Sunday, November 19, 1989

A SOUTH AFRICAN TALKS OF HIT TEAM

A former South African security police captain says he commanded an assassination team created to track down and eliminate opponents of the Government. The former officer, Capt. Dirk Johannes Coetzee, who quit the police in 1986 and left South Africa last week, made the statement in an interview in Mauritius with a reporter for Vrye Weekblad, an Afrikaans-language weekly newspaper. The paper published the story in its current issue.

On Friday, Maj. Gen. Herman Stadler of the South African police said Mr. Coetzee's ''unfounded, untested and wild'' allegations would be investigated by T. P. McNally, the Attorney General of the Orange Free State, and Lieut. Gen. Alwyn Conradie, head of the police criminal investigation division.The police said Mr. Coetzee had made his accusations in a foreign country where they could not be verified. It also said he had been dishonorably discharged in 1986 for criminal misconduct. Vrye Weekblad said Mr. Coetzee, who is 44 years old, had left the force ''for health reasons after a departmental inquiry.'' Corroboration by Doomed Killer

A few weeks ago, Butana Nofomela, a convicted murderer awaiting hanging in Pretoria, asserted that he served as a member of the hit squad and named Captain Coetzee as his operational commander. His execution was stayed so his assertions could be investigated. Mr. Coetzee confirmed that Mr. Nofomela had served under him. ''I was the commander of the assassination squad of South African police,'' the newspaper quoted Mr. Coetzee as saying. ''My men and I killed and eliminated opponents of the Government.'' He said he was guilty of, or an accomplice to several murders.

Mr. Coetzee said the security police operation had five squads, including his, and had carried out attacks in Swaziland, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Britain, as well as inside South Africa. ''We operated in civilian dress and were armed with the strangest weaponry and explosive devices,'' the newspaper quoted him as saying. ''We operated underground and were not recognizable as policemen.''

Some opponents of apartheid have insisted that the police were behind the killing of a number of Pretoria's adversaries, among them members of the outlawed African National Congress living in exile. The police have consistently denied the existence of any such ''hit squads,'' and General Stadler reiterated this denial on Friday.

Mr. Coetzee asserted that the operation was run from Vlakplaas, a restricted police training base near Pretoria, using former guerrillas from the African National Congress, nicknamed ''askaris,'' who had been recruited to fight their old comrades. Not for That Purpose The police confirmed on Friday that Mr. Coetzee had been stationed at Vlakplaas, but said that he had ''irresponsibly'' misidentified the base's purpose. ''The base was not open to the public because it houses former A.N.C. members, who are now proud South African policemen and citizens,'' the police statement said. ''They provide the force with valuable intelligence and also play a cardinal role in the identification of A.N.C. terrorists infiltrating South Africa,'' ''Their lives are constantly in jeopardy, and the base provided a safe haven for them,'' the statement said.

The former South African Police Commissioner, Gen. Johan Coetzee, told the South African Broadcasting Corporation today that the askaris were used to identify guerrillas trying to infiltrate through border posts with forged documents and were not involved in assassinations. General Coetzee, who is not related to Mr. Coetzee, said there were no ''hit squads.'' ''The police are there to maintain law and order,'' he added, ''and just the thought of such a squad would defeat all that the police stand for.''

The victims of his team, Mr. Coetzee said, included Griffiths Mxenge, a Durban lawyer stabbed to death in 1981. ''Yes, we killed Mxenge,'' the former officer was quoted as saying. He said the four killers each were paid 1,000 rand, now about $380. ''They assured me it looked like a robbery,'' he said. Guerrilla Targeted

On another assignment, Mr. Coetzee said, he was issued a Scorpion machine pistol concealed in a briefcase and ordered to kill Marius Schoon, an A.N.C. member living in Botswana. The mission was called off when other plans were made, he said. A letter bomb killed Mr. Schoon's wife, Jeanette, and young daughter in Angola in 1984.

Vrye Weekblad quoted Mr. Coetzee as relating other cases, in which he said captured guerrillas were drugged and shot with pistols fitted with silencers. Mr. Coetzee said his unit broke into the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Mbabane, Swaziland, and stole ''whatever we could find.'' One of the official envelopes they took, he said, was later used to mail the letter bomb that killed Ruth First in Maputo, Mozambique, in August 1982. She was the wife of Joe Slovo, who heads the South African Communist Party in exile.

Mr. Coetzee, who said he headed an assassination squad until 1982, told Vrye Weekblad: ''I decided to confess to cleanse my conscience. I think with contempt of the things that I did.''

Source: New York Times

Thursday, November 9, 1989

Berliners celebrate the fall of the Wall

The Berlin Wall has been breached after nearly three decades keeping East and West Berliners apart.

At midnight East Germany's Communist rulers gave permission for gates along the Wall to be opened after hundreds of people converged on crossing points. They surged through cheering and shouting and were be met by jubilant West Berliners on the other side. Ecstatic crowds immediately began to clamber on top of the Wall and hack large chunks out of the 28-mile (45-kilometre) barrier.

It had been erected in 1961 on the orders of East Germany's former leader Walter Ulbricht to stop people leaving for West Germany.

Source: BBC

Sunday, November 5, 1989

NAMIBIAN VOTERS DENY TOTAL POWER TO SWAPO

Along this city's well-traveled Talstrasse last week, almost every corner had a large red and blue billboard. `Vote Without Fear,' the signs instructed passing Namibians. Signs on neighborhing streets informed passersby, `Your Vote Is Your Secret.'

