Paul Lee got his liver from an executed Chinese prisoner; Karam in Egypt bought a kidney for his sister for $5Â 300; in Istanbul, Hakan is holding out for $30Â 700 for one of his kidneys.
They are not so unusual: a dire shortage of donated organs in rich countries is sending foreigners with end-stage illnesses to poorer places like China, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Colombia and the Philippines to buy a new lease of life.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Showing posts with label Colombia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Colombia. Show all posts
Monday, August 6, 2007
Sunday, October 29, 2000
South Africa's Arms Trade: Further Progress Needed
South Africa is not living up to its own high standards with respect to arms exports, Human Rights Watch charged. In a 45-page report, "A Question of Principle: Arms Trade and Human Rights," Human Rights Watch charged the South African government with selling weapons to countries with serious human rights problems, where an influx of weaponry could significantly worsen ongoing abuses.
In a 45-page report released today, "A Question of Principle: Arms Trade and Human Rights," Human Rights Watch charged the South African government with selling weapons to countries with serious human rights problems, where an influx of weaponry could significantly worsen ongoing abuses.
Human Rights Watch noted that after 1994, South Africa announced more restrictive policies on arms transfers. But the report charges that those policies are not always being followed. In 1994, a scandal erupted involving the sale by Armscor, the apartheid-era governmental arms export agency, of weapons to Yemen for probable on-shipment to the former Yugoslavia, then under U.N. embargo.
"South Africa has come a long way in overturning apartheid's awful legacy," said Joost Hiltermann, Executive Director of the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch. "In the arms trade, the country has committed to some very good human rights principles. But these principles are not consistently applied and are now under real threat."
The Human Rights Watch report cited examples of weapons sales since 1994 to governments engaging in repression against their own people or to countries involved in their own or others' civil wars. These sales clearly violated South Africa's own stated policies. Purchasers of South African arms include Algeria, Angola, Colombia, the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), India, Namibia, Pakistan, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
Hiltermann noted that South Africa has a strong record in other areas involving the nexus of military policy and human rights. The South African government has taken firm position on banning antipersonnel landmines, and has been one of the world's leaders in implementing the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. It has taken important steps to curb the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in southern Africa, and passed a law on mercenaries in 1998, which prohibited South African citizens from participating in either internal or international armed conflicts. But Hiltermann urged that the South African government do more to institutionalize the important policy reforms on arms sales made since the first democratic elections in 1994. "First and foremost, South Africa should formalize in law the arms export policies that the government has declared on paper, which include a code of conduct on arms transfers," said Hiltermann. He also urged a more significant role for parliament and civil society in arms trade decisions.
Human Rights Watch called on South Africa to:
· establish a legal framework for its arms export policy;
· enhance the capacity of government officials to assess the human rights implications of arms transfers;
· increase the participation of parliament and civil society in arms trade decisions;
· make a greater commitment to full transparency in arms exports.
Source: Human Rights Watch
In a 45-page report released today, "A Question of Principle: Arms Trade and Human Rights," Human Rights Watch charged the South African government with selling weapons to countries with serious human rights problems, where an influx of weaponry could significantly worsen ongoing abuses.
Human Rights Watch noted that after 1994, South Africa announced more restrictive policies on arms transfers. But the report charges that those policies are not always being followed. In 1994, a scandal erupted involving the sale by Armscor, the apartheid-era governmental arms export agency, of weapons to Yemen for probable on-shipment to the former Yugoslavia, then under U.N. embargo.
"South Africa has come a long way in overturning apartheid's awful legacy," said Joost Hiltermann, Executive Director of the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch. "In the arms trade, the country has committed to some very good human rights principles. But these principles are not consistently applied and are now under real threat."
