatened legal action against the M&G without confirming or denying the flow of money to it. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the ANC knew exactly where the funding was coming from. Between 2000 and 2002, when Majali was trading in oil allocations from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the ANC's Motlanthe repeatedly accompanied him to that country. ANC treasurer general Mendi Msimang also went along on at least one occasion.
It is rumoured that the relationship between Majali and Motlanthe has cooled recently, but an Imvume brochure last year still described Majali as "economic adviser to the secretary general of the ANC". Describing the company's "winning formula", the brochure said Imvume had "access and influence on economic policy".
How they responded ...
PETROSA
The cornerstone of this deal is the policy adopted by PetroSA, which is a national initiative, black economic empowerment (BEE). PetroSA has a mandate to introduce hitherto disadvantaged South Africans into the oil and gas industry. PetroSA had a choice: to continue business as usual and exclude historically disadvantaged South Africans from the mainstream economy and prolong, if not propagate, the two-economies concept, or use our procurement muscle to bring fundamental change to the industry.
To procure a raw material referred to as condensate, the requirement was that the preferred supplier must have a South African partner who qualifies as a BEE candidate. This in effect introduced a major shift in the industry. We deliberately signed deals with the historically disadvantaged party to ensure that they were not "brought along" to the deal, but in fact they were the "principal partner" in the deal.
# On the [High Court] case PetroSA brought against Imvume PetroSA suspended the case due to the fact that if Imvume were liquidated, there would be very little proceeds flowing into PetroSA from that exercise. Imvume is much better off remaining operational for PetroSA to be able to recoup the total sum owed to PetroSA as well as interest and the legal costs.
# On Leslie Mkhabela [PetroSA's choice of lawyer to sue Imvume]
Mkhabela assured PetroSA of the following: he acted on behalf of Imvume during 2002/03. He later decided to resign from their business. While he acted for Imvume, he was invited into a consortium that submitted a bid for the Aventura Resort in exchange for his services. He retains no personal friendship with Imvume.
# On PetroSA's actions and internal inquiry
At the request of Imvume, PetroSA effected a pre-payment into an account different from the normal account. We changed the account without considering that there may be negative ramifications. PetroSA has since tightened the controls around channels of communication and instruction from vendors on payments. PetroSA in its enquiry has not found any wrongdoing by any individual or individuals within PetroSA or external to PetroSA with line of sight to PetroSA. All the procedures and processes were followed. PetroSA honoured the letter of the contract. At times we assist suppliers to better deliver to PetroSA where possible. The procurement policy at PetroSA allows for payments of this nature.
# On the double payment
Glencore held the product. Even though PetroSA did not have a contract with them, they had a ship in the harbour with our product. As we had already paid, PetroSA had to make a decision; to either pay them and deal with Imvume later -- this would cost us $2,8-million -- or refuse to pay and have our refinery cease operating for a minimum of 40 days, at the cost of $1-million daily. The PetroSA board ratified the decision.
# Conclusion
It is the intention of PetroSA to recoup all the funds involved in this dispute. A liquidated Imvume would not generate the required proceeds for PetroSA. This would lead to an outright loss. PetroSA needs Imvume to pay back the money owed to PetroSA.
BARRY AARON & ASSOCIATES (lawyers for Majali and Imvume):
Our clients have requested us to record that Imvume had legitimately withheld payment in the sum of $2,8-million from Glencore against receipt of the expected commission on the profit-sharing arrangement in relation to Imvume's contract with PetroSA.
The withholding of this payment was not contested by Glencore until immediately prior to delivery of the next shipment, which it then refused to offload until such time as the shortfall (as Glencore perceived it) on the previous shipment had been paid. This resulted in PetroSA effecting payment of the shortfall and Imvume executing the acknowledgement [of debt] in favour of PetroSA.
The issue of commission from Glencore remains unresolved. Imvume expected to repay PetroSA from anticipated funds and separately resolve the issue with Glencore. Unfortunately, the anticipated funds did not materialise. Imvume has concluded arrangements with PetroSA for repayment. Imvume intends honouring its obligations to PetroSA. Our clients have no objection to fair investigative journalism and comment. [The M&G] however continues to harass our clients in an ongoing witch-hunt. [The M&G] appears to have accessed Imvume's private and confidential records, including (in particular) its banking records, constituting an invasion of our clients' rights to privacy, conduct way beyond the norms of responsible or acceptable investigative journalism. Our clients are a private businessman and a private company respectively, engaging in the legitimate pursuit of their activities. Their business activities and support for the ANC are their private affair. [The M&G] is sabotaging and subverting a legitimate black empowerment initiative.