Erected by the South African administrator general, who with the United Nations is responsible for the maintenance of Namibia through independence, the signs were designed to calm the fears of Namibian voters as they elected a constituent assembly. In the balloting, the first major step toward independence, the Marxist South West African People's Organization won most of the votes, about 75%, according to unofficial figures. But SWAPO fell short of the two-thirds majority it was predicting and thus was denied total power to write a new constitution.

This is despite the fact that to Namibians, who have been ruled by South Africa since 1915, democracy is a foreign concept. The administrator general and the U.N. Transitional Assistance Group, or UNTAG, had been busy correcting widespread misconceptions about election rules. The unfamiliarity with the voting process, combined with Namibia's 60% illiteracy rate, opened the door for intimidation and deception tactics by many of Namibia's political parties.

For instance, some Namibians were led to believe that political parties would be informed about how their votes were cast and that there would be retribution if they voted for a rival party. Several SWAPO leaders went so far as to threaten that if SWAPO failed to gain 50% of the vote, they might renew the guerrilla war SWAPO has waged for 23 years. This tactic may have been perhaps the most intimidating of all, because it turned the election into a referendum on the war.

Stories abound of political parties spreading deliberate disinformation about the voting. During the campaign, SWAPO reportedly told many Namibians to `put a big `X' on the SWAPO ballot if you support SWAPO, but if you are against us, put a small `x' on the SWAPO ballot.'

Like other African independence elections, Namibia's constituent-assembly elections may have been its last. Though SWAPO now contends that it is prepared, if necessary, to work with other parties to develop a coalition government, it has strong totalitarian inclinations, and fear is widespread that a SWAPO-dominated government would lead Namibia into one-party rule.

There is concern that SWAPO will not respect rival opinions in the prospective coalition, and may use the constituent assembly as a stepping stone to total control in Namibia, similar to the approach used by the Marxist-Leninist factor of the Sandinistas following the overthrow of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua. Werner Neef, an adviser to the Christian Democratic Action Party, says that the CDA will not join a coalition with SWAPO.

The SWAPO victory could lead to ethnic-based violence. SWAPO's power base is rooted in Namibia's largest tribe, the northern-based Ovambos. Indeed, SWAPO lost Namibia outside of Ovambo territory to the free-market Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, winning overall only because it defeated the Alliance by 197,000 votes to 9,200 in the northern region of Ovambo.

There are fears that an Ovambo-based SWAPO government might persecute other tribes such as the Hereros, Namas and Bushmen. SWAPO has admitted keeping many non-Ovambos in underground pits in its camps in Angola and Zambia and torturing them as `spies.'

SWAPO's win also raises security concerns. Since 1964, SWAPO has received financial and military support from the Soviet Union, and SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma has boasted of his strong alliance with Cuba's Fidel Castro, SWAPO also enjoys close relations with the African National Congress, which sent SWAPO 300 minibuses to assist in getting SWAPO supporters to the polls.

There is deep concern that the SWAPO-dominated government may attempt to model Namibia after its northern neighbor, Angola, by bringing in Cuban troops and Soviet military advisers. There is even deeper concern that SWAPO may cooperate with the Angolan regime in launching military attacks against Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, which is based in southern Angola. However, South Africa's proximity and may force SWAPO military restraint.

SWAPO's ecomomic vision is no more promising, but its traditional Marxist-Leninist rhetoric moderated considerably during the campaign. SWAPO told foreign investors recently that is does not support wholesale nationalization, and Mr. Nujoma has said that he does not wish the country's 70,000 whites to flee since their technical and management skills are needed. But according to Mishake Muyongo of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, which got 29% of the votes. `SWAPO will say in public `We want whites here,' but then in private they will turn around and say `Get rid of these people.' '

For southern Africa, the outcome of Namibia's independence process will be critical for the strategic and economic composition of the region. With Namibia's mineral wealth and abundant land (the country is twice the size of France), a moderate, free-market approach by the country's new government could lead to strong economic growth, perhaps making Namibia a regional success story among the underdeveloped front-line states. Conversely, a statist, authoritarian approach by Namibia will likely sway the regional political and economic balance in the other direction.

The outcome is equally important for the U.N., which, as the monitor of Namibia's independence process, has embarked on one of its most ambitious missions to date. More than 6,200 members of UNTAG are in the country to oversee the process, and the U.N. brought in more than 1,000 additional personnel to serve as official election observers.

Having funded SWAPO, given it observer status in New York, and recognized it as `the sole, authentic representative of the Namibian people' in General Assembly resolutions, the U.N.'s capability for objectivity is in justifiable doubt. Indeed, several Namibian political parties contend that the U.N.'s longstanding finanical and diplomatic support for SWAPO tipped the scale in SWAPO that is now taking issue with the U.N.'s formal declaration after the polls closed that the five-days elections were `free and fair.'

But perhaps the greatest irony of the Namibian independence process is the composition of the member nations represented in UNTAG. Nondemocratic nations such as Cuba, Libya, Romania, East Germany and the U.S.S.R. have been sent to Namibia to oversee democratic procedures that they forbid in their own countries.

For Namibians, the concern is not merely that many of these countries have their own dubious agenda in southern Africa, but also that the political system of an independent Namibia may soon be shaped in their image.

Source: US Library of Congress