Swedish nuclear power station leaks high levels of radioactive waste into Baltic

A nuclear power station at Forsmark, north of Stockholm, has leaked high levels of radioactive caesium into the Baltic Sea, reported Swedish Radio.

Measurements are 10 times greater than normal but the Swedish State Radiation Protection Authority said the levels are still well below the risk zone. The agency said it appears that storage tanks for low and medium-level radioactive wastes have corroded, and the wastes have leaked into the drainage system.

Swedes voted in a referendum in 1980 to phase out nuclear power, but the main political parties are currently at loggerheads over the country's nuclear future with some parties arguing for an extension to the life of existing power stations.

Source: Forbes

Profile: Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka

Since her appointment as minister of minerals and energy in 1999, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka has consistently won praise as one of the most effective ministers in the South African government.

Mining, for which she has carried political responsibility, remains a key sector within the South African economy, but also one that has been urgently in need of reform. The minister is admired for having steered the industry successfully through a time of change, increasing black South African participation in the sector without alienating foreign investors. Her achievements in government have been acknowledged with her promotion to the deputy presidency. As deputy president, she moves into the highest office ever occupied by a woman in South Africa, and her appointment is the latest step in President Thabo Mbeki's efforts to increase female representation in government.

It is only in the past few months that two incidents in particular have cast a shadow over her reputation. When environmental activists called for an investigation into the illness of workers at a nuclear installation, Ms Mlambo-Ngcuka responded by saying that South Africa needed laws to prevent organisations from "spreading panic" - a remark that angered defenders of free speech.

More recently, it emerged that her brother had benefited from a loan involving state money that was to have been used in a government oil transaction. The minister's office strongly denied any suggestions of wrong-doing, saying the loan had been repaid before the matter was made public. But any discontentment with her appointment is less likely to hinge on anything she has done than on the man to whom she is married. Her husband, Bulelani Ngcuka, is the former chief prosecutor who initiated an investigation into the financial affairs of sacked former Deputy President Jacob Zuma - the man she replaces.

In 2003, he angered Mr Zuma by publicly announcing that while there was a prima facie case against the then deputy president, there was insufficient evidence to convict him. Her appointment to the deputy presidency will inevitably leave Ms Mlambo-Ngcuka open to criticism from Mr Zuma's supporters who already believe - albeit without concrete evidence - that her husband was part of a conspiracy to get rid of the former deputy president.

Born in 1955, Phumzile Mlambo began her career as a schoolteacher, before moving into development work. Working both inside and outside South Africa during the apartheid years, she rose to political prominence after the unbanning of the ANC in 1990. She entered government as a deputy minister in 1996, and has headed the Minerals and Energy Ministry since Thabo Mbeki was elected president in 1999. Her appointment as deputy president does not automatically mean she will succeed Thabo Mbeki, but it certainly improves her chances of becoming Africa's first elected female head of state.

Source: BBC News

Mass protests against housing shortages in South Africa

Mass protests have been taking place in the poverty-stricken neighbourhoods of Cape Town, Durban and Free State, South Africa, as well as in the country’s administrative capital, Pretoria.

The response of the African National Congress (ANC) government has been to denounce the protests as the work of a “secret force” which is fomenting trouble in an attempt to overthrow democracy. It called in the National Intelligence Agency to investigate, and charged 13 demonstrators from last year’s protest in Harrismith with sedition, a charge carrying a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment. President Thabo Mbeki threatened that the full force of the law will be used against the illegal protests and the Western Cape premier, Ebrahim Rasool, echoed his words.

Source: World Socialist Web

The Curse of Gold

This 159-page report documents how local armed groups fighting for the control of gold mines and trading routes have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity using the profits from gold to fund their activities and buy weapons. The report provides details of how a leading gold mining company, AngloGold Ashanti, part of the international mining conglomerate Anglo American, developed links with one murderous armed group, the Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI), helping them to access the gold-rich mining site around the town of Mongbwalu in the northeastern Ituri district.

Source: Human Rights Watch

Most judges 'support change'

Moseneke, appearing before the commission after being nominated by President Thabo Mbeki to the post of deputy chief justice, took the opportunity to say that judges needed to be trusted. "If we appoint people as judges we should trust them" - otherwise it would create unnecessary levels of tension.

Moseneke, who ironically first went to work for an Afrikaner law firm, was later one of the founder members of the Black Lawyers Association. He was also a member of the technical committee which helped draft South Africa's interim constitution. "(It was) one of my privileges... quite a special moment... a fundamental vindication of what one stood for, what one was striving for."

Moseneke said he was "minding my own business" when he was approached by Pallo Jordan on behalf of former president Nelson Mandela to help transform the business sector. He helped restructure state enterprise Telkom before being head-hunted to lead pioneering black empowerment group Nail (New Africa Investment Limited).

When Mbeki called him to offer the position of deputy chief justice, Moseneke did not hesitate in accepting.

Source: News 24.com

PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AGAINST TERRORIST AND RELATED ACTIVITIES ACT 33 OF 2004

The purpose Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorism and Related Activities Act is to provide for measures to prevent and combat terrorist and related activities; to provide for an offence of terrorism and other offences associated or connected with terrorist activities; to provide for Convention offences; to give effect to international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities; to provide for a mechanism to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions, which are binding on member States, in respect of terrorist and related activities; to provide for measures to prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities; to provide for investigative measures in respect of terrorist and related activities; and to provide for matters connected therewith.

WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa is a constitutional democracy where fundamental human rights, such as the right to life and free political activity, are constitutionally enshrined;

AND WHEREAS terrorist and related activities, in whichever form, are intended to achieve political and other aims in a violent or otherwise unconstitutional manner, and thereby undermine democratic rights and values and the Constitution;

AND WHEREAS terrorist and related activities are an international problem, which can only be effectively addressed by means of international co-operation;

AND WHEREAS the Government of the Republic of South Africa has committed itself in international fora such as the United Nations, the African Union and the Non-Aligned Movement, to the prevention and combating of terrorist and related activities;

AND WHEREAS the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373/2001, which is binding on all Member States of the United Nations, as well as the Convention for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted by the Organisation of African Unity, requires Member States to become Party to instruments, dealing with terrorist and related activities, as soon as possible;

AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa has already become Party to the following instruments of the United Nations:

(a) The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963. The Republic became a Party thereto, by accession on 26 May 1972;
(b) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 30 May 1972;
(c) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded at Montreal on 23 September 1971. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 30 May 1972;
(d) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 23 September 2003;
(e) the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 23 September 2003;
(f) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, adopted at Montreal on 24 February 1988. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 21 September 1998;
(g) the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, signed at Montreal on 1 March 1991. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 1 December 1999;
(h) the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 1 May 2003; and
(i) the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1999. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 1 May 2003;

AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa desires to become a Party to the following remaining instruments of the United Nations, not yet ratified or acceded to by the Republic:

(a) The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, adopted at Rome on 10 March 1988;
(b) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf, adopted at Rome on 10 March 1988; and
(c) the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna on 26 October 1979, and signed on behalf of the Republic on 18 May 1981;

AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa has become a Party by ratification, on 7 November 2002, to the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted by the Organisation of African Unity at Algiers on 14 July 1999;

AND WHEREAS the United Nations Security Council from time to time passes resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, requiring Member States to combat terrorist and related activities, including taking effective measures to prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities, and the freezing of funds, assets or economic resources of persons who commit terrorist and related activities;

AND WHEREAS our national laws do not meet all the international requirements relating to the prevention and combating of terrorist and related activities;

AND WHEREAS international law, and in particular international humanitarian law, including the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the said Charter recognizes acts committed in accordance with such international law during a struggle waged by peoples, including any action during an armed struggle, in the exercise or furtherance of their legitimate right to national liberation, self-determination and independence against colonialism, or occupation or aggression or domination by alien or foreign forces, as being excluded from terrorist activities;

AND REALISING the importance to enact appropriate domestic legislation necessary to implement the provisions of relevant international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities, to ensure that the jurisdiction of the courts of the Republic of South Africa enables them to bring to trial the perpetrators of terrorist and related activities; and to co-operate with and provide support and assistance to other States and relevant international and regional organisations to that end;

AND MINDFUL that the Republic, has since 1994, become a legitimate member of the community of nations and is committed to bringing to justice persons who commit such terrorist and related activities; and to carrying out its obligations in terms of the international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities.

Source: SABINET

PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AGAINST TERRORIST AND RELATED ACTIVITIES ACT 33 OF 2004

The purpose of the PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AGAINST TERRORIST AND RELATED ACTIVITIES ACT 33 OF 2004 is to provide for measures to prevent and combat terrorist and related activities; to provide for an offence of terrorism and other offences associated or connected with terrorist activities; to provide for Convention offences; to give effect to international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities; to provide for a mechanism to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions, which are binding on member States, in respect of terrorist and related activities; to provide for measures to prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities; to provide for investigative measures in respect of terrorist and related activities; and to provide for matters connected therewith.

