A Mail & Guardian investigation into covert party funding has revealed how R11-million of public money was diverted to African National Congress coffers ahead of the 2004 elections. In what may be the biggest political funding scandal since 1994, the M&G has established that South Africa's state oil company, PetroSA, irregularly paid R15-million to Imvume Management -- a company closely tied to the ANC -- at a time when the party was desperate for funds to fight elections. The M&G possesses bank statements and has seen other forensic evidence proving that Imvume transferred the lion's share of this to the ANC within days. PetroSA this week said it was unaware of this. The ANC denied impropriety and said it was not obliged to discuss its funders.
The scheme unfolded in two stages. First, PetroSA management bent over backwards to pay Imvume the money as an advance for the procurement of oil condensate. Then, when Imvume diverted the funds to the ANC instead of paying its own foreign suppliers, PetroSA had to cover the shortfall by paying the same amount again. A multimillion-rand hole remains in the parastatalis books. PetroSA has gone through the motions to recover the debt by suing Imvume -- but most of it remains outstanding. The effect of the entire transaction was that PetroSA, and ultimately the taxpayer, subsidised the ruling party's election campaign: a blatant abuse of public resources.
Imvume's role as an ANC "front company" first emerged in February last year when the M&G exposed its oil dealings with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Imvume principal Sandi Majali obtained lucrative crude oil allocations from that regime when he travelled to Iraq with top ANC officials between 2000 and 2002. More recently, Imvume described its boss as ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe's "economic adviser".
But it was the diversion of the Petro-SA money four months ahead of the 2004 elections that is now lifting the lid on the funding scandal. The deal puts the spotlight on PetroSA's management, which approved the payment; Imvume boss Majali, who asked for the advance and then issued the cheques to the ANC; and Motlanthe, who was Majali's ANC patron. Imvume, now unable to pay its debts, was once the empowerment pin-up of the oil industry. The contract that caused all the trouble was awarded by PetroSA to Imvume on October 15 2002 -- the day President Thabo Mbeki publicly launched PetroSA as the national oil company.
Under the contract, Imvume -- with the backing of Swiss-based resource trader Glencore International -- was to supply PetroSA with regular cargoes of condensate, a feedstock for PetroSA's Mossel Bay gas-to-liquid fuels plant. A number of condensate cargoes were delivered to Mossel Bay during 2003. The standard contractual procedure was for PetroSA to pay Imvume the full cargo price no later than 30 days after the bill of lading date (the date the cargo was loaded for shipment to Mossel Bay). Once it received payment from PetroSA, Imvume would immediately pay it on to Glencore, which sourced the cargo on international markets. Glencore paid Imvume a commission. But in December 2003 the pattern was broken, and PetroSA has confirmed that standard procedure was departed from. The bill of lading date for that cargo was December 6 2003, meaning PetroSA's payment for the cargo -- worth $10-million (about R65-million) -- was due on January 5 2004. But Imvume's Majali asked PetroSA for an advance of R15-million (just more than $2-million of the $10-million) which was paid even before the cargo was discharged on December 22. PetroSA paid the advance into a different account to that usually used by Imvume for the contract.
Evidence in the M&G's possession confirms that Imvume Management's corporate account was credited with R15-million a day later, on December 19. And the M&G has seen forensic proof that within the next four days, Imvume's Majali issued a series of four cheques to the ANC -- for R4-million, R3-million and R2-million (twice). These cheques, totalling R11-million, were all transacted on December 23. This week Majali and Imvume did not dispute that the money was paid to the ANC, but claimed their support for the party was a "private affair".
The transfers to the ANC came four months before the elections, held on April 14 2004. A number of sources have described the party's financial straits around that time, claiming it had a bank overdraft typically running at more than R100-million. When payment for the cargo became due to Glencore on January 5, Imvume failed to pay the company the R15-million advance -- and, effectively, also withheld another R3-million from the balance owed. Glencore turned to PetroSA for what it was owed, eventually threatening in February not to offload the next cargo. PetroSA agreed to cover the shortfall of R18-million, for fear that the Mossel Bay plant would run out of feedstock, leading to greater losses. Effectively, PetroSA paid R18-million twice -- once to Imvume, and once to Imvume's supplier.
PetroSA maintains that the special circumstances of the empowerment environment largely excuse the actions of its management. It also denies that there was pressure from either the Minerals and Energy Ministry or the ANC to approve the advance to Imvume. Circumstances, however, suggest that empowerment is not a sufficient explanation and that Imvume's ANC links played a role. These links were no secret in oil trading circles. A businessman active in the sector told the M&G last year: "It was talked about when they got tenders ... that it was an ANC company ... I certainly understand that ANC fundraising has a keen interest."
The advance payment to Imvume was irregular in that it was a departure from standard procedures. PetroSA maintains procurement policy allows for advance payments, but admits it "should have checked" whether the money was going into the usual account. When the transaction with Imvume blew up in its face, PetroSA continued treating the company with kid gloves.
On February 23 last year, four days after PetroSA had been forced to settle Imvume's debt with Glencore, Majali signed an acknowledgement of debt to PetroSA, agreeing to repay the R18-million plus interest within 90 days. He also ceded his company's revenue stream as security. But Imvume paid nothing in terms of that agreement. Court records show more than a month passed after the expiry of the 90-day term before PetroSA issued a letter of demand. (See "PetroSA vs Imvume Management" download box on top right of this article for full documents).
PetroSA's choice of lawyer employed to pursue the demand raises further questions about PetroSA's seriousness of purpose. The lawyer, Leslie Mkhabela, was previously Imvume's own attorney and still has a business relationship with Majali via their common interest in Forever Resorts Aventura, the privatised state leisure company. This raises conflict-of-interest questions. Mkhabela maintained this week that this was not a problem as he had disclosed his business relationship with Majali to PetroSA. The agreement signed between Mkhize and Majali was still not enforced. Instead new terms, much more favourable to Imvume, were agreed between PetroSA chief executive Sipho Mkhize and Majali in September last year. Now PetroSA waived any claim to interest and agreed that Imvume could repay the capital amount in monthly instalments over four and a half years. But again, in February this year and after paying only R1,33-million, Imvume defaulted, court papers show.
PetroSA took off the kid gloves for a little while, filing an application for summary judgement in the Johannesburg High Court. But the matter was postponed twice, and on a third court date -- May 3 this year -- PetroSA removed the matter from the roll. PetroSA this week claimed that this was to allow Imvume to remain operational, which would give PetroSA a better chance eventually to recoup the debt. The ANC this week threatened legal action against the M&G without confirming or denying the flow of money to it. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the ANC knew exactly where the funding was coming from. Between 2000 and 2002, when Majali was trading in oil allocations from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the ANC's Motlanthe repeatedly accompanied him to that country. ANC treasurer general Mendi Msimang also went along on at least one occasion. It is rumoured that the relationship between Majali and Motlanthe has cooled recently, but an Imvume brochure last year still described Majali as "economic adviser to the secretary general of the ANC". Describing the company's "winning formula", the brochure said Imvume had "access and influence on economic policy".
How they responded ...
PETROSA
The cornerstone of this deal is the policy adopted by PetroSA, which is a national initiative, black economic empowerment (BEE). PetroSA has a mandate to introduce hitherto disadvantaged South Africans into the oil and gas industry. PetroSA had a choice: to continue business as usual and exclude historically disadvantaged South Africans from the mainstream economy and prolong, if not propagate, the two-economies concept, or use our procurement muscle to bring fundamental change to the industry.
To procure a raw material referred to as condensate, the requirement was that the preferred supplier must have a South African partner who qualifies as a BEE candidate. This in effect introduced a major shift in the industry. We deliberately signed deals with the historically disadvantaged party to ensure that they were not "brought along" to the deal, but in fact they were the "principal partner" in the deal.
# On the [High Court] case PetroSA brought against Imvume PetroSA suspended the case due to the fact that if Imvume were liquidated, there would be very little proceeds flowing into PetroSA from that exercise. Imvume is much better off remaining operational for PetroSA to be able to recoup the total sum owed to PetroSA as well as interest and the legal costs.
# On Leslie Mkhabela [PetroSA's choice of lawyer to sue Imvume]
Mkhabela assured PetroSA of the following: he acted on behalf of Imvume during 2002/03. He later decided to resign from their business. While he acted for Imvume, he was invited into a consortium that submitted a bid for the Aventura Resort in exchange for his services. He retains no personal friendship with Imvume.
# On PetroSA's actions and internal inquiry
At the request of Imvume, PetroSA effected a pre-payment into an account different from the normal account. We changed the account without considering that there may be negative ramifications. PetroSA has since tightened the controls around channels of communication and instruction from vendors on payments. PetroSA in its enquiry has not found any wrongdoing by any individual or individuals within PetroSA or external to PetroSA with line of sight to PetroSA. All the procedures and processes were followed. PetroSA honoured the letter of the contract. At times we assist suppliers to better deliver to PetroSA where possible. The procurement policy at PetroSA allows for payments of this nature.
# On the double payment
Glencore held the product. Even though PetroSA did not have a contract with them, they had a ship in the harbour with our product. As we had already paid, PetroSA had to make a decision; to either pay them and deal with Imvume later -- this would cost us $2,8-million -- or refuse to pay and have our refinery cease operating for a minimum of 40 days, at the cost of $1-million daily. The PetroSA board ratified the decision.
Conclusion
It is the intention of PetroSA to recoup all the funds involved in this dispute. A liquidated Imvume would not generate the required proceeds for PetroSA. This would lead to an outright loss. PetroSA needs Imvume to pay back the money owed to PetroSA.
BARRY AARON & ASSOCIATES (lawyers for Majali and Imvume):
Our clients have requested us to record that Imvume had legitimately withheld payment in the sum of $2,8-million from Glencore against receipt of the expected commission on the profit-sharing arrangement in relation to Imvume's contract with PetroSA.
The withholding of this payment was not contested by Glencore until immediately prior to delivery of the next shipment, which it then refused to offload until such time as the shortfall (as Glencore perceived it) on the previous shipment had been paid. This resulted in PetroSA effecting payment of the shortfall and Imvume executing the acknowledgement [of debt] in favour of PetroSA.
The issue of commission from Glencore remains unresolved. Imvume expected to repay PetroSA from anticipated funds and separately resolve the issue with Glencore. Unfortunately, the anticipated funds did not materialise. Imvume has concluded arrangements with PetroSA for repayment. Imvume intends honouring its obligations to PetroSA. Our clients have no objection to fair investigative journalism and comment. [The M&G] however continues to harass our clients in an ongoing witch-hunt. [The M&G] appears to have accessed Imvume's private and confidential records, including (in particular) its banking records, constituting an invasion of our clients' rights to privacy, conduct way beyond the norms of responsible or acceptable investigative journalism. Our clients are a private businessman and a private company respectively, engaging in the legitimate pursuit of their activities. Their business activities and support for the ANC are their private affair. [The M&G] is sabotaging and subverting a legitimate black empowerment initiative.
MNMR Attorneys (for the ANC and Kgalema Motlanthe)
The short time period provided for comment demonstrates that the M&G will not give proper consideration to our clients' submissions. We wish to note that following the recent decision of the Cape high court in the Idasa matter, our clients are not obliged to discuss donations received by it from any person. Even if it were so, our clients would have no obligation and would not always have the ability or means to verify the identity of the sources of all donations made to it. We record, however, that our clients deny any insinuation that they acted in any corrupt, illegal or improper manner. Our clients will not hesitate to protect their rights should the M&G publish the defamatory material contemplated in [your] e-mail.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Tuesday, May 3, 2005
The ANC's Oilgate
A Mail & Guardian investigation into covert party funding has revealed how R11-million of public money was diverted to African National Congress coffers ahead of the 2004 elections. In what may be the biggest political funding scandal since 1994, the M&G has established that South Africa's state oil company, PetroSA, irregularly paid R15-million to Imvume Management -- a company closely tied to the ANC -- at a time when the party was desperate for funds to fight elections.
The M&G possesses bank statements and has seen other forensic evidence proving that Imvume transferred the lion's share of this to the ANC within days. PetroSA this week said it was unaware of this. The ANC denied impropriety and said it was not obliged to discuss its funders. The scheme unfolded in two stages. First, PetroSA management bent over backwards to pay Imvume the money as an advance for the procurement of oil condensate. Then, when Imvume diverted the funds to the ANC instead of paying its own foreign suppliers, PetroSA had to cover the shortfall by paying the same amount again.
A multimillion-rand hole remains in the parastatalis books. PetroSA has gone through the motions to recover the debt by suing Imvume -- but most of it remains outstanding. The effect of the entire transaction was that PetroSA, and ultimately the taxpayer, subsidised the ruling party's election campaign: a blatant abuse of public resources. Imvume's role as an ANC "front company" first emerged in February last year when the M&G exposed its oil dealings with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Imvume principal Sandi Majali obtained lucrative crude oil allocations from that regime when he travelled to Iraq with top ANC officials between 2000 and 2002. More recently, Imvume described its boss as ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe's "economic adviser".
The transaction in a nutshell
But it was the diversion of the Petro-SA money four months ahead of the 2004 elections that is now lifting the lid on the funding scandal. The deal puts the spotlight on PetroSA's management, which approved the payment; Imvume boss Majali, who asked for the advance and then issued the cheques to the ANC; and Motlanthe, who was Majali's ANC patron. Imvume, now unable to pay its debts, was once the empowerment pin-up of the oil industry.
The contract that caused all the trouble was awarded by PetroSA to Imvume on October 15 2002 -- the day President Thabo Mbeki publicly launched PetroSA as the national oil company. Under the contract, Imvume -- with the backing of Swiss-based resource trader Glencore International -- was to supply PetroSA with regular cargoes of condensate, a feedstock for PetroSA's Mossel Bay gas-to-liquid fuels plant. A number of condensate cargoes were delivered to Mossel Bay during 2003. The standard contractual procedure was for PetroSA to pay Imvume the full cargo price no later than 30 days after the bill of lading date (the date the cargo was loaded for shipment to Mossel Bay).
Once it received payment from PetroSA, Imvume would immediately pay it on to Glencore, which sourced the cargo on international markets. Glencore paid Imvume a commission. But in December 2003 the pattern was broken, and PetroSA has confirmed that standard procedure was departed from. The bill of lading date for that cargo was December 6 2003, meaning PetroSA's payment for the cargo -- worth $10-million (about R65-million) -- was due on January 5 2004. But Imvume's Majali asked PetroSA for an advance of R15-million (just more than $2-million of the $10-million) which was paid even before the cargo was discharged on December 22. PetroSA paid the advance into a different account to that usually used by Imvume for the contract.
Evidence in the M&G's possession confirms that Imvume Management's corporate account was credited with R15-million a day later, on December 19. And the M&G has seen forensic proof that within the next four days, Imvume's Majali issued a series of four cheques to the ANC -- for R4-million, R3-million and R2-million (twice). These cheques, totalling R11-million, were all transacted on December 23. This week Majali and Imvume did not dispute that the money was paid to the ANC, but claimed their support for the party was a "private affair".
The transfers to the ANC came four months before the elections, held on April 14 2004. A number of sources have described the party's financial straits around that time, claiming it had a bank overdraft typically running at more than R100-million. When payment for the cargo became due to Glencore on January 5, Imvume failed to pay the company the R15-million advance -- and, effectively, also withheld another R3-million from the balance owed.
Glencore turned to PetroSA for what it was owed, eventually threatening in February not to offload the next cargo. PetroSA agreed to cover the shortfall of R18-million, for fear that the Mossel Bay plant would run out of feedstock, leading to greater losses. Effectively, PetroSA paid R18-million twice -- once to Imvume, and once to Imvume's supplier. PetroSA maintains that the special circumstances of the empowerment environment largely excuse the actions of its management. It also denies that there was pressure from either the Minerals and Energy Ministry or the ANC to approve the advance to Imvume.
Circumstances, however, suggest that empowerment is not a sufficient explanation and that Imvume's ANC links played a role. These links were no secret in oil trading circles. A businessman active in the sector told the M&G last year: "It was talked about when they got tenders ... that it was an ANC company ... I certainly understand that ANC fundraising has a keen interest."
The advance payment to Imvume was irregular in that it was a departure from standard procedures. PetroSA maintains procurement policy allows for advance payments, but admits it "should have checked" whether the money was going into the usual account. When the transaction with Imvume blew up in its face, PetroSA continued treating the company with kid gloves.
On February 23 last year, four days after PetroSA had been forced to settle Imvume's debt with Glencore, Majali signed an acknowledgement of debt to PetroSA, agreeing to repay the R18-million plus interest within 90 days. He also ceded his company's revenue stream as security. But Imvume paid nothing in terms of that agreement. Court records show more than a month passed after the expiry of the 90-day term before PetroSA issued a letter of demand. (See "PetroSA vs Imvume Management" download box on top right of this article for full documents).
PetroSA's choice of lawyer employed to pursue the demand raises further questions about PetroSA's seriousness of purpose. The lawyer, Leslie Mkhabela, was previously Imvume's own attorney and still has a business relationship with Majali via their common interest in Forever Resorts Aventura, the privatised state leisure company. This raises conflict-of-interest questions.
Mkhabela maintained this week that this was not a problem as he had disclosed his business relationship with Majali to PetroSA. The agreement signed between Mkhize and Majali was still not enforced. Instead new terms, much more favourable to Imvume, were agreed between PetroSA chief executive Sipho Mkhize and Majali in September last year.
Now PetroSA waived any claim to interest and agreed that Imvume could repay the capital amount in monthly instalments over four and a half years. But again, in February this year and after paying only R1,33-million, Imvume defaulted, court papers show.
PetroSA took off the kid gloves for a little while, filing an application for summary judgement in the Johannesburg High Court. But the matter was postponed twice, and on a third court date -- May 3 this year -- PetroSA removed the matter from the roll. PetroSA this week claimed that this was to allow Imvume to remain operational, which would give PetroSA a better chance eventually to recoup the debt.
