On the 21st of April 2016, President Jacob Zuma announced the release of the report of the Commission of Inquiry into allegations of fraud, corruption, impropriety or irregularity in the Strategic Defence Procurement Package (the ‘Arms Deal’). During the same announcement, President Zuma provided a summary of the findings of the Commission.
The Commission found that there was nothing wrong with the Arms Deal in its conception, execution or economic impact, despite considerable evidence in the public domain to the contrary. Most importantly, it found that there was no evidence that any of the contracts in the Arms Deal were tainted by evidence of corruption, fraud or irregularity.
We are disappointed, but hardly surprised, that the Commission has come to these findings, which are tantamount to a cover-up. Indeed, it was abundantly clear during the work of the Commission that it was ill-disposed towards undertaking a full, meaningful and unbiased investigation into the Arms Deal. It routinely failed to either admit or interrogate any evidence of wrongdoing in relation to the Deal.
In August 2014, we withdrew from the Commission of Inquiry in protest at the manner in which it was conducting its investigation. Our withdrawal and subsequent refusal to testify before the Commission in October 2014 was supported by over forty civil society organisations who shared our concerns. We identified four primary problems, which we believed indicated that the Commission was failing to investigate the Arms Deal fully, meaningfully and without favour. These concerns were:
1. During the life of the Commission, a number of employees resigned in protest at the manner in which it was conducting its work. In at least two cases, the employees stated that they were resigning because the Commission did not intend to investigate the Arms Deal. Rather, the Commission was pursuing a ‘second agenda’, namely, to discredit critics of the Arms Deal and find in favour of the State and arms companies’ version of events;
2. The Commission refused to admit vital documentary evidence of wrongdoing during the public hearings. One such document was the Debevoise Plimpton Report, an internal audit of the arms company Ferrostaal, which received contracts in the Arms Deal. The Report indicated that Ferrostaal had made tens of millions of rands in payments to politically connected politicians and procurement officials. The report also quoted senior Ferrostaal employees as stating that the offset program was merely a conduit for bribes. In their resignation from the Commission, evidence leaders Advocates Barry Skinner and Carol Sibiya specifically pointed out that refusing to admit the Report ‘nullifies the very purposes for which the Commission was set up.’
3. The Commission refused to allow critical witnesses to testify about documents that they had not written, or events to which they were not personally witness. One major consequence of this is that the only people who could testify to corruption in the Arms Deal were those who paid or received bribes.
4. The Commission failed to provide documents to which we were entitled under the terms of our subpoena, despite repeated requests. The Commission claimed that it was refusing to do so as we were undertaking a ‘fishing expedition.’ The failure of the Commission to provide us with the documents to which we were legally entitled was typical of the Commission’s attitude of sometimes open hostility to critical witnesses.
Despite the above concerns, we are pleased that the Commission Report is now public. We look forward to interrogating its contents in full, and intend to provide a detailed response to the material therein at the earliest opportunity.
In addition, we are seeking legal advice as to the legality of the Commission’s conduct and the viability of a legal review to have the Report set aside. An announcement on this process will be made in due course.
We believe that the report represents a massive missed opportunity at arriving at the truth. However this is not the end of the road in the struggle for truth justice and accountability of corruption in the arms deal.
CONTACT
HENNIE VAN VUUREN
+27 82 902 1303
hennievvuuren@gmail.com
ANDREW FEINSTEIN
+1 929 392 0133
+44 7809728164
andrewfeinstein@me.com
PAUL HOLDEN
+44 795 088 3329
pauledwardholden@gmail.com
Source: Lawyers for Human Rights
Showing posts with label Accountability. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Accountability. Show all posts
Thursday, April 21, 2016
Monday, February 17, 2014
Board Investigations and the Curse of the Mummy’s Tomb – Part I
On this day in 1923, the tomb of King Tut was opened. It created a worldwide stir that has in many ways continued down into the 21st century. Clearly, the boy ruler influenced Steve Martin , (How’d you get so funky?, Funky Tut). Moreover, when the King Tut exhibit first toured the US in the 1970s, it sold out everywhere that it went. And, of course, there was the Curse of the Mummy’s Tomb, which led to some great Universal classic horror pictures. This curse may have killed the dig’s benefactor, Lord Carnarvon who died just months after entering the tomb in November 1923, but the archeologist who discovered King Tut, Howard Carter, seemingly outlived the curse, dying at the age of 64 on the eve of World War II.
I thought about the techniques employed by these two archeologists in the Curse of the Mummy’s Tomb when I read an article in the Corporate Board magazine, entitled “Successful Board Investigations” by David Bayless and Tammy Albarrán, partners in the law firm of Covington & Burling LLP. Why the Curse of the Mummy’s Tomb? It is because if a Board of Directors does not get an investigation which it handles right, the consequences can be quite severe. Over the next two posts I will explore the article by Bayless and Albarrán. Today in Part I, I will review the author’s five key objectives, which they believe a board must pursue to ensure a successful investigation. Tomorrow. in Part II, I will review the authors seven considerations to facilitate a successful board investigation.
The authors recognize that the vast majority of investigations will be handled or directed by in-house counsel. However, if and when such an investigation is needed, it is critical that it be handled with great care and skill. The authors note that “While this task is fraught with peril, there are a number of steps a board can take to ensure that the investigation accomplishes the board’s goals, which will enable it to make informed decisions, and withstands scrutiny by third parties” because it is this third party scrutiny, in the form of regulators, government officials, judges/arbitrators or plaintiffs’ counsel in shareholder actions, who will be reviewing any investigation commissioned by a Board of Directors. The authors believe that there are five key goals that any investigation led by a Board of Directors must meet. They are:
Thoroughness - The authors believe that one of the key, and most critical, questions that any regulator might pose is just how thorough is an investigation; to test whether they can rely on the facts discovered without having to repeat the investigation themselves. Regulators tend to be skeptical of investigations where limits are placed (expressly or otherwise) on the investigators, in terms of what is investigated, or how the investigation is conducted. This question can be an initial deal-killer particularly if the regulator involved views an investigation insufficiently thorough, its credibility is undermined. And, of course, it can lead to the dreaded ‘Where else’ question.
Objectivity - Here the authors write that any “investigation must follow the facts wherever they lead, regardless of the consequences. This includes how the findings may impact senior management or other company employees. An investigation seen as lacking objectivity will be viewed by outsiders as inadequate or deficient.” I would add that in addition to the objectivity requirement in the investigation, the same must be had with the investigators themselves. If a company uses its regular outside counsel, it may be viewed with some askance, particularly if the client is a high volume client of the law firm involved, either in dollar amounts or in number of matters handled by the firm.
Accuracy - As in any part of a best practices anti-corruption compliance program, the three most important things are Document, Document and Document. This means that the factual findings of an investigation must be well supported. For if the developed facts are not well supported, the authors believe that the investigation is “open to collateral attack by skeptical prosecutors and regulators. If that happens, the time and money spent on the internal investigation will have been wasted, because the government will end up conducting its own investigation of the same issues.” This is never good and your company may well lose what little credibility and good will that it may have engendered by self-reporting or self-investigating.
Timeliness - Certainly in the world of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement, an internal investigation should be done quickly. This has become even more necessary with the tight deadlines set under the Dodd-Frank Act Whistleblower provisions. But there are other considerations for a public company such as an impending Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quarterly or annual report that may need to be deferred absent as a timely resolution of the matter. Lastly, the Department of Justice (DOJ) or SEC may view delaying an investigation as simply a part of document spoliation. So timeliness is crucial.
Credibility - One of the realities of any FCPA investigation is that a Board of Directors led investigation is reviewed after the fact by not only skeptical third parties but also sometimes years after the initial events and investigation. So not only is there the opportunity for Monday-Morning Quarterbacking but quite a bit of post event analysis. So the authors believe that any Board of Directors led investigation “must be (and must be perceived as) credible as to what was done, how it was done, and who did it. Otherwise, the board’s work will have been for naught.”