PREAMBLE

WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa is a constitutional democracy where fundamental human rights, such as the right to life and free political activity, are constitutionally enshrined;

AND WHEREAS terrorist and related activities, in whichever form, are intended to achieve political and other aims in a violent or otherwise unconstitutional manner, and thereby undermine democratic rights and values and the Constitution;

AND WHEREAS terrorist and related activities are an international problem, which can only be effectively addressed by means of international co-operation;

AND WHEREAS the Government of the Republic of South Africa has committed itself in international fora such as the United Nations, the African Union and the Non-Aligned Movement, to the prevention and combating of terrorist and related activities;

AND WHEREAS the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373/2001, which is binding on all Member States of the United Nations, as well as the Convention for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted by the Organisation of African Unity, requires Member States to become Party to instruments, dealing with terrorist and related activities, as soon as possible;

AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa has already become Party to the following instruments of the United Nations:

(a) The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963. The Republic became a Party thereto, by accession on 26 May 1972;

(b) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 30 May 1972;

(c) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded at Montreal on 23 September 1971. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 30 May 1972;

(d) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 23 September 2003;

(e) the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 23 September 2003;

(f) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, adopted at Montreal on 24 February 1988. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 21 September 1998;

(g) the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, signed at Montreal on 1 March 1991. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 1 December 1999;

(h) the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 1 May 2003; and

(i) the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1999. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 1 May 2003;

AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa desires to become a Party to the following remaining instruments of the United Nations, not yet ratified or acceded to by the Republic:

(a) The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, adopted at Rome on 10 March 1988;

(b) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf, adopted at Rome on 10 March 1988; and

(c) the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna on 26 October 1979, and signed on behalf of the Republic on 18 May 1981;

AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa has become a Party by ratification, on 7 November 2002, to the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted by the Organisation of African Unity at Algiers on 14 July 1999;

AND WHEREAS the United Nations Security Council from time to time passes resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, requiring Member States to combat terrorist and related activities, including taking effective measures to prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities, and the freezing of funds, assets or economic resources of persons who commit terrorist and related activities;

AND WHEREAS our national laws do not meet all the international requirements relating to the prevention and combating of terrorist and related activities;

AND WHEREAS international law, and in particular international humanitarian law, including the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the said Charter recognizes acts committed in accordance with such international law during a struggle waged by peoples, including any action during an armed struggle, in the exercise or furtherance of their legitimate right to national liberation, self-determination and independence against colonialism, or occupation or aggression or domination by alien or foreign forces, as being excluded from terrorist activities;

AND REALISING the importance to enact appropriate domestic legislation necessary to implement the provisions of relevant international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities, to ensure that the jurisdiction of the courts of the Republic of South Africa enables them to bring to trial the perpetrators of terrorist and related activities; and to co-operate with and provide support and assistance to other States and relevant international and regional organisations to that end;

AND MINDFUL that the Republic, has since 1994, become a legitimate member of the community of nations and is committed to bringing to justice persons who commit such terrorist and related activities; and to carrying out its obligations in terms of the international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities, [the act is therefore promolgated].

Inmates appear in court after escape attempt

The trial of three convicted criminals who staged a daring escape attempt in 2004 during a visit by the minister of correctional services was on Monday postponed after the one accused unexpectedly ended the mandate of his lawyer.

Klaas Ndlovu, 32, and Jacob Kgatlane, 29, indicated in August that they would plead guilty. But the Pretoria regional court on Monday had to postpone the case at the last minute after Kgatlane decided to apply for another Legal Aid lawyer. Preparations were ready for their trial to be separated from co-accused Matthews Sithole, 34, who indicated he would plead not guilty.

The men are accused of escaping from C-Max prison in May. In the process they allegedly assaulted prison warder Thomas Malamathso when he refused to open a door for them. They are also accused of assaulting inmate George Mbonani and warder Jacobus Hatting by hitting them with the butt of a firearm.

The three prisoners then allegedly kidnapped warder Johannes Phaladi by dragging him from his office to his vehicle where they apparently stole the car. In addition, they are charged with the illegal possession of a .38 Special calibre Rossi Model revolver and five rounds of ammunition. Sithole was sent to C-Max in November 1998. He was serving a 66-year sentence for murdering a warder at the Venda Prison.

Kgatlane was moved to C-Max in August 2001 due to his involvement in gang unrest at Odi prison. He was serving three years for the illegal possession of a firearm. Ndlovu was in C-Max since October 2002 doing a four-year sentence for escaping from police custody. The case was postponed to May 30.

Source: IoL

The ANC's Oilgate

A Mail & Guardian investigation into covert party funding has revealed how R11-million of public money was diverted to African National Congress coffers ahead of the 2004 elections. In what may be the biggest political funding scandal since 1994, the M&G has established that South Africa's state oil company, PetroSA, irregularly paid R15-million to Imvume Management -- a company closely tied to the ANC -- at a time when the party was desperate for funds to fight elections. The M&G possesses bank statements and has seen other forensic evidence proving that Imvume transferred the lion's share of this to the ANC within days. PetroSA this week said it was unaware of this. The ANC denied impropriety and said it was not obliged to discuss its funders.

The scheme unfolded in two stages. First, PetroSA management bent over backwards to pay Imvume the money as an advance for the procurement of oil condensate. Then, when Imvume diverted the funds to the ANC instead of paying its own foreign suppliers, PetroSA had to cover the shortfall by paying the same amount again. A multimillion-rand hole remains in the parastatalis books. PetroSA has gone through the motions to recover the debt by suing Imvume -- but most of it remains outstanding. The effect of the entire transaction was that PetroSA, and ultimately the taxpayer, subsidised the ruling party's election campaign: a blatant abuse of public resources.

Imvume's role as an ANC "front company" first emerged in February last year when the M&G exposed its oil dealings with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Imvume principal Sandi Majali obtained lucrative crude oil allocations from that regime when he travelled to Iraq with top ANC officials between 2000 and 2002. More recently, Imvume described its boss as ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe's "economic adviser".

But it was the diversion of the Petro-SA money four months ahead of the 2004 elections that is now lifting the lid on the funding scandal. The deal puts the spotlight on PetroSA's management, which approved the payment; Imvume boss Majali, who asked for the advance and then issued the cheques to the ANC; and Motlanthe, who was Majali's ANC patron. Imvume, now unable to pay its debts, was once the empowerment pin-up of the oil industry. The contract that caused all the trouble was awarded by PetroSA to Imvume on October 15 2002 -- the day President Thabo Mbeki publicly launched PetroSA as the national oil company.

Under the contract, Imvume -- with the backing of Swiss-based resource trader Glencore International -- was to supply PetroSA with regular cargoes of condensate, a feedstock for PetroSA's Mossel Bay gas-to-liquid fuels plant. A number of condensate cargoes were delivered to Mossel Bay during 2003. The standard contractual procedure was for PetroSA to pay Imvume the full cargo price no later than 30 days after the bill of lading date (the date the cargo was loaded for shipment to Mossel Bay). Once it received payment from PetroSA, Imvume would immediately pay it on to Glencore, which sourced the cargo on international markets. Glencore paid Imvume a commission. But in December 2003 the pattern was broken, and PetroSA has confirmed that standard procedure was departed from. The bill of lading date for that cargo was December 6 2003, meaning PetroSA's payment for the cargo -- worth $10-million (about R65-million) -- was due on January 5 2004. But Imvume's Majali asked PetroSA for an advance of R15-million (just more than $2-million of the $10-million) which was paid even before the cargo was discharged on December 22. PetroSA paid the advance into a different account to that usually used by Imvume for the contract.

Evidence in the M&G's possession confirms that Imvume Management's corporate account was credited with R15-million a day later, on December 19. And the M&G has seen forensic proof that within the next four days, Imvume's Majali issued a series of four cheques to the ANC -- for R4-million, R3-million and R2-million (twice). These cheques, totalling R11-million, were all transacted on December 23. This week Majali and Imvume did not dispute that the money was paid to the ANC, but claimed their support for the party was a "private affair".

The transfers to the ANC came four months before the elections, held on April 14 2004. A number of sources have described the party's financial straits around that time, claiming it had a bank overdraft typically running at more than R100-million. When payment for the cargo became due to Glencore on January 5, Imvume failed to pay the company the R15-million advance -- and, effectively, also withheld another R3-million from the balance owed. Glencore turned to PetroSA for what it was owed, eventually threatening in February not to offload the next cargo. PetroSA agreed to cover the shortfall of R18-million, for fear that the Mossel Bay plant would run out of feedstock, leading to greater losses. Effectively, PetroSA paid R18-million twice -- once to Imvume, and once to Imvume's supplier.

PetroSA maintains that the special circumstances of the empowerment environment largely excuse the actions of its management. It also denies that there was pressure from either the Minerals and Energy Ministry or the ANC to approve the advance to Imvume. Circumstances, however, suggest that empowerment is not a sufficient explanation and that Imvume's ANC links played a role. These links were no secret in oil trading circles. A businessman active in the sector told the M&G last year: "It was talked about when they got tenders ... that it was an ANC company ... I certainly understand that ANC fundraising has a keen interest."

The advance payment to Imvume was irregular in that it was a departure from standard procedures. PetroSA maintains procurement policy allows for advance payments, but admits it "should have checked" whether the money was going into the usual account. When the transaction with Imvume blew up in its face, PetroSA continued treating the company with kid gloves.

On February 23 last year, four days after PetroSA had been forced to settle Imvume's debt with Glencore, Majali signed an acknowledgement of debt to PetroSA, agreeing to repay the R18-million plus interest within 90 days. He also ceded his company's revenue stream as security. But Imvume paid nothing in terms of that agreement. Court records show more than a month passed after the expiry of the 90-day term before PetroSA issued a letter of demand. (See "PetroSA vs Imvume Management" download box on top right of this article for full documents).