The ANC this week threatened legal action against the M&G without confirming or denying the flow of money to it. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the ANC knew exactly where the funding was coming from. Between 2000 and 2002, when Majali was trading in oil allocations from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the ANC's Motlanthe repeatedly accompanied him to that country. ANC treasurer general Mendi Msimang also went along on at least one occasion.
It is rumoured that the relationship between Majali and Motlanthe has cooled recently, but an Imvume brochure last year still described Majali as "economic adviser to the secretary general of the ANC". Describing the company's "winning formula", the brochure said Imvume had "access and influence on economic policy".
How they responded ...
PETROSA
The cornerstone of this deal is the policy adopted by PetroSA, which is a national initiative, black economic empowerment (BEE). PetroSA has a mandate to introduce hitherto disadvantaged South Africans into the oil and gas industry. PetroSA had a choice: to continue business as usual and exclude historically disadvantaged South Africans from the mainstream economy and prolong, if not propagate, the two-economies concept, or use our procurement muscle to bring fundamental change to the industry.
To procure a raw material referred to as condensate, the requirement was that the preferred supplier must have a South African partner who qualifies as a BEE candidate. This in effect introduced a major shift in the industry. We deliberately signed deals with the historically disadvantaged party to ensure that they were not "brought along" to the deal, but in fact they were the "principal partner" in the deal.
# On the [High Court] case PetroSA brought against Imvume PetroSA suspended the case due to the fact that if Imvume were liquidated, there would be very little proceeds flowing into PetroSA from that exercise. Imvume is much better off remaining operational for PetroSA to be able to recoup the total sum owed to PetroSA as well as interest and the legal costs.
# On Leslie Mkhabela [PetroSA's choice of lawyer to sue Imvume]
Mkhabela assured PetroSA of the following: he acted on behalf of Imvume during 2002/03. He later decided to resign from their business. While he acted for Imvume, he was invited into a consortium that submitted a bid for the Aventura Resort in exchange for his services. He retains no personal friendship with Imvume.
# On PetroSA's actions and internal inquiry
At the request of Imvume, PetroSA effected a pre-payment into an account different from the normal account. We changed the account without considering that there may be negative ramifications. PetroSA has since tightened the controls around channels of communication and instruction from vendors on payments. PetroSA in its enquiry has not found any wrongdoing by any individual or individuals within PetroSA or external to PetroSA with line of sight to PetroSA. All the procedures and processes were followed. PetroSA honoured the letter of the contract. At times we assist suppliers to better deliver to PetroSA where possible. The procurement policy at PetroSA allows for payments of this nature.
# On the double payment
Glencore held the product. Even though PetroSA did not have a contract with them, they had a ship in the harbour with our product. As we had already paid, PetroSA had to make a decision; to either pay them and deal with Imvume later -- this would cost us $2,8-million -- or refuse to pay and have our refinery cease operating for a minimum of 40 days, at the cost of $1-million daily. The PetroSA board ratified the decision.
# Conclusion
It is the intention of PetroSA to recoup all the funds involved in this dispute. A liquidated Imvume would not generate the required proceeds for PetroSA. This would lead to an outright loss. PetroSA needs Imvume to pay back the money owed to PetroSA.
BARRY AARON & ASSOCIATES (lawyers for Majali and Imvume):
Our clients have requested us to record that Imvume had legitimately withheld payment in the sum of $2,8-million from Glencore against receipt of the expected commission on the profit-sharing arrangement in relation to Imvume's contract with PetroSA.
The withholding of this payment was not contested by Glencore until immediately prior to delivery of the next shipment, which it then refused to offload until such time as the shortfall (as Glencore perceived it) on the previous shipment had been paid. This resulted in PetroSA effecting payment of the shortfall and Imvume executing the acknowledgement [of debt] in favour of PetroSA.
The issue of commission from Glencore remains unresolved. Imvume expected to repay PetroSA from anticipated funds and separately resolve the issue with Glencore. Unfortunately, the anticipated funds did not materialise. Imvume has concluded arrangements with PetroSA for repayment. Imvume intends honouring its obligations to PetroSA. Our clients have no objection to fair investigative journalism and comment. [The M&G] however continues to harass our clients in an ongoing witch-hunt. [The M&G] appears to have accessed Imvume's private and confidential records, including (in particular) its banking records, constituting an invasion of our clients' rights to privacy, conduct way beyond the norms of responsible or acceptable investigative journalism. Our clients are a private businessman and a private company respectively, engaging in the legitimate pursuit of their activities. Their business activities and support for the ANC are their private affair. [The M&G] is sabotaging and subverting a legitimate black empowerment initiative.
MNMR Attorneys (for the ANC and Kgalema Motlanthe)
The short time period provided for comment demonstrates that the M&G will not give proper consideration to our clients' submissions. We wish to note that following the recent decision of the Cape high court in the Idasa matter, our clients are not obliged to discuss donations received by it from any person. Even if it were so, our clients would have no obligation and would not always have the ability or means to verify the identity of the sources of all donations made to it. We record, however, that our clients deny any insinuation that they acted in any corrupt, illegal or improper manner. Our clients will not hesitate to protect their rights should the M&G publish the defamatory material contemplated in [your] e-mail.
Source: Mail & Guardian
The M&G possesses bank statements and has seen other forensic evidence proving that Imvume transferred the lion's share of this to the ANC within days. PetroSA this week said it was unaware of this. The ANC denied impropriety and said it was not obliged to discuss its funders. The scheme unfolded in two stages. First, PetroSA management bent over backwards to pay Imvume the money as an advance for the procurement of oil condensate. Then, when Imvume diverted the funds to the ANC instead of paying its own foreign suppliers, PetroSA had to cover the shortfall by paying the same amount again.
A multimillion-rand hole remains in the parastatalis books. PetroSA has gone through the motions to recover the debt by suing Imvume -- but most of it remains outstanding. The effect of the entire transaction was that PetroSA, and ultimately the taxpayer, subsidised the ruling party's election campaign: a blatant abuse of public resources. Imvume's role as an ANC "front company" first emerged in February last year when the M&G exposed its oil dealings with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Imvume principal Sandi Majali obtained lucrative crude oil allocations from that regime when he travelled to Iraq with top ANC officials between 2000 and 2002. More recently, Imvume described its boss as ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe's "economic adviser".
The transaction in a nutshell
But it was the diversion of the Petro-SA money four months ahead of the 2004 elections that is now lifting the lid on the funding scandal. The deal puts the spotlight on PetroSA's management, which approved the payment; Imvume boss Majali, who asked for the advance and then issued the cheques to the ANC; and Motlanthe, who was Majali's ANC patron. Imvume, now unable to pay its debts, was once the empowerment pin-up of the oil industry.
The contract that caused all the trouble was awarded by PetroSA to Imvume on October 15 2002 -- the day President Thabo Mbeki publicly launched PetroSA as the national oil company. Under the contract, Imvume -- with the backing of Swiss-based resource trader Glencore International -- was to supply PetroSA with regular cargoes of condensate, a feedstock for PetroSA's Mossel Bay gas-to-liquid fuels plant. A number of condensate cargoes were delivered to Mossel Bay during 2003. The standard contractual procedure was for PetroSA to pay Imvume the full cargo price no later than 30 days after the bill of lading date (the date the cargo was loaded for shipment to Mossel Bay).
Once it received payment from PetroSA, Imvume would immediately pay it on to Glencore, which sourced the cargo on international markets. Glencore paid Imvume a commission. But in December 2003 the pattern was broken, and PetroSA has confirmed that standard procedure was departed from. The bill of lading date for that cargo was December 6 2003, meaning PetroSA's payment for the cargo -- worth $10-million (about R65-million) -- was due on January 5 2004. But Imvume's Majali asked PetroSA for an advance of R15-million (just more than $2-million of the $10-million) which was paid even before the cargo was discharged on December 22. PetroSA paid the advance into a different account to that usually used by Imvume for the contract.
Evidence in the M&G's possession confirms that Imvume Management's corporate account was credited with R15-million a day later, on December 19. And the M&G has seen forensic proof that within the next four days, Imvume's Majali issued a series of four cheques to the ANC -- for R4-million, R3-million and R2-million (twice). These cheques, totalling R11-million, were all transacted on December 23. This week Majali and Imvume did not dispute that the money was paid to the ANC, but claimed their support for the party was a "private affair".
The transfers to the ANC came four months before the elections, held on April 14 2004. A number of sources have described the party's financial straits around that time, claiming it had a bank overdraft typically running at more than R100-million. When payment for the cargo became due to Glencore on January 5, Imvume failed to pay the company the R15-million advance -- and, effectively, also withheld another R3-million from the balance owed.
Glencore turned to PetroSA for what it was owed, eventually threatening in February not to offload the next cargo. PetroSA agreed to cover the shortfall of R18-million, for fear that the Mossel Bay plant would run out of feedstock, leading to greater losses. Effectively, PetroSA paid R18-million twice -- once to Imvume, and once to Imvume's supplier. PetroSA maintains that the special circumstances of the empowerment environment largely excuse the actions of its management. It also denies that there was pressure from either the Minerals and Energy Ministry or the ANC to approve the advance to Imvume.
Circumstances, however, suggest that empowerment is not a sufficient explanation and that Imvume's ANC links played a role. These links were no secret in oil trading circles. A businessman active in the sector told the M&G last year: "It was talked about when they got tenders ... that it was an ANC company ... I certainly understand that ANC fundraising has a keen interest."
The advance payment to Imvume was irregular in that it was a departure from standard procedures. PetroSA maintains procurement policy allows for advance payments, but admits it "should have checked" whether the money was going into the usual account. When the transaction with Imvume blew up in its face, PetroSA continued treating the company with kid gloves.
On February 23 last year, four days after PetroSA had been forced to settle Imvume's debt with Glencore, Majali signed an acknowledgement of debt to PetroSA, agreeing to repay the R18-million plus interest within 90 days. He also ceded his company's revenue stream as security. But Imvume paid nothing in terms of that agreement. Court records show more than a month passed after the expiry of the 90-day term before PetroSA issued a letter of demand. (See "PetroSA vs Imvume Management" download box on top right of this article for full documents).
PetroSA's choice of lawyer employed to pursue the demand raises further questions about PetroSA's seriousness of purpose. The lawyer, Leslie Mkhabela, was previously Imvume's own attorney and still has a business relationship with Majali via their common interest in Forever Resorts Aventura, the privatised state leisure company. This raises conflict-of-interest questions.
Mkhabela maintained this week that this was not a problem as he had disclosed his business relationship with Majali to PetroSA. The agreement signed between Mkhize and Majali was still not enforced. Instead new terms, much more favourable to Imvume, were agreed between PetroSA chief executive Sipho Mkhize and Majali in September last year.
Now PetroSA waived any claim to interest and agreed that Imvume could repay the capital amount in monthly instalments over four and a half years. But again, in February this year and after paying only R1,33-million, Imvume defaulted, court papers show.
PetroSA took off the kid gloves for a little while, filing an application for summary judgement in the Johannesburg High Court. But the matter was postponed twice, and on a third court date -- May 3 this year -- PetroSA removed the matter from the roll. PetroSA this week claimed that this was to allow Imvume to remain operational, which would give PetroSA a better chance eventually to recoup the debt.
The ANC this week threatened legal action against the M&G without confirming or denying the flow of money to it. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the ANC knew exactly where the funding was coming from. Between 2000 and 2002, when Majali was trading in oil allocations from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the ANC's Motlanthe repeatedly accompanied him to that country. ANC treasurer general Mendi Msimang also went along on at least one occasion.
It is rumoured that the relationship between Majali and Motlanthe has cooled recently, but an Imvume brochure last year still described Majali as "economic adviser to the secretary general of the ANC". Describing the company's "winning formula", the brochure said Imvume had "access and influence on economic policy".
How they responded ...
PETROSA
The cornerstone of this deal is the policy adopted by PetroSA, which is a national initiative, black economic empowerment (BEE). PetroSA has a mandate to introduce hitherto disadvantaged South Africans into the oil and gas industry. PetroSA had a choice: to continue business as usual and exclude historically disadvantaged South Africans from the mainstream economy and prolong, if not propagate, the two-economies concept, or use our procurement muscle to bring fundamental change to the industry.
To procure a raw material referred to as condensate, the requirement was that the preferred supplier must have a South African partner who qualifies as a BEE candidate. This in effect introduced a major shift in the industry. We deliberately signed deals with the historically disadvantaged party to ensure that they were not "brought along" to the deal, but in fact they were the "principal partner" in the deal.
# On the [High Court] case PetroSA brought against Imvume PetroSA suspended the case due to the fact that if Imvume were liquidated, there would be very little proceeds flowing into PetroSA from that exercise. Imvume is much better off remaining operational for PetroSA to be able to recoup the total sum owed to PetroSA as well as interest and the legal costs.
# On Leslie Mkhabela [PetroSA's choice of lawyer to sue Imvume]
Mkhabela assured PetroSA of the following: he acted on behalf of Imvume during 2002/03. He later decided to resign from their business. While he acted for Imvume, he was invited into a consortium that submitted a bid for the Aventura Resort in exchange for his services. He retains no personal friendship with Imvume.
# On PetroSA's actions and internal inquiry
At the request of Imvume, PetroSA effected a pre-payment into an account different from the normal account. We changed the account without considering that there may be negative ramifications. PetroSA has since tightened the controls around channels of communication and instruction from vendors on payments. PetroSA in its enquiry has not found any wrongdoing by any individual or individuals within PetroSA or external to PetroSA with line of sight to PetroSA. All the procedures and processes were followed. PetroSA honoured the letter of the contract. At times we assist suppliers to better deliver to PetroSA where possible. The procurement policy at PetroSA allows for payments of this nature.
# On the double payment
Glencore held the product. Even though PetroSA did not have a contract with them, they had a ship in the harbour with our product. As we had already paid, PetroSA had to make a decision; to either pay them and deal with Imvume later -- this would cost us $2,8-million -- or refuse to pay and have our refinery cease operating for a minimum of 40 days, at the cost of $1-million daily. The PetroSA board ratified the decision.
# Conclusion
It is the intention of PetroSA to recoup all the funds involved in this dispute. A liquidated Imvume would not generate the required proceeds for PetroSA. This would lead to an outright loss. PetroSA needs Imvume to pay back the money owed to PetroSA.
BARRY AARON & ASSOCIATES (lawyers for Majali and Imvume):
Our clients have requested us to record that Imvume had legitimately withheld payment in the sum of $2,8-million from Glencore against receipt of the expected commission on the profit-sharing arrangement in relation to Imvume's contract with PetroSA.
The withholding of this payment was not contested by Glencore until immediately prior to delivery of the next shipment, which it then refused to offload until such time as the shortfall (as Glencore perceived it) on the previous shipment had been paid. This resulted in PetroSA effecting payment of the shortfall and Imvume executing the acknowledgement [of debt] in favour of PetroSA.
The issue of commission from Glencore remains unresolved. Imvume expected to repay PetroSA from anticipated funds and separately resolve the issue with Glencore. Unfortunately, the anticipated funds did not materialise. Imvume has concluded arrangements with PetroSA for repayment. Imvume intends honouring its obligations to PetroSA. Our clients have no objection to fair investigative journalism and comment. [The M&G] however continues to harass our clients in an ongoing witch-hunt. [The M&G] appears to have accessed Imvume's private and confidential records, including (in particular) its banking records, constituting an invasion of our clients' rights to privacy, conduct way beyond the norms of responsible or acceptable investigative journalism. Our clients are a private businessman and a private company respectively, engaging in the legitimate pursuit of their activities. Their business activities and support for the ANC are their private affair. [The M&G] is sabotaging and subverting a legitimate black empowerment initiative.
MNMR Attorneys (for the ANC and Kgalema Motlanthe)
The short time period provided for comment demonstrates that the M&G will not give proper consideration to our clients' submissions. We wish to note that following the recent decision of the Cape high court in the Idasa matter, our clients are not obliged to discuss donations received by it from any person. Even if it were so, our clients would have no obligation and would not always have the ability or means to verify the identity of the sources of all donations made to it. We record, however, that our clients deny any insinuation that they acted in any corrupt, illegal or improper manner. Our clients will not hesitate to protect their rights should the M&G publish the defamatory material contemplated in [your] e-mail.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Saturday, April 30, 2005
Langa is to be chief justice
Justice Pius Langa is to become the country's new chief justice.
He will replace Arthur Chaskalson who is to retire. Langa, currently Chaskalson's deputy, will take up his post on June 1, President Thabo Mbeki's office said in a statement on Saturday.
Mbeki nominated current Constitutional Court justice Dikgang Moseneke as Langa's deputy. The president is required by law to consult parties in the National Assembly as well as the Judicial Service Commission before appointing a deputy.
Source: News 24
He will replace Arthur Chaskalson who is to retire. Langa, currently Chaskalson's deputy, will take up his post on June 1, President Thabo Mbeki's office said in a statement on Saturday.
Mbeki nominated current Constitutional Court justice Dikgang Moseneke as Langa's deputy. The president is required by law to consult parties in the National Assembly as well as the Judicial Service Commission before appointing a deputy.
Source: News 24
Thursday, April 28, 2005
Calm returns after Togo poll riot
Residents of Togo's capital, Lomé, are clearing up after violence erupted following Sunday's disputed elections. Soldiers beat people to make them take down barricades and clean the streets in opposition strongholds, correspondents say. At least 20 people were killed as opposition supporters went on the rampage, saying the polls were rigged.
Ruling party candidate and son of the former leader, Faure Gnassingbe, officially won with 60% of the vote. His main rival Emmanuel Bob Akitani got 38%, the electoral commission said but he declared himself president, saying there had been massive fraud.