The Human Rights Watch report cited examples of weapons sales since 1994 to governments engaging in repression against their own people or to countries involved in their own or others' civil wars. These sales clearly violated South Africa's own stated policies. Purchasers of South African arms include Algeria, Angola, Colombia, the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), India, Namibia, Pakistan, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
Hiltermann noted that South Africa has a strong record in other areas involving the nexus of military policy and human rights. The South African government has taken firm position on banning antipersonnel landmines, and has been one of the world's leaders in implementing the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. It has taken important steps to curb the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in southern Africa, and passed a law on mercenaries in 1998, which prohibited South African citizens from participating in either internal or international armed conflicts. But Hiltermann urged that the South African government do more to institutionalize the important policy reforms on arms sales made since the first democratic elections in 1994. "First and foremost, South Africa should formalize in law the arms export policies that the government has declared on paper, which include a code of conduct on arms transfers," said Hiltermann. He also urged a more significant role for parliament and civil society in arms trade decisions.
Human Rights Watch called on South Africa to:
· establish a legal framework for its arms export policy;
· enhance the capacity of government officials to assess the human rights implications of arms transfers;
· increase the participation of parliament and civil society in arms trade decisions;
· make a greater commitment to full transparency in arms exports.
Source: Human Rights Watch
Wednesday, October 20, 1993
WHAT'S BEHIND WASHINGTON'S SILENCE ON HAITI DRUG CONNECTION?
At stake in the U.S. confrontation with the Haitian military regime is a cocaine smuggling operation that earns millions of dollars for Haitian military officials while dumping tons of the deadly white powder on American streets. Yet while the country debates the merits of armed intervention in Haiti, the Clinton administration has remained mum on the Haitian "drug connection."
A confidential report by the Drug Enforcement Agency obtained by Pacific News Service describes Haiti as "a major transshipment point for cocaine traffickers" funnelling drugs from Colombia and the Dominican Republic into the U.S.-with the knowledge and active involvement of high military officials and business elites.
The corruption of the Haitian military "is substantial enough to hamper any significant drug investigation attempting to dismantle" illicit drug operations inside Haiti, the report states. Echoing the report's findings, exiled Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide recently blamed the military's role in the drug trade for his ouster.
Despite extensive DEA intelligence documenting Haiti's drug role, neither the Clinton administration, nor the Bush administration before it, have ever raised that role publicly. Now critics of U.S. policy on Haiti, including one Congressman, are questioning that silence, suggesting it reflects de facto U.S. support for the Haitian military and a reluctance to offer unqualified support for Aristide.
"I've been amazed that our government has never talked about the drug trafficking...even though it is obviously one of the major reasons why these people drove their president out of the country and why they are determined not to let him back in. We're talking hundreds of millions of dollars of illegal profits that are having disastrous consequences for the American people," says Rep. John Conyers (D-MI).
Larry Burns, head of the Washington, D.C.-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs, claims, "From the moment Aristide was overthrown two years ago, Washington has equivocated on whether it wanted him back or not..." To secure the military "as an anchor to Aristide's sail," Burns charges, Washington "turned a blind eye to the corruption charges, and pretended that it could be reformed through professionalization and U.S. training."
A senior administration official at the National Security Council dismisses the charge but when asked why the administration has failed to publicize DEA allegations of drug trafficking, the spokesman had no comment.
The DEA first established a Country Office (CO) in Port-au-Prince to assist the Haitian government with its anti-narcotics activities in November 1987. Throughout Aristide's brief tenure in office, DEA agents worked closely with Haitian military narcotics services, investigating an illegal cocaine network estimated to be moving some $300-$500 million worth of cocaine into the U.S. per year. Although the DEA office was shut down after the 1991 coup, it reopened in the fall of 1992. But soon after DEA intelligence prompted the arrest of a member of Haiti's ClA-linked National Intelligence, DEA local agent Tony Greco received death threats from a man identifying himself as the National Intelligence member's boss.
A Congressional source familiar with the DEA's history in Haiti told PNS that Greco had also "connected (Lt. Colonel Michel) Francois to the drug trafficking operations in Haiti." Francois, the current chief of police, is alleged to be behind the current campaign of terror.
What disturbs Rep. Conyers is that none of this information ever reached the public. "By turning a deaf ear to what is obviously a prime force behind Aristide's ouster, we raise questions about our own involvement in drug activities," Conyers says. He is currently investigating how it is that the ships and aircraft necessary to sustain such a large operation evade detection and interdiction, while the U.S. government has managed to spot, stop and turn back almost every ramshackle boat carrying refugees.