To help manage these five issues the authors have seven tangible considerations they suggest that a Board of Directors follow to help make an investigation successful. Tomorrow I will review and scrutinize these seven considerations.
Source: FPCA Compliance and Ethics Blog by Thomas Fox.
Thomas Fox has practiced law in Houston for 30 years. He is now an Independent Consultant, assisting companies with anti-corruption and anti-bribery compliance and international transaction issues. He was most recently the General Counsel at Drilling Controls, Inc., a worldwide oilfield manufacturing and service company. He was previously division counsel with Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. where he supported Halliburton’s software division and its downhole division. Tom is the author of the award winning FCPA Compliance and Ethics Blog and the international best-selling book “Lessons Learned on Compliance and Ethics”. His second book, “Best Practices Under the FCPA and Bribery Act” was released in April, 2013. He recently released his first eBook, “GSK In China: A Game Changer in Compliance”. He writes and lectures across the globe on anti-corruption and anti-bribery compliance programs.
I thought about the techniques employed by these two archeologists in the Curse of the Mummy’s Tomb when I read an article in the Corporate Board magazine, entitled “Successful Board Investigations” by David Bayless and Tammy Albarrán, partners in the law firm of Covington & Burling LLP. Why the Curse of the Mummy’s Tomb? It is because if a Board of Directors does not get an investigation which it handles right, the consequences can be quite severe. Over the next two posts I will explore the article by Bayless and Albarrán. Today in Part I, I will review the author’s five key objectives, which they believe a board must pursue to ensure a successful investigation. Tomorrow. in Part II, I will review the authors seven considerations to facilitate a successful board investigation.
The authors recognize that the vast majority of investigations will be handled or directed by in-house counsel. However, if and when such an investigation is needed, it is critical that it be handled with great care and skill. The authors note that “While this task is fraught with peril, there are a number of steps a board can take to ensure that the investigation accomplishes the board’s goals, which will enable it to make informed decisions, and withstands scrutiny by third parties” because it is this third party scrutiny, in the form of regulators, government officials, judges/arbitrators or plaintiffs’ counsel in shareholder actions, who will be reviewing any investigation commissioned by a Board of Directors. The authors believe that there are five key goals that any investigation led by a Board of Directors must meet. They are:
Thoroughness - The authors believe that one of the key, and most critical, questions that any regulator might pose is just how thorough is an investigation; to test whether they can rely on the facts discovered without having to repeat the investigation themselves. Regulators tend to be skeptical of investigations where limits are placed (expressly or otherwise) on the investigators, in terms of what is investigated, or how the investigation is conducted. This question can be an initial deal-killer particularly if the regulator involved views an investigation insufficiently thorough, its credibility is undermined. And, of course, it can lead to the dreaded ‘Where else’ question.
Objectivity - Here the authors write that any “investigation must follow the facts wherever they lead, regardless of the consequences. This includes how the findings may impact senior management or other company employees. An investigation seen as lacking objectivity will be viewed by outsiders as inadequate or deficient.” I would add that in addition to the objectivity requirement in the investigation, the same must be had with the investigators themselves. If a company uses its regular outside counsel, it may be viewed with some askance, particularly if the client is a high volume client of the law firm involved, either in dollar amounts or in number of matters handled by the firm.
Accuracy - As in any part of a best practices anti-corruption compliance program, the three most important things are Document, Document and Document. This means that the factual findings of an investigation must be well supported. For if the developed facts are not well supported, the authors believe that the investigation is “open to collateral attack by skeptical prosecutors and regulators. If that happens, the time and money spent on the internal investigation will have been wasted, because the government will end up conducting its own investigation of the same issues.” This is never good and your company may well lose what little credibility and good will that it may have engendered by self-reporting or self-investigating.
Timeliness - Certainly in the world of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement, an internal investigation should be done quickly. This has become even more necessary with the tight deadlines set under the Dodd-Frank Act Whistleblower provisions. But there are other considerations for a public company such as an impending Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quarterly or annual report that may need to be deferred absent as a timely resolution of the matter. Lastly, the Department of Justice (DOJ) or SEC may view delaying an investigation as simply a part of document spoliation. So timeliness is crucial.
Credibility - One of the realities of any FCPA investigation is that a Board of Directors led investigation is reviewed after the fact by not only skeptical third parties but also sometimes years after the initial events and investigation. So not only is there the opportunity for Monday-Morning Quarterbacking but quite a bit of post event analysis. So the authors believe that any Board of Directors led investigation “must be (and must be perceived as) credible as to what was done, how it was done, and who did it. Otherwise, the board’s work will have been for naught.”
To help manage these five issues the authors have seven tangible considerations they suggest that a Board of Directors follow to help make an investigation successful. Tomorrow I will review and scrutinize these seven considerations.
Source: FPCA Compliance and Ethics Blog by Thomas Fox.
Thomas Fox has practiced law in Houston for 30 years. He is now an Independent Consultant, assisting companies with anti-corruption and anti-bribery compliance and international transaction issues. He was most recently the General Counsel at Drilling Controls, Inc., a worldwide oilfield manufacturing and service company. He was previously division counsel with Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. where he supported Halliburton’s software division and its downhole division. Tom is the author of the award winning FCPA Compliance and Ethics Blog and the international best-selling book “Lessons Learned on Compliance and Ethics”. His second book, “Best Practices Under the FCPA and Bribery Act” was released in April, 2013. He recently released his first eBook, “GSK In China: A Game Changer in Compliance”. He writes and lectures across the globe on anti-corruption and anti-bribery compliance programs.
Friday, January 10, 2014
President Proclaims Civilian Secretariat Commencement
The remaining sections of the Civilian Secretariat for Police Service Act of 2011 that did not come into effect in December 2011 will now come into force on 1 April 2014.
The act seeks to give effect to section 208 of the Constitution by establishing a civilian secretariat tasked with monitoring, assessing and evaluating the performance of the South African Police Service (SAPS).
The minister of police will be responsible for the new secretariat.
Provincial police secretariats will be expected to align their planning and operations with the new national secretariat.
The civilian secretariat will be expected to:
• Exercise civilian oversight over the SAPS
• Advise the minister on developing and implementing policies
• Provide administrative support to the minister
• Communicate with stakeholders
• Form a partnership with stakeholders to improve service delivery by SAPS
• Improve relations between itself and the independent police investigative directorate
In terms of the sections that are to now come into effect, section 4(2) refers to the establishing of the secretariat as a national department while 4(3) deals with the secretary as the accounting officer of the secretariat.
Section 14 focuses on the responsibilities of the secretary in terms of finances and accountability.
The proclamation notice was published in Government Gazette 37151.
Prior to the notice, the presidency had indicated in a statement at the beginning of December that the remaining sections were to commence on 1 April.
Source: SABINET
The act seeks to give effect to section 208 of the Constitution by establishing a civilian secretariat tasked with monitoring, assessing and evaluating the performance of the South African Police Service (SAPS).
The minister of police will be responsible for the new secretariat.
Provincial police secretariats will be expected to align their planning and operations with the new national secretariat.
The civilian secretariat will be expected to:
• Exercise civilian oversight over the SAPS
• Advise the minister on developing and implementing policies
• Provide administrative support to the minister
• Communicate with stakeholders
• Form a partnership with stakeholders to improve service delivery by SAPS
• Improve relations between itself and the independent police investigative directorate
In terms of the sections that are to now come into effect, section 4(2) refers to the establishing of the secretariat as a national department while 4(3) deals with the secretary as the accounting officer of the secretariat.
Section 14 focuses on the responsibilities of the secretary in terms of finances and accountability.
The proclamation notice was published in Government Gazette 37151.
Prior to the notice, the presidency had indicated in a statement at the beginning of December that the remaining sections were to commence on 1 April.