Election observers from West African regional body Ecowas accepted that there had been problems but said the results had generally reflected the will of the people. “ [The security forces] smashed in the door. They told us to get out and pick up the stones ”
Ecowas condemned Mr Akitani's declaration and called for a national unity government to prevent further violence. According to the BBC's Mark Dummett in Lome, security was tightened overnight and soldiers are patrolling the city in jeeps mounted with heavy machine guns. They began a massive clear-up operation with bulldozers clear the remnants of burning roadblocks. "[The security forces] smashed in the door. They told us to get out and pick up the stones," Lome resident Assou told Reuters news agency, adding one of soldiers shouted: "Work, work!" Meanwhile, communication remains difficult as telephone networks are not working and most private radio stations were taken off the air on Wednesday. Some 600 people are reported to have fled into Benin from southern Togo, following clashes in the opposition town of Aného.
Mr Atikani's coalition intends to appeal to Togo's constitutional court - which has still to confirm the result of the election - saying he won majorities in all the most populous regions of the country. His support is strongest in the south, including Lome, while Mr Faure's power base is in the north.
Mr Faure denied vote-rigging and urged veteran opposition Union of Forces for Change (UCF) leader Gilchrist Olympio to join a government of national unity. Earlier, Mr Olympio, who was ineligible to stand in the poll because he lives in exile following a 1992 assassination attempt, said his party would not serve as a minority partner in any unity government. The army tried to install Mr Faure after his father's President Gnassingbe Eyadema's death, but pressure led him to step down and call an election.
President Eyadema, led Togo for 38 years, had seized power in a coup from Mr Olympio's father, Sylvanus Olympio, in 1963.
Source: BBC
Ruling party candidate and son of the former leader, Faure Gnassingbe, officially won with 60% of the vote. His main rival Emmanuel Bob Akitani got 38%, the electoral commission said but he declared himself president, saying there had been massive fraud.
Election observers from West African regional body Ecowas accepted that there had been problems but said the results had generally reflected the will of the people. “ [The security forces] smashed in the door. They told us to get out and pick up the stones ”
Ecowas condemned Mr Akitani's declaration and called for a national unity government to prevent further violence. According to the BBC's Mark Dummett in Lome, security was tightened overnight and soldiers are patrolling the city in jeeps mounted with heavy machine guns. They began a massive clear-up operation with bulldozers clear the remnants of burning roadblocks. "[The security forces] smashed in the door. They told us to get out and pick up the stones," Lome resident Assou told Reuters news agency, adding one of soldiers shouted: "Work, work!" Meanwhile, communication remains difficult as telephone networks are not working and most private radio stations were taken off the air on Wednesday. Some 600 people are reported to have fled into Benin from southern Togo, following clashes in the opposition town of Aného.
Mr Atikani's coalition intends to appeal to Togo's constitutional court - which has still to confirm the result of the election - saying he won majorities in all the most populous regions of the country. His support is strongest in the south, including Lome, while Mr Faure's power base is in the north.
Mr Faure denied vote-rigging and urged veteran opposition Union of Forces for Change (UCF) leader Gilchrist Olympio to join a government of national unity. Earlier, Mr Olympio, who was ineligible to stand in the poll because he lives in exile following a 1992 assassination attempt, said his party would not serve as a minority partner in any unity government. The army tried to install Mr Faure after his father's President Gnassingbe Eyadema's death, but pressure led him to step down and call an election.
President Eyadema, led Togo for 38 years, had seized power in a coup from Mr Olympio's father, Sylvanus Olympio, in 1963.
Source: BBC
Friday, April 1, 2005
FINANCIAL SERVICES OMBUD SCHEMES ACT 37 OF 2004
The purpose of the Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act is to provide for the recognition of financial services ombud schemes; to lay down minimum requirements for ombud schemes; to promote consumer education with regard to ombud schemes; to co-ordinate the activities of ombuds of recognised schemes with the activities of the Pension Funds Adjudicator and the Ombud for Financial Services Providers; to develop and promote best practices for complaint resolution; to empower the Ombud for Financial Services Providers to act as a statutory ombud in certain cases; and to provide for matters connected therewith.
An ombud Scheme is an arrangement for the settlement of disputes between between a financial services provider and a client.
Source: SABINET
An ombud Scheme is an arrangement for the settlement of disputes between between a financial services provider and a client.
Source: SABINET
Tuesday, February 15, 2005
Rafik Hariri, Ex-Premier of Lebanon, Dies at 60
Mr. Hariri, who had always surrounded himself with bodyguards and lived in a heavily fortified compound, was killed when the bomb hit his motorcade in the city center that he helped restore. He had served as prime minister a total of 10 years, stepping down last fall over Syrian interference in Lebanon.
Born poor in southern Lebanon, Mr. Hariri was a self-made man who amassed a fortune building hotels, palaces and conference centers for the royal family in Saudi Arabia, and remained very close to the Saud family. He was as extravagant in his charitable works as he was in his big-game hunting, yachts, private jets and multimillion-dollar real estate projects. Always impeccably dressed, he was stout with bushy eyebrows and a commanding manner. As a politician, though, he was obliged to keep his domineering nature in check to placate Lebanon's powerful neighbor, Syria.
While Mr. Hariri was accused by some Lebanese of driving the country into debt with his ambitious rebuilding plans, he was also praised as the architect of its rebirth and renewed confidence after the devastation of 15 years of civil war, from 1975 to 1990. He was a well-known figure in Washington and European capitals, where he was largely successful in obtaining Western help to overcome Lebanon's intermittent financial crisis. Yet his political fortunes were always hostage to his up-and-down relations with Syria's presidents, now Bashar al-Assad and before him his father, Hafez al-Assad. For the most part, he appeared to steer an even course. Unlike some of the more impetuous Lebanese clan and religious leaders, Mr. Hariri carefully avoided direct criticism of Syria's role as Lebanon's overlord.
Yet his frustration with the limits that Damascus set sometimes showed. In an interview with The Boston Globe in 1993, he was asked whether the ubiquitous portrait of the elder Mr. Assad on every wall of the old Beirut airport was a problem for him. "It's not a problem to put it up," Mr. Hariri said. "It's a problem to take it down." His long-running rivalry with Émile Lahoud, the pro-Syrian Lebanese president, defined much of his political career. It prompted him to resign in 1998, after his first six years in office. He was re-elected in 2000. His irritation with Mr. Lahoud drove him to another break last year. When Damascus insisted on keeping Mr. Lahoud in office beyond the constitutional limit, Mr. Hariri resigned, a move that was widely interpreted as a definitive rupture with Syria. He had a big enough bloc in Parliament that he could have stopped Syria's order last summer to amend the Constitution to extend Mr. Lahoud's term. He agreed not to after traveling to Damascus and then to the office of Syrian intelligence, which serves as a kind of proconsul in Lebanon. He appeared for the hastily called Parliament vote on the constitutional change with his left arm in a sling from a fall, leading to jokes that the Syrians had twisted it too hard.
The downtown area was already plastered with freshly printed Lahoud posters and pre-positioned fireworks went off as soon as the vote was taken. "He could bypass criticizing Syria because he was able to criticize people who were supporting Syria, like Lahoud," said Edward S. Walker, a former American diplomat who knew Mr. Hariri from his service in the Middle East. "But he never went so far as to make himself a direct target."
Mr. Hariri was born in 1944 in Sidon, an ancient port city on the Mediterranean. The son of a vegetable vendor, he earned a degree in business administration at Arab University in Beirut and then chose the path taken by many enterprising young Arabs of his day: In 1965, he left home to seek his fortune in Saudi Arabia. After a short stint as a teacher, he turned to construction, amassing a fortune in the building frenzy that swept the kingdom in the early years of its oil boom. He became a favorite of the Saudi royal family, even gaining Saudi citizenship, a connection that would prove invaluable after he returned to Lebanon and sought to re-establish its reputation as a tourism and financial center after the civil war.
Mr. Hariri's charitable works - among them a hospital, a teaching university and scholarships for Lebanese students - first reintroduced him to his homeland and grew in tandem with his expanding financial interests. He invested heavily in the reconstruction of central Beirut along the former Green Line, which separated warring militias during the war, and later formed television and radio stations in Lebanon. Although there was some initial criticism, the downtown is now an architectural gem and very popular, particularly with tourists during the summer, when the outdoor cafes are buzzing until 3 a.m. Mr. Hariri's political career began in 1983, one year after an Israeli invasion of Lebanon and at a time when the country was paralyzed by sectarian fighting. He arrived as an envoy of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, with a mandate to mediate between sectarian militias, dodging bullets in typically swashbuckling fashion as his small plane flew into the besieged capital. His mission failed that time, but he was later involved in the successful Saudi effort to end the war and establish the Syrian military as a peacekeeping force.
Under Lebanon's Constitution, the prime minister must be a Sunni Muslim like Mr. Hariri. He was first appointed prime minister in 1992, in the hope that his reputation as a savvy businessman would attract investment and restore confidence in the shattered Lebanese economy, and held onto the post after the country's first postwar elections in 1996. When he first took office, he pledged to lead the country in a "quantum leap" to the future. "I want to go down in the history books," he said at the time, "as the man who resurrected Beirut." Regularly cited as one of the richest men in the world, Mr. Hariri did some of that resurrection with his own money. He was a major shareholder in Solidere, the private company set up to rebuild downtown Beirut, and reportedly paid $10 million for the project's engineering plans. While he was able to pursue an independent economic policy, one that provided wealthy Syrians a safe haven for their money, Mr. Hariri had little control over Lebanon's foreign policy. The militant Shiite party, Hezbollah, supported by Syria and Iran, was left in control over southern Lebanon for years, operating without consultation or coordination with Mr. Hariri's government.
When Hezbollah attacked an Israeli patrol at the border in 2001, prompting a retaliatory airstrike by Israel, for example, Mr. Hariri said he was not surprised that he had not been given advance notice. "Maybe they wanted to make a point that they don't take advice from the government," he said. Last September, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution calling on Syria to respect the sovereignty of Lebanon. The vote followed the moves by pro-Syria politicians in Lebanon to change the Constitution to allow President Lahoud to remain in office. Mr. Hariri, while making his opposition known, acquiesced to the change. Then he resigned. Before his death, he had been promoting a new movement he called Al Mustaqbal (The Future), and seemed intent on remaining in Lebanese politics.
He is survived by his wife, Nazik Hariri, and six children.
Source: New York Times
Saturday, February 5, 2005
G. Eyadema, Togo's Ruler, Dies at 69
Africa's longest serving ruler, President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, died on Saturday as he was being moved to France for medical treatment, the government said in a statement. He was 69. Mr. Eyadema, Togo's ruler for 38 years, had been suffering from illness for several years and had been abroad on several occasions for medical treatment. He was a young soldier when he staged one of the continent's first post-colonial coups in 1963. He took power in his own name in 1967.
On the African stage, Mr. Eyadema carved himself the role of a peacemaker, focusing on regional diplomacy and, most recently, helping to mediate in Ivory Coast's civil war. But at home, his authoritarian style and the slow pace of political reform drew international criticism. Amnesty International accused his forces of killing hundreds in a presidential election in 1998, when he was declared the winner after the vote count was abruptly stopped.
The armed forces said Mr. Eyadema's son Faure would assume power. Under the constitution, the head of the National Assembly should assume provisional power following the death, but the armed forces chief said the action was taken to avoid a power vacuum since the head of the assembly was out of the country.
Source: New York Times
On the African stage, Mr. Eyadema carved himself the role of a peacemaker, focusing on regional diplomacy and, most recently, helping to mediate in Ivory Coast's civil war. But at home, his authoritarian style and the slow pace of political reform drew international criticism. Amnesty International accused his forces of killing hundreds in a presidential election in 1998, when he was declared the winner after the vote count was abruptly stopped.
The armed forces said Mr. Eyadema's son Faure would assume power. Under the constitution, the head of the National Assembly should assume provisional power following the death, but the armed forces chief said the action was taken to avoid a power vacuum since the head of the assembly was out of the country.
Source: New York Times
Tuesday, February 1, 2005
New NPA head 'must deliver'
Justice Minister Brigitte Mabandla introduced national prosecuting authority boss Vusi Pikoli to the institution's staff in Pretoria on Tuesday, saying she expected the best from him. "I am expecting that in the next five years there should be a further qualitative improvement in delivery and in levels of excellence in the services that you provide. "Good wishes, and I know you will deliver. I expect the best," she told a packed auditorium at the NPA's headquarters.
Pikoli, who takes over from Bulelani Ncguka, was appointed on January 21.
Source: News 24.com
Pikoli, who takes over from Bulelani Ncguka, was appointed on January 21.
Source: News 24.com
Tuesday, January 25, 2005
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, here is this Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General from Geneva, dated 25 January 2005.
Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, on 18 September 2004 the Security Council adopted resolution 1564 requesting, inter alia, that the Secretary-General ‘rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable’.
In October 2004, the Secretary General appointed Antonio Cassese (Chairperson), Mohamed Fayek, Hina Jilani, Dumisa Ntsebeza and Therese Striggner-Scott as members of the Commission and requested that they report back on their findings within three months. The Commission was supported in its work by a Secretariat headed by an Executive Director, Ms. Mona Rishmawi, as well as a legal research team and an investigative team composed of investigators, forensic experts, military analysts, and investigators specializing in gender violence, all appointed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Commission assembled in Geneva and began its work on 25 October 2004.
In order to discharge its mandate, the Commission endeavoured to fulfil four key tasks: (1) to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties; (2) to determine whether or not acts of genocide have occurred; (3) to identify the perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur; and (4) to suggest means of ensuring that those responsible for such violations are held accountable. While the Commission considered all events relevant to the current conflict in Darfur, it focused in particular on incidents that occurred between February 2003 and mid-January 2005.
The Commission engaged in a regular dialogue with the Government of the Sudan throughout its mandate, in particular through meetings in Geneva and in the Sudan, as well as through the work of its investigative team. The Commission visited the Sudan from 7-21 November 2004 and 9-16 January 2005, including travel to the three Darfur States. The investigative team remained in Darfur from November 2004 through January 2005. During its presence in the Sudan, the Commission held extensive meetings with representatives of the Government, the Governors of the Darfur States and other senior officials in the capital and at provincial and local levels, members of the armed forces and police, leaders of rebel forces, tribal leaders, internally displaced persons, victims and witnesses of violations, NGOs and United Nations representatives.
The Commission submitted a full report on its findings to the Secretary-General on 25 January 2005. The report describes the terms of reference, methodology, approach and activities of the Commission and its investigative team. It also provides an overview of the historical and social background to the conflict in Darfur. The report then addresses in detail the four key tasks referred to above, namely the Commission’s findings in relation to: i) violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by all parties; ii) whether or not acts of genocide have taken place; iii) the identification of perpetrators; and iv) accountability mechanisms. These four sections are briefly summarized here.
A copy of the report can be downloaded (in pdf format) here.
Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, on 18 September 2004 the Security Council adopted resolution 1564 requesting, inter alia, that the Secretary-General ‘rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable’.
In October 2004, the Secretary General appointed Antonio Cassese (Chairperson), Mohamed Fayek, Hina Jilani, Dumisa Ntsebeza and Therese Striggner-Scott as members of the Commission and requested that they report back on their findings within three months. The Commission was supported in its work by a Secretariat headed by an Executive Director, Ms. Mona Rishmawi, as well as a legal research team and an investigative team composed of investigators, forensic experts, military analysts, and investigators specializing in gender violence, all appointed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Commission assembled in Geneva and began its work on 25 October 2004.
In order to discharge its mandate, the Commission endeavoured to fulfil four key tasks: (1) to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties; (2) to determine whether or not acts of genocide have occurred; (3) to identify the perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur; and (4) to suggest means of ensuring that those responsible for such violations are held accountable. While the Commission considered all events relevant to the current conflict in Darfur, it focused in particular on incidents that occurred between February 2003 and mid-January 2005.
The Commission engaged in a regular dialogue with the Government of the Sudan throughout its mandate, in particular through meetings in Geneva and in the Sudan, as well as through the work of its investigative team. The Commission visited the Sudan from 7-21 November 2004 and 9-16 January 2005, including travel to the three Darfur States. The investigative team remained in Darfur from November 2004 through January 2005. During its presence in the Sudan, the Commission held extensive meetings with representatives of the Government, the Governors of the Darfur States and other senior officials in the capital and at provincial and local levels, members of the armed forces and police, leaders of rebel forces, tribal leaders, internally displaced persons, victims and witnesses of violations, NGOs and United Nations representatives.
The Commission submitted a full report on its findings to the Secretary-General on 25 January 2005. The report describes the terms of reference, methodology, approach and activities of the Commission and its investigative team. It also provides an overview of the historical and social background to the conflict in Darfur. The report then addresses in detail the four key tasks referred to above, namely the Commission’s findings in relation to: i) violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by all parties; ii) whether or not acts of genocide have taken place; iii) the identification of perpetrators; and iv) accountability mechanisms. These four sections are briefly summarized here.
A copy of the report can be downloaded (in pdf format) here.
Thursday, November 11, 2004
Yasir Arafat, Father and Leader of Palestinian Nationalism, Dies at 75
Yasir Arafat, who died this morning in Paris, was the wily and enigmatic father of Palestinian nationalism who for almost 40 years symbolized his people's longing for a distinct political identity and independent state. He was 75.
No other individual so embodied the Palestinians' plight: their dispersal, their statelessness, their hunger for a return to a homeland lost to Israel. Mr. Arafat was once seen as a romantic hero and praised as a statesman, but his luster and reputation faded over time. A brilliant navigator of political currents in opposition, once in power he proved more tactician than strategist, and a leader who rejected crucial opportunities to achieve his declared goal.
At the end of his life, Mr. Arafat governed Palestinians from an almost three-year confinement by Israel to his Ramallah headquarters. While many Palestinians continued to revere him, others came to see him as undemocratic and his administration as corrupt, as they faced growing poverty, lawlessness and despair over prospects for statehood.