PetroSA's choice of lawyer employed to pursue the demand raises further questions about PetroSA's seriousness of purpose. The lawyer, Leslie Mkhabela, was previously Imvume's own attorney and still has a business relationship with Majali via their common interest in Forever Resorts Aventura, the privatised state leisure company. This raises conflict-of-interest questions. Mkhabela maintained this week that this was not a problem as he had disclosed his business relationship with Majali to PetroSA. The agreement signed between Mkhize and Majali was still not enforced. Instead new terms, much more favourable to Imvume, were agreed between PetroSA chief executive Sipho Mkhize and Majali in September last year. Now PetroSA waived any claim to interest and agreed that Imvume could repay the capital amount in monthly instalments over four and a half years. But again, in February this year and after paying only R1,33-million, Imvume defaulted, court papers show.

PetroSA took off the kid gloves for a little while, filing an application for summary judgement in the Johannesburg High Court. But the matter was postponed twice, and on a third court date -- May 3 this year -- PetroSA removed the matter from the roll. PetroSA this week claimed that this was to allow Imvume to remain operational, which would give PetroSA a better chance eventually to recoup the debt. The ANC this week threatened legal action against the M&G without confirming or denying the flow of money to it. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the ANC knew exactly where the funding was coming from. Between 2000 and 2002, when Majali was trading in oil allocations from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the ANC's Motlanthe repeatedly accompanied him to that country. ANC treasurer general Mendi Msimang also went along on at least one occasion. It is rumoured that the relationship between Majali and Motlanthe has cooled recently, but an Imvume brochure last year still described Majali as "economic adviser to the secretary general of the ANC". Describing the company's "winning formula", the brochure said Imvume had "access and influence on economic policy".

How they responded ...

PETROSA

The cornerstone of this deal is the policy adopted by PetroSA, which is a national initiative, black economic empowerment (BEE). PetroSA has a mandate to introduce hitherto disadvantaged South Africans into the oil and gas industry. PetroSA had a choice: to continue business as usual and exclude historically disadvantaged South Africans from the mainstream economy and prolong, if not propagate, the two-economies concept, or use our procurement muscle to bring fundamental change to the industry.

To procure a raw material referred to as condensate, the requirement was that the preferred supplier must have a South African partner who qualifies as a BEE candidate. This in effect introduced a major shift in the industry. We deliberately signed deals with the historically disadvantaged party to ensure that they were not "brought along" to the deal, but in fact they were the "principal partner" in the deal.

# On the [High Court] case PetroSA brought against Imvume PetroSA suspended the case due to the fact that if Imvume were liquidated, there would be very little proceeds flowing into PetroSA from that exercise. Imvume is much better off remaining operational for PetroSA to be able to recoup the total sum owed to PetroSA as well as interest and the legal costs.

# On Leslie Mkhabela [PetroSA's choice of lawyer to sue Imvume]
Mkhabela assured PetroSA of the following: he acted on behalf of Imvume during 2002/03. He later decided to resign from their business. While he acted for Imvume, he was invited into a consortium that submitted a bid for the Aventura Resort in exchange for his services. He retains no personal friendship with Imvume.

# On PetroSA's actions and internal inquiry
At the request of Imvume, PetroSA effected a pre-payment into an account different from the normal account. We changed the account without considering that there may be negative ramifications. PetroSA has since tightened the controls around channels of communication and instruction from vendors on payments. PetroSA in its enquiry has not found any wrongdoing by any individual or individuals within PetroSA or external to PetroSA with line of sight to PetroSA. All the procedures and processes were followed. PetroSA honoured the letter of the contract. At times we assist suppliers to better deliver to PetroSA where possible. The procurement policy at PetroSA allows for payments of this nature.

# On the double payment
Glencore held the product. Even though PetroSA did not have a contract with them, they had a ship in the harbour with our product. As we had already paid, PetroSA had to make a decision; to either pay them and deal with Imvume later -- this would cost us $2,8-million -- or refuse to pay and have our refinery cease operating for a minimum of 40 days, at the cost of $1-million daily. The PetroSA board ratified the decision.

Conclusion

It is the intention of PetroSA to recoup all the funds involved in this dispute. A liquidated Imvume would not generate the required proceeds for PetroSA. This would lead to an outright loss. PetroSA needs Imvume to pay back the money owed to PetroSA.

BARRY AARON & ASSOCIATES (lawyers for Majali and Imvume):
Our clients have requested us to record that Imvume had legitimately withheld payment in the sum of $2,8-million from Glencore against receipt of the expected commission on the profit-sharing arrangement in relation to Imvume's contract with PetroSA.

The withholding of this payment was not contested by Glencore until immediately prior to delivery of the next shipment, which it then refused to offload until such time as the shortfall (as Glencore perceived it) on the previous shipment had been paid. This resulted in PetroSA effecting payment of the shortfall and Imvume executing the acknowledgement [of debt] in favour of PetroSA.

The issue of commission from Glencore remains unresolved. Imvume expected to repay PetroSA from anticipated funds and separately resolve the issue with Glencore. Unfortunately, the anticipated funds did not materialise. Imvume has concluded arrangements with PetroSA for repayment. Imvume intends honouring its obligations to PetroSA. Our clients have no objection to fair investigative journalism and comment. [The M&G] however continues to harass our clients in an ongoing witch-hunt. [The M&G] appears to have accessed Imvume's private and confidential records, including (in particular) its banking records, constituting an invasion of our clients' rights to privacy, conduct way beyond the norms of responsible or acceptable investigative journalism. Our clients are a private businessman and a private company respectively, engaging in the legitimate pursuit of their activities. Their business activities and support for the ANC are their private affair. [The M&G] is sabotaging and subverting a legitimate black empowerment initiative.

MNMR Attorneys (for the ANC and Kgalema Motlanthe)
The short time period provided for comment demonstrates that the M&G will not give proper consideration to our clients' submissions. We wish to note that following the recent decision of the Cape high court in the Idasa matter, our clients are not obliged to discuss donations received by it from any person. Even if it were so, our clients would have no obligation and would not always have the ability or means to verify the identity of the sources of all donations made to it. We record, however, that our clients deny any insinuation that they acted in any corrupt, illegal or improper manner. Our clients will not hesitate to protect their rights should the M&G publish the defamatory material contemplated in [your] e-mail.

Source: Mail & Guardian

The ANC's Oilgate

A Mail & Guardian investigation into covert party funding has revealed how R11-million of public money was diverted to African National Congress coffers ahead of the 2004 elections. In what may be the biggest political funding scandal since 1994, the M&G has established that South Africa's state oil company, PetroSA, irregularly paid R15-million to Imvume Management -- a company closely tied to the ANC -- at a time when the party was desperate for funds to fight elections.

The M&G possesses bank statements and has seen other forensic evidence proving that Imvume transferred the lion's share of this to the ANC within days. PetroSA this week said it was unaware of this. The ANC denied impropriety and said it was not obliged to discuss its funders. The scheme unfolded in two stages. First, PetroSA management bent over backwards to pay Imvume the money as an advance for the procurement of oil condensate. Then, when Imvume diverted the funds to the ANC instead of paying its own foreign suppliers, PetroSA had to cover the shortfall by paying the same amount again.

A multimillion-rand hole remains in the parastatalis books. PetroSA has gone through the motions to recover the debt by suing Imvume -- but most of it remains outstanding. The effect of the entire transaction was that PetroSA, and ultimately the taxpayer, subsidised the ruling party's election campaign: a blatant abuse of public resources. Imvume's role as an ANC "front company" first emerged in February last year when the M&G exposed its oil dealings with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Imvume principal Sandi Majali obtained lucrative crude oil allocations from that regime when he travelled to Iraq with top ANC officials between 2000 and 2002. More recently, Imvume described its boss as ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe's "economic adviser".

The transaction in a nutshell

But it was the diversion of the Petro-SA money four months ahead of the 2004 elections that is now lifting the lid on the funding scandal. The deal puts the spotlight on PetroSA's management, which approved the payment; Imvume boss Majali, who asked for the advance and then issued the cheques to the ANC; and Motlanthe, who was Majali's ANC patron. Imvume, now unable to pay its debts, was once the empowerment pin-up of the oil industry.

The contract that caused all the trouble was awarded by PetroSA to Imvume on October 15 2002 -- the day President Thabo Mbeki publicly launched PetroSA as the national oil company. Under the contract, Imvume -- with the backing of Swiss-based resource trader Glencore International -- was to supply PetroSA with regular cargoes of condensate, a feedstock for PetroSA's Mossel Bay gas-to-liquid fuels plant. A number of condensate cargoes were delivered to Mossel Bay during 2003. The standard contractual procedure was for PetroSA to pay Imvume the full cargo price no later than 30 days after the bill of lading date (the date the cargo was loaded for shipment to Mossel Bay).

Once it received payment from PetroSA, Imvume would immediately pay it on to Glencore, which sourced the cargo on international markets. Glencore paid Imvume a commission. But in December 2003 the pattern was broken, and PetroSA has confirmed that standard procedure was departed from. The bill of lading date for that cargo was December 6 2003, meaning PetroSA's payment for the cargo -- worth $10-million (about R65-million) -- was due on January 5 2004. But Imvume's Majali asked PetroSA for an advance of R15-million (just more than $2-million of the $10-million) which was paid even before the cargo was discharged on December 22. PetroSA paid the advance into a different account to that usually used by Imvume for the contract.