Source: SABINET
Thursday, November 21, 2013
Friday, November 15, 2013
Nkandla report: The real reasons why ministers took on Thuli
The fight between Public Protector Thuli Madonsela and the security cluster is about much more than her provisional report into state expenditure at President Jacob Zuma’s private Nkandla homestead.
It signals the start of a new war between openness and accountability, on the one hand, and secrecy, cloaked in the garb of security, on the other. And it is clear that the Protection of State Information Bill – the so-called secrecy Bill – passed for the third time in the National Assembly this week, opens up a dangerous new front in that war.
Last Friday, Police Minister Nathi Mthethwa approached the Pretoria high court to interdict Madonsela from releasing the draft report, purportedly in a quest for more time.
In effect, though, he sought to block the release until the security cluster ministers were satisfied with the way she had accommodated their concerns about allegedly sensitive information.
What emerges starkly in the court papers is that the ministers believe any document that draws on classified information must itself be classified. In his founding affidavit, Mthethwa in effect threatened criminal sanction should Madonsela release an uncensored draft report to other “affected, implicated and interested parties” to obtain their responses.
Principle of secrecy
He warned: “Release of the provisional report to third parties … without prior authorisation of [the ministers] … is unlawful and carries … a criminal penalty.”
Mthethwa’s affidavit attached an earlier letter to Madonsela from Public Works Minister Thulas Nxesi, also on behalf of the defence, police and state security ministers.
Nxesi made the point explicitly: “As neither I, nor the ministers involved, have given the necessary permission to declassify the documentation relied upon by you in your provisional report, we deem it necessary to inform you that to release your provisional report without our authorisation would, in effect, result in … a contravention of section 4 of the National Key Points Act, 102 of 1980, and section 4 of the Protection of Information Act, 84 of 1982.”
Nowhere did Mthethwa refer to any specific contents of the draft report to justify the claim that the president’s security was at risk.
What really seems to be at stake is the principle of secrecy – and who gets to pronounce on it.
In her stinging reply, Madonsela said the ministers did not cite a “single fact” to illustrate how the president’s safety would be compromised by the disclosure of the draft report.
In his second affidavit, tabled on Thursday, Mthethwa sidestepped that challenge, claiming it was irrelevant to the request for more time.
In their reply, the ministers abandoned their interdict, citing the fact that Madonsela, in asking for the matter to be postponed until November 15, had in effect given them the extra time they asked for.
But it would be a mistake to see this as a final climb-down instead of a tactical retreat.
Further litigation to come?
In his second affidavit, Mthethwa foreshadows potential further litigation, stating: “It will be argued at an appropriate time, when the need arises, that the [public protector], not being an expert on matters of security, cannot be an arbiter on whether or not there exists a security breach from the contents of the provisional report … Should the respondent arrogate to herself that power to determine whether or not there is a breach of security arising from the contents of her provisional report, I am advised that she will in law be acting ultra vires her powers and the law.”
In short, ministers, not Madonsela, must decide whether the report breaches security.
Mthethwa adds: “The classified and top-secret information extracted by [the public protector] in her provisional report … is governed by the minimum information security standards, and it is those classified and top-secret documents and/or extracts that require the minister to authorise its further publication.”
Clearly, no authorisation has been granted. If Madonsela does not excise what they ask her to, there appears to be a real chance the security cluster will return to court.
The state security department itself accepts that apartheid-era laws the ministers rely on are probably unconstitutional, making the ministers’ attempt to exert their authority over Madonsela something of a reach.
That will change when the secrecy Bill is signed into law – which the president could do any day now.
Top secret
The new Act specifies that the state security minister will make regulations governing how chapter nine institutions – including the public protector and the auditor general – will be allowed to access and use classified information.
The push for a security curtain was echoed in the report of the Joint Standing Committee of Intelligence (JSCI), which released its Nkandla report on Thursday.
After the outcry over the expenditure – about R210-million – in November 2012, the public works minister appointed a government task team to investigate. Its report – classified as top secret – was delivered to Nxesi in January.
In June, the report was referred to the JSCI, which usually carries out oversight of the intelligence services.
An opinion from the parliamentary legal adviser recommended the JSCI restrict itself to matters to do with security oversight, redact sensitive information and then refer the report to the National Assembly.
The JSCI ignored this advice, endorsed the top-secret classification and even recommended that any new information uncovered should be referred back to the JSCI for consideration behind closed doors.
It notes: “Matters relating to the allocation of tenders … should be referred to the office of the auditor general for a full investigation … However, the JSCI believes that because of the classification aspects of the subject matter, the auditor general should report on this investigation to the JSCI.”
Of even more concern is how the JSCI parrots the ministers’ line in their interaction with Madonsela.
A sign of things to come
In a veiled reference to her, the JSCI notes: “Entities which have investigative powers … should not be inappropriately motivated … to launch into an investigation on a matter which has already been assigned to another entity. It is therefore recommended that the executive give urgent attention to this matter … so that unnecessary parallel investigations can be avoided.”
This was precisely the argument the ministers used to try to discourage Madonsela’s Nkandla investigation.
In a letter to Madonsela in April, the state attorney referred to her meeting with the ministers and noted: “The purpose … was to discuss with you our concerns regarding parallel investigations ...”
He said a draft proclamation for the Special Investigating Unit to take up the matter had already been sent to the president and a request for an Nkandla audit had been addressed to the auditor general. “Our clients, therefore, propose … that you hold your investigation in abeyance until the processes embarked upon have been completed.”
Madonsela said in her affidavit this week that the auditor general’s audit had not materialised, nor had the Special Investigating Unit yet been authorised to investigate.
Source: Mail & Guardian
It signals the start of a new war between openness and accountability, on the one hand, and secrecy, cloaked in the garb of security, on the other. And it is clear that the Protection of State Information Bill – the so-called secrecy Bill – passed for the third time in the National Assembly this week, opens up a dangerous new front in that war.
Last Friday, Police Minister Nathi Mthethwa approached the Pretoria high court to interdict Madonsela from releasing the draft report, purportedly in a quest for more time.
In effect, though, he sought to block the release until the security cluster ministers were satisfied with the way she had accommodated their concerns about allegedly sensitive information.
What emerges starkly in the court papers is that the ministers believe any document that draws on classified information must itself be classified. In his founding affidavit, Mthethwa in effect threatened criminal sanction should Madonsela release an uncensored draft report to other “affected, implicated and interested parties” to obtain their responses.
Principle of secrecy
He warned: “Release of the provisional report to third parties … without prior authorisation of [the ministers] … is unlawful and carries … a criminal penalty.”
Mthethwa’s affidavit attached an earlier letter to Madonsela from Public Works Minister Thulas Nxesi, also on behalf of the defence, police and state security ministers.
Nxesi made the point explicitly: “As neither I, nor the ministers involved, have given the necessary permission to declassify the documentation relied upon by you in your provisional report, we deem it necessary to inform you that to release your provisional report without our authorisation would, in effect, result in … a contravention of section 4 of the National Key Points Act, 102 of 1980, and section 4 of the Protection of Information Act, 84 of 1982.”
Nowhere did Mthethwa refer to any specific contents of the draft report to justify the claim that the president’s security was at risk.
What really seems to be at stake is the principle of secrecy – and who gets to pronounce on it.
In her stinging reply, Madonsela said the ministers did not cite a “single fact” to illustrate how the president’s safety would be compromised by the disclosure of the draft report.
In his second affidavit, tabled on Thursday, Mthethwa sidestepped that challenge, claiming it was irrelevant to the request for more time.
In their reply, the ministers abandoned their interdict, citing the fact that Madonsela, in asking for the matter to be postponed until November 15, had in effect given them the extra time they asked for.
But it would be a mistake to see this as a final climb-down instead of a tactical retreat.
Further litigation to come?