A co-winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1994 for his agreement to work toward peaceful coexistence with Israel, Mr. Arafat began his long political career with high-profile acts of anti-Israel terrorism.
No other individual so embodied the Palestinians' plight: their dispersal, their statelessness, their hunger for a return to a homeland lost to Israel. Mr. Arafat was once seen as a romantic hero and praised as a statesman, but his luster and reputation faded over time. A brilliant navigator of political currents in opposition, once in power he proved more tactician than strategist, and a leader who rejected crucial opportunities to achieve his declared goal.
At the end of his life, Mr. Arafat governed Palestinians from an almost three-year confinement by Israel to his Ramallah headquarters. While many Palestinians continued to revere him, others came to see him as undemocratic and his administration as corrupt, as they faced growing poverty, lawlessness and despair over prospects for statehood.
A co-winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1994 for his agreement to work toward peaceful coexistence with Israel, Mr. Arafat began his long political career with high-profile acts of anti-Israel terrorism.
Monday, November 8, 2004
Count Agusta link probed in Palazzolo hearing
An Italian prosecutor on Monday sought to probe the link between alleged Mafioso Vito Palazzolo and Count Riccardo Agusta, who achieved notoriety in the Roodefontein saga.
The prosecutor, Gaetano Paci, was cross-examining former police officer Gert Nel in the Cape Town Magistrate's Court, which is hearing evidence for Palazzolo's trial in absentia in Italy.
Nel told the court he was one of the police officers who arrested Palazzolo in the Eastern Cape in 1988, which resulted in Palazzolo returning to Switzerland to complete a jail term for playing banker in a massive drug deal.
Last year, a civil engineer told the George Regional Court, hearing corruption charges against former Western Cape politicians Peter Marais and David Malatsi, that Palazzolo played a key role in Agusta's controversial Roodefontein golf-estate development.
The engineer, Ray Durden, testified that Palazzolo asked him to bring together a professional team to drive the project, and gave him instructions on an earlier, abandoned plan for a retirement complex on the farm.
Palazzolo had said he was acting as an adviser for Agusta.
Agusta last year paid a R1-million fine for his part in the Roodefontein corruption saga.
The prosecutor, Gaetano Paci, was cross-examining former police officer Gert Nel in the Cape Town Magistrate's Court, which is hearing evidence for Palazzolo's trial in absentia in Italy.
Nel told the court he was one of the police officers who arrested Palazzolo in the Eastern Cape in 1988, which resulted in Palazzolo returning to Switzerland to complete a jail term for playing banker in a massive drug deal.
Last year, a civil engineer told the George Regional Court, hearing corruption charges against former Western Cape politicians Peter Marais and David Malatsi, that Palazzolo played a key role in Agusta's controversial Roodefontein golf-estate development.
The engineer, Ray Durden, testified that Palazzolo asked him to bring together a professional team to drive the project, and gave him instructions on an earlier, abandoned plan for a retirement complex on the farm.
Palazzolo had said he was acting as an adviser for Agusta.
Agusta last year paid a R1-million fine for his part in the Roodefontein corruption saga.
Tuesday, August 24, 2004
Bank with close ties to Bush administration engulfed in scandal
The Justice Department announced on Friday that it is launching a criminal investigation into Riggs Bank. In recent months, the Washington-based bank has become engulfed in a scandal related to charges of money-laundering, corruption and terrorist financing. Riggs, which touts itself as “the most important bank in the most important city in the world,” has been known for decades as the bank of the Washington elite, including politicians, foreign ambassadors and the wealthy. It has held presidential accounts stretching back to the time of the Civil War, and is a prominent fixture in the political and social establishment of the nation’s capital.
Or rather, it was a prominent fixture. In July, PNL Financial Services agreed to buy Riggs for $779 million. The sale will become final by early next year. The bank’s prominent embassy and international operations will be shut down in an attempt to bury a scandal that has the potential of becoming much larger. That an institution like Riggs could so quickly disintegrate is an indication of the extent of the corruption that has overtaken American finance and government. There are three separate activities for which Riggs has come under investigation: (1) its relationship with the Saudi royal family and the potential financing of two of the September 11 hijackers through an account owned by the wife of the Saudi ambassador; (2) its relationship with the corrupt and dictatorial regime of the oil-rich West African country of Equatorial Guinea; and (3) its banking business with the former military dictator of Chile, Augusto Pinochet.
The public revelations concerning the bank’s relationship with Saudi Arabia came mainly through the publication of a Newsweek article on December 2, 2002 (“The Saudi Money Trail”). The news magazine reported that in January 2000, two of the hijackers who were on the plane that crashed into the Pentagon—Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar—received monetary aid and other assistance from Omar al-Bayoumi.
Alhazmi and Almihdhar are at the center of suspicions of US government complicity in the 9/11 attacks—and for good reason. The CIA had identified the two as early as January 2000 as Al Qaeda operatives, and the Washington Post reported in June 2002 that the FBI also knew of the two from January of 2000. Yet they were allowed to enter the US and live openly in San Diego for 18 months prior to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Newsweek reported in September 2002 that the roommate of Alhazmi and Almihdhar in San Diego was an FBI informant!
According to the December 2002 Newsweek article on Riggs Bank, al-Bayoumi “apparently did work for Dallah Avco, an aviation-services company with extensive contracts with the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation, headed by Prince Sultan, the father of the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar. According to informed sources, some federal investigators suspect that al-Bayoumi could have been an advance man for the 9/11 hijackers, sent by Al Qaeda to assist the plot that ultimately claimed 3,000 lives.”
Al-Bayoumi may have been receiving assistance in his activities from sections of the Saudi royal family. The Newsweek article states: “About two months after al-Bayoumi began aiding Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Newsweek has learned, al-Bayoumi’s wife began receiving regular stipends, often monthly and usually around $2,000 and totaling tens of thousands of dollars. The money came in the form of cashier’s checks, purchased from Washington’s Riggs Bank by Princess Haifa bin Faisal, the daughter of the late King Faisal and wife of Prince Bandar, the Saudi envoy who is a prominent Washington figure and personal friend of the Bush family. The checks were sent to a woman named Majeda Ibrahin Dweikat, who in turn signed over many of them to al-Bayoumi’s wife...”
Dweikat’s husband, Osama Basnan, is reported to be a sympathizer of Al Qaeda and is known to have had friendly relations with the two hijackers, Alhazmi and Almihdhar.
Al-Bayoumi apparently came under suspicion shortly after the attacks of September 11. He was picked up by British intelligence, which found evidence that he had made two phone calls to diplomats at the Saudi Embassy in Washington. However, he was released and is reported to be in Saudi Arabia.
Further, according to Newsweek: “Osama Basnan showed up in Houston last April [2001] while Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah came to town with a vast entourage en route to President George W. Bush’s ranch. According to informed sources, Basnan met with a high Saudi prince who has responsibilities for intelligence matters and is known to bring suitcases full of cash into the United States.”
There are suspicions that Basnan may have been a member of Saudi intelligence, suggesting that Saudi intelligence was closely monitoring, if not aiding, the activity of the September 11 hijackers through its accounts at Riggs.
Newsweek noted that the FBI, as of December 2002, still had an investigation open into the transactions. In July 2003, the FBI accused Riggs Bank of failing to abide by anti-money-laundering (AML) regulations.
Prior to and after the attacks of September 11, it was not unusual for Saudi clients to transfers of millions of dollars in and out of the bank with no questions asked. This was in violation of AML regulations, which require the reporting of all transaction involving such large sums of money.
The bank was eventually fined $25 million in May 2004 for violating these regulations. However, the FBI has issued a statement saying it found no evidence of terrorist financing. The Bush administration has refused to release the intelligence behind the investigation, citing “national security concerns.”
Even after the FBI’s accusations in July 2003, the bank continued to allow massive cash transfers by the Saudi ambassador. Under pressure, the bank announced this past March that it was closing all Saudi accounts.
On July 14, 2004, the Minority Staff of the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, at the request of Democrat Carl Levin, the ranking minority member of the subcommittee, issued a report that dealt mainly with the bank’s accounts for Equatorial Guinea and Augusto Pinochet.
The report found that “the evidence reviewed by the Subcommittee staff establishes that, since at least 1997, Riggs has disregarded its anti-money laundering (AML) obligations, maintained a dysfunctional AML program despite frequent warnings from OCC [Office of the Comptroller of the Currency] regulators, and allowed or, at times, actively facilitated suspicious financial activity.” The OCC, a branch of the Treasury Department, is responsible for regulating nationally chartered banks.
Equatorial Guinea was Riggs’ largest client. It held over 60 accounts at the bank, with varied holdings of $300-700 million. Its ruler, Teodoro Obian Nguema Mbasogo, came to power in a military coup in 1979 and is infamous for his corruption and brutality. Relations with the United States became strained in the mid-1990s, when the Clinton administration broke off diplomatic ties. However, these were restored by the Bush administration in 2003. The country holds interest for the United States because of its large oil reserves.
Riggs appears to have held both Equatorial Guinea government treasury accounts and the personal accounts of Obiang, his family members, and ministers in his government.
According to the subcommittee report, Riggs “serviced the EG [Equatorial Guinean] accounts with little or no attention to the bank’s anti-money laundering obligations...” For example, “Riggs opened multiple personal accounts for the President of Equatorial Guinea, his wife, and other relatives; helped establish shell offshore corporations for the EG President and his sons; and over a three-year period, from 2000 to 2002, facilitated nearly $13 million in cash deposits into Riggs accounts controlled by the EG President and his wife.”
Riggs also opened an account that received large sums of money from oil companies that did business with Equatorial Guinea, including Exxon Mobil, Amerada Hess, Marathon Oil and ChevronTexaco. Riggs allowed the wire transfer of over $35 million from the account to two unknown companies. “The Subcommittee has reason to believe that at least one of these recipient companies is controlled in whole or in part by the EG President.”
Riggs appears to have acted as a conduit for large-scale bribes or other corrupt machinations between the giant oil corporations and the dictator of a country with which they were eager to do business. The report also noted that these oil companies made a number of large payments (sometimes valued at over $1 million) to individual officials or family members for a variety of services.
The manager of Riggs’ accounts for Equatorial Guinea was Simon P. Kareri, who was eventually fired by the bank in January 2004. According to a bank employee, on more than one occasion Kareri visited the Equatorial Guinean embassy and returned with a suitcase full of $3 million in cash, which was deposited in the bank with no reports to financial regulators.
According to the subcommittee report, “The bank leadership permitted [Kareri] ...to become closely involved with EG officials and business activities, including advising the EG government on financial matters and becoming the sole signatory on an EG account holding substantial funds. The bank exercised such lax oversight of the account manager’s activities that, among other misconduct, the account manager was able to wire transfer more than $1 million from the EG oil account at Riggs to another bank for an account opened in the name of Jadini Holdings, an offshore corporation controlled by the account manager’s wife.”
In addition to its dealings with the Saudi royal family and Equatorial Guinea’s dictator, Riggs had a close relationship with the former dictator of Chile, Augusto Pinochet. Pinochet held numerous active accounts at Riggs between 1994 and 2002, even while he was under house arrest in Britain and his assets were supposedly frozen.
According to the subcommittee report, “The aggregate deposits in the Pinochet accounts at Riggs ranged from $4 to $8 million at a time.... Riggs account managers took actions consistent with helping Mr. Pinochet to evade legal proceedings seeking to discover and attach his bank accounts.... Riggs opened multiple accounts and accepted millions of dollars in deposits from Mr. Pinochet with no serious inquiry into questions regarding the source of his wealth; helped him set up offshore shell corporations and open accounts in the names of those corporations to disguise his control of the accounts; altered the names of his personal accounts to disguise their ownership; transferred $1.6 million from London to the United States while Mr. Pinochet was in detention and the subject of a court order to attach his bank accounts; conducted transactions through Riggs’ own accounts to hide Mr. Pinochet’s involvement in some cash transactions; and delivered over $1.9 million in cashiers checks to Mr. Pinochet in Chile to enable him to obtain substantial cash payments from banks in that country.”
The scope of the corruption, money-laundering and other suspicious activities is indeed astonishing. While it was engaged in these activities, the bank operated under the not-so-watchful eye of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. In spite of clear indications of regulatory violations at least as early as 1997, the OCC took no actions.
Particularly closely involved with the OCC’s investigation into the Pinochet accounts was the comptroller’s examiner-in-charge, R. Ashley Lee, who worked at the OCC from 1998 to October 2002. According to the subcommittee report, “In 2001, [Lee]...advised more senior OCC personnel against taking a formal enforcement action against Riggs, because the bank had promised to correct identified AML deficiencies. In 2002, he ordered examiners not to include a memorandum or work papers on the Pinochet examination to the OCC’s electronic database.”
Lee went to work for Riggs two weeks later, quickly becoming an executive vice president and the chief risk officer. The subcommittee report states: “During his next 18-months at the bank, he attended a number of meetings with OCC personnel related to Riggs’ AML problems,” despite regulations prohibiting former OCC employees from attending meetings on OCC-related maters.
The revelations of the activities at Riggs Bank demonstrate how commonplace and extensive criminal activity has become within the American financial and political establishment. Not coincidentally, the bank’s activity has a great deal in common with certain features prominent in the Bush administration: the heavy influence of oil interests, the close ties with the Saudi ruling elite, the funding and support given to dictators and former dictators, including General Pinochet.
The relationship of Riggs to the Bush administration is more than tangential. Riggs owns a money management firm, J. Bush & Co., operated by Jonathan Bush, the brother of George H.W. Bush and the current president’s uncle.
Jonathan Bush played a very important role in helping find investors for the various failed oil businesses that George W. Bush ran before he began his career in politics. Jonathan Bush also helped raise money for George H.W. Bush and is a former chair of the New York Republican State Finance Committee. In 2000, he was briefly named president and CEO of Riggs Investment Management Company (RIMCO), a wholly owned subsidiary of Riggs Bank.
While Jonathan Bush appears not to have been directly involved in the Saudi, Pinochet or Equatorial Guinean accounts, his position at Riggs is an indication of the close ties between the bank and the Bush family.
Moreover, Riggs is owned by the Allbritton family, a Texas family with close ties to the Republican establishment. Joe Allbritton, the former head of Riggs who bought the bank in the mid-1970s, is a friend of the Bush family. His son, Robert Allbritton, is the current chairman and CEO.
The Allbritton family is known among the Washington elite for the party it traditionally holds after the annual Alfalfa Club dinner, hosted to mark the birthday of Robert E. Lee, the southern general in the Civil War. The New York Times (“A Washington Bank, A Global Mess,” April 11, 2004) notes, “The Alfalfa roster includes presidents, politicians, diplomats and business impresarios, all bound together by being either formidably influential or fabulously rich. Attendees have included luminaries like Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States; Jack Valenti, the president of the Motion Picture Association of America; and others with surnames like Greenspan, Kissinger and Rehnquist. President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney made their first joint public appearance after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks at the Alfalfa gathering in 2002.”
Valenti, who, like Allbritton and Bush, is a former Texas businessman, is also on the board of directors of Riggs Bank.
A television station also owned by Allbritton was in the news earlier this year after it refused to air an ad critical of the Bush administration’s policy in Iraq.
Perhaps even more than the Enron scandal, the Riggs scandal is a deeply political scandal. No doubt, much of what went on at Riggs remains to be uncovered. With the announced sale of Riggs to PNL, which will be completed by early next year, the owners of the bank are clearly attempting to contain the scandal’s fallout.
Source: World Socialist Web Site
Or rather, it was a prominent fixture. In July, PNL Financial Services agreed to buy Riggs for $779 million. The sale will become final by early next year. The bank’s prominent embassy and international operations will be shut down in an attempt to bury a scandal that has the potential of becoming much larger. That an institution like Riggs could so quickly disintegrate is an indication of the extent of the corruption that has overtaken American finance and government. There are three separate activities for which Riggs has come under investigation: (1) its relationship with the Saudi royal family and the potential financing of two of the September 11 hijackers through an account owned by the wife of the Saudi ambassador; (2) its relationship with the corrupt and dictatorial regime of the oil-rich West African country of Equatorial Guinea; and (3) its banking business with the former military dictator of Chile, Augusto Pinochet.
The public revelations concerning the bank’s relationship with Saudi Arabia came mainly through the publication of a Newsweek article on December 2, 2002 (“The Saudi Money Trail”). The news magazine reported that in January 2000, two of the hijackers who were on the plane that crashed into the Pentagon—Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar—received monetary aid and other assistance from Omar al-Bayoumi.
Alhazmi and Almihdhar are at the center of suspicions of US government complicity in the 9/11 attacks—and for good reason. The CIA had identified the two as early as January 2000 as Al Qaeda operatives, and the Washington Post reported in June 2002 that the FBI also knew of the two from January of 2000. Yet they were allowed to enter the US and live openly in San Diego for 18 months prior to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Newsweek reported in September 2002 that the roommate of Alhazmi and Almihdhar in San Diego was an FBI informant!
According to the December 2002 Newsweek article on Riggs Bank, al-Bayoumi “apparently did work for Dallah Avco, an aviation-services company with extensive contracts with the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation, headed by Prince Sultan, the father of the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar. According to informed sources, some federal investigators suspect that al-Bayoumi could have been an advance man for the 9/11 hijackers, sent by Al Qaeda to assist the plot that ultimately claimed 3,000 lives.”
Al-Bayoumi may have been receiving assistance in his activities from sections of the Saudi royal family. The Newsweek article states: “About two months after al-Bayoumi began aiding Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Newsweek has learned, al-Bayoumi’s wife began receiving regular stipends, often monthly and usually around $2,000 and totaling tens of thousands of dollars. The money came in the form of cashier’s checks, purchased from Washington’s Riggs Bank by Princess Haifa bin Faisal, the daughter of the late King Faisal and wife of Prince Bandar, the Saudi envoy who is a prominent Washington figure and personal friend of the Bush family. The checks were sent to a woman named Majeda Ibrahin Dweikat, who in turn signed over many of them to al-Bayoumi’s wife...”