MNMR Attorneys (for the ANC and Kgalema Motlanthe)
The short time period provided for comment demonstrates that the M&G will not give proper consideration to our clients' submissions. We wish to note that following the recent decision of the Cape high court in the Idasa matter, our clients are not obliged to discuss donations received by it from any person. Even if it were so, our clients would have no obligation and would not always have the ability or means to verify the identity of the sources of all donations made to it. We record, however, that our clients deny any insinuation that they acted in any corrupt, illegal or improper manner. Our clients will not hesitate to protect their rights should the M&G publish the defamatory material contemplated in [your] e-mail.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Saturday, April 30, 2005
Langa is to be chief justice
Justice Pius Langa is to become the country's new chief justice.
He will replace Arthur Chaskalson who is to retire. Langa, currently Chaskalson's deputy, will take up his post on June 1, President Thabo Mbeki's office said in a statement on Saturday.
Mbeki nominated current Constitutional Court justice Dikgang Moseneke as Langa's deputy. The president is required by law to consult parties in the National Assembly as well as the Judicial Service Commission before appointing a deputy.
Source: News 24
He will replace Arthur Chaskalson who is to retire. Langa, currently Chaskalson's deputy, will take up his post on June 1, President Thabo Mbeki's office said in a statement on Saturday.
Mbeki nominated current Constitutional Court justice Dikgang Moseneke as Langa's deputy. The president is required by law to consult parties in the National Assembly as well as the Judicial Service Commission before appointing a deputy.
Source: News 24
Thursday, April 28, 2005
Calm returns after Togo poll riot
Residents of Togo's capital, Lomé, are clearing up after violence erupted following Sunday's disputed elections. Soldiers beat people to make them take down barricades and clean the streets in opposition strongholds, correspondents say. At least 20 people were killed as opposition supporters went on the rampage, saying the polls were rigged.
Ruling party candidate and son of the former leader, Faure Gnassingbe, officially won with 60% of the vote. His main rival Emmanuel Bob Akitani got 38%, the electoral commission said but he declared himself president, saying there had been massive fraud.
Election observers from West African regional body Ecowas accepted that there had been problems but said the results had generally reflected the will of the people. “ [The security forces] smashed in the door. They told us to get out and pick up the stones ”
Ecowas condemned Mr Akitani's declaration and called for a national unity government to prevent further violence. According to the BBC's Mark Dummett in Lome, security was tightened overnight and soldiers are patrolling the city in jeeps mounted with heavy machine guns. They began a massive clear-up operation with bulldozers clear the remnants of burning roadblocks. "[The security forces] smashed in the door. They told us to get out and pick up the stones," Lome resident Assou told Reuters news agency, adding one of soldiers shouted: "Work, work!" Meanwhile, communication remains difficult as telephone networks are not working and most private radio stations were taken off the air on Wednesday. Some 600 people are reported to have fled into Benin from southern Togo, following clashes in the opposition town of Aného.
Mr Atikani's coalition intends to appeal to Togo's constitutional court - which has still to confirm the result of the election - saying he won majorities in all the most populous regions of the country. His support is strongest in the south, including Lome, while Mr Faure's power base is in the north.
Mr Faure denied vote-rigging and urged veteran opposition Union of Forces for Change (UCF) leader Gilchrist Olympio to join a government of national unity. Earlier, Mr Olympio, who was ineligible to stand in the poll because he lives in exile following a 1992 assassination attempt, said his party would not serve as a minority partner in any unity government. The army tried to install Mr Faure after his father's President Gnassingbe Eyadema's death, but pressure led him to step down and call an election.
President Eyadema, led Togo for 38 years, had seized power in a coup from Mr Olympio's father, Sylvanus Olympio, in 1963.
Source: BBC
Ruling party candidate and son of the former leader, Faure Gnassingbe, officially won with 60% of the vote. His main rival Emmanuel Bob Akitani got 38%, the electoral commission said but he declared himself president, saying there had been massive fraud.
Election observers from West African regional body Ecowas accepted that there had been problems but said the results had generally reflected the will of the people. “ [The security forces] smashed in the door. They told us to get out and pick up the stones ”
Ecowas condemned Mr Akitani's declaration and called for a national unity government to prevent further violence. According to the BBC's Mark Dummett in Lome, security was tightened overnight and soldiers are patrolling the city in jeeps mounted with heavy machine guns. They began a massive clear-up operation with bulldozers clear the remnants of burning roadblocks. "[The security forces] smashed in the door. They told us to get out and pick up the stones," Lome resident Assou told Reuters news agency, adding one of soldiers shouted: "Work, work!" Meanwhile, communication remains difficult as telephone networks are not working and most private radio stations were taken off the air on Wednesday. Some 600 people are reported to have fled into Benin from southern Togo, following clashes in the opposition town of Aného.
Mr Atikani's coalition intends to appeal to Togo's constitutional court - which has still to confirm the result of the election - saying he won majorities in all the most populous regions of the country. His support is strongest in the south, including Lome, while Mr Faure's power base is in the north.