Evidence in the M&G's possession confirms that Imvume Management's corporate account was credited with R15-million a day later, on December 19. And the M&G has seen forensic proof that within the next four days, Imvume's Majali issued a series of four cheques to the ANC -- for R4-million, R3-million and R2-million (twice). These cheques, totalling R11-million, were all transacted on December 23. This week Majali and Imvume did not dispute that the money was paid to the ANC, but claimed their support for the party was a "private affair".

The transfers to the ANC came four months before the elections, held on April 14 2004. A number of sources have described the party's financial straits around that time, claiming it had a bank overdraft typically running at more than R100-million. When payment for the cargo became due to Glencore on January 5, Imvume failed to pay the company the R15-million advance -- and, effectively, also withheld another R3-million from the balance owed.

Glencore turned to PetroSA for what it was owed, eventually threatening in February not to offload the next cargo. PetroSA agreed to cover the shortfall of R18-million, for fear that the Mossel Bay plant would run out of feedstock, leading to greater losses. Effectively, PetroSA paid R18-million twice -- once to Imvume, and once to Imvume's supplier. PetroSA maintains that the special circumstances of the empowerment environment largely excuse the actions of its management. It also denies that there was pressure from either the Minerals and Energy Ministry or the ANC to approve the advance to Imvume.

Circumstances, however, suggest that empowerment is not a sufficient explanation and that Imvume's ANC links played a role. These links were no secret in oil trading circles. A businessman active in the sector told the M&G last year: "It was talked about when they got tenders ... that it was an ANC company ... I certainly understand that ANC fundraising has a keen interest."

The advance payment to Imvume was irregular in that it was a departure from standard procedures. PetroSA maintains procurement policy allows for advance payments, but admits it "should have checked" whether the money was going into the usual account. When the transaction with Imvume blew up in its face, PetroSA continued treating the company with kid gloves.

On February 23 last year, four days after PetroSA had been forced to settle Imvume's debt with Glencore, Majali signed an acknowledgement of debt to PetroSA, agreeing to repay the R18-million plus interest within 90 days. He also ceded his company's revenue stream as security. But Imvume paid nothing in terms of that agreement. Court records show more than a month passed after the expiry of the 90-day term before PetroSA issued a letter of demand. (See "PetroSA vs Imvume Management" download box on top right of this article for full documents).

PetroSA's choice of lawyer employed to pursue the demand raises further questions about PetroSA's seriousness of purpose. The lawyer, Leslie Mkhabela, was previously Imvume's own attorney and still has a business relationship with Majali via their common interest in Forever Resorts Aventura, the privatised state leisure company. This raises conflict-of-interest questions.

Mkhabela maintained this week that this was not a problem as he had disclosed his business relationship with Majali to PetroSA. The agreement signed between Mkhize and Majali was still not enforced. Instead new terms, much more favourable to Imvume, were agreed between PetroSA chief executive Sipho Mkhize and Majali in September last year.

Now PetroSA waived any claim to interest and agreed that Imvume could repay the capital amount in monthly instalments over four and a half years. But again, in February this year and after paying only R1,33-million, Imvume defaulted, court papers show.

PetroSA took off the kid gloves for a little while, filing an application for summary judgement in the Johannesburg High Court. But the matter was postponed twice, and on a third court date -- May 3 this year -- PetroSA removed the matter from the roll. PetroSA this week claimed that this was to allow Imvume to remain operational, which would give PetroSA a better chance eventually to recoup the debt.

The ANC this week threatened legal action against the M&G without confirming or denying the flow of money to it. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the ANC knew exactly where the funding was coming from. Between 2000 and 2002, when Majali was trading in oil allocations from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the ANC's Motlanthe repeatedly accompanied him to that country. ANC treasurer general Mendi Msimang also went along on at least one occasion.

It is rumoured that the relationship between Majali and Motlanthe has cooled recently, but an Imvume brochure last year still described Majali as "economic adviser to the secretary general of the ANC". Describing the company's "winning formula", the brochure said Imvume had "access and influence on economic policy".

How they responded ...

PETROSA
The cornerstone of this deal is the policy adopted by PetroSA, which is a national initiative, black economic empowerment (BEE). PetroSA has a mandate to introduce hitherto disadvantaged South Africans into the oil and gas industry. PetroSA had a choice: to continue business as usual and exclude historically disadvantaged South Africans from the mainstream economy and prolong, if not propagate, the two-economies concept, or use our procurement muscle to bring fundamental change to the industry.

To procure a raw material referred to as condensate, the requirement was that the preferred supplier must have a South African partner who qualifies as a BEE candidate. This in effect introduced a major shift in the industry. We deliberately signed deals with the historically disadvantaged party to ensure that they were not "brought along" to the deal, but in fact they were the "principal partner" in the deal.

# On the [High Court] case PetroSA brought against Imvume PetroSA suspended the case due to the fact that if Imvume were liquidated, there would be very little proceeds flowing into PetroSA from that exercise. Imvume is much better off remaining operational for PetroSA to be able to recoup the total sum owed to PetroSA as well as interest and the legal costs.

# On Leslie Mkhabela [PetroSA's choice of lawyer to sue Imvume]
Mkhabela assured PetroSA of the following: he acted on behalf of Imvume during 2002/03. He later decided to resign from their business. While he acted for Imvume, he was invited into a consortium that submitted a bid for the Aventura Resort in exchange for his services. He retains no personal friendship with Imvume.

# On PetroSA's actions and internal inquiry
At the request of Imvume, PetroSA effected a pre-payment into an account different from the normal account. We changed the account without considering that there may be negative ramifications. PetroSA has since tightened the controls around channels of communication and instruction from vendors on payments. PetroSA in its enquiry has not found any wrongdoing by any individual or individuals within PetroSA or external to PetroSA with line of sight to PetroSA. All the procedures and processes were followed. PetroSA honoured the letter of the contract. At times we assist suppliers to better deliver to PetroSA where possible. The procurement policy at PetroSA allows for payments of this nature.

# On the double payment
Glencore held the product. Even though PetroSA did not have a contract with them, they had a ship in the harbour with our product. As we had already paid, PetroSA had to make a decision; to either pay them and deal with Imvume later -- this would cost us $2,8-million -- or refuse to pay and have our refinery cease operating for a minimum of 40 days, at the cost of $1-million daily. The PetroSA board ratified the decision.

# Conclusion
It is the intention of PetroSA to recoup all the funds involved in this dispute. A liquidated Imvume would not generate the required proceeds for PetroSA. This would lead to an outright loss. PetroSA needs Imvume to pay back the money owed to PetroSA.

BARRY AARON & ASSOCIATES (lawyers for Majali and Imvume):
Our clients have requested us to record that Imvume had legitimately withheld payment in the sum of $2,8-million from Glencore against receipt of the expected commission on the profit-sharing arrangement in relation to Imvume's contract with PetroSA.

The withholding of this payment was not contested by Glencore until immediately prior to delivery of the next shipment, which it then refused to offload until such time as the shortfall (as Glencore perceived it) on the previous shipment had been paid. This resulted in PetroSA effecting payment of the shortfall and Imvume executing the acknowledgement [of debt] in favour of PetroSA.

The issue of commission from Glencore remains unresolved. Imvume expected to repay PetroSA from anticipated funds and separately resolve the issue with Glencore. Unfortunately, the anticipated funds did not materialise. Imvume has concluded arrangements with PetroSA for repayment. Imvume intends honouring its obligations to PetroSA. Our clients have no objection to fair investigative journalism and comment. [The M&G] however continues to harass our clients in an ongoing witch-hunt. [The M&G] appears to have accessed Imvume's private and confidential records, including (in particular) its banking records, constituting an invasion of our clients' rights to privacy, conduct way beyond the norms of responsible or acceptable investigative journalism. Our clients are a private businessman and a private company respectively, engaging in the legitimate pursuit of their activities. Their business activities and support for the ANC are their private affair. [The M&G] is sabotaging and subverting a legitimate black empowerment initiative.

MNMR Attorneys (for the ANC and Kgalema Motlanthe)
The short time period provided for comment demonstrates that the M&G will not give proper consideration to our clients' submissions. We wish to note that following the recent decision of the Cape high court in the Idasa matter, our clients are not obliged to discuss donations received by it from any person. Even if it were so, our clients would have no obligation and would not always have the ability or means to verify the identity of the sources of all donations made to it. We record, however, that our clients deny any insinuation that they acted in any corrupt, illegal or improper manner. Our clients will not hesitate to protect their rights should the M&G publish the defamatory material contemplated in [your] e-mail.

Source: Mail & Guardian

Langa is to be chief justice

Justice Pius Langa is to become the country's new chief justice.

He will replace Arthur Chaskalson who is to retire. Langa, currently Chaskalson's deputy, will take up his post on June 1, President Thabo Mbeki's office said in a statement on Saturday.

Mbeki nominated current Constitutional Court justice Dikgang Moseneke as Langa's deputy. The president is required by law to consult parties in the National Assembly as well as the Judicial Service Commission before appointing a deputy.

Source: News 24

Calm returns after Togo poll riot

Residents of Togo's capital, Lomé, are clearing up after violence erupted following Sunday's disputed elections. Soldiers beat people to make them take down barricades and clean the streets in opposition strongholds, correspondents say. At least 20 people were killed as opposition supporters went on the rampage, saying the polls were rigged.

Ruling party candidate and son of the former leader, Faure Gnassingbe, officially won with 60% of the vote. His main rival Emmanuel Bob Akitani got 38%, the electoral commission said but he declared himself president, saying there had been massive fraud.