Dweikat’s husband, Osama Basnan, is reported to be a sympathizer of Al Qaeda and is known to have had friendly relations with the two hijackers, Alhazmi and Almihdhar.
Al-Bayoumi apparently came under suspicion shortly after the attacks of September 11. He was picked up by British intelligence, which found evidence that he had made two phone calls to diplomats at the Saudi Embassy in Washington. However, he was released and is reported to be in Saudi Arabia.
Further, according to Newsweek: “Osama Basnan showed up in Houston last April [2001] while Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah came to town with a vast entourage en route to President George W. Bush’s ranch. According to informed sources, Basnan met with a high Saudi prince who has responsibilities for intelligence matters and is known to bring suitcases full of cash into the United States.”
There are suspicions that Basnan may have been a member of Saudi intelligence, suggesting that Saudi intelligence was closely monitoring, if not aiding, the activity of the September 11 hijackers through its accounts at Riggs.
Newsweek noted that the FBI, as of December 2002, still had an investigation open into the transactions. In July 2003, the FBI accused Riggs Bank of failing to abide by anti-money-laundering (AML) regulations.
Prior to and after the attacks of September 11, it was not unusual for Saudi clients to transfers of millions of dollars in and out of the bank with no questions asked. This was in violation of AML regulations, which require the reporting of all transaction involving such large sums of money.
The bank was eventually fined $25 million in May 2004 for violating these regulations. However, the FBI has issued a statement saying it found no evidence of terrorist financing. The Bush administration has refused to release the intelligence behind the investigation, citing “national security concerns.”
Even after the FBI’s accusations in July 2003, the bank continued to allow massive cash transfers by the Saudi ambassador. Under pressure, the bank announced this past March that it was closing all Saudi accounts.
On July 14, 2004, the Minority Staff of the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, at the request of Democrat Carl Levin, the ranking minority member of the subcommittee, issued a report that dealt mainly with the bank’s accounts for Equatorial Guinea and Augusto Pinochet.
The report found that “the evidence reviewed by the Subcommittee staff establishes that, since at least 1997, Riggs has disregarded its anti-money laundering (AML) obligations, maintained a dysfunctional AML program despite frequent warnings from OCC [Office of the Comptroller of the Currency] regulators, and allowed or, at times, actively facilitated suspicious financial activity.” The OCC, a branch of the Treasury Department, is responsible for regulating nationally chartered banks.
Equatorial Guinea was Riggs’ largest client. It held over 60 accounts at the bank, with varied holdings of $300-700 million. Its ruler, Teodoro Obian Nguema Mbasogo, came to power in a military coup in 1979 and is infamous for his corruption and brutality. Relations with the United States became strained in the mid-1990s, when the Clinton administration broke off diplomatic ties. However, these were restored by the Bush administration in 2003. The country holds interest for the United States because of its large oil reserves.
Riggs appears to have held both Equatorial Guinea government treasury accounts and the personal accounts of Obiang, his family members, and ministers in his government.
According to the subcommittee report, Riggs “serviced the EG [Equatorial Guinean] accounts with little or no attention to the bank’s anti-money laundering obligations...” For example, “Riggs opened multiple personal accounts for the President of Equatorial Guinea, his wife, and other relatives; helped establish shell offshore corporations for the EG President and his sons; and over a three-year period, from 2000 to 2002, facilitated nearly $13 million in cash deposits into Riggs accounts controlled by the EG President and his wife.”
Riggs also opened an account that received large sums of money from oil companies that did business with Equatorial Guinea, including Exxon Mobil, Amerada Hess, Marathon Oil and ChevronTexaco. Riggs allowed the wire transfer of over $35 million from the account to two unknown companies. “The Subcommittee has reason to believe that at least one of these recipient companies is controlled in whole or in part by the EG President.”
Riggs appears to have acted as a conduit for large-scale bribes or other corrupt machinations between the giant oil corporations and the dictator of a country with which they were eager to do business. The report also noted that these oil companies made a number of large payments (sometimes valued at over $1 million) to individual officials or family members for a variety of services.
The manager of Riggs’ accounts for Equatorial Guinea was Simon P. Kareri, who was eventually fired by the bank in January 2004. According to a bank employee, on more than one occasion Kareri visited the Equatorial Guinean embassy and returned with a suitcase full of $3 million in cash, which was deposited in the bank with no reports to financial regulators.
According to the subcommittee report, “The bank leadership permitted [Kareri] ...to become closely involved with EG officials and business activities, including advising the EG government on financial matters and becoming the sole signatory on an EG account holding substantial funds. The bank exercised such lax oversight of the account manager’s activities that, among other misconduct, the account manager was able to wire transfer more than $1 million from the EG oil account at Riggs to another bank for an account opened in the name of Jadini Holdings, an offshore corporation controlled by the account manager’s wife.”
In addition to its dealings with the Saudi royal family and Equatorial Guinea’s dictator, Riggs had a close relationship with the former dictator of Chile, Augusto Pinochet. Pinochet held numerous active accounts at Riggs between 1994 and 2002, even while he was under house arrest in Britain and his assets were supposedly frozen.
According to the subcommittee report, “The aggregate deposits in the Pinochet accounts at Riggs ranged from $4 to $8 million at a time.... Riggs account managers took actions consistent with helping Mr. Pinochet to evade legal proceedings seeking to discover and attach his bank accounts.... Riggs opened multiple accounts and accepted millions of dollars in deposits from Mr. Pinochet with no serious inquiry into questions regarding the source of his wealth; helped him set up offshore shell corporations and open accounts in the names of those corporations to disguise his control of the accounts; altered the names of his personal accounts to disguise their ownership; transferred $1.6 million from London to the United States while Mr. Pinochet was in detention and the subject of a court order to attach his bank accounts; conducted transactions through Riggs’ own accounts to hide Mr. Pinochet’s involvement in some cash transactions; and delivered over $1.9 million in cashiers checks to Mr. Pinochet in Chile to enable him to obtain substantial cash payments from banks in that country.”
The scope of the corruption, money-laundering and other suspicious activities is indeed astonishing. While it was engaged in these activities, the bank operated under the not-so-watchful eye of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. In spite of clear indications of regulatory violations at least as early as 1997, the OCC took no actions.
Particularly closely involved with the OCC’s investigation into the Pinochet accounts was the comptroller’s examiner-in-charge, R. Ashley Lee, who worked at the OCC from 1998 to October 2002. According to the subcommittee report, “In 2001, [Lee]...advised more senior OCC personnel against taking a formal enforcement action against Riggs, because the bank had promised to correct identified AML deficiencies. In 2002, he ordered examiners not to include a memorandum or work papers on the Pinochet examination to the OCC’s electronic database.”
Lee went to work for Riggs two weeks later, quickly becoming an executive vice president and the chief risk officer. The subcommittee report states: “During his next 18-months at the bank, he attended a number of meetings with OCC personnel related to Riggs’ AML problems,” despite regulations prohibiting former OCC employees from attending meetings on OCC-related maters.
The revelations of the activities at Riggs Bank demonstrate how commonplace and extensive criminal activity has become within the American financial and political establishment. Not coincidentally, the bank’s activity has a great deal in common with certain features prominent in the Bush administration: the heavy influence of oil interests, the close ties with the Saudi ruling elite, the funding and support given to dictators and former dictators, including General Pinochet.
The relationship of Riggs to the Bush administration is more than tangential. Riggs owns a money management firm, J. Bush & Co., operated by Jonathan Bush, the brother of George H.W. Bush and the current president’s uncle.
Jonathan Bush played a very important role in helping find investors for the various failed oil businesses that George W. Bush ran before he began his career in politics. Jonathan Bush also helped raise money for George H.W. Bush and is a former chair of the New York Republican State Finance Committee. In 2000, he was briefly named president and CEO of Riggs Investment Management Company (RIMCO), a wholly owned subsidiary of Riggs Bank.
While Jonathan Bush appears not to have been directly involved in the Saudi, Pinochet or Equatorial Guinean accounts, his position at Riggs is an indication of the close ties between the bank and the Bush family.
Moreover, Riggs is owned by the Allbritton family, a Texas family with close ties to the Republican establishment. Joe Allbritton, the former head of Riggs who bought the bank in the mid-1970s, is a friend of the Bush family. His son, Robert Allbritton, is the current chairman and CEO.
The Allbritton family is known among the Washington elite for the party it traditionally holds after the annual Alfalfa Club dinner, hosted to mark the birthday of Robert E. Lee, the southern general in the Civil War. The New York Times (“A Washington Bank, A Global Mess,” April 11, 2004) notes, “The Alfalfa roster includes presidents, politicians, diplomats and business impresarios, all bound together by being either formidably influential or fabulously rich. Attendees have included luminaries like Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States; Jack Valenti, the president of the Motion Picture Association of America; and others with surnames like Greenspan, Kissinger and Rehnquist. President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney made their first joint public appearance after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks at the Alfalfa gathering in 2002.”
Valenti, who, like Allbritton and Bush, is a former Texas businessman, is also on the board of directors of Riggs Bank.
A television station also owned by Allbritton was in the news earlier this year after it refused to air an ad critical of the Bush administration’s policy in Iraq.
Perhaps even more than the Enron scandal, the Riggs scandal is a deeply political scandal. No doubt, much of what went on at Riggs remains to be uncovered. With the announced sale of Riggs to PNL, which will be completed by early next year, the owners of the bank are clearly attempting to contain the scandal’s fallout.
Source: World Socialist Web Site
Saturday, August 14, 2004
Germany admits Namibia genocide
Germany has offered its first formal apology for the colonial-era massacre of some 65,000 members of the Herero tribe by German troops in Namibia. German minister Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul told a commemorative ceremony that the brutal crushing of the Herero uprising 100 years ago was genocide. But the German government has ruled out compensation for victims' descendants.
A group of Herero has filed a case against Germany in the United States demanding $4bn in compensation.
"We Germans accept our historic and moral responsibility," Ms Wieczorek-Zeul, Germany's Development Aid Minister, told a crowd of some 1,000 at the ceremony in Okokarara. "Germany has learnt the bitter lessons of the past."
But after the minister's speech, the crowd repeated calls for an apology.
"Everything I said in my speech was an apology for crimes committed under German colonial rule," she replied.
Ms Wieczorek-Zeul repeated that there would be no compensation, but she promised continued economic aid for Namibia which currently amounts to $14m a year.
Driven into desert
The Herero rebelled in 1904 against German soldiers and settlers who were colonising south-west Africa.
In response, the German military commander, General Lothar von Trotha, ordered the Herero people to leave Namibia or be killed.
Germany argues that international laws to protect civilians were not in force at the time of the conflict.
Herero chief Kuaima Riruako said the apology was appreciated but added: "We still have the right to take the German government to court."
However, correspondents say the lawsuit filed in the US three years ago against the German government and two German companies is seen as having a limited chance of success.
Source: BBC
A group of Herero has filed a case against Germany in the United States demanding $4bn in compensation.
"We Germans accept our historic and moral responsibility," Ms Wieczorek-Zeul, Germany's Development Aid Minister, told a crowd of some 1,000 at the ceremony in Okokarara. "Germany has learnt the bitter lessons of the past."
But after the minister's speech, the crowd repeated calls for an apology.
"Everything I said in my speech was an apology for crimes committed under German colonial rule," she replied.
Ms Wieczorek-Zeul repeated that there would be no compensation, but she promised continued economic aid for Namibia which currently amounts to $14m a year.
Driven into desert
The Herero rebelled in 1904 against German soldiers and settlers who were colonising south-west Africa.
In response, the German military commander, General Lothar von Trotha, ordered the Herero people to leave Namibia or be killed.
Germany argues that international laws to protect civilians were not in force at the time of the conflict.
Herero chief Kuaima Riruako said the apology was appreciated but added: "We still have the right to take the German government to court."
However, correspondents say the lawsuit filed in the US three years ago against the German government and two German companies is seen as having a limited chance of success.
Source: BBC
Friday, August 6, 2004
Inside the matrix
The quaint brotherhood in the liquidations industry is starting to fall apart, showing up some astonishing tactics. One meaning for Mafiosi, according to the Merriman-Webster dictionary, is a person who is a member of a group of people likened to the Mafia; especially: a group of people of similar interests or backgrounds prominent in a particular field or enterprise. It would probably be stretching a point to describe a group of people networked within South Africa’s liquidations sector as Mafiosi. Nevertheless, they do have an overriding interest in generating mountains of filthy lucre. And they are now being subjected, to increasing doses of public exposure.
There is perhaps one major – and totally surprising - factor that would disqualify the group as Mafia. Where the original Mafia were linked by origin as Sicilians, this group is as diverse as it gets. There are Muslim elements, such as liquidator Enver Motala, who was arrested on July 2 on charges of fraud and corruption. There are Jewish elements, in attorneys Stan Rothbart, and in Motala’s only remaining partner, Norman Simon, and also their disgruntled ex-partner, Mervyn Swartz.
And then there are the black players: on the fringes ex-justice minister Penuell Maduna, and Vusi Pikoli, who is still director general of the justice department. The picture would be incomplete without a middle-aged, bespectacled white Afrikaner, represented by Leon Lategan, one of Motala’s chief button men, and a senior officer in the Masters Office, the unit of the justice department which appoints liquidators according to its “unfettered discretion.”
One of Lategan’s most unforgettable Motala appointments was seen in respect of RAG, a R1-bn bankruptcy. Maduna intervened in that case, long after the original four liquidators had done all the work, and appointed Motala as fifth liquidator. The action was struck out by the High Court. Maduna then simply appointed Lategan as an extra Master in the Pietermaritzburg Masters Office, and Lategan simply appointed Motala to RAG, apparently in contempt of court. The appointment has, however, stuck.
Other key players fit in-between this group. Take Enver Daniels, the Chief State Law Adviser, who became acting MD of the Masters Business Unit on January 29, 2003. Daniels, who has recently been on study leave to complete his doctoral thesis in law, was a Marxist way back when, like Pikoli. Again, Pikoli knows Maduna very well from their days in exile from the apartheid regime, and so on.
Like most such organisations, there has been lots of training involved within this network. Simon and Swartz selected Motala as their front man for converting their business, SBT Trust, into a “black empowered” entity. The basis for this selection has never been understood. For one thing, Motala had been arrested on charges of fraud and corruption, back in 1989, amid an alleged massive sugar swindle in Middleburg, Mpumalanga. The case has yet to be prosecuted; the file just seems to keep traveling around the country for reasons that cannot be fully explained. However, in the 1990s, Motala acquired lots of experience in liquidations – but on the receiving end. According to Mohan Patel, a medical doctor who loaned hundreds of thousands of rands to Motala in and around the mid-1990s, Motala went from one bankruptcy to the next. Some of the businesses were burned to the ground, in accidents no doubt. Today, Patel is just one of the many judicial opponents that Motala faces. Patel is sore about suing Motala for return of loans and interest, but fails to understand how Motala could be so insensitive to Patel’s role, then anyway, as a friend helping when Motala was down and out. Well, not quite, recalls Patel. At the time, Motala was the apparent owner of two luxury BMWs, a sports Mercedes Benz and a Porsche. The way Patel remembers it, at least one of those cars was mysteriously stolen from Motala.
And then fast forward to the year 2000, by which time Motala had enjoyed the full benefits of being trained by some of the “best” in the brotherhood. At the time, an offensive to clear the way for Motala was being waged. At the end of 1999, Oliver Powell, one of the country’s leading liquidators, had been “bust” by Maduna.
On December 9, 1999, Maduna stated that “possible prosecutions for alleged corruption at the Pretoria Master’s Office were expected as early as next month.” It was not just Powell’s premises that had been raided. On October 24, 1999, the Scorpions, an investigative unit of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA, itself a unit of the justice department), also searched the Centurion home of the Master of the Pretoria High Court, Ben Nell. In November 1999, Nell and two of his deputies, Charles Stewart and Eugene Januarie, were suspended with immediate effect. To this day, none of the prosecutions that Maduna promised have materialized. On the contrary, Powell has won two major court cases this year, and orders that every last thing seized from him be returned. Powell’s final big case will see him suing – in their present and/or previous capacities - Maduna, Jan Swanepoel (then head of the Scorpions, now of PricewaterhouseCoopers), Basil Nel (then of PricewaterhouseCoopers) and a former Sunday Times journalist, Amanda Vermeulen, for R60-m. It has hardly escaped attention that when Motala was arrested on July 2, 2004, his arraignment, following search and seizure, was by the Serious Economic Offences Unit (SEO), an elite unit of the South African Police Services.
The Scorpions and SAPS are as chalk and cheese. In full, the Scorpions are the Directorate of Special Operations, National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). The NPA national director, Bulelani Ngcuka, has been in his position since mid-1998, and was thus Scorpions overlord when Powell’s business and personal life were ruined. Two weeks ago, news emerged that Ngcuka was resigning after only six years of his ten-year contract. Ngcuka reports to the new justice minister, Brigitte Mabandla. In another world, national police commissioner Jackie Selebi reports to the Minister for Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula. It is clear that Motala has not been investigated by the Scorpions. On the contrary, Motala has on more than one occasion publicly advertised that he was working with the Scorpions (for example, in the RAG and Krion cases), and has even been described in some media reports as the “Scorpions liquidator.”
The rivalry between the Scorpions and the SEO is hardly a secret. Maduna’s apparent protection of Motala may yet be countered by Maduna’s potential nemesis, in the form of Mike Tshishonga, a deputy director general in the justice department. In October 2003, Tshishonga blew the whistle, alleging that his political boss had a nepotistic relationship with Motala; further, that Maduna had “abused the infrastructure and staff of the justice department for the purposes of advancing his personal interests,” and that Maduna had endangered South Africa’s criminal justice system.