In his second affidavit, Mthethwa foreshadows potential further litigation, stating: “It will be argued at an appropriate time, when the need arises, that the [public protector], not being an expert on matters of security, cannot be an arbiter on whether or not there exists a security breach from the contents of the provisional report … Should the respondent arrogate to herself that power to determine whether or not there is a breach of security arising from the contents of her provisional report, I am advised that she will in law be acting ultra vires her powers and the law.”
In short, ministers, not Madonsela, must decide whether the report breaches security.
Mthethwa adds: “The classified and top-secret information extracted by [the public protector] in her provisional report … is governed by the minimum information security standards, and it is those classified and top-secret documents and/or extracts that require the minister to authorise its further publication.”
Clearly, no authorisation has been granted. If Madonsela does not excise what they ask her to, there appears to be a real chance the security cluster will return to court.
The state security department itself accepts that apartheid-era laws the ministers rely on are probably unconstitutional, making the ministers’ attempt to exert their authority over Madonsela something of a reach.
That will change when the secrecy Bill is signed into law – which the president could do any day now.
Top secret
The new Act specifies that the state security minister will make regulations governing how chapter nine institutions – including the public protector and the auditor general – will be allowed to access and use classified information.
The push for a security curtain was echoed in the report of the Joint Standing Committee of Intelligence (JSCI), which released its Nkandla report on Thursday.
After the outcry over the expenditure – about R210-million – in November 2012, the public works minister appointed a government task team to investigate. Its report – classified as top secret – was delivered to Nxesi in January.
In June, the report was referred to the JSCI, which usually carries out oversight of the intelligence services.
An opinion from the parliamentary legal adviser recommended the JSCI restrict itself to matters to do with security oversight, redact sensitive information and then refer the report to the National Assembly.
The JSCI ignored this advice, endorsed the top-secret classification and even recommended that any new information uncovered should be referred back to the JSCI for consideration behind closed doors.
It notes: “Matters relating to the allocation of tenders … should be referred to the office of the auditor general for a full investigation … However, the JSCI believes that because of the classification aspects of the subject matter, the auditor general should report on this investigation to the JSCI.”
Of even more concern is how the JSCI parrots the ministers’ line in their interaction with Madonsela.
A sign of things to come
In a veiled reference to her, the JSCI notes: “Entities which have investigative powers … should not be inappropriately motivated … to launch into an investigation on a matter which has already been assigned to another entity. It is therefore recommended that the executive give urgent attention to this matter … so that unnecessary parallel investigations can be avoided.”
This was precisely the argument the ministers used to try to discourage Madonsela’s Nkandla investigation.
In a letter to Madonsela in April, the state attorney referred to her meeting with the ministers and noted: “The purpose … was to discuss with you our concerns regarding parallel investigations ...”
He said a draft proclamation for the Special Investigating Unit to take up the matter had already been sent to the president and a request for an Nkandla audit had been addressed to the auditor general. “Our clients, therefore, propose … that you hold your investigation in abeyance until the processes embarked upon have been completed.”
Madonsela said in her affidavit this week that the auditor general’s audit had not materialised, nor had the Special Investigating Unit yet been authorised to investigate.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Saturday, June 22, 2013
Agang launch: Nkandla, Guptas, Arms Deal - Ramphele criticises government
"The leaders of this current government set an appalling example that others follow ... They seem to think they are beyond the reach of the law," Agang SA leader Mamphela Ramphele said on Saturday at the Tshwane Events Centre.
"One by one they have systematically attacked the very foundations of our constitutional democracy, the judicial system, the freedom of the press, accountability of government and the human rights of all citizens."
She said the arrogance of the current government was "breathtaking". It was acting with impunity and abusing "the resources of the state for the enrichment of a party, themselves and their friends".
"The arms deal, Nkandla, the Guptas, the list of these abuses goes on and on," she said to a cheering crowd.
The former activist and businessperson was welcomed by cheers from the crowd who arrived to support her new party.
More than a thousand people, mostly dressed in white T-shirts with Agang SA printed on them, listened intently and cheered as Ramphele spoke about problems facing South Africa.
For the past five months Ramphele visited communities around the country listening to people's concerns.
"We are here to begin the restoration of the promise of our great nation and to offer the hope of a better future for South Africa," she told the crowd.
"There is a desperate need for change."
Leaders failed to deliver
After nearly 20 years, the country's leaders failed to deliver on the promise of freedom, she said. Adding that it was too long to wait for jobs, education and healthcare.
Ramphele said the country had reached a crossroads.
"I for one do not want to think about where we will be in five years time unless we change course. Imagine five more years of corruption," she said as the crowd shouted "no".
"Imagine five more years of young people being lost from the education system and the economy. Five more years of millions of people entering the workforce but not having jobs. Five more years of non-functioning hospitals and clinics."
However, the country had potential and it was this, according to Ramphele, which inspired her at the age of 65 to enter South African politics and start Agang SA.
During Ramphele's speech the mostly youthful crowd, started shouting "enough is enough".
She introduced her campaign team calling them world-class.
Nkosinathi Solomon, who joined Agang from Absa, was the campaign director.
Also on the team were Dr Mills Soko, director of policy, from the University of Cape Town's graduate school of business, Thabo Leshilo, a former Sowetan editor as director of communications, Zohra Dawood as director of fundraising and Rorisang Tshabalala as deputy director of field management.
Elective conference
Ramphele also announced that Vanessa Hani, former South African Communist Party leader Chris Hani's daughter, would join her team to focus on mobilising women as part of the field management team.
Moeketsi Mosola joined as political director and would lead the creation of the party's political leadership.
Ramphele said Agang would hold an elective conference towards the end of the year.
"There are many experienced parliamentarians and battle hardened activists who will join our national and provincial leadership in the coming months," she said.
"We will strike a balance between old hands and many new faces." – Sapa
Source: Mail & Guardian
"One by one they have systematically attacked the very foundations of our constitutional democracy, the judicial system, the freedom of the press, accountability of government and the human rights of all citizens."
She said the arrogance of the current government was "breathtaking". It was acting with impunity and abusing "the resources of the state for the enrichment of a party, themselves and their friends".
"The arms deal, Nkandla, the Guptas, the list of these abuses goes on and on," she said to a cheering crowd.
The former activist and businessperson was welcomed by cheers from the crowd who arrived to support her new party.
More than a thousand people, mostly dressed in white T-shirts with Agang SA printed on them, listened intently and cheered as Ramphele spoke about problems facing South Africa.
For the past five months Ramphele visited communities around the country listening to people's concerns.
"We are here to begin the restoration of the promise of our great nation and to offer the hope of a better future for South Africa," she told the crowd.
"There is a desperate need for change."
Leaders failed to deliver
After nearly 20 years, the country's leaders failed to deliver on the promise of freedom, she said. Adding that it was too long to wait for jobs, education and healthcare.
Ramphele said the country had reached a crossroads.
"I for one do not want to think about where we will be in five years time unless we change course. Imagine five more years of corruption," she said as the crowd shouted "no".
"Imagine five more years of young people being lost from the education system and the economy. Five more years of millions of people entering the workforce but not having jobs. Five more years of non-functioning hospitals and clinics."
However, the country had potential and it was this, according to Ramphele, which inspired her at the age of 65 to enter South African politics and start Agang SA.
During Ramphele's speech the mostly youthful crowd, started shouting "enough is enough".
She introduced her campaign team calling them world-class.
Nkosinathi Solomon, who joined Agang from Absa, was the campaign director.
Also on the team were Dr Mills Soko, director of policy, from the University of Cape Town's graduate school of business, Thabo Leshilo, a former Sowetan editor as director of communications, Zohra Dawood as director of fundraising and Rorisang Tshabalala as deputy director of field management.
Elective conference
Ramphele also announced that Vanessa Hani, former South African Communist Party leader Chris Hani's daughter, would join her team to focus on mobilising women as part of the field management team.