Mr Faure denied vote-rigging and urged veteran opposition Union of Forces for Change (UCF) leader Gilchrist Olympio to join a government of national unity. Earlier, Mr Olympio, who was ineligible to stand in the poll because he lives in exile following a 1992 assassination attempt, said his party would not serve as a minority partner in any unity government. The army tried to install Mr Faure after his father's President Gnassingbe Eyadema's death, but pressure led him to step down and call an election.
President Eyadema, led Togo for 38 years, had seized power in a coup from Mr Olympio's father, Sylvanus Olympio, in 1963.
Source: BBC
Friday, April 1, 2005
FINANCIAL SERVICES OMBUD SCHEMES ACT 37 OF 2004
The purpose of the Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act is to provide for the recognition of financial services ombud schemes; to lay down minimum requirements for ombud schemes; to promote consumer education with regard to ombud schemes; to co-ordinate the activities of ombuds of recognised schemes with the activities of the Pension Funds Adjudicator and the Ombud for Financial Services Providers; to develop and promote best practices for complaint resolution; to empower the Ombud for Financial Services Providers to act as a statutory ombud in certain cases; and to provide for matters connected therewith.
An ombud Scheme is an arrangement for the settlement of disputes between between a financial services provider and a client.
Source: SABINET
An ombud Scheme is an arrangement for the settlement of disputes between between a financial services provider and a client.
Source: SABINET
Tuesday, February 15, 2005
Rafik Hariri, Ex-Premier of Lebanon, Dies at 60
Rafik Hariri, a billionaire contractor who plunged into the maelstrom of Lebanese politics to rebuild his war-ravaged country and twice served as prime minister, died on Monday in a huge car bomb explosion in Beirut. He was 60. Mr. Hariri, who had always surrounded himself with bodyguards and lived in a heavily fortified compound, was killed when the bomb hit his motorcade in the city center that he helped restore. He had served as prime minister a total of 10 years, stepping down last fall over Syrian interference in Lebanon.
Born poor in southern Lebanon, Mr. Hariri was a self-made man who amassed a fortune building hotels, palaces and conference centers for the royal family in Saudi Arabia, and remained very close to the Saud family. He was as extravagant in his charitable works as he was in his big-game hunting, yachts, private jets and multimillion-dollar real estate projects. Always impeccably dressed, he was stout with bushy eyebrows and a commanding manner. As a politician, though, he was obliged to keep his domineering nature in check to placate Lebanon's powerful neighbor, Syria.
While Mr. Hariri was accused by some Lebanese of driving the country into debt with his ambitious rebuilding plans, he was also praised as the architect of its rebirth and renewed confidence after the devastation of 15 years of civil war, from 1975 to 1990. He was a well-known figure in Washington and European capitals, where he was largely successful in obtaining Western help to overcome Lebanon's intermittent financial crisis. Yet his political fortunes were always hostage to his up-and-down relations with Syria's presidents, now Bashar al-Assad and before him his father, Hafez al-Assad. For the most part, he appeared to steer an even course. Unlike some of the more impetuous Lebanese clan and religious leaders, Mr. Hariri carefully avoided direct criticism of Syria's role as Lebanon's overlord.
Yet his frustration with the limits that Damascus set sometimes showed. In an interview with The Boston Globe in 1993, he was asked whether the ubiquitous portrait of the elder Mr. Assad on every wall of the old Beirut airport was a problem for him. "It's not a problem to put it up," Mr. Hariri said. "It's a problem to take it down." His long-running rivalry with Émile Lahoud, the pro-Syrian Lebanese president, defined much of his political career. It prompted him to resign in 1998, after his first six years in office. He was re-elected in 2000. His irritation with Mr. Lahoud drove him to another break last year. When Damascus insisted on keeping Mr. Lahoud in office beyond the constitutional limit, Mr. Hariri resigned, a move that was widely interpreted as a definitive rupture with Syria. He had a big enough bloc in Parliament that he could have stopped Syria's order last summer to amend the Constitution to extend Mr. Lahoud's term. He agreed not to after traveling to Damascus and then to the office of Syrian intelligence, which serves as a kind of proconsul in Lebanon. He appeared for the hastily called Parliament vote on the constitutional change with his left arm in a sling from a fall, leading to jokes that the Syrians had twisted it too hard.
The downtown area was already plastered with freshly printed Lahoud posters and pre-positioned fireworks went off as soon as the vote was taken. "He could bypass criticizing Syria because he was able to criticize people who were supporting Syria, like Lahoud," said Edward S. Walker, a former American diplomat who knew Mr. Hariri from his service in the Middle East. "But he never went so far as to make himself a direct target."