Election observers from West African regional body Ecowas accepted that there had been problems but said the results had generally reflected the will of the people. “ [The security forces] smashed in the door. They told us to get out and pick up the stones ”

Ecowas condemned Mr Akitani's declaration and called for a national unity government to prevent further violence. According to the BBC's Mark Dummett in Lome, security was tightened overnight and soldiers are patrolling the city in jeeps mounted with heavy machine guns. They began a massive clear-up operation with bulldozers clear the remnants of burning roadblocks. "[The security forces] smashed in the door. They told us to get out and pick up the stones," Lome resident Assou told Reuters news agency, adding one of soldiers shouted: "Work, work!" Meanwhile, communication remains difficult as telephone networks are not working and most private radio stations were taken off the air on Wednesday. Some 600 people are reported to have fled into Benin from southern Togo, following clashes in the opposition town of Aného.

Mr Atikani's coalition intends to appeal to Togo's constitutional court - which has still to confirm the result of the election - saying he won majorities in all the most populous regions of the country. His support is strongest in the south, including Lome, while Mr Faure's power base is in the north.

Mr Faure denied vote-rigging and urged veteran opposition Union of Forces for Change (UCF) leader Gilchrist Olympio to join a government of national unity. Earlier, Mr Olympio, who was ineligible to stand in the poll because he lives in exile following a 1992 assassination attempt, said his party would not serve as a minority partner in any unity government. The army tried to install Mr Faure after his father's President Gnassingbe Eyadema's death, but pressure led him to step down and call an election.

President Eyadema, led Togo for 38 years, had seized power in a coup from Mr Olympio's father, Sylvanus Olympio, in 1963.

Source: BBC

FINANCIAL SERVICES OMBUD SCHEMES ACT 37 OF 2004

The purpose of the Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act is to provide for the recognition of financial services ombud schemes; to lay down minimum requirements for ombud schemes; to promote consumer education with regard to ombud schemes; to co-ordinate the activities of ombuds of recognised schemes with the activities of the Pension Funds Adjudicator and the Ombud for Financial Services Providers; to develop and promote best practices for complaint resolution; to empower the Ombud for Financial Services Providers to act as a statutory ombud in certain cases; and to provide for matters connected therewith.

An ombud Scheme is an arrangement for the settlement of disputes between between a financial services provider and a client.

Source: SABINET

Rafik Hariri, Ex-Premier of Lebanon, Dies at 60

Rafik Hariri, a billionaire contractor who plunged into the maelstrom of Lebanese politics to rebuild his war-ravaged country and twice served as prime minister, died on Monday in a huge car bomb explosion in Beirut. He was 60.

Mr. Hariri, who had always surrounded himself with bodyguards and lived in a heavily fortified compound, was killed when the bomb hit his motorcade in the city center that he helped restore. He had served as prime minister a total of 10 years, stepping down last fall over Syrian interference in Lebanon.

Born poor in southern Lebanon, Mr. Hariri was a self-made man who amassed a fortune building hotels, palaces and conference centers for the royal family in Saudi Arabia, and remained very close to the Saud family. He was as extravagant in his charitable works as he was in his big-game hunting, yachts, private jets and multimillion-dollar real estate projects. Always impeccably dressed, he was stout with bushy eyebrows and a commanding manner. As a politician, though, he was obliged to keep his domineering nature in check to placate Lebanon's powerful neighbor, Syria.

While Mr. Hariri was accused by some Lebanese of driving the country into debt with his ambitious rebuilding plans, he was also praised as the architect of its rebirth and renewed confidence after the devastation of 15 years of civil war, from 1975 to 1990. He was a well-known figure in Washington and European capitals, where he was largely successful in obtaining Western help to overcome Lebanon's intermittent financial crisis. Yet his political fortunes were always hostage to his up-and-down relations with Syria's presidents, now Bashar al-Assad and before him his father, Hafez al-Assad. For the most part, he appeared to steer an even course. Unlike some of the more impetuous Lebanese clan and religious leaders, Mr. Hariri carefully avoided direct criticism of Syria's role as Lebanon's overlord.

Yet his frustration with the limits that Damascus set sometimes showed. In an interview with The Boston Globe in 1993, he was asked whether the ubiquitous portrait of the elder Mr. Assad on every wall of the old Beirut airport was a problem for him. "It's not a problem to put it up," Mr. Hariri said. "It's a problem to take it down." His long-running rivalry with Émile Lahoud, the pro-Syrian Lebanese president, defined much of his political career. It prompted him to resign in 1998, after his first six years in office. He was re-elected in 2000. His irritation with Mr. Lahoud drove him to another break last year. When Damascus insisted on keeping Mr. Lahoud in office beyond the constitutional limit, Mr. Hariri resigned, a move that was widely interpreted as a definitive rupture with Syria. He had a big enough bloc in Parliament that he could have stopped Syria's order last summer to amend the Constitution to extend Mr. Lahoud's term. He agreed not to after traveling to Damascus and then to the office of Syrian intelligence, which serves as a kind of proconsul in Lebanon. He appeared for the hastily called Parliament vote on the constitutional change with his left arm in a sling from a fall, leading to jokes that the Syrians had twisted it too hard.

The downtown area was already plastered with freshly printed Lahoud posters and pre-positioned fireworks went off as soon as the vote was taken. "He could bypass criticizing Syria because he was able to criticize people who were supporting Syria, like Lahoud," said Edward S. Walker, a former American diplomat who knew Mr. Hariri from his service in the Middle East. "But he never went so far as to make himself a direct target."

Mr. Hariri was born in 1944 in Sidon, an ancient port city on the Mediterranean. The son of a vegetable vendor, he earned a degree in business administration at Arab University in Beirut and then chose the path taken by many enterprising young Arabs of his day: In 1965, he left home to seek his fortune in Saudi Arabia. After a short stint as a teacher, he turned to construction, amassing a fortune in the building frenzy that swept the kingdom in the early years of its oil boom. He became a favorite of the Saudi royal family, even gaining Saudi citizenship, a connection that would prove invaluable after he returned to Lebanon and sought to re-establish its reputation as a tourism and financial center after the civil war.

Mr. Hariri's charitable works - among them a hospital, a teaching university and scholarships for Lebanese students - first reintroduced him to his homeland and grew in tandem with his expanding financial interests. He invested heavily in the reconstruction of central Beirut along the former Green Line, which separated warring militias during the war, and later formed television and radio stations in Lebanon. Although there was some initial criticism, the downtown is now an architectural gem and very popular, particularly with tourists during the summer, when the outdoor cafes are buzzing until 3 a.m. Mr. Hariri's political career began in 1983, one year after an Israeli invasion of Lebanon and at a time when the country was paralyzed by sectarian fighting. He arrived as an envoy of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, with a mandate to mediate between sectarian militias, dodging bullets in typically swashbuckling fashion as his small plane flew into the besieged capital. His mission failed that time, but he was later involved in the successful Saudi effort to end the war and establish the Syrian military as a peacekeeping force.

Under Lebanon's Constitution, the prime minister must be a Sunni Muslim like Mr. Hariri. He was first appointed prime minister in 1992, in the hope that his reputation as a savvy businessman would attract investment and restore confidence in the shattered Lebanese economy, and held onto the post after the country's first postwar elections in 1996. When he first took office, he pledged to lead the country in a "quantum leap" to the future. "I want to go down in the history books," he said at the time, "as the man who resurrected Beirut." Regularly cited as one of the richest men in the world, Mr. Hariri did some of that resurrection with his own money. He was a major shareholder in Solidere, the private company set up to rebuild downtown Beirut, and reportedly paid $10 million for the project's engineering plans. While he was able to pursue an independent economic policy, one that provided wealthy Syrians a safe haven for their money, Mr. Hariri had little control over Lebanon's foreign policy. The militant Shiite party, Hezbollah, supported by Syria and Iran, was left in control over southern Lebanon for years, operating without consultation or coordination with Mr. Hariri's government.

When Hezbollah attacked an Israeli patrol at the border in 2001, prompting a retaliatory airstrike by Israel, for example, Mr. Hariri said he was not surprised that he had not been given advance notice. "Maybe they wanted to make a point that they don't take advice from the government," he said. Last September, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution calling on Syria to respect the sovereignty of Lebanon. The vote followed the moves by pro-Syria politicians in Lebanon to change the Constitution to allow President Lahoud to remain in office. Mr. Hariri, while making his opposition known, acquiesced to the change. Then he resigned. Before his death, he had been promoting a new movement he called Al Mustaqbal (The Future), and seemed intent on remaining in Lebanese politics.

He is survived by his wife, Nazik Hariri, and six children.

Source: New York Times

G. Eyadema, Togo's Ruler, Dies at 69

Africa's longest serving ruler, President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, died on Saturday as he was being moved to France for medical treatment, the government said in a statement. He was 69. Mr. Eyadema, Togo's ruler for 38 years, had been suffering from illness for several years and had been abroad on several occasions for medical treatment. He was a young soldier when he staged one of the continent's first post-colonial coups in 1963. He took power in his own name in 1967.

On the African stage, Mr. Eyadema carved himself the role of a peacemaker, focusing on regional diplomacy and, most recently, helping to mediate in Ivory Coast's civil war. But at home, his authoritarian style and the slow pace of political reform drew international criticism. Amnesty International accused his forces of killing hundreds in a presidential election in 1998, when he was declared the winner after the vote count was abruptly stopped.