Beyond the criminal charges that Motala faces, his nemesis may well prove to be Garveni Creations, fast on its way to being the most infamous South African bankruptcy ever. This week, John Cameron, attorney to one of Garveni’s major creditors, PG Bison, released an independent report on the Garveni estate. It contained shocking new information, of a most detailed kind, on and around the behaviour of Motala, whose appointment to Garveni was voided by the High Court on April 29.Cameron alleges that “as has been suspected, the estate of Garveni has been maladministered by Motala and Frans Langford [the co-liquidator], their conduct being highly unprofessional, irregular and improper and deserving of the highest censure and in due course, will be the subject matter of various complaints and civil proceedings.” In earlier court papers, Cameron had alleged that the conduct of Motala in and around the Garveni case had been “prima facie suggestive of fraudulent conduct . . . the existence of fraudulent conduct is fortified and substantiated;” that “[Motala’s] appointment was sought and obtained under a very unusual set of circumstances, all of which are suggestive of fraud.” Among the more-alarming disclosures in Cameron’s new report, is that Neville Shifren, previously the CEO and major shareholder in Garveni, met Motala early in May this year; that is, after Motala had been removed as a Garveni liquidator. Motala presented Shifren with accounts of Knowles, Husein Lindsay, Inc (KHL), a prominent Johannesburg law firm. One of its senior partners, Mohamed Junaid Husein, had acted for Motala throughout the Garveni matter (and apparently continues to act for Motala). Shifren was presented with KHL accounts in an amount “in excess of R500 000.”Cameron states that, in regard to such accounts, Motala, after making certain calculations, demanded that Shifren “pay 50% thereof.” To this, Shifren reacted that “he would consider no such payment, to which Motala reacted that if that was the case, he would be locking up the premises and would prevent GOF [Garveni Office Furniture] from removing any further items therefrom.”The KHL account would have eaten a big chunk out of the Garveni estate, which had been valued initially at R4-m. Cameron’s new report shows that Rothbart also submitted “one account” to the Garveni estate. Rothbart’s “invoice does not indicate exactly what services were rendered and in regard to what matter and naturally, as Motala has failed to provide the relevant information, it is uncertain as to what professional services were rendered.” The Garveni estate also made out cheques to Motala’s brother, and to the son of Simon.
The nepotism first emerged at the “417” enquiry into RAG. There, the Masters Office is represented by Stephan du Toit, senior counsel, assisted by Rafik Bhana (apparently a relative of Motala) and Soraya Hassim (previously, or perhaps still, Motala’s fiancée, and the only apparent female member of the cast), and Husein. In the RAG matter, Rothbart represents Motala.Déjà vu. In the latest big liquidations event, the R1-bn-plus bankruptcy of MP Finance, more popularly known as Krion, a giant pyramid scheme, four liquidators were originally appointed in August 2002. On January 6, 2004, Lategan appointed two further Krion liquidators. One of them was Motala. One of the original liquidators Koos van Rensburg, of Negota KVR, asked Lategan to supply his reasons for appointing the new liquidators. Lategan failed to respond. Instead, Rothbart replied in writing that he now acted for Lategan and that further correspondence must be addressed to him. Rothbart’s letter appeared to have been the clearest admission that it is Motala, and not Lategan, who was making the Master’s decisions. There has been similar evidence that Motala stage-managed the RAG matter, and perhaps others, directly through Maduna’s offices.
Source: Money Web
There is perhaps one major – and totally surprising - factor that would disqualify the group as Mafia. Where the original Mafia were linked by origin as Sicilians, this group is as diverse as it gets. There are Muslim elements, such as liquidator Enver Motala, who was arrested on July 2 on charges of fraud and corruption. There are Jewish elements, in attorneys Stan Rothbart, and in Motala’s only remaining partner, Norman Simon, and also their disgruntled ex-partner, Mervyn Swartz.
And then there are the black players: on the fringes ex-justice minister Penuell Maduna, and Vusi Pikoli, who is still director general of the justice department. The picture would be incomplete without a middle-aged, bespectacled white Afrikaner, represented by Leon Lategan, one of Motala’s chief button men, and a senior officer in the Masters Office, the unit of the justice department which appoints liquidators according to its “unfettered discretion.”
One of Lategan’s most unforgettable Motala appointments was seen in respect of RAG, a R1-bn bankruptcy. Maduna intervened in that case, long after the original four liquidators had done all the work, and appointed Motala as fifth liquidator. The action was struck out by the High Court. Maduna then simply appointed Lategan as an extra Master in the Pietermaritzburg Masters Office, and Lategan simply appointed Motala to RAG, apparently in contempt of court. The appointment has, however, stuck.
Other key players fit in-between this group. Take Enver Daniels, the Chief State Law Adviser, who became acting MD of the Masters Business Unit on January 29, 2003. Daniels, who has recently been on study leave to complete his doctoral thesis in law, was a Marxist way back when, like Pikoli. Again, Pikoli knows Maduna very well from their days in exile from the apartheid regime, and so on.
Like most such organisations, there has been lots of training involved within this network. Simon and Swartz selected Motala as their front man for converting their business, SBT Trust, into a “black empowered” entity. The basis for this selection has never been understood. For one thing, Motala had been arrested on charges of fraud and corruption, back in 1989, amid an alleged massive sugar swindle in Middleburg, Mpumalanga. The case has yet to be prosecuted; the file just seems to keep traveling around the country for reasons that cannot be fully explained. However, in the 1990s, Motala acquired lots of experience in liquidations – but on the receiving end. According to Mohan Patel, a medical doctor who loaned hundreds of thousands of rands to Motala in and around the mid-1990s, Motala went from one bankruptcy to the next. Some of the businesses were burned to the ground, in accidents no doubt. Today, Patel is just one of the many judicial opponents that Motala faces. Patel is sore about suing Motala for return of loans and interest, but fails to understand how Motala could be so insensitive to Patel’s role, then anyway, as a friend helping when Motala was down and out. Well, not quite, recalls Patel. At the time, Motala was the apparent owner of two luxury BMWs, a sports Mercedes Benz and a Porsche. The way Patel remembers it, at least one of those cars was mysteriously stolen from Motala.
And then fast forward to the year 2000, by which time Motala had enjoyed the full benefits of being trained by some of the “best” in the brotherhood. At the time, an offensive to clear the way for Motala was being waged. At the end of 1999, Oliver Powell, one of the country’s leading liquidators, had been “bust” by Maduna.
On December 9, 1999, Maduna stated that “possible prosecutions for alleged corruption at the Pretoria Master’s Office were expected as early as next month.” It was not just Powell’s premises that had been raided. On October 24, 1999, the Scorpions, an investigative unit of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA, itself a unit of the justice department), also searched the Centurion home of the Master of the Pretoria High Court, Ben Nell. In November 1999, Nell and two of his deputies, Charles Stewart and Eugene Januarie, were suspended with immediate effect. To this day, none of the prosecutions that Maduna promised have materialized. On the contrary, Powell has won two major court cases this year, and orders that every last thing seized from him be returned. Powell’s final big case will see him suing – in their present and/or previous capacities - Maduna, Jan Swanepoel (then head of the Scorpions, now of PricewaterhouseCoopers), Basil Nel (then of PricewaterhouseCoopers) and a former Sunday Times journalist, Amanda Vermeulen, for R60-m. It has hardly escaped attention that when Motala was arrested on July 2, 2004, his arraignment, following search and seizure, was by the Serious Economic Offences Unit (SEO), an elite unit of the South African Police Services.
The Scorpions and SAPS are as chalk and cheese. In full, the Scorpions are the Directorate of Special Operations, National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). The NPA national director, Bulelani Ngcuka, has been in his position since mid-1998, and was thus Scorpions overlord when Powell’s business and personal life were ruined. Two weeks ago, news emerged that Ngcuka was resigning after only six years of his ten-year contract. Ngcuka reports to the new justice minister, Brigitte Mabandla. In another world, national police commissioner Jackie Selebi reports to the Minister for Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula. It is clear that Motala has not been investigated by the Scorpions. On the contrary, Motala has on more than one occasion publicly advertised that he was working with the Scorpions (for example, in the RAG and Krion cases), and has even been described in some media reports as the “Scorpions liquidator.”
The rivalry between the Scorpions and the SEO is hardly a secret. Maduna’s apparent protection of Motala may yet be countered by Maduna’s potential nemesis, in the form of Mike Tshishonga, a deputy director general in the justice department. In October 2003, Tshishonga blew the whistle, alleging that his political boss had a nepotistic relationship with Motala; further, that Maduna had “abused the infrastructure and staff of the justice department for the purposes of advancing his personal interests,” and that Maduna had endangered South Africa’s criminal justice system.
Beyond the criminal charges that Motala faces, his nemesis may well prove to be Garveni Creations, fast on its way to being the most infamous South African bankruptcy ever. This week, John Cameron, attorney to one of Garveni’s major creditors, PG Bison, released an independent report on the Garveni estate. It contained shocking new information, of a most detailed kind, on and around the behaviour of Motala, whose appointment to Garveni was voided by the High Court on April 29.Cameron alleges that “as has been suspected, the estate of Garveni has been maladministered by Motala and Frans Langford [the co-liquidator], their conduct being highly unprofessional, irregular and improper and deserving of the highest censure and in due course, will be the subject matter of various complaints and civil proceedings.” In earlier court papers, Cameron had alleged that the conduct of Motala in and around the Garveni case had been “prima facie suggestive of fraudulent conduct . . . the existence of fraudulent conduct is fortified and substantiated;” that “[Motala’s] appointment was sought and obtained under a very unusual set of circumstances, all of which are suggestive of fraud.” Among the more-alarming disclosures in Cameron’s new report, is that Neville Shifren, previously the CEO and major shareholder in Garveni, met Motala early in May this year; that is, after Motala had been removed as a Garveni liquidator. Motala presented Shifren with accounts of Knowles, Husein Lindsay, Inc (KHL), a prominent Johannesburg law firm. One of its senior partners, Mohamed Junaid Husein, had acted for Motala throughout the Garveni matter (and apparently continues to act for Motala). Shifren was presented with KHL accounts in an amount “in excess of R500 000.”Cameron states that, in regard to such accounts, Motala, after making certain calculations, demanded that Shifren “pay 50% thereof.” To this, Shifren reacted that “he would consider no such payment, to which Motala reacted that if that was the case, he would be locking up the premises and would prevent GOF [Garveni Office Furniture] from removing any further items therefrom.”The KHL account would have eaten a big chunk out of the Garveni estate, which had been valued initially at R4-m. Cameron’s new report shows that Rothbart also submitted “one account” to the Garveni estate. Rothbart’s “invoice does not indicate exactly what services were rendered and in regard to what matter and naturally, as Motala has failed to provide the relevant information, it is uncertain as to what professional services were rendered.” The Garveni estate also made out cheques to Motala’s brother, and to the son of Simon.
The nepotism first emerged at the “417” enquiry into RAG. There, the Masters Office is represented by Stephan du Toit, senior counsel, assisted by Rafik Bhana (apparently a relative of Motala) and Soraya Hassim (previously, or perhaps still, Motala’s fiancée, and the only apparent female member of the cast), and Husein. In the RAG matter, Rothbart represents Motala.Déjà vu. In the latest big liquidations event, the R1-bn-plus bankruptcy of MP Finance, more popularly known as Krion, a giant pyramid scheme, four liquidators were originally appointed in August 2002. On January 6, 2004, Lategan appointed two further Krion liquidators. One of them was Motala. One of the original liquidators Koos van Rensburg, of Negota KVR, asked Lategan to supply his reasons for appointing the new liquidators. Lategan failed to respond. Instead, Rothbart replied in writing that he now acted for Lategan and that further correspondence must be addressed to him. Rothbart’s letter appeared to have been the clearest admission that it is Motala, and not Lategan, who was making the Master’s decisions. There has been similar evidence that Motala stage-managed the RAG matter, and perhaps others, directly through Maduna’s offices.
Source: Money Web
Wednesday, July 7, 2004
ANC member charged with murder of farm couple
In the second prosecution of apartheid-era crimes not covered by an amnesty, the state has charged an ANC member with the murder of a farmer and his wife 19 years ago.
Ronnie Blani, 41, was allegedly part of a group of eight members of the then-banned ANC Youth League driven by the slogan "Kill the farmer, kill the boer". He did not apply for amnesty and is now facing two counts of murder for the brutal killing of farmer Koos de Jager and his wife Myrtle on June 17, 1985.
In the first prosecution, apartheid security police officer Gideon Niewoudt was arrested in February and charged with the 1985 murder of the Pebco Three - Sipho Hashe, Qaquwili Godolozi and Champion Galela - popular leaders of the ANC-inspired uprising in the Eastern Cape.
Blani fled to Angola soon after the killings. Niewoudt applied for amnesty to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission but it was denied in June 1999 because he had failed to make a full disclosure of his crimes. He was also denied amnesty for the Motherwell bombing of three fellow security police officers and an informer suspected of having defected to the ANC.
Niewoudt is out on R50 000 bail and the case now hinges on Niewoudt's appeal against the TRC's refusal of amnesty. Blani was the only one of the group of eight to escape capture. Two, Ndumiso Siphenuka, 25, and Makwezana Menze, 42, were found guilty and were hanged in 1989. Two others, Similo Wonci and Mziwoxolo Makeleni, had their death sentences commuted at the last minute to life in jail and were later pardoned by President Thabo Mbeki and freed with three other members serving long jail terms. Blani fled to Angola soon after the killings and returned to South Africa only in 1992.
Twelve years later, Blani appeared in the Kirkwood magistrate's court on Tuesday, and his case was postponed to July 19 at the same court. He was warned to appear. It was his third appearance. On June 25 and 28, the case was postponed without charges being put to him. Blani said on Tuesday that he had not approached the TRC for amnesty because he thought he had returned home under a "blanket amnesty" for all exiles. One of the group of eight, Similo Wonci, on Tuesday condemned the prosecution. "We were all pardoned and I don't understand why Bulelani Ngcuka (national public prosecutions director) has now decided to prosecute Ronnie. We have asked the ANC to look into the matter," said Wonci.
National Prosecuting Authority spokesperson Makhosini Nkosi said on Tuesday: "He (Blani) was involved in these crimes. "He is being charged and will have to appear in court."
Source: IoL
Ronnie Blani, 41, was allegedly part of a group of eight members of the then-banned ANC Youth League driven by the slogan "Kill the farmer, kill the boer". He did not apply for amnesty and is now facing two counts of murder for the brutal killing of farmer Koos de Jager and his wife Myrtle on June 17, 1985.
In the first prosecution, apartheid security police officer Gideon Niewoudt was arrested in February and charged with the 1985 murder of the Pebco Three - Sipho Hashe, Qaquwili Godolozi and Champion Galela - popular leaders of the ANC-inspired uprising in the Eastern Cape.
Blani fled to Angola soon after the killings. Niewoudt applied for amnesty to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission but it was denied in June 1999 because he had failed to make a full disclosure of his crimes. He was also denied amnesty for the Motherwell bombing of three fellow security police officers and an informer suspected of having defected to the ANC.
Niewoudt is out on R50 000 bail and the case now hinges on Niewoudt's appeal against the TRC's refusal of amnesty. Blani was the only one of the group of eight to escape capture. Two, Ndumiso Siphenuka, 25, and Makwezana Menze, 42, were found guilty and were hanged in 1989. Two others, Similo Wonci and Mziwoxolo Makeleni, had their death sentences commuted at the last minute to life in jail and were later pardoned by President Thabo Mbeki and freed with three other members serving long jail terms. Blani fled to Angola soon after the killings and returned to South Africa only in 1992.
Twelve years later, Blani appeared in the Kirkwood magistrate's court on Tuesday, and his case was postponed to July 19 at the same court. He was warned to appear. It was his third appearance. On June 25 and 28, the case was postponed without charges being put to him. Blani said on Tuesday that he had not approached the TRC for amnesty because he thought he had returned home under a "blanket amnesty" for all exiles. One of the group of eight, Similo Wonci, on Tuesday condemned the prosecution. "We were all pardoned and I don't understand why Bulelani Ngcuka (national public prosecutions director) has now decided to prosecute Ronnie. We have asked the ANC to look into the matter," said Wonci.
National Prosecuting Authority spokesperson Makhosini Nkosi said on Tuesday: "He (Blani) was involved in these crimes. "He is being charged and will have to appear in court."
Source: IoL
Monday, July 5, 2004
Rebels face Sierra Leone tribunal
A UN-backed war crimes tribunal in Sierra Leone has begun hearing the first cases against members of the rebel Revolutionary United Front. The RUF is blamed for killings, rapes and abductions during a decade of civil war that ended in 2002. But the first three defendants - who include the RUF's final military leader Issa Sesay - are refusing to acknowledge the court's legitimacy.
About 50,000 people were killed, and many more maimed and raped in the war. The RUF's internal security chief, Augustine Gbao, and a key battlefield commander, Morris Kallon, are on trial alongside Issa Hassan Sesay. The RUF's campaign of violence included hacking off the limbs of civilians as a trademark act of terror. The BBC's Lansana Fofana in Freetown says that Mr Sesay occasionally lowered his head as the 18 war crimes charges, including sexual slavery, murder, looting and terrorising civilians, were read out.
Chief Prosecutor David Crane said that atrocities were committed in virtually all parts of Sierra Leone. "This is the day I have been waiting for," said one amputee. "I am now satisfied that someone is being held accountable for what the rebels did to me." But correspondents say the tribunal's importance has been diminished by the deaths of RUF leader Foday Sankoh his deputy Sam Bockarie - best known under his nom de guerre Mosquito.
The tribunal has not yet been able to arrest the man accused of being the RUF's paymaster, former Liberian President Charles Taylor. Despite being indicted on 17 charges of war crimes or crimes against humanity, Mr Taylor is living a life of luxury in exile in Nigeria. Unlike the war crimes tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the court is based where the alleged crimes occurred and draws on both national and international law.