Moeketsi Mosola joined as political director and would lead the creation of the party's political leadership.
Ramphele said Agang would hold an elective conference towards the end of the year.
"There are many experienced parliamentarians and battle hardened activists who will join our national and provincial leadership in the coming months," she said.
"We will strike a balance between old hands and many new faces." – Sapa
Source: Mail & Guardian
Monday, February 18, 2013
Mamphela Ramphele launches new party political platform
DR MAMPHELA Ramphele on Monday announced the formation of a “party political platform” whose first order of business would be to call for reform of South Africa’s electoral system and with the aim of contesting the 2014 national elections.
Speculation had been rife for weeks that the activist and doctor — a former MD of the World Bank — would enter the country’s political space through forming her own political party.
She will challenge the 2014 election, although she admits to having a staff of just five people, and expects funding, always an elephant in the room for political parties, to come largely from “supportive” South Africans.
On Monday, she delivered a hard-hitting speech on how the dream of a democratic South Africa had been derailed by poor governance, corruption, nepotism, poverty and powerlessness.
“Our country is at risk because self-interest has become the driver of many of those in positions of authority who should be focused on serving the public,” she said.
The platform — to be called “Agang” in Sesotho, meaning “Build SA” — will embark on a 1-million-signature campaign to ensure that electoral reform is the “first order of business” for Parliament after the 2014 election.
“I am here today to invite you, young and old, to reimagine the country of our dreams and to commit to building it into a reality in the lives of every South African,” Dr Ramphele said at the historic Women’s Gaol at Constitutional Hill in Johannesburg.
“I have said that I am no messiah. No single individual acting on their own can build our nation into the country of our dreams. But I am willing to be a bridge between my generation — those of us who fought for freedom who remember not only with their minds but also with their hearts — and that of my children. For us the dream remains alive as a link between those who sacrificed their lives for freedom to be born and those who live in the hope of seeing the reality of the dream come alive in their own lifetime.”
She said South Africans were being denied the right to govern by the current electoral system, and bemoaned the deployment of people to government by parties and the impact of being beholden to party leaders on their performance.
“We should be able to vote for the person in our own area we want to represent us in Parliament, so we can hold them accountable for the electoral promises they make,” she said. “We want an MP for Marikana, an MP for De Doorns and an MP for Sasolburg, so if the people are unhappy and the MP is not responsive enough, they will be voted out at the next election.”
The new party political platform would give citizens who stood on the sidelines an opportunity to become actively involved in building a South Africa to be proud of, Ms Ramphele said.
She blamed a passive citizenry for the direction South Africa had taken, saying she wanted to ignite South Africans to help pull the country back on track. This would be accomplished through “consultation” with those in villages, townships and suburbs, which would feed into her party’s policies.
An active citizenry would also aid in the party’s “war” against corruption. “If we operate as vigilant, active citizens, we can tackle corruption. We too are part of the problem,” Dr Ramphele said.
She added that the decision to enter party politics had not come easily. “I have never been a member of a political party nor aspired to political office. I however feel called to lead the efforts of many South Africans who increasingly fear that we are missing too many opportunities to become that which we have the potential to become — a great society.
“I have no illusions about the difficult road ahead. Bridges get trampled on. But I trust my fellow South Africans’ capacity to come together at critical times to do what others believe is impossible. I believe in our potential for greatness. I believe that greatness is within our grasp if only we can reach out across divisions and self-interests and put the country first.”
Dr Ramphele also said Marikana and De Doorns underscored the urgent need for South Africa to restructure its economic system — but such a restructuring should also focus on job satisfaction and a sense of fulfilment for workers.
Since last year, South Africa has seen a surge in violent and sometimes deadly industrial protests, often with demands for higher wages.
“What we want is an economy that works for all South Africans,” Dr Ramphele said.
She said Agang did not have a preferred economic policy at this stage as it was a work in progress and would be developed as consultation continued. She added, however, that the current economic structure undermined the country’s growth prospects.
News of Dr Ramphele’s political plans have created a buzz in opposition circles, though she made it clear on Monday that she was not joining any other political party, but consulting them widely with. “I am not a joiner,” she said.
The Democratic Alliance (DA) said on Monday that it took note of Dr Ramphele’s intention “to engage South Africans about the formation of a new political party”.
“Dr Ramphele shares the DA’s core values of nonracialism and constitutionalism, and her move is another step in the long process of realigning South African politics around these values,” said DA spokesman Mmusi Maimane, adding: “We will continue to engage Dr Ramphele in the coming months.”
Smaller parties such as the Congress of the People (COPE) can be expected to seize the opportunity of jumping on the bandwagon.
COPE leaders have said they are mulling ways to work with Dr Ramphele. While this could give her initiative a boost, it could also raise credibility questions, as COPE has battled with internal squabbles that have all but eroded its credibility.
Political analyst Susan Booysens said Ms Ramphele’s announcement on Monday was “odd and bizarre”.
Ms Booysens said she did not see Agang taking off as an imagination-grabbing political party. “I cannot even say refreshing because I cannot see how it fits into party politics,” said Ms Booysens.
Aubrey Matshiqi, political analyst and research fellow at the Helen Suzman Foundation, said Ms Ramphele’s first handicap was that she started with a party political platform. However, Mr Matshiqi said he was not surprised with the move as it appeared that Ms Ramphele and her team were “not able to settle for a very clear way of defining themselves”.
“But when you are consulting a broad range of people, defining yourself can be a problem,” Mr Matshiqi said.
Related files
PDF: Dr Mamphela Ramphele's full speech delivered at the launch of her new party political platform
Source:
Speculation had been rife for weeks that the activist and doctor — a former MD of the World Bank — would enter the country’s political space through forming her own political party.
She will challenge the 2014 election, although she admits to having a staff of just five people, and expects funding, always an elephant in the room for political parties, to come largely from “supportive” South Africans.
On Monday, she delivered a hard-hitting speech on how the dream of a democratic South Africa had been derailed by poor governance, corruption, nepotism, poverty and powerlessness.
“Our country is at risk because self-interest has become the driver of many of those in positions of authority who should be focused on serving the public,” she said.
The platform — to be called “Agang” in Sesotho, meaning “Build SA” — will embark on a 1-million-signature campaign to ensure that electoral reform is the “first order of business” for Parliament after the 2014 election.
“I am here today to invite you, young and old, to reimagine the country of our dreams and to commit to building it into a reality in the lives of every South African,” Dr Ramphele said at the historic Women’s Gaol at Constitutional Hill in Johannesburg.
“I have said that I am no messiah. No single individual acting on their own can build our nation into the country of our dreams. But I am willing to be a bridge between my generation — those of us who fought for freedom who remember not only with their minds but also with their hearts — and that of my children. For us the dream remains alive as a link between those who sacrificed their lives for freedom to be born and those who live in the hope of seeing the reality of the dream come alive in their own lifetime.”
She said South Africans were being denied the right to govern by the current electoral system, and bemoaned the deployment of people to government by parties and the impact of being beholden to party leaders on their performance.
“We should be able to vote for the person in our own area we want to represent us in Parliament, so we can hold them accountable for the electoral promises they make,” she said. “We want an MP for Marikana, an MP for De Doorns and an MP for Sasolburg, so if the people are unhappy and the MP is not responsive enough, they will be voted out at the next election.”
The new party political platform would give citizens who stood on the sidelines an opportunity to become actively involved in building a South Africa to be proud of, Ms Ramphele said.
She blamed a passive citizenry for the direction South Africa had taken, saying she wanted to ignite South Africans to help pull the country back on track. This would be accomplished through “consultation” with those in villages, townships and suburbs, which would feed into her party’s policies.
An active citizenry would also aid in the party’s “war” against corruption. “If we operate as vigilant, active citizens, we can tackle corruption. We too are part of the problem,” Dr Ramphele said.