Mr. Hariri was born in 1944 in Sidon, an ancient port city on the Mediterranean. The son of a vegetable vendor, he earned a degree in business administration at Arab University in Beirut and then chose the path taken by many enterprising young Arabs of his day: In 1965, he left home to seek his fortune in Saudi Arabia. After a short stint as a teacher, he turned to construction, amassing a fortune in the building frenzy that swept the kingdom in the early years of its oil boom. He became a favorite of the Saudi royal family, even gaining Saudi citizenship, a connection that would prove invaluable after he returned to Lebanon and sought to re-establish its reputation as a tourism and financial center after the civil war.
Mr. Hariri's charitable works - among them a hospital, a teaching university and scholarships for Lebanese students - first reintroduced him to his homeland and grew in tandem with his expanding financial interests. He invested heavily in the reconstruction of central Beirut along the former Green Line, which separated warring militias during the war, and later formed television and radio stations in Lebanon. Although there was some initial criticism, the downtown is now an architectural gem and very popular, particularly with tourists during the summer, when the outdoor cafes are buzzing until 3 a.m. Mr. Hariri's political career began in 1983, one year after an Israeli invasion of Lebanon and at a time when the country was paralyzed by sectarian fighting. He arrived as an envoy of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, with a mandate to mediate between sectarian militias, dodging bullets in typically swashbuckling fashion as his small plane flew into the besieged capital. His mission failed that time, but he was later involved in the successful Saudi effort to end the war and establish the Syrian military as a peacekeeping force.
Under Lebanon's Constitution, the prime minister must be a Sunni Muslim like Mr. Hariri. He was first appointed prime minister in 1992, in the hope that his reputation as a savvy businessman would attract investment and restore confidence in the shattered Lebanese economy, and held onto the post after the country's first postwar elections in 1996. When he first took office, he pledged to lead the country in a "quantum leap" to the future. "I want to go down in the history books," he said at the time, "as the man who resurrected Beirut." Regularly cited as one of the richest men in the world, Mr. Hariri did some of that resurrection with his own money. He was a major shareholder in Solidere, the private company set up to rebuild downtown Beirut, and reportedly paid $10 million for the project's engineering plans. While he was able to pursue an independent economic policy, one that provided wealthy Syrians a safe haven for their money, Mr. Hariri had little control over Lebanon's foreign policy. The militant Shiite party, Hezbollah, supported by Syria and Iran, was left in control over southern Lebanon for years, operating without consultation or coordination with Mr. Hariri's government.
When Hezbollah attacked an Israeli patrol at the border in 2001, prompting a retaliatory airstrike by Israel, for example, Mr. Hariri said he was not surprised that he had not been given advance notice. "Maybe they wanted to make a point that they don't take advice from the government," he said. Last September, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution calling on Syria to respect the sovereignty of Lebanon. The vote followed the moves by pro-Syria politicians in Lebanon to change the Constitution to allow President Lahoud to remain in office. Mr. Hariri, while making his opposition known, acquiesced to the change. Then he resigned. Before his death, he had been promoting a new movement he called Al Mustaqbal (The Future), and seemed intent on remaining in Lebanese politics.
He is survived by his wife, Nazik Hariri, and six children.
Source: New York Times
Saturday, February 5, 2005
G. Eyadema, Togo's Ruler, Dies at 69
Africa's longest serving ruler, President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, died on Saturday as he was being moved to France for medical treatment, the government said in a statement. He was 69. Mr. Eyadema, Togo's ruler for 38 years, had been suffering from illness for several years and had been abroad on several occasions for medical treatment. He was a young soldier when he staged one of the continent's first post-colonial coups in 1963. He took power in his own name in 1967.
On the African stage, Mr. Eyadema carved himself the role of a peacemaker, focusing on regional diplomacy and, most recently, helping to mediate in Ivory Coast's civil war. But at home, his authoritarian style and the slow pace of political reform drew international criticism. Amnesty International accused his forces of killing hundreds in a presidential election in 1998, when he was declared the winner after the vote count was abruptly stopped.
The armed forces said Mr. Eyadema's son Faure would assume power. Under the constitution, the head of the National Assembly should assume provisional power following the death, but the armed forces chief said the action was taken to avoid a power vacuum since the head of the assembly was out of the country.
Source: New York Times
On the African stage, Mr. Eyadema carved himself the role of a peacemaker, focusing on regional diplomacy and, most recently, helping to mediate in Ivory Coast's civil war. But at home, his authoritarian style and the slow pace of political reform drew international criticism. Amnesty International accused his forces of killing hundreds in a presidential election in 1998, when he was declared the winner after the vote count was abruptly stopped.
The armed forces said Mr. Eyadema's son Faure would assume power. Under the constitution, the head of the National Assembly should assume provisional power following the death, but the armed forces chief said the action was taken to avoid a power vacuum since the head of the assembly was out of the country.
Source: New York Times
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