Source: BBC
About 50,000 people were killed, and many more maimed and raped in the war. The RUF's internal security chief, Augustine Gbao, and a key battlefield commander, Morris Kallon, are on trial alongside Issa Hassan Sesay. The RUF's campaign of violence included hacking off the limbs of civilians as a trademark act of terror. The BBC's Lansana Fofana in Freetown says that Mr Sesay occasionally lowered his head as the 18 war crimes charges, including sexual slavery, murder, looting and terrorising civilians, were read out.
Chief Prosecutor David Crane said that atrocities were committed in virtually all parts of Sierra Leone. "This is the day I have been waiting for," said one amputee. "I am now satisfied that someone is being held accountable for what the rebels did to me." But correspondents say the tribunal's importance has been diminished by the deaths of RUF leader Foday Sankoh his deputy Sam Bockarie - best known under his nom de guerre Mosquito.
The tribunal has not yet been able to arrest the man accused of being the RUF's paymaster, former Liberian President Charles Taylor. Despite being indicted on 17 charges of war crimes or crimes against humanity, Mr Taylor is living a life of luxury in exile in Nigeria. Unlike the war crimes tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the court is based where the alleged crimes occurred and draws on both national and international law.
Source: BBC
Tuesday, June 29, 2004
MILAN BABIC SENTENCED TO 13 YEARS’ IMPRISONMENT
Milan Babic was born in 1956 in Kukar, in Croatia. He is married with two children, and is a dentist by profession.
In October 2001 Babic initiated contact with this Tribunal after learning that he had been named as a co-perpetrator in the Croatia Indictment issued in the case of Slobodan Miloševic in September 2001. Babic agreed to be interviewed by the Prosecution and to testify in the Miloševic case. An indictment against Babic was confirmed in November 2003. The indictment charged him with persecution, murder, cruel treatment, wanton destruction of villages or devastation not justified by military necessity, and destruction or wilful damage to institutions dedicated to education or religion. The charges were based on events which took place in Croatian Krajina from August 1991 to February 1992.
In November 2003 Babic surrendered to the Tribunal. Two months later he filed a plea agreement jointly with the Prosecution. According to this agreement, Babic would admit to having aided and abetted the crime of persecutions, committed by a joint criminal enterprise, as charged in count 1 of the indictment. The goal of the joint criminal enterprise was the forcible permanent removal of Croat and other non-Serb populations from approximately one-third of Croatia, in order to transform the acquired territory into a Serb-dominated state through the commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
Babic does not deny the seriousness of the crimes committed. Virtually the whole of the Croat and non-Serb population was expelled from the region in question, by forcible removal or by being caused to flee through fear of imminent attack. More than 200 civilians, including women and elderly persons, were murdered, and several hundred civilians were confined or imprisoned in inhumane conditions. The crime was characterized by ruthlessness and savagery and had a severe impact on victims and their relatives. Their suffering is still significant. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that Babic’s expression of remorse is sincere and constitutes a mitigating factor.
Having considered the arguments and the evidence presented by the parties, the Trial Chamber hereby sentences Milan Babic to 13 years of imprisonment. Milan Babic is entitled to credit for 211 days served in detention prior to this day. Milan Babic shall remain in the custody of the Tribunal until such time as arrangements for his transfer to the State in which he will serve his sentence have been finalized.
Source: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
In October 2001 Babic initiated contact with this Tribunal after learning that he had been named as a co-perpetrator in the Croatia Indictment issued in the case of Slobodan Miloševic in September 2001. Babic agreed to be interviewed by the Prosecution and to testify in the Miloševic case. An indictment against Babic was confirmed in November 2003. The indictment charged him with persecution, murder, cruel treatment, wanton destruction of villages or devastation not justified by military necessity, and destruction or wilful damage to institutions dedicated to education or religion. The charges were based on events which took place in Croatian Krajina from August 1991 to February 1992.
In November 2003 Babic surrendered to the Tribunal. Two months later he filed a plea agreement jointly with the Prosecution. According to this agreement, Babic would admit to having aided and abetted the crime of persecutions, committed by a joint criminal enterprise, as charged in count 1 of the indictment. The goal of the joint criminal enterprise was the forcible permanent removal of Croat and other non-Serb populations from approximately one-third of Croatia, in order to transform the acquired territory into a Serb-dominated state through the commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
Babic does not deny the seriousness of the crimes committed. Virtually the whole of the Croat and non-Serb population was expelled from the region in question, by forcible removal or by being caused to flee through fear of imminent attack. More than 200 civilians, including women and elderly persons, were murdered, and several hundred civilians were confined or imprisoned in inhumane conditions. The crime was characterized by ruthlessness and savagery and had a severe impact on victims and their relatives. Their suffering is still significant. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that Babic’s expression of remorse is sincere and constitutes a mitigating factor.
Having considered the arguments and the evidence presented by the parties, the Trial Chamber hereby sentences Milan Babic to 13 years of imprisonment. Milan Babic is entitled to credit for 211 days served in detention prior to this day. Milan Babic shall remain in the custody of the Tribunal until such time as arrangements for his transfer to the State in which he will serve his sentence have been finalized.
Source: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
Friday, June 11, 2004
Congo National Troops Thwart Coup Attempt
The coup attempt began after midnight Thursday when renegade forces took over the state radio station in the capital, Kinshasa. Coup leader -- Major Eric Lenge -- announced that the transitional government had been suspended. Following skirmishes with government security forces, Major Lenge and 21 of his men fled the capital. President Kabila said the army had arrested 12 of the renegade soldiers and was chasing the others. The arrested soldiers were all members of the presidential guard.
Source: Voice of America
Wednesday, June 9, 2004
UN links Rautenbach to DRC
Billy Rautenbach, the former head of Hyundai South Africa and the fugitive millionaire "somewhere in Africa", has been named in a secret report by the United Nations as a "prominent roleplayer" in corruption activities in Africa - particularly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This information was given exclusively to Beeld on Wednesday amid allegations in court documents that the DRC government and its officials owned various assets were being seized in South Africa and other countries.
A UN report, completed about four years ago, uncovered Rautenbach's corrupt activities in various African countries. At the time, copies of the report were distributed to a number of African heads of state, but nothing came of this. The existence of this report came to light amid efforts by Frans Rootman, a Pretoria investigator, to seize assets after winning a US$20m claim in September in Pretoria against the DRC government. By Wednesday, the DRC had not paid one cent towards the settlement, which included legal costs.
Chris Schoeman, who is representing Rootman in the asset-seizure process, on Wednesday registered an asset-seizure claim in the Belgium high court for DRC-owned property in this country. Millions of rands are also held in a DRC bank account in Belgium. Two of Rootman's attorneys, John Mendelsohn of Johannesburg and Gerhard Painter of Pretoria, confirmed the existence of the UN report on Wednesday. Mendelsohn said, however, the DRC refused to give them a copy of the report as it "contained state secrets".
Rautenbach, considered by the UN to be a prominent roleplayer in corruption, was appointed head of the state-controlled Gecamines by the late president, Laurent-Désiré Kabila. But, in the wake of this report, Kabila appointed Rootman to investigate the theft of large amounts of cobalt from Gecamines. In his investigations, Rootman also found Rautenbach to be a key figure in the disappearance of the cobalt.
Willie Hofmeyr of the SA national prosecutions authority said an international warrant of arrest had already been issued against Rautenbach. He said the UN was also working on an extradition. Sources close to Rautenbach said he was in Harare "where he has President Robert Mugabe and other ministers in his pocket". They also said it was common knowledge that Rautenbach had involved the late Kabila's government in his schemes.
Source: News 24
A UN report, completed about four years ago, uncovered Rautenbach's corrupt activities in various African countries. At the time, copies of the report were distributed to a number of African heads of state, but nothing came of this. The existence of this report came to light amid efforts by Frans Rootman, a Pretoria investigator, to seize assets after winning a US$20m claim in September in Pretoria against the DRC government. By Wednesday, the DRC had not paid one cent towards the settlement, which included legal costs.
Chris Schoeman, who is representing Rootman in the asset-seizure process, on Wednesday registered an asset-seizure claim in the Belgium high court for DRC-owned property in this country. Millions of rands are also held in a DRC bank account in Belgium. Two of Rootman's attorneys, John Mendelsohn of Johannesburg and Gerhard Painter of Pretoria, confirmed the existence of the UN report on Wednesday. Mendelsohn said, however, the DRC refused to give them a copy of the report as it "contained state secrets".
Rautenbach, considered by the UN to be a prominent roleplayer in corruption, was appointed head of the state-controlled Gecamines by the late president, Laurent-Désiré Kabila. But, in the wake of this report, Kabila appointed Rootman to investigate the theft of large amounts of cobalt from Gecamines. In his investigations, Rootman also found Rautenbach to be a key figure in the disappearance of the cobalt.
Willie Hofmeyr of the SA national prosecutions authority said an international warrant of arrest had already been issued against Rautenbach. He said the UN was also working on an extradition. Sources close to Rautenbach said he was in Harare "where he has President Robert Mugabe and other ministers in his pocket". They also said it was common knowledge that Rautenbach had involved the late Kabila's government in his schemes.
Source: News 24
Tuesday, June 1, 2004
Liberian Ruler Can Be Tried, Court Rules
Charles G. Taylor, the former Liberian president accused of crimes against humanity in connection with a rebel insurrection in neighboring Sierra Leone, can be prosecuted by an international war crimes tribunal, a United Nations-backed court in Sierra Leone ruled Monday.
Mr. Taylor's lawyers had argued that a court in one country had no right to try the head of state of another country. But the four judges on the appeals panel of the Special Court for Sierra Leone rejected that argument, ruling that as an international tribunal, the special court does have that authority. The ruling clears the last legal hurdle for the prosecution, but another more daunting one remains. Nigeria, which has sheltered Mr. Taylor since he stepped down as president of Liberia in August 2003, has so far rebuffed demands to turn him over to the court in Sierra Leone. The Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, has said only that he would return his guest to his home country if the Liberian courts seek to prosecute him.
Liberia, which emerged from 14 years of crushing civil war with Mr. Taylor's departure, has issued no such request. Mr. Taylor's lawyer in Freetown, Sierra Leone's capital, declined to comment on the special court's ruling. "I haven't read the report, so how can I comment on it?" said the lawyer, Terrence Terry.
The special court was created jointly by the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone to punish the ringleaders of that country's decade-long war. Mr. Taylor is the most prominent among 11 people indicted so far. He faces 17 counts of murder, rape and other crimes against humanity in connection with the support he reportedly gave the rebels in Sierra Leone. "With this decision, Charles Taylor has no more legal cards to play," said Richard Dicker, director of international justice for Human Rights Watch, based in New York. "The time has come for Nigeria to hand Taylor over to the special court." The special court will begin its first trial on Thursday. Among the defendants is Sam Hinga Norman, a former government minister in Sierra Leone accused of raising a terrifying pro-government militia, the Kamajors.
Source: New York Times
Mr. Taylor's lawyers had argued that a court in one country had no right to try the head of state of another country. But the four judges on the appeals panel of the Special Court for Sierra Leone rejected that argument, ruling that as an international tribunal, the special court does have that authority. The ruling clears the last legal hurdle for the prosecution, but another more daunting one remains. Nigeria, which has sheltered Mr. Taylor since he stepped down as president of Liberia in August 2003, has so far rebuffed demands to turn him over to the court in Sierra Leone. The Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, has said only that he would return his guest to his home country if the Liberian courts seek to prosecute him.
Liberia, which emerged from 14 years of crushing civil war with Mr. Taylor's departure, has issued no such request. Mr. Taylor's lawyer in Freetown, Sierra Leone's capital, declined to comment on the special court's ruling. "I haven't read the report, so how can I comment on it?" said the lawyer, Terrence Terry.
The special court was created jointly by the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone to punish the ringleaders of that country's decade-long war. Mr. Taylor is the most prominent among 11 people indicted so far. He faces 17 counts of murder, rape and other crimes against humanity in connection with the support he reportedly gave the rebels in Sierra Leone. "With this decision, Charles Taylor has no more legal cards to play," said Richard Dicker, director of international justice for Human Rights Watch, based in New York. "The time has come for Nigeria to hand Taylor over to the special court." The special court will begin its first trial on Thursday. Among the defendants is Sam Hinga Norman, a former government minister in Sierra Leone accused of raising a terrifying pro-government militia, the Kamajors.
Source: New York Times
Saturday, May 22, 2004
United Nations report highlights growing inequality in South Africa
The tenth anniversary of the end of apartheid and the first democratic elections in South Africa has been widely celebrated throughout the country. The government has used the occasion to congratulate itself on its performance in eradicating poverty, reducing inequality, and generally producing “a better life for all.” However, a report by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) presents a different picture to that painted by politicians and government spokesmen.
One of the most significant issues affecting working class South Africans is massive unemployment. Over the last nine years the rate of unemployment has steadily increased, with between 30 and 42 percent of the labour force caught in “a vicious cycle of open unemployment.” Between 5.2 million and 8.4 million South Africans are unemployed, depending upon whether one applies the official definition or an extended definition of unemployment.
South Africa also has one of the most unequal distribution of incomes in the world, with approximately 60 percent of the population earning less than R42,000 per annum (about US$7,000), whereas 2.2 percent of the population have an income exceeding R360,000 per annum (about US$50,000).
Source: World Socialist Web
One of the most significant issues affecting working class South Africans is massive unemployment. Over the last nine years the rate of unemployment has steadily increased, with between 30 and 42 percent of the labour force caught in “a vicious cycle of open unemployment.” Between 5.2 million and 8.4 million South Africans are unemployed, depending upon whether one applies the official definition or an extended definition of unemployment.
South Africa also has one of the most unequal distribution of incomes in the world, with approximately 60 percent of the population earning less than R42,000 per annum (about US$7,000), whereas 2.2 percent of the population have an income exceeding R360,000 per annum (about US$50,000).
Source: World Socialist Web
Friday, May 14, 2004
Ramatlhodi: Inside the Scorpions probe
A Scorpions probe and a lawsuit brought by rugby boss Brian van Rooyen have opened a Limpopo province can of worms in which tender-rigging and financial favours to the African National Congress and former premier Ngoako Ramatlhodi are alleged.
The Mail & Guardian revealed last week that Ramatlhodi was earmarked to take over from Bulelani Ngcuka as head of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) -- but that his appointment was stalled because he was being probed for corruption by the Scorpions, a division of the NPA. Ramatlhodi was a surprise omission from President Thabo Mbeki's Cabinet.
The NPA this week maintained its official policy of "no comment", but the M&G has ascertained key aspects of the probe from players in companies involved, and from court documents and related sources. At stake are the reputations of and potential criminal prosecutions against Ramatlhodi and Limpopo finance minister Thaba Mufamadi, who is also being probed. Both have denied the allegations.
Also of concern is the ethical implication of the ruling party receiving funding -- confirmed by key players -- flowing from a lucrative government contract. The controversial renewal of this contract, for the payment of social grants in the province, is being challenged in the Pretoria High Court by Van Rooyen and his company, Labat Africa Management Consulting. Labat claims the provincial government irregularly re-awarded the tender, worth about R250-million, to Cash Paymaster Services Northern (CPS) in late 2002 after a consortium led by Labat had scored higher on tender evaluation criteria. CPS and provincial authorities are opposing Labat's legal action.
Van Rooyen claims in court papers that tender criteria were "manipulated" by the late introduction of "track record" as a requirement. This, a Labat consortium representative charged this week, came after Labat had turned down a request for a bribe. CPS was first awarded the provincial grants contract in 1996. For much of the duration of this contract CPS was a joint venture between national technology company Aplitec and Limpopo-based Northern Corporate Investment Holdings, better known as Nicoh. It is Nicoh that has been funding the provincial ANC through a "charitable" trust set up to benefit the people and developing businesses in the province. It is also through Nicoh that individual politicians, Ramatlhodi and Mufamadi, are alleged to have benefited. Nicoh's principal players are lawyer Solly Mohale and businessman Gideon Serote. Also associated with it, whether directly or by way of the charitable trust called the Baobab Development Trust, are cane furniture king Habakuk Shikoane and prominent car dealer Haroun Moti.
There have been differences between the four over who are the true shareholders, but there is no dispute that Baobab has been at least a 10% beneficiary of Nicoh -- and that the ANC has benefited from Baobab. Mohale this week confirmed that Nicoh has given 10% of proceeds to Baobab, and that Baobab in turn has donated to the ANC. He refused to give a rand value, but the CPS deal has been estimated to have paid Nicoh R700 000 a month, which means R70 000 a month to Baobab. Said Mohale: "[Limpopo] is dominated by the main political party, the ANC ... If people come to ask for money, the trustees, if they agree with the objectives, will entertain it." He defended the party benefiting from a government contract, saying: "It depends on at what stage you are giving them money, whether it is open to everybody, and whether it is not illegal."
There are contradictory views on whether others besides the ANC benefited from Baobab. Mohale claimed "community structures" and other parties had also received donations. This was contradicted this week by Shikoane, who is the chairperson of Baobab. He said it was "only the ANC" and that he estimated that the total benefit to the party was "not more than R1-million".
ANC provincial secretary Cassell Mathale this week confirmed "it is quite possible [Baobab] may have donated money to the party", but would not comment further without checking the facts. Mufamadi, who is also the party's provincial treasurer, said: "The ANC receives donations from many business organisations."
As Baobab has funded the party, the question arises whether this helped CPS win the grants tender in the first place or when it was renewed. And if influential individual politicians Ramatlhodi and Mufamadi also benefited from the CPS contract via Nicoh -- the central question the Scorpions are trying to answer -- it would have been outright corruption. But the Scorpions investigation against Ramatlhodi and Mufamadi appears to have run into some difficulties. The original lead investigator, Cornwell Tshavhungwa, is now suspended from the Scorpions on corruption allegations relating to his dealings with a finance parastatal in Mpumalanga.