She added that the decision to enter party politics had not come easily. “I have never been a member of a political party nor aspired to political office. I however feel called to lead the efforts of many South Africans who increasingly fear that we are missing too many opportunities to become that which we have the potential to become — a great society.
“I have no illusions about the difficult road ahead. Bridges get trampled on. But I trust my fellow South Africans’ capacity to come together at critical times to do what others believe is impossible. I believe in our potential for greatness. I believe that greatness is within our grasp if only we can reach out across divisions and self-interests and put the country first.”
Dr Ramphele also said Marikana and De Doorns underscored the urgent need for South Africa to restructure its economic system — but such a restructuring should also focus on job satisfaction and a sense of fulfilment for workers.
Since last year, South Africa has seen a surge in violent and sometimes deadly industrial protests, often with demands for higher wages.
“What we want is an economy that works for all South Africans,” Dr Ramphele said.
She said Agang did not have a preferred economic policy at this stage as it was a work in progress and would be developed as consultation continued. She added, however, that the current economic structure undermined the country’s growth prospects.
News of Dr Ramphele’s political plans have created a buzz in opposition circles, though she made it clear on Monday that she was not joining any other political party, but consulting them widely with. “I am not a joiner,” she said.
The Democratic Alliance (DA) said on Monday that it took note of Dr Ramphele’s intention “to engage South Africans about the formation of a new political party”.
“Dr Ramphele shares the DA’s core values of nonracialism and constitutionalism, and her move is another step in the long process of realigning South African politics around these values,” said DA spokesman Mmusi Maimane, adding: “We will continue to engage Dr Ramphele in the coming months.”
Smaller parties such as the Congress of the People (COPE) can be expected to seize the opportunity of jumping on the bandwagon.
COPE leaders have said they are mulling ways to work with Dr Ramphele. While this could give her initiative a boost, it could also raise credibility questions, as COPE has battled with internal squabbles that have all but eroded its credibility.
Political analyst Susan Booysens said Ms Ramphele’s announcement on Monday was “odd and bizarre”.
Ms Booysens said she did not see Agang taking off as an imagination-grabbing political party. “I cannot even say refreshing because I cannot see how it fits into party politics,” said Ms Booysens.
Aubrey Matshiqi, political analyst and research fellow at the Helen Suzman Foundation, said Ms Ramphele’s first handicap was that she started with a party political platform. However, Mr Matshiqi said he was not surprised with the move as it appeared that Ms Ramphele and her team were “not able to settle for a very clear way of defining themselves”.
“But when you are consulting a broad range of people, defining yourself can be a problem,” Mr Matshiqi said.
Related files
PDF: Dr Mamphela Ramphele's full speech delivered at the launch of her new party political platform
Source:
Thursday, November 29, 2012
Glenister prepares for round 3 in ConCourt over Hawks Act
Hugh Glenister is preparing to return to the Constitutional Court, to argue that the amendments to the South African Police Amendment Act - known as the ‘Hawks Act' - do not meet that Court's criteria for an effective anti-corruption entity as laid out in the Glenister judgment of March 2011.
The Act was signed into law by President Zuma in September this year. Glenister submitted a notice of application to the Court today.
Glenister and his legal counsel have asked that the Court give the executive six months to remedy the legislation once again, and have suggested that a new entity with a specific mandate to combat corruption be established outside of the police service. Glenister says that this could be achieved in a number of ways, either through the creation of:
a new Chapter 9 institution;
a specialised unit within an existing Chapter 9 Institution (e.g. The office of the Public Protector or the Auditor General); or
a free-standing legislated body which is not accountable to the National Commissioner, the Minister or the cabinet.
The SAPS Amendment Act was first passed into law in 2008, when anti-corruption unit, the Scorpions, was disbanded and replaced by the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, a new unit within the police service known as ‘the Hawks'.
Glenister successfully argued that the legislation establishing the Hawks was unconstitutional when he won the 2011 ‘Glenister judgement' in the Constitutional Court. The Court found that the SAPS Amendment Act gave inadequate independence to the anti-graft unit in investigating corruption and gave the executive 18 months to amend the legislation. The cut-off date was 18 September 2012.
In its judgement, the Court clearly outlined its criteria for South Africa's anti-corruption entity:
Adequate specialisation and training;
independence from political influence and interference;
guaranteed resources; and
security of tenure for the entity's officials.
However, Glenister believes that the executive failed to adhere to these criteria and therefore to the requirements of the Constitution, specifically regarding the location of the Hawks and its reporting structure.
As a unit within the police, the Hawks head is answerable to the Commissioner of Police, the Minister of Police, Cabinet and ultimately, the President. Glenister believes that this makes the unit vulnerable to political meddling, compromising its ability to effectively investigate corruption at all levels of society.
"How can the Hawks combat corruption within the public sector if the ruling party has control over who can be investigated and who is above the law?" says Glenister, "The unit has its hands tied and is vulnerable to the kind of political interference which resulted in corruption charges being withdrawn against the President, without the opportunity of being tested in court."
According to the 2008/2009 annual report of the National Prosecuting Authority, the number of new investigations has dropped by 85% since the Hawks took over from the Scorpions in 2008, and the value of illegally acquired assets seized has fallen from R4 billion to R35 million.
Additionally, public perception about corruption within the SAPS is at an all time low according to an October survey by market research firm, TNS, which revealed that it is seen as the most corrupt government entity in South Africa. The Court regards public perception of independence as a relevant factor in its deliberations on the effectiveness and autonomy of the tweaked Hawks unit.
"If the unit itself is corrupt, how can it be expected to fight corruption?"
Statement issued by FTI Consulting on behalf of Hugh Glenister, November 29 2012
Source: Politicsweb
The Act was signed into law by President Zuma in September this year. Glenister submitted a notice of application to the Court today.
Glenister and his legal counsel have asked that the Court give the executive six months to remedy the legislation once again, and have suggested that a new entity with a specific mandate to combat corruption be established outside of the police service. Glenister says that this could be achieved in a number of ways, either through the creation of:
a new Chapter 9 institution;
a specialised unit within an existing Chapter 9 Institution (e.g. The office of the Public Protector or the Auditor General); or
a free-standing legislated body which is not accountable to the National Commissioner, the Minister or the cabinet.
The SAPS Amendment Act was first passed into law in 2008, when anti-corruption unit, the Scorpions, was disbanded and replaced by the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, a new unit within the police service known as ‘the Hawks'.
Glenister successfully argued that the legislation establishing the Hawks was unconstitutional when he won the 2011 ‘Glenister judgement' in the Constitutional Court. The Court found that the SAPS Amendment Act gave inadequate independence to the anti-graft unit in investigating corruption and gave the executive 18 months to amend the legislation. The cut-off date was 18 September 2012.
In its judgement, the Court clearly outlined its criteria for South Africa's anti-corruption entity:
Adequate specialisation and training;
independence from political influence and interference;
guaranteed resources; and
security of tenure for the entity's officials.
However, Glenister believes that the executive failed to adhere to these criteria and therefore to the requirements of the Constitution, specifically regarding the location of the Hawks and its reporting structure.
As a unit within the police, the Hawks head is answerable to the Commissioner of Police, the Minister of Police, Cabinet and ultimately, the President. Glenister believes that this makes the unit vulnerable to political meddling, compromising its ability to effectively investigate corruption at all levels of society.
"How can the Hawks combat corruption within the public sector if the ruling party has control over who can be investigated and who is above the law?" says Glenister, "The unit has its hands tied and is vulnerable to the kind of political interference which resulted in corruption charges being withdrawn against the President, without the opportunity of being tested in court."
According to the 2008/2009 annual report of the National Prosecuting Authority, the number of new investigations has dropped by 85% since the Hawks took over from the Scorpions in 2008, and the value of illegally acquired assets seized has fallen from R4 billion to R35 million.