The armed forces said Mr. Eyadema's son Faure would assume power. Under the constitution, the head of the National Assembly should assume provisional power following the death, but the armed forces chief said the action was taken to avoid a power vacuum since the head of the assembly was out of the country.

Source: New York Times

New NPA head 'must deliver'

Justice Minister Brigitte Mabandla introduced national prosecuting authority boss Vusi Pikoli to the institution's staff in Pretoria on Tuesday, saying she expected the best from him. "I am expecting that in the next five years there should be a further qualitative improvement in delivery and in levels of excellence in the services that you provide. "Good wishes, and I know you will deliver. I expect the best," she told a packed auditorium at the NPA's headquarters.

Pikoli, who takes over from Bulelani Ncguka, was appointed on January 21.

Source: News 24.com

International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur

Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, here is this Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General from Geneva, dated 25 January 2005.

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, on 18 September 2004 the Security Council adopted resolution 1564 requesting, inter alia, that the Secretary-General ‘rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable’.

In October 2004, the Secretary General appointed Antonio Cassese (Chairperson), Mohamed Fayek, Hina Jilani, Dumisa Ntsebeza and Therese Striggner-Scott as members of the Commission and requested that they report back on their findings within three months. The Commission was supported in its work by a Secretariat headed by an Executive Director, Ms. Mona Rishmawi, as well as a legal research team and an investigative team composed of investigators, forensic experts, military analysts, and investigators specializing in gender violence, all appointed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Commission assembled in Geneva and began its work on 25 October 2004.

In order to discharge its mandate, the Commission endeavoured to fulfil four key tasks: (1) to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties; (2) to determine whether or not acts of genocide have occurred; (3) to identify the perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur; and (4) to suggest means of ensuring that those responsible for such violations are held accountable. While the Commission considered all events relevant to the current conflict in Darfur, it focused in particular on incidents that occurred between February 2003 and mid-January 2005.

The Commission engaged in a regular dialogue with the Government of the Sudan throughout its mandate, in particular through meetings in Geneva and in the Sudan, as well as through the work of its investigative team. The Commission visited the Sudan from 7-21 November 2004 and 9-16 January 2005, including travel to the three Darfur States. The investigative team remained in Darfur from November 2004 through January 2005. During its presence in the Sudan, the Commission held extensive meetings with representatives of the Government, the Governors of the Darfur States and other senior officials in the capital and at provincial and local levels, members of the armed forces and police, leaders of rebel forces, tribal leaders, internally displaced persons, victims and witnesses of violations, NGOs and United Nations representatives.

The Commission submitted a full report on its findings to the Secretary-General on 25 January 2005. The report describes the terms of reference, methodology, approach and activities of the Commission and its investigative team. It also provides an overview of the historical and social background to the conflict in Darfur. The report then addresses in detail the four key tasks referred to above, namely the Commission’s findings in relation to: i) violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by all parties; ii) whether or not acts of genocide have taken place; iii) the identification of perpetrators; and iv) accountability mechanisms. These four sections are briefly summarized here.

A copy of the report can be downloaded (in pdf format) here.

Yasir Arafat, Father and Leader of Palestinian Nationalism, Dies at 75

Yasir Arafat, who died this morning in Paris, was the wily and enigmatic father of Palestinian nationalism who for almost 40 years symbolized his people's longing for a distinct political identity and independent state. He was 75.

No other individual so embodied the Palestinians' plight: their dispersal, their statelessness, their hunger for a return to a homeland lost to Israel. Mr. Arafat was once seen as a romantic hero and praised as a statesman, but his luster and reputation faded over time. A brilliant navigator of political currents in opposition, once in power he proved more tactician than strategist, and a leader who rejected crucial opportunities to achieve his declared goal.

At the end of his life, Mr. Arafat governed Palestinians from an almost three-year confinement by Israel to his Ramallah headquarters. While many Palestinians continued to revere him, others came to see him as undemocratic and his administration as corrupt, as they faced growing poverty, lawlessness and despair over prospects for statehood.

A co-winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1994 for his agreement to work toward peaceful coexistence with Israel, Mr. Arafat began his long political career with high-profile acts of anti-Israel terrorism.

Count Agusta link probed in Palazzolo hearing

An Italian prosecutor on Monday sought to probe the link between alleged Mafioso Vito Palazzolo and Count Riccardo Agusta, who achieved notoriety in the Roodefontein saga.

The prosecutor, Gaetano Paci, was cross-examining former police officer Gert Nel in the Cape Town Magistrate's Court, which is hearing evidence for Palazzolo's trial in absentia in Italy.

Nel told the court he was one of the police officers who arrested Palazzolo in the Eastern Cape in 1988, which resulted in Palazzolo returning to Switzerland to complete a jail term for playing banker in a massive drug deal.

Last year, a civil engineer told the George Regional Court, hearing corruption charges against former Western Cape politicians Peter Marais and David Malatsi, that Palazzolo played a key role in Agusta's controversial Roodefontein golf-estate development.

The engineer, Ray Durden, testified that Palazzolo asked him to bring together a professional team to drive the project, and gave him instructions on an earlier, abandoned plan for a retirement complex on the farm.

Palazzolo had said he was acting as an adviser for Agusta.

Agusta last year paid a R1-million fine for his part in the Roodefontein corruption saga.

Bank with close ties to Bush administration engulfed in scandal

The Justice Department announced on Friday that it is launching a criminal investigation into Riggs Bank. In recent months, the Washington-based bank has become engulfed in a scandal related to charges of money-laundering, corruption and terrorist financing. Riggs, which touts itself as “the most important bank in the most important city in the world,” has been known for decades as the bank of the Washington elite, including politicians, foreign ambassadors and the wealthy. It has held presidential accounts stretching back to the time of the Civil War, and is a prominent fixture in the political and social establishment of the nation’s capital.

Or rather, it was a prominent fixture. In July, PNL Financial Services agreed to buy Riggs for $779 million. The sale will become final by early next year. The bank’s prominent embassy and international operations will be shut down in an attempt to bury a scandal that has the potential of becoming much larger. That an institution like Riggs could so quickly disintegrate is an indication of the extent of the corruption that has overtaken American finance and government. There are three separate activities for which Riggs has come under investigation: (1) its relationship with the Saudi royal family and the potential financing of two of the September 11 hijackers through an account owned by the wife of the Saudi ambassador; (2) its relationship with the corrupt and dictatorial regime of the oil-rich West African country of Equatorial Guinea; and (3) its banking business with the former military dictator of Chile, Augusto Pinochet.

The public revelations concerning the bank’s relationship with Saudi Arabia came mainly through the publication of a Newsweek article on December 2, 2002 (“The Saudi Money Trail”). The news magazine reported that in January 2000, two of the hijackers who were on the plane that crashed into the Pentagon—Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar—received monetary aid and other assistance from Omar al-Bayoumi.

Alhazmi and Almihdhar are at the center of suspicions of US government complicity in the 9/11 attacks—and for good reason. The CIA had identified the two as early as January 2000 as Al Qaeda operatives, and the Washington Post reported in June 2002 that the FBI also knew of the two from January of 2000. Yet they were allowed to enter the US and live openly in San Diego for 18 months prior to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Newsweek reported in September 2002 that the roommate of Alhazmi and Almihdhar in San Diego was an FBI informant!

According to the December 2002 Newsweek article on Riggs Bank, al-Bayoumi “apparently did work for Dallah Avco, an aviation-services company with extensive contracts with the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation, headed by Prince Sultan, the father of the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar. According to informed sources, some federal investigators suspect that al-Bayoumi could have been an advance man for the 9/11 hijackers, sent by Al Qaeda to assist the plot that ultimately claimed 3,000 lives.”

Al-Bayoumi may have been receiving assistance in his activities from sections of the Saudi royal family. The Newsweek article states: “About two months after al-Bayoumi began aiding Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Newsweek has learned, al-Bayoumi’s wife began receiving regular stipends, often monthly and usually around $2,000 and totaling tens of thousands of dollars. The money came in the form of cashier’s checks, purchased from Washington’s Riggs Bank by Princess Haifa bin Faisal, the daughter of the late King Faisal and wife of Prince Bandar, the Saudi envoy who is a prominent Washington figure and personal friend of the Bush family. The checks were sent to a woman named Majeda Ibrahin Dweikat, who in turn signed over many of them to al-Bayoumi’s wife...”

Dweikat’s husband, Osama Basnan, is reported to be a sympathizer of Al Qaeda and is known to have had friendly relations with the two hijackers, Alhazmi and Almihdhar.

Al-Bayoumi apparently came under suspicion shortly after the attacks of September 11. He was picked up by British intelligence, which found evidence that he had made two phone calls to diplomats at the Saudi Embassy in Washington. However, he was released and is reported to be in Saudi Arabia.

Further, according to Newsweek: “Osama Basnan showed up in Houston last April [2001] while Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah came to town with a vast entourage en route to President George W. Bush’s ranch. According to informed sources, Basnan met with a high Saudi prince who has responsibilities for intelligence matters and is known to bring suitcases full of cash into the United States.”

There are suspicions that Basnan may have been a member of Saudi intelligence, suggesting that Saudi intelligence was closely monitoring, if not aiding, the activity of the September 11 hijackers through its accounts at Riggs.

Newsweek noted that the FBI, as of December 2002, still had an investigation open into the transactions. In July 2003, the FBI accused Riggs Bank of failing to abide by anti-money-laundering (AML) regulations.