Tshavhungwa is understood to have recommended that the investigations into Ramatlhodi and Mufamadi be halted owing to a lack of evidence, but Ngcuka insisted that they be pursued. The M&G understands that Tshavhungwa interviewed key players such as Shikoane and Mohale, but neither of them confirmed the allegations. Other investigators have now taken over the probe from Tshavhungwa.
The Scorpions started probing the allegations against Ramatlhodi and Mufamadi last year after they were first publicly aired by noseweek magazine, which quoted Shikoane as confirming the kickbacks. Speaking to the M&G this week, Shikoane maintained no individuals had benefited. And Mohale said he had "no knowledge" of Ramatlhodi or Mufamadi having received money, "unless it was in their [ANC] executive capacities". Approached for comment, Mufamadi also denied individual benefit, saying it was "nonsense" and that "I have no relations with those companies that have been mentioned." Ramatlhodi referred all queries to the ANC.
Serge Belamont, chief executive of Aplitec, Nicoh's partner in CPS, said he had no knowledge of party funding flowing from the contract via Nicoh and the Baobab Development Trust, but said that "if that's the case it wouldn't be right". He said the province was correct to have re-awarded the contract to CPS rather than to Labat, as track record counted. "You are dealing with paying 800 000 poor people ... The tender board has a greater responsibility to decide than on simply who scored the highest points."
NPA spokesperson Sipho Ngwema this week said: "The NPA did not publish any information to the M&G or anyone for that matter that suggests that we are investigating Mr Ngoako Ramatlhodi and/or Mr Thaba Mufamadi. We are, therefore, unable to verify or deny any of your assertions."
Source: Mail & Guardian
The Mail & Guardian revealed last week that Ramatlhodi was earmarked to take over from Bulelani Ngcuka as head of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) -- but that his appointment was stalled because he was being probed for corruption by the Scorpions, a division of the NPA. Ramatlhodi was a surprise omission from President Thabo Mbeki's Cabinet.
The NPA this week maintained its official policy of "no comment", but the M&G has ascertained key aspects of the probe from players in companies involved, and from court documents and related sources. At stake are the reputations of and potential criminal prosecutions against Ramatlhodi and Limpopo finance minister Thaba Mufamadi, who is also being probed. Both have denied the allegations.
Also of concern is the ethical implication of the ruling party receiving funding -- confirmed by key players -- flowing from a lucrative government contract. The controversial renewal of this contract, for the payment of social grants in the province, is being challenged in the Pretoria High Court by Van Rooyen and his company, Labat Africa Management Consulting. Labat claims the provincial government irregularly re-awarded the tender, worth about R250-million, to Cash Paymaster Services Northern (CPS) in late 2002 after a consortium led by Labat had scored higher on tender evaluation criteria. CPS and provincial authorities are opposing Labat's legal action.
Van Rooyen claims in court papers that tender criteria were "manipulated" by the late introduction of "track record" as a requirement. This, a Labat consortium representative charged this week, came after Labat had turned down a request for a bribe. CPS was first awarded the provincial grants contract in 1996. For much of the duration of this contract CPS was a joint venture between national technology company Aplitec and Limpopo-based Northern Corporate Investment Holdings, better known as Nicoh. It is Nicoh that has been funding the provincial ANC through a "charitable" trust set up to benefit the people and developing businesses in the province. It is also through Nicoh that individual politicians, Ramatlhodi and Mufamadi, are alleged to have benefited. Nicoh's principal players are lawyer Solly Mohale and businessman Gideon Serote. Also associated with it, whether directly or by way of the charitable trust called the Baobab Development Trust, are cane furniture king Habakuk Shikoane and prominent car dealer Haroun Moti.
There have been differences between the four over who are the true shareholders, but there is no dispute that Baobab has been at least a 10% beneficiary of Nicoh -- and that the ANC has benefited from Baobab. Mohale this week confirmed that Nicoh has given 10% of proceeds to Baobab, and that Baobab in turn has donated to the ANC. He refused to give a rand value, but the CPS deal has been estimated to have paid Nicoh R700 000 a month, which means R70 000 a month to Baobab. Said Mohale: "[Limpopo] is dominated by the main political party, the ANC ... If people come to ask for money, the trustees, if they agree with the objectives, will entertain it." He defended the party benefiting from a government contract, saying: "It depends on at what stage you are giving them money, whether it is open to everybody, and whether it is not illegal."
There are contradictory views on whether others besides the ANC benefited from Baobab. Mohale claimed "community structures" and other parties had also received donations. This was contradicted this week by Shikoane, who is the chairperson of Baobab. He said it was "only the ANC" and that he estimated that the total benefit to the party was "not more than R1-million".
ANC provincial secretary Cassell Mathale this week confirmed "it is quite possible [Baobab] may have donated money to the party", but would not comment further without checking the facts. Mufamadi, who is also the party's provincial treasurer, said: "The ANC receives donations from many business organisations."
As Baobab has funded the party, the question arises whether this helped CPS win the grants tender in the first place or when it was renewed. And if influential individual politicians Ramatlhodi and Mufamadi also benefited from the CPS contract via Nicoh -- the central question the Scorpions are trying to answer -- it would have been outright corruption. But the Scorpions investigation against Ramatlhodi and Mufamadi appears to have run into some difficulties. The original lead investigator, Cornwell Tshavhungwa, is now suspended from the Scorpions on corruption allegations relating to his dealings with a finance parastatal in Mpumalanga.
Tshavhungwa is understood to have recommended that the investigations into Ramatlhodi and Mufamadi be halted owing to a lack of evidence, but Ngcuka insisted that they be pursued. The M&G understands that Tshavhungwa interviewed key players such as Shikoane and Mohale, but neither of them confirmed the allegations. Other investigators have now taken over the probe from Tshavhungwa.
The Scorpions started probing the allegations against Ramatlhodi and Mufamadi last year after they were first publicly aired by noseweek magazine, which quoted Shikoane as confirming the kickbacks. Speaking to the M&G this week, Shikoane maintained no individuals had benefited. And Mohale said he had "no knowledge" of Ramatlhodi or Mufamadi having received money, "unless it was in their [ANC] executive capacities". Approached for comment, Mufamadi also denied individual benefit, saying it was "nonsense" and that "I have no relations with those companies that have been mentioned." Ramatlhodi referred all queries to the ANC.
Serge Belamont, chief executive of Aplitec, Nicoh's partner in CPS, said he had no knowledge of party funding flowing from the contract via Nicoh and the Baobab Development Trust, but said that "if that's the case it wouldn't be right". He said the province was correct to have re-awarded the contract to CPS rather than to Labat, as track record counted. "You are dealing with paying 800 000 poor people ... The tender board has a greater responsibility to decide than on simply who scored the highest points."
NPA spokesperson Sipho Ngwema this week said: "The NPA did not publish any information to the M&G or anyone for that matter that suggests that we are investigating Mr Ngoako Ramatlhodi and/or Mr Thaba Mufamadi. We are, therefore, unable to verify or deny any of your assertions."
Source: Mail & Guardian
Wednesday, April 28, 2004
New cabinet surprises
Former housing minister Brigitte Mabandla was named South Africa's new Justice Minister on Wednesday. Announcing his new cabinet, President Thabo Mbeki announced that Mabandla's portfolio would be taken over by Intelligence Minister Lindiwe Sisulu.
Former Sports Minister Ngconde Balfour would take over as Correctional Services Minister but continue work with the 2010 soccer bid. He also named Naledi Pandor as the new Minister of Education, taking over from the retiring Kader Asmal. Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula is the new minister of Home Affairs, replacing IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi. The ministry of Public Enterprises has been handed to former Trade and Industry Minister Alec Erwin. He takes over from Jeff Radebe who becomes Transport Minister. Former Eastern Cape premier Makhenkesi Stofile becomes the Sports Minister, while the new post of Science and Technology Minister goes to Azanian People's Organisation leader Mosibudi Mangena. "This is a very strong team. I'm glad that when I spoke to them all last night and early this morning they responded well ... to the critical challenge which is the implementation of policy," Mbeki said after announcing the new cabinet.
Mbeki announced that the ministry of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology will be split into a ministry of Art and Culture and a ministry of Science and Technology. "We have not paid enough attention to Arts and Culture over the past ten years," Mbeki said, adding that science in its own right was important for the development of the country. There will also be three additional women in cabinet and two more women at the deputy position, he said. "As you can see we have not reached 50%," he said refering to the percentage of women in parliament.
A list of members of the cabinet and theire credentials can be found here.
Source: News 24
Former Sports Minister Ngconde Balfour would take over as Correctional Services Minister but continue work with the 2010 soccer bid. He also named Naledi Pandor as the new Minister of Education, taking over from the retiring Kader Asmal. Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula is the new minister of Home Affairs, replacing IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi. The ministry of Public Enterprises has been handed to former Trade and Industry Minister Alec Erwin. He takes over from Jeff Radebe who becomes Transport Minister. Former Eastern Cape premier Makhenkesi Stofile becomes the Sports Minister, while the new post of Science and Technology Minister goes to Azanian People's Organisation leader Mosibudi Mangena. "This is a very strong team. I'm glad that when I spoke to them all last night and early this morning they responded well ... to the critical challenge which is the implementation of policy," Mbeki said after announcing the new cabinet.
Mbeki announced that the ministry of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology will be split into a ministry of Art and Culture and a ministry of Science and Technology. "We have not paid enough attention to Arts and Culture over the past ten years," Mbeki said, adding that science in its own right was important for the development of the country. There will also be three additional women in cabinet and two more women at the deputy position, he said. "As you can see we have not reached 50%," he said refering to the percentage of women in parliament.
A list of members of the cabinet and theire credentials can be found here.
Source: News 24
Edna Molewa: Premier of North West Province

Edna Molewa served in the North West legislature for eight years before she was appointed premier in 2004. She was one of the first women chairpersons of a parliamentary committee, heading trade and industry until 1996, when she became North West minister for tourism, environment and conservation. Two years later, she headed the economic development and tourism portfolio and then moved on to the agriculture, conservation and environment portfolio.
Molewa began her career as a teacher in the 1970s before becoming involved in the underground structures of the liberation movement. She served on various trade union leadership structures: she was a first deputy president of Saccawu, and in women's organisations, she was a member of the Federation of Transvaal Women, then provincial chairperson of the ANC Women's League. She completed courses in economic leadership and administration at two prestigious American institutions: the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania, and the Kennedy School of Governance at Harvard University.
Picture: http://www.info.gov.za/images/cabinet/molewa_large.jpg
Source: Mail & Guardian
Tuesday, April 27, 2004
PREVENTION AND COMBATING OF CORRUPT ACTIVITIES ACT 12 OF 2004
The purpose of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act is to provide for the strengthening of measures to prevent and combat corruption and corrupt activities; to provide for the offence of corruption and offences relating to corrupt activities; to provide for investigative measures in respect of corruption and related corrupt activities; to provide for the establishment and endorsement of a Register in order to place certain restrictions on persons and enterprises convicted of corrupt activities relating to tenders and contracts; to place a duty on certain persons holding a position of authority to report certain corrupt transactions; to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction in respect of the offence of corruption and offences relating to corrupt activities; and to provide for matters connected therewith.
WHEREAS the Constitution enshrines the rights of all people in the Republic and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom;
AND WHEREAS the Constitution places a duty on the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfil all the rights as enshrined in the Bill of Rights;
AND WHEREAS corruption and related corrupt activities undermine the said rights, endanger the stability and security of societies, undermine the institutions and values of democracy and ethical values and morality, jeopardise sustainable development, the rule of law and the credibility of governments, and provide a breeding ground for organised crime;
AND WHEREAS the illicit acquisition of personal wealth can be particularly damaging to democratic institutions, national economies, ethical values and the rule of law;
AND WHEREAS there are links between corrupt activities and other forms of crime, in particular organised crime and economic crime, including money-laundering;
AND WHEREAS corruption is a transnational phenomenon that crosses national borders and affects all societies and economies, and is equally destructive and reprehensible within both the public and private spheres of life, so that regional and international cooperation is essential to prevent and control corruption and related corrupt activities;
AND WHEREAS a comprehensive, integrated and multidisciplinary approach is required to prevent and combat corruption and related corrupt activities efficiently and effectively;
AND WHEREAS the availability of technical assistance can play an important role in enhancing the ability of States, including by strengthening capacity and by institution-building, to prevent and combat corruption and related corrupt activities efficiently and effectively;
AND WHEREAS the prevention and combating of corruption and related corrupt activities is a responsibility of all States requiring mutual cooperation, with the support and involvement of individuals and groups outside the public sector, such as organs of civil society and non- governmental and community-based organizations, if their efforts in this area are to be efficient and effective;
AND WHEREAS the United Nations has adopted various resolutions condemning all corrupt practices, and urged member states to take effective and concrete action to combat all forms of corruption and related corrupt practices;
AND WHEREAS the Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption, adopted on 14 August 2001 in Malawi, reaffirmed the need to eliminate the scourges of corruption through the adoption of effective preventive and deterrent measures and by strictly enforcing legislation against all types of corruption;
AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa desires to be in compliance with and to become Party to the United Nations Convention against Corruption adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 31 October 2003;
AND WHEREAS it is desirable to unbundle the crime of corruption in terms of which, in addition to the creation of a general, broad and all-encompassing offence of corruption, various specific corrupt activities are criminalized.
Source: SABINET
WHEREAS the Constitution enshrines the rights of all people in the Republic and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom;
AND WHEREAS the Constitution places a duty on the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfil all the rights as enshrined in the Bill of Rights;
AND WHEREAS corruption and related corrupt activities undermine the said rights, endanger the stability and security of societies, undermine the institutions and values of democracy and ethical values and morality, jeopardise sustainable development, the rule of law and the credibility of governments, and provide a breeding ground for organised crime;
AND WHEREAS the illicit acquisition of personal wealth can be particularly damaging to democratic institutions, national economies, ethical values and the rule of law;
AND WHEREAS there are links between corrupt activities and other forms of crime, in particular organised crime and economic crime, including money-laundering;
AND WHEREAS corruption is a transnational phenomenon that crosses national borders and affects all societies and economies, and is equally destructive and reprehensible within both the public and private spheres of life, so that regional and international cooperation is essential to prevent and control corruption and related corrupt activities;
AND WHEREAS a comprehensive, integrated and multidisciplinary approach is required to prevent and combat corruption and related corrupt activities efficiently and effectively;
AND WHEREAS the availability of technical assistance can play an important role in enhancing the ability of States, including by strengthening capacity and by institution-building, to prevent and combat corruption and related corrupt activities efficiently and effectively;
AND WHEREAS the prevention and combating of corruption and related corrupt activities is a responsibility of all States requiring mutual cooperation, with the support and involvement of individuals and groups outside the public sector, such as organs of civil society and non- governmental and community-based organizations, if their efforts in this area are to be efficient and effective;
AND WHEREAS the United Nations has adopted various resolutions condemning all corrupt practices, and urged member states to take effective and concrete action to combat all forms of corruption and related corrupt practices;
AND WHEREAS the Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption, adopted on 14 August 2001 in Malawi, reaffirmed the need to eliminate the scourges of corruption through the adoption of effective preventive and deterrent measures and by strictly enforcing legislation against all types of corruption;
AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa desires to be in compliance with and to become Party to the United Nations Convention against Corruption adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 31 October 2003;
AND WHEREAS it is desirable to unbundle the crime of corruption in terms of which, in addition to the creation of a general, broad and all-encompassing offence of corruption, various specific corrupt activities are criminalized.
Source: SABINET
Saturday, April 17, 2004
BASA: Awesome Africa Music Festival
“The arts are the soul of a people: they express their joys and sorrows, their fears and their hopes. The history of our cultural heritage is one to be preserved and inspire us to new creation.”
Athol Fugard,
Patron of Arts & Culture Trust
“The Festival’s links to the City (of Durban) have opened up various channels which have enabled the bank to forge a closer working relationship with local and provincial government. It has also given us the opportunity to endorse the City’s regeneration programme in the Albert Park area which will eventually offer more business opportunities for the bank.”
Thomas Naidoo, Provincial Director, Standard Bank
Results:Through its sponsorship of the festival, the Bank is seen to be making a direct contribution to the regeneration of the City. Arising from this is a successful partnership with the City of Durban, an important business partner for the Bank.
Source: BASA
Athol Fugard,
Patron of Arts & Culture Trust
“The Festival’s links to the City (of Durban) have opened up various channels which have enabled the bank to forge a closer working relationship with local and provincial government. It has also given us the opportunity to endorse the City’s regeneration programme in the Albert Park area which will eventually offer more business opportunities for the bank.”
Thomas Naidoo, Provincial Director, Standard Bank
Results:Through its sponsorship of the festival, the Bank is seen to be making a direct contribution to the regeneration of the City. Arising from this is a successful partnership with the City of Durban, an important business partner for the Bank.
Source: BASA
Monday, April 5, 2004
Gito Baloi shot dead
Gito Baloi, a bass guitarist originally from Mozambique, lived and performed in South Africa for many years.
Gito Baloi, 39, was driving home from a gig in Pretoria when he was attacked. Eyewitnesses say he was shot three times through the window of his car by two men as he dropped off a friend in central Johannesburg.
This is the second killing of a high profile musician in Johannesburg this year - in February the lead singer of the band Mafikizolo, popular with young black people, was shot in Soweto in a road-rage incident.
His murder comes one week before a general election, in which South Africa's high crime rate is an important issue.
Source: BBC News
Gito Baloi, 39, was driving home from a gig in Pretoria when he was attacked. Eyewitnesses say he was shot three times through the window of his car by two men as he dropped off a friend in central Johannesburg.
This is the second killing of a high profile musician in Johannesburg this year - in February the lead singer of the band Mafikizolo, popular with young black people, was shot in Soweto in a road-rage incident.
His murder comes one week before a general election, in which South Africa's high crime rate is an important issue.
Source: BBC News
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