Additionally, public perception about corruption within the SAPS is at an all time low according to an October survey by market research firm, TNS, which revealed that it is seen as the most corrupt government entity in South Africa. The Court regards public perception of independence as a relevant factor in its deliberations on the effectiveness and autonomy of the tweaked Hawks unit.
"If the unit itself is corrupt, how can it be expected to fight corruption?"
Statement issued by FTI Consulting on behalf of Hugh Glenister, November 29 2012
Source: Politicsweb
Friday, April 20, 2012
Posted by: amaBhungane Posted on: April 20, 2012 Posted in: Perspective Comments: 7 Comments Views: 3078 Eish and goodbye: the pains of information-seeking
Sorry, in advance, to the politically correct who support sex work and to dentists who love their jobs. But in my subjective mind, while there are many torturous jobs, these two spring to mind first: selling sex to strangers and drilling into someone’s mouth. Right up there, however, has to be an aspect of my job as advocacy co-ordinator: that of “information officer”, which I performed since January 2011 at the M&G Centre for Investigative Journalism (amaBhungane).
This performance entailed making requests for information – without much success – and filling out official forms to request information from public and private bodies in terms of the Promotion of Access to Information Act (Paia) of 2000. This Act is what the government and supporters of the secrecy Bill have been waving in our faces. In other words, the secrecy Bill balances out Paia. So, if something is classified in terms of the secrecy Bill, no problem, you can always apply, using Paia, to request the very same info get declassified. Do you sniff cumbersome and burdensome?
Alas, the present reality of Paia is already a hoot, without the secrecy Bill being passed.
In the execution of my tasks as information officer, I have ground my teeth in frustration and have had three migraines in one year, as opposed to my usual, only one. I blame Paia. It takes a very special person to do Paia requests. Someone who is patient, gentle and kind, and who doesn’t mind phoning the same person weekly, with the same conversation: “Hello, how are you, where is the information you promised to send me last week?” Then that person says to you: “Gosh, didn’t you get it?” And you go: “Gosh, no, when did you send it?” But you know the cheque is not in the post. In fact, it hasn’t gotten anywhere close to being posted.
An inordinate amount of time is spent trying to get information. I have had about a 10% success rate. To get what you need, you have to fill out a form, but there is a process and challenges to face before you send the form.
First, many people in public and private bodies seem not to know of Paia. I don’t know if they are pretending blissful ignorance. Second, they give you a name and you fill out the form and with some satisfaction and press the send button. Third, you then get a call to say that was not the correct person to deal with. So you start the process all over again. Fourth, you email, fax, and post to ensure that at least through one method the request falls onto the right lap. And then telephone to confirm receipt of the request.
To begin to describe the frustration you feel when you hear that the request was not received is beyond the power of words to describe. I grind my teeth, get a tense neck and worry about a migraine coming on, and I start again. Fax. Email. Post. Telephone. “How are you? When can I expect…?”
Our kind receptionist, Thuli, has witnessed my trying to send the same fax over and over again. She has often offered to help fax for me. Sometimes, she has discovered that I was given the wrong number.
Back to the process. It goes like this: an investigator needs information. You have to find out who the right person is to send the information to. You often get it wrong, or sometimes the wrong name is given to you, maybe in ignorance, maybe deliberately. There is no way of knowing for sure. Then, you fill out the forms. You follow up. You send again. The request is refused. You lodge an internal appeal. But you get the run-around first, to find out who you lodge the internal appeal with. When all fails you go to court. We haven’t done that in the past year.
So what is the point I’m trying to make? Paia is slow and cumbersome. The turnaround time for receiving an acknowledgement of a request is long. The turnaround time for receiving the information is, mostly, never. Imagine what will happen if the secrecy Bill is passed in its current form – the “new” deadline for the Bill is May 17.
The M&G‘s amaBhungane investigators have heard me on the other end of the telephone, pretending to be patient and polite, and have been quite sympathetic. They have also heard me lose my temper, after I’ve put the phone down, and curse about the obstreperous nature of the other side or of having quit the smoking habit maybe a bit prematurely.
These requests for information are not just about exercising our constitutional rights to information. Investigations need information, full stop. Journalists cannot do their jobs without authentic information, as in documentation, be these from deeds offices, court records, or local government or private sector vaults.
I leave to take up a research position at Wits Journalism School on the state of the media in South Africa. I will also be involved in putting the finishing touches to my book, The Fight for Democracy: The ANC and media in South Africa. It is published by Wits University Press and will be out later this year. I say goodbye to my advocacy co-ordinator job on April 30 with mixed feelings. After all, there were a few great aspects: I was back at the M&G where I started my career as a journalist more than two decades ago (I love this paper, it definitely showcases the best journalism, especially investigations and analyses, in the country); I enjoyed writing comment pieces on the secrecy Bill; and finally, my engagement in media freedom and access to information activism was great.
As for Paia and the information officer performance, say no more. Maybe except for just one word: Eish.
Source: By Glenda Daniels: Mail & Guardian
This performance entailed making requests for information – without much success – and filling out official forms to request information from public and private bodies in terms of the Promotion of Access to Information Act (Paia) of 2000. This Act is what the government and supporters of the secrecy Bill have been waving in our faces. In other words, the secrecy Bill balances out Paia. So, if something is classified in terms of the secrecy Bill, no problem, you can always apply, using Paia, to request the very same info get declassified. Do you sniff cumbersome and burdensome?
Alas, the present reality of Paia is already a hoot, without the secrecy Bill being passed.
In the execution of my tasks as information officer, I have ground my teeth in frustration and have had three migraines in one year, as opposed to my usual, only one. I blame Paia. It takes a very special person to do Paia requests. Someone who is patient, gentle and kind, and who doesn’t mind phoning the same person weekly, with the same conversation: “Hello, how are you, where is the information you promised to send me last week?” Then that person says to you: “Gosh, didn’t you get it?” And you go: “Gosh, no, when did you send it?” But you know the cheque is not in the post. In fact, it hasn’t gotten anywhere close to being posted.
An inordinate amount of time is spent trying to get information. I have had about a 10% success rate. To get what you need, you have to fill out a form, but there is a process and challenges to face before you send the form.
First, many people in public and private bodies seem not to know of Paia. I don’t know if they are pretending blissful ignorance. Second, they give you a name and you fill out the form and with some satisfaction and press the send button. Third, you then get a call to say that was not the correct person to deal with. So you start the process all over again. Fourth, you email, fax, and post to ensure that at least through one method the request falls onto the right lap. And then telephone to confirm receipt of the request.
To begin to describe the frustration you feel when you hear that the request was not received is beyond the power of words to describe. I grind my teeth, get a tense neck and worry about a migraine coming on, and I start again. Fax. Email. Post. Telephone. “How are you? When can I expect…?”
Our kind receptionist, Thuli, has witnessed my trying to send the same fax over and over again. She has often offered to help fax for me. Sometimes, she has discovered that I was given the wrong number.
Back to the process. It goes like this: an investigator needs information. You have to find out who the right person is to send the information to. You often get it wrong, or sometimes the wrong name is given to you, maybe in ignorance, maybe deliberately. There is no way of knowing for sure. Then, you fill out the forms. You follow up. You send again. The request is refused. You lodge an internal appeal. But you get the run-around first, to find out who you lodge the internal appeal with. When all fails you go to court. We haven’t done that in the past year.
So what is the point I’m trying to make? Paia is slow and cumbersome. The turnaround time for receiving an acknowledgement of a request is long. The turnaround time for receiving the information is, mostly, never. Imagine what will happen if the secrecy Bill is passed in its current form – the “new” deadline for the Bill is May 17.
The M&G‘s amaBhungane investigators have heard me on the other end of the telephone, pretending to be patient and polite, and have been quite sympathetic. They have also heard me lose my temper, after I’ve put the phone down, and curse about the obstreperous nature of the other side or of having quit the smoking habit maybe a bit prematurely.