Prior to and after the attacks of September 11, it was not unusual for Saudi clients to transfers of millions of dollars in and out of the bank with no questions asked. This was in violation of AML regulations, which require the reporting of all transaction involving such large sums of money.

The bank was eventually fined $25 million in May 2004 for violating these regulations. However, the FBI has issued a statement saying it found no evidence of terrorist financing. The Bush administration has refused to release the intelligence behind the investigation, citing “national security concerns.”

Even after the FBI’s accusations in July 2003, the bank continued to allow massive cash transfers by the Saudi ambassador. Under pressure, the bank announced this past March that it was closing all Saudi accounts.


On July 14, 2004, the Minority Staff of the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, at the request of Democrat Carl Levin, the ranking minority member of the subcommittee, issued a report that dealt mainly with the bank’s accounts for Equatorial Guinea and Augusto Pinochet.

The report found that “the evidence reviewed by the Subcommittee staff establishes that, since at least 1997, Riggs has disregarded its anti-money laundering (AML) obligations, maintained a dysfunctional AML program despite frequent warnings from OCC [Office of the Comptroller of the Currency] regulators, and allowed or, at times, actively facilitated suspicious financial activity.” The OCC, a branch of the Treasury Department, is responsible for regulating nationally chartered banks.

Equatorial Guinea was Riggs’ largest client. It held over 60 accounts at the bank, with varied holdings of $300-700 million. Its ruler, Teodoro Obian Nguema Mbasogo, came to power in a military coup in 1979 and is infamous for his corruption and brutality. Relations with the United States became strained in the mid-1990s, when the Clinton administration broke off diplomatic ties. However, these were restored by the Bush administration in 2003. The country holds interest for the United States because of its large oil reserves.

Riggs appears to have held both Equatorial Guinea government treasury accounts and the personal accounts of Obiang, his family members, and ministers in his government.

According to the subcommittee report, Riggs “serviced the EG [Equatorial Guinean] accounts with little or no attention to the bank’s anti-money laundering obligations...” For example, “Riggs opened multiple personal accounts for the President of Equatorial Guinea, his wife, and other relatives; helped establish shell offshore corporations for the EG President and his sons; and over a three-year period, from 2000 to 2002, facilitated nearly $13 million in cash deposits into Riggs accounts controlled by the EG President and his wife.”

Riggs also opened an account that received large sums of money from oil companies that did business with Equatorial Guinea, including Exxon Mobil, Amerada Hess, Marathon Oil and ChevronTexaco. Riggs allowed the wire transfer of over $35 million from the account to two unknown companies. “The Subcommittee has reason to believe that at least one of these recipient companies is controlled in whole or in part by the EG President.”

Riggs appears to have acted as a conduit for large-scale bribes or other corrupt machinations between the giant oil corporations and the dictator of a country with which they were eager to do business. The report also noted that these oil companies made a number of large payments (sometimes valued at over $1 million) to individual officials or family members for a variety of services.

The manager of Riggs’ accounts for Equatorial Guinea was Simon P. Kareri, who was eventually fired by the bank in January 2004. According to a bank employee, on more than one occasion Kareri visited the Equatorial Guinean embassy and returned with a suitcase full of $3 million in cash, which was deposited in the bank with no reports to financial regulators.

According to the subcommittee report, “The bank leadership permitted [Kareri] ...to become closely involved with EG officials and business activities, including advising the EG government on financial matters and becoming the sole signatory on an EG account holding substantial funds. The bank exercised such lax oversight of the account manager’s activities that, among other misconduct, the account manager was able to wire transfer more than $1 million from the EG oil account at Riggs to another bank for an account opened in the name of Jadini Holdings, an offshore corporation controlled by the account manager’s wife.”

In addition to its dealings with the Saudi royal family and Equatorial Guinea’s dictator, Riggs had a close relationship with the former dictator of Chile, Augusto Pinochet. Pinochet held numerous active accounts at Riggs between 1994 and 2002, even while he was under house arrest in Britain and his assets were supposedly frozen.

According to the subcommittee report, “The aggregate deposits in the Pinochet accounts at Riggs ranged from $4 to $8 million at a time.... Riggs account managers took actions consistent with helping Mr. Pinochet to evade legal proceedings seeking to discover and attach his bank accounts.... Riggs opened multiple accounts and accepted millions of dollars in deposits from Mr. Pinochet with no serious inquiry into questions regarding the source of his wealth; helped him set up offshore shell corporations and open accounts in the names of those corporations to disguise his control of the accounts; altered the names of his personal accounts to disguise their ownership; transferred $1.6 million from London to the United States while Mr. Pinochet was in detention and the subject of a court order to attach his bank accounts; conducted transactions through Riggs’ own accounts to hide Mr. Pinochet’s involvement in some cash transactions; and delivered over $1.9 million in cashiers checks to Mr. Pinochet in Chile to enable him to obtain substantial cash payments from banks in that country.”

The scope of the corruption, money-laundering and other suspicious activities is indeed astonishing. While it was engaged in these activities, the bank operated under the not-so-watchful eye of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. In spite of clear indications of regulatory violations at least as early as 1997, the OCC took no actions.

Particularly closely involved with the OCC’s investigation into the Pinochet accounts was the comptroller’s examiner-in-charge, R. Ashley Lee, who worked at the OCC from 1998 to October 2002. According to the subcommittee report, “In 2001, [Lee]...advised more senior OCC personnel against taking a formal enforcement action against Riggs, because the bank had promised to correct identified AML deficiencies. In 2002, he ordered examiners not to include a memorandum or work papers on the Pinochet examination to the OCC’s electronic database.”

Lee went to work for Riggs two weeks later, quickly becoming an executive vice president and the chief risk officer. The subcommittee report states: “During his next 18-months at the bank, he attended a number of meetings with OCC personnel related to Riggs’ AML problems,” despite regulations prohibiting former OCC employees from attending meetings on OCC-related maters.

The revelations of the activities at Riggs Bank demonstrate how commonplace and extensive criminal activity has become within the American financial and political establishment. Not coincidentally, the bank’s activity has a great deal in common with certain features prominent in the Bush administration: the heavy influence of oil interests, the close ties with the Saudi ruling elite, the funding and support given to dictators and former dictators, including General Pinochet.

The relationship of Riggs to the Bush administration is more than tangential. Riggs owns a money management firm, J. Bush & Co., operated by Jonathan Bush, the brother of George H.W. Bush and the current president’s uncle.

Jonathan Bush played a very important role in helping find investors for the various failed oil businesses that George W. Bush ran before he began his career in politics. Jonathan Bush also helped raise money for George H.W. Bush and is a former chair of the New York Republican State Finance Committee. In 2000, he was briefly named president and CEO of Riggs Investment Management Company (RIMCO), a wholly owned subsidiary of Riggs Bank.

While Jonathan Bush appears not to have been directly involved in the Saudi, Pinochet or Equatorial Guinean accounts, his position at Riggs is an indication of the close ties between the bank and the Bush family.

Moreover, Riggs is owned by the Allbritton family, a Texas family with close ties to the Republican establishment. Joe Allbritton, the former head of Riggs who bought the bank in the mid-1970s, is a friend of the Bush family. His son, Robert Allbritton, is the current chairman and CEO.

The Allbritton family is known among the Washington elite for the party it traditionally holds after the annual Alfalfa Club dinner, hosted to mark the birthday of Robert E. Lee, the southern general in the Civil War. The New York Times (“A Washington Bank, A Global Mess,” April 11, 2004) notes, “The Alfalfa roster includes presidents, politicians, diplomats and business impresarios, all bound together by being either formidably influential or fabulously rich. Attendees have included luminaries like Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States; Jack Valenti, the president of the Motion Picture Association of America; and others with surnames like Greenspan, Kissinger and Rehnquist. President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney made their first joint public appearance after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks at the Alfalfa gathering in 2002.”

Valenti, who, like Allbritton and Bush, is a former Texas businessman, is also on the board of directors of Riggs Bank.

A television station also owned by Allbritton was in the news earlier this year after it refused to air an ad critical of the Bush administration’s policy in Iraq.

Perhaps even more than the Enron scandal, the Riggs scandal is a deeply political scandal. No doubt, much of what went on at Riggs remains to be uncovered. With the announced sale of Riggs to PNL, which will be completed by early next year, the owners of the bank are clearly attempting to contain the scandal’s fallout.

Source: World Socialist Web Site

Germany admits Namibia genocide

Germany has offered its first formal apology for the colonial-era massacre of some 65,000 members of the Herero tribe by German troops in Namibia. German minister Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul told a commemorative ceremony that the brutal crushing of the Herero uprising 100 years ago was genocide. But the German government has ruled out compensation for victims' descendants.

A group of Herero has filed a case against Germany in the United States demanding $4bn in compensation.

"We Germans accept our historic and moral responsibility," Ms Wieczorek-Zeul, Germany's Development Aid Minister, told a crowd of some 1,000 at the ceremony in Okokarara. "Germany has learnt the bitter lessons of the past."

But after the minister's speech, the crowd repeated calls for an apology.

"Everything I said in my speech was an apology for crimes committed under German colonial rule," she replied.

Ms Wieczorek-Zeul repeated that there would be no compensation, but she promised continued economic aid for Namibia which currently amounts to $14m a year.


Driven into desert

The Herero rebelled in 1904 against German soldiers and settlers who were colonising south-west Africa.

In response, the German military commander, General Lothar von Trotha, ordered the Herero people to leave Namibia or be killed.

Germany argues that international laws to protect civilians were not in force at the time of the conflict.

Herero chief Kuaima Riruako said the apology was appreciated but added: "We still have the right to take the German government to court."

However, correspondents say the lawsuit filed in the US three years ago against the German government and two German companies is seen as having a limited chance of success.

Source: BBC

Inside the matrix

The quaint brotherhood in the liquidations industry is starting to fall apart, showing up some astonishing tactics. One meaning for Mafiosi, according to the Merriman-Webster dictionary, is a person who is a member of a group of people likened to the Mafia; especially: a group of people of similar interests or backgrounds prominent in a particular field or enterprise. It would probably be stretching a point to describe a group of people networked within South Africa’s liquidations sector as Mafiosi. Nevertheless, they do have an overriding interest in generating mountains of filthy lucre. And they are now being subjected, to increasing doses of public exposure.

There is perhaps one major – and totally surprising - factor that would disqualify the group as Mafia. Where the original Mafia were linked by origin as Sicilians, this group is as diverse as it gets. There are Muslim elements, such as liquidator Enver Motala, who was arrested on July 2 on charges of fraud and corruption. There are Jewish elements, in attorneys Stan Rothbart, and in Motala’s only remaining partner, Norman Simon, and also their disgruntled ex-partner, Mervyn Swartz.

And then there are the black players: on the fringes ex-justice minister Penuell Maduna, and Vusi Pikoli, who is still director general of the justice department. The picture would be incomplete without a middle-aged, bespectacled white Afrikaner, represented by Leon Lategan, one of Motala’s chief button men, and a senior officer in the Masters Office, the unit of the justice department which appoints liquidators according to its “unfettered discretion.”

One of Lategan’s most unforgettable Motala appointments was seen in respect of RAG, a R1-bn bankruptcy. Maduna intervened in that case, long after the original four liquidators had done all the work, and appointed Motala as fifth liquidator. The action was struck out by the High Court. Maduna then simply appointed Lategan as an extra Master in the Pietermaritzburg Masters Office, and Lategan simply appointed Motala to RAG, apparently in contempt of court. The appointment has, however, stuck.

Other key players fit in-between this group. Take Enver Daniels, the Chief State Law Adviser, who became acting MD of the Masters Business Unit on January 29, 2003. Daniels, who has recently been on study leave to complete his doctoral thesis in law, was a Marxist way back when, like Pikoli. Again, Pikoli knows Maduna very well from their days in exile from the apartheid regime, and so on.

Like most such organisations, there has been lots of training involved within this network. Simon and Swartz selected Motala as their front man for converting their business, SBT Trust, into a “black empowered” entity. The basis for this selection has never been understood. For one thing, Motala had been arrested on charges of fraud and corruption, back in 1989, amid an alleged massive sugar swindle in Middleburg, Mpumalanga. The case has yet to be prosecuted; the file just seems to keep traveling around the country for reasons that cannot be fully explained. However, in the 1990s, Motala acquired lots of experience in liquidations – but on the receiving end. According to Mohan Patel, a medical doctor who loaned hundreds of thousands of rands to Motala in and around the mid-1990s, Motala went from one bankruptcy to the next. Some of the businesses were burned to the ground, in accidents no doubt. Today, Patel is just one of the many judicial opponents that Motala faces. Patel is sore about suing Motala for return of loans and interest, but fails to understand how Motala could be so insensitive to Patel’s role, then anyway, as a friend helping when Motala was down and out. Well, not quite, recalls Patel. At the time, Motala was the apparent owner of two luxury BMWs, a sports Mercedes Benz and a Porsche. The way Patel remembers it, at least one of those cars was mysteriously stolen from Motala.

And then fast forward to the year 2000, by which time Motala had enjoyed the full benefits of being trained by some of the “best” in the brotherhood. At the time, an offensive to clear the way for Motala was being waged. At the end of 1999, Oliver Powell, one of the country’s leading liquidators, had been “bust” by Maduna.

On December 9, 1999, Maduna stated that “possible prosecutions for alleged corruption at the Pretoria Master’s Office were expected as early as next month.” It was not just Powell’s premises that had been raided. On October 24, 1999, the Scorpions, an investigative unit of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA, itself a unit of the justice department), also searched the Centurion home of the Master of the Pretoria High Court, Ben Nell. In November 1999, Nell and two of his deputies, Charles Stewart and Eugene Januarie, were suspended with immediate effect. To this day, none of the prosecutions that Maduna promised have materialized. On the contrary, Powell has won two major court cases this year, and orders that every last thing seized from him be returned. Powell’s final big case will see him suing – in their present and/or previous capacities - Maduna, Jan Swanepoel (then head of the Scorpions, now of PricewaterhouseCoopers), Basil Nel (then of PricewaterhouseCoopers) and a former Sunday Times journalist, Amanda Vermeulen, for R60-m. It has hardly escaped attention that when Motala was arrested on July 2, 2004, his arraignment, following search and seizure, was by the Serious Economic Offences Unit (SEO), an elite unit of the South African Police Services.

The Scorpions and SAPS are as chalk and cheese. In full, the Scorpions are the Directorate of Special Operations, National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). The NPA national director, Bulelani Ngcuka, has been in his position since mid-1998, and was thus Scorpions overlord when Powell’s business and personal life were ruined. Two weeks ago, news emerged that Ngcuka was resigning after only six years of his ten-year contract. Ngcuka reports to the new justice minister, Brigitte Mabandla. In another world, national police commissioner Jackie Selebi reports to the Minister for Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula. It is clear that Motala has not been investigated by the Scorpions. On the contrary, Motala has on more than one occasion publicly advertised that he was working with the Scorpions (for example, in the RAG and Krion cases), and has even been described in some media reports as the “Scorpions liquidator.”

The rivalry between the Scorpions and the SEO is hardly a secret. Maduna’s apparent protection of Motala may yet be countered by Maduna’s potential nemesis, in the form of Mike Tshishonga, a deputy director general in the justice department. In October 2003, Tshishonga blew the whistle, alleging that his political boss had a nepotistic relationship with Motala; further, that Maduna had “abused the infrastructure and staff of the justice department for the purposes of advancing his personal interests,” and that Maduna had endangered South Africa’s criminal justice system.

Beyond the criminal charges that Motala faces, his nemesis may well prove to be Garveni Creations, fast on its way to being the most infamous South African bankruptcy ever. This week, John Cameron, attorney to one of Garveni’s major creditors, PG Bison, released an independent report on the Garveni estate. It contained shocking new information, of a most detailed kind, on and around the behaviour of Motala, whose appointment to Garveni was voided by the High Court on April 29.Cameron alleges that “as has been suspected, the estate of Garveni has been maladministered by Motala and Frans Langford [the co-liquidator], their conduct being highly unprofessional, irregular and improper and deserving of the highest censure and in due course, will be the subject matter of various complaints and civil proceedings.” In earlier court papers, Cameron had alleged that the conduct of Motala in and around the Garveni case had been “prima facie suggestive of fraudulent conduct . . . the existence of fraudulent conduct is fortified and substantiated;” that “[Motala’s] appointment was sought and obtained under a very unusual set of circumstances, all of which are suggestive of fraud.” Among the more-alarming disclosures in Cameron’s new report, is that Neville Shifren, previously the CEO and major shareholder in Garveni, met Motala early in May this year; that is, after Motala had been removed as a Garveni liquidator. Motala presented Shifren with accounts of Knowles, Husein Lindsay, Inc (KHL), a prominent Johannesburg law firm. One of its senior partners, Mohamed Junaid Husein, had acted for Motala throughout the Garveni matter (and apparently continues to act for Motala). Shifren was presented with KHL accounts in an amount “in excess of R500 000.”Cameron states that, in regard to such accounts, Motala, after making certain calculations, demanded that Shifren “pay 50% thereof.” To this, Shifren reacted that “he would consider no such payment, to which Motala reacted that if that was the case, he would be locking up the premises and would prevent GOF [Garveni Office Furniture] from removing any further items therefrom.”The KHL account would have eaten a big chunk out of the Garveni estate, which had been valued initially at R4-m. Cameron’s new report shows that Rothbart also submitted “one account” to the Garveni estate. Rothbart’s “invoice does not indicate exactly what services were rendered and in regard to what matter and naturally, as Motala has failed to provide the relevant information, it is uncertain as to what professional services were rendered.” The Garveni estate also made out cheques to Motala’s brother, and to the son of Simon.

The nepotism first emerged at the “417” enquiry into RAG. There, the Masters Office is represented by Stephan du Toit, senior counsel, assisted by Rafik Bhana (apparently a relative of Motala) and Soraya Hassim (previously, or perhaps still, Motala’s fiancée, and the only apparent female member of the cast), and Husein. In the RAG matter, Rothbart represents Motala.Déjà vu. In the latest big liquidations event, the R1-bn-plus bankruptcy of MP Finance, more popularly known as Krion, a giant pyramid scheme, four liquidators were originally appointed in August 2002. On January 6, 2004, Lategan appointed two further Krion liquidators. One of them was Motala. One of the original liquidators Koos van Rensburg, of Negota KVR, asked Lategan to supply his reasons for appointing the new liquidators. Lategan failed to respond. Instead, Rothbart replied in writing that he now acted for Lategan and that further correspondence must be addressed to him. Rothbart’s letter appeared to have been the clearest admission that it is Motala, and not Lategan, who was making the Master’s decisions. There has been similar evidence that Motala stage-managed the RAG matter, and perhaps others, directly through Maduna’s offices.

Source: Money Web