Indeed the DEA report shows that after the 1991 coup sent Aristide into exile, there were virtually no major seizures of cocaine from Haiti as compared to nearly 4,000 pounds seized in 1990.
Michael Levine, author of "Deep Cover" and a decorated DEA agent with 25 years of experience fighting drugs overseas, says what's going on in Haiti is "just another example of elements of the U.S. government protecting killers, drug dealers and dictators for the sake of some political end that's going to cost a whole bunch of kids in this country their lives.
"I saw the drug traffickers take over the government of Bolivia in 1980, ironically with the assistance of the CIA, and we (the DEA) just packed up our office and went home."
Source: Global research.ca
A confidential report by the Drug Enforcement Agency obtained by Pacific News Service describes Haiti as "a major transshipment point for cocaine traffickers" funnelling drugs from Colombia and the Dominican Republic into the U.S.-with the knowledge and active involvement of high military officials and business elites.
The corruption of the Haitian military "is substantial enough to hamper any significant drug investigation attempting to dismantle" illicit drug operations inside Haiti, the report states. Echoing the report's findings, exiled Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide recently blamed the military's role in the drug trade for his ouster.
Despite extensive DEA intelligence documenting Haiti's drug role, neither the Clinton administration, nor the Bush administration before it, have ever raised that role publicly. Now critics of U.S. policy on Haiti, including one Congressman, are questioning that silence, suggesting it reflects de facto U.S. support for the Haitian military and a reluctance to offer unqualified support for Aristide.
"I've been amazed that our government has never talked about the drug trafficking...even though it is obviously one of the major reasons why these people drove their president out of the country and why they are determined not to let him back in. We're talking hundreds of millions of dollars of illegal profits that are having disastrous consequences for the American people," says Rep. John Conyers (D-MI).
Larry Burns, head of the Washington, D.C.-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs, claims, "From the moment Aristide was overthrown two years ago, Washington has equivocated on whether it wanted him back or not..." To secure the military "as an anchor to Aristide's sail," Burns charges, Washington "turned a blind eye to the corruption charges, and pretended that it could be reformed through professionalization and U.S. training."
A senior administration official at the National Security Council dismisses the charge but when asked why the administration has failed to publicize DEA allegations of drug trafficking, the spokesman had no comment.
The DEA first established a Country Office (CO) in Port-au-Prince to assist the Haitian government with its anti-narcotics activities in November 1987. Throughout Aristide's brief tenure in office, DEA agents worked closely with Haitian military narcotics services, investigating an illegal cocaine network estimated to be moving some $300-$500 million worth of cocaine into the U.S. per year. Although the DEA office was shut down after the 1991 coup, it reopened in the fall of 1992. But soon after DEA intelligence prompted the arrest of a member of Haiti's ClA-linked National Intelligence, DEA local agent Tony Greco received death threats from a man identifying himself as the National Intelligence member's boss.
A Congressional source familiar with the DEA's history in Haiti told PNS that Greco had also "connected (Lt. Colonel Michel) Francois to the drug trafficking operations in Haiti." Francois, the current chief of police, is alleged to be behind the current campaign of terror.
What disturbs Rep. Conyers is that none of this information ever reached the public. "By turning a deaf ear to what is obviously a prime force behind Aristide's ouster, we raise questions about our own involvement in drug activities," Conyers says. He is currently investigating how it is that the ships and aircraft necessary to sustain such a large operation evade detection and interdiction, while the U.S. government has managed to spot, stop and turn back almost every ramshackle boat carrying refugees.
Indeed the DEA report shows that after the 1991 coup sent Aristide into exile, there were virtually no major seizures of cocaine from Haiti as compared to nearly 4,000 pounds seized in 1990.
Michael Levine, author of "Deep Cover" and a decorated DEA agent with 25 years of experience fighting drugs overseas, says what's going on in Haiti is "just another example of elements of the U.S. government protecting killers, drug dealers and dictators for the sake of some political end that's going to cost a whole bunch of kids in this country their lives.
"I saw the drug traffickers take over the government of Bolivia in 1980, ironically with the assistance of the CIA, and we (the DEA) just packed up our office and went home."
Source: Global research.ca
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