These requests for information are not just about exercising our constitutional rights to information. Investigations need information, full stop. Journalists cannot do their jobs without authentic information, as in documentation, be these from deeds offices, court records, or local government or private sector vaults.
I leave to take up a research position at Wits Journalism School on the state of the media in South Africa. I will also be involved in putting the finishing touches to my book, The Fight for Democracy: The ANC and media in South Africa. It is published by Wits University Press and will be out later this year. I say goodbye to my advocacy co-ordinator job on April 30 with mixed feelings. After all, there were a few great aspects: I was back at the M&G where I started my career as a journalist more than two decades ago (I love this paper, it definitely showcases the best journalism, especially investigations and analyses, in the country); I enjoyed writing comment pieces on the secrecy Bill; and finally, my engagement in media freedom and access to information activism was great.
As for Paia and the information officer performance, say no more. Maybe except for just one word: Eish.
Source: By Glenda Daniels: Mail & Guardian
Sunday, January 29, 2012
Is the ANC in a decline it cannot reverse?
Songezo Zibi
Sunday Independent
29 January 2012
The
centennial celebrations of the African National Congress provide an
opportunity to reflect on what the future holds for the organisation. Of
course the emotion accompanying the invocation of history, both proud
and painful, raises the question of whether it is possible to offer a
dispassionate appraisal of the future meaning of the ANC. Yet it is
necessary that we do so in order that we may not fall into the folly of
overplaying the hand of historical credibility, or succumbing to the
cynicism that arises out of the ANC’s long incumbency in government.
While
millions of South Africans probably have hundreds of reasons why they
accepted wholeheartedly the ANC’s leadership during the struggle and
after 1994, there are a few on which there appears to be general
agreement. The most central is the extent to which the character and
ethos of the ANC was representative of the best aspirations of the broad
spectrum of South African society. Both in its policy enunciations and
in the exemplary behaviour of its leaders and members, South Africans
saw in the ANC a representation of their highest ideals. As part of our
reflection, we have to ponder whether this still holds true.
Character
relates to behaviour, effectively leading by example. Leadership by its
nature triggers both careful and casual observation of the behaviour of
leaders within and outside their official context. That is why it
matters a lot to church congregants whether their Pastor is also a hard
drinking, womaniser. Equally, it matters greatly to the general
community whether the behaviour of the said church’s congregants is
considered enough of a good example for the community to accept the
collective leadership of the church on relevant matters.
How has the ANC described the prevailing character of the organisation? The year 2000 discussion document titled ANC – People’s Movement and Agent for Change,
notes the development of a trend in which the ANC’s members see
leadership positions in the ANC as a pathway to accessing state power
and resources. The document states: “within
the ANC, the tendency is developing in which positions in government
(and the ANC itself) are seen as platforms for acquiring resources and
power, and divisions based on this perspective of self-enrichment can be
bitter”.
A decade later, the NGC discussion document Tasks of organisation-building and renewal describes the “current situation” in the ANC, which on the face of it, and considering what was outlined in the earlier Through the eye of the needle,
appears to indicate progressive degeneration. “And yet, lack of
discipline and blatant ill-discipline is becoming a distinct feature of
the current situation. Inconsistency in application of rules and
reluctance to act against ill-disciplined elements is rife. The
leadership is often afraid to take action if this will threaten the
prospects of re-election. The culture of our movement is being eroded at a frightening pace.”
In Leadership renewal, discipline and organisational culture,
there is a longer list of behaviours considered rife and an antithesis
of what the ANC historically stood for. In part the document says:
“Since Polokwane (2007, when President Zuma took over), a number of these tendencies have become embedded
(my emphasis) and in fact worsened especially as part of the lobbying
process.” It goes on to list among others an inability to conduct ANC
meetings in an orderly manner, abuse of methods and symbols of the
struggle and indecisive leadership. It further states that these and
many other stated practices have become a “shadow culture which coexists
alongside what the ANC has always stood for”, and that old and new
members and leaders are involved.
Given
these self-assessments, and the seeming degenerative trend they
project, is it still credible to insist that the ANC’s ideals are a
reflection of its current character? Does an aspirational goal
constitute present reality? Does this not suggest that the character of
organisations is separate from the vices of the men who populate and
lead them? These questions are critical towards assessing not only the
true character of the ANC as it currently exists, but its possibility to
lead society in the future.
The
question that arises as a result of this is whether the ANC as
characterised by the example set by its members and leaders represents
the best aspirations of the South African people. We know that in
successive elections, the people have voted the ANC overwhelmingly into
power. But does this mean the character of the current ANC is reflective
of the aspirations of the South African people?
Some have claimed that the ANC is in decline,
including its own leaders. Gauteng provincial secretary, David Makhura
recently stated that “the ANC is a patient, and it is very sick” in an
assessment of the state of the party. COSATU leader Zwelinzima Vavi has
used even more startling language, describing an organisation populated
by proverbial hyenas and greedy elites. Others like political scientist,
Dr Mzukisi Qobo have stated that it is already dead.
But
what do scholars and experts tell us about organisational decline and
eventual descent into oblivion? Jim Collins in his lesser celebrated but
profound book, How the mighty fall, describes the typical steps
into oblivion which are: arrogance born of success, undisciplined
pursuit of more, denial of risk or peril, grasping for salvation and
succumbing to irrelevance or death. Of these, the ANC, even with its
receding intellectual depth, cannot be accused of absolute denial of
risk. It has repeatedly announced bold initiatives to turn the decline
around. A more pertinent question is whether the measures it purported
to put in place have been successful. The increasingly desperate tone of
these assessments appears to suggest decisive failure.
But why is it not succeeding? It could be because it has chosen a path of organisational involution. Xiaobo Lu in Cadres and Corruption describes
involution thus: “Organisational involution takes place when a ruling
party, in dealing with change of environment, opts to retain existing
modes and ethos rather than adopt new ones.” He further goes on to
explain why symptoms of organisational sickness become difficult to cure
under involutionary conditions: “new rules and procedures are often turned into something familiar that bears the imprint of yesteryear.”
What
Xiaobo Lu describes can be seen in the ANC. For instance it continues
to believe, naively, in the inherent integrity of its members and
leaders on the basis of what they swore to when they joined the
organisation. This has led to its complete ill-preparedness for the
dangers of unchecked ambition and lust for power. The other is the
insistence on allowing anyone, no matter how ill-prepared, to run for
high office on the basis of making the biggest hollow promises to
branches. In a world of crises caused by high finance and complicated
economics, any election without minimum qualification standards is
outright foolish.
We
must therefore ask whether the current state of the ANC as described by
itself makes it ready to lead for the next 100 years. We must also
question the assertion common among some in its ranks that because it
has faced numerous challenges in the past and managed to overcome them,
this necessarily suggests it shall again prevail.
Dispassionate
examination should show us that the ANC’s ability to overcome serious
debilitation was anchored in the intellectual and ethical strength of
the leaders it had the consciousness to elect. In addition, in all those
instances the ANC did not have to grapple with the challenges of
holding state power and having access to vast fiscal and institutional
resources. Renewal does not somehow occur. It is the outcome of hard
work founded on ethical and moral ethical application and standards of
leaders and members of an organisation.
Is
the ANC in decline? In addition to the challenges it has already
identified, there are others it appears paralysed to talk or do anything
which relate to questionable personal behaviour some of its senior
leaders because decisive action could cause further divisions. It is
simply mind-boggling that the custodian of the finances of the Northern
Cape, MEC John Block, retains his job while facing criminal charges of
swindling the very State he swore to protect. In KwaZulu Natal, House
Speaker Peggy Nkonyeni and MEC Mike Mabuyakhulu will go on trial in
October for corruption against the State, yet they retain their
positions as if nothing is wrong.
Suggestions
seen so far have included the “screening” of new members, but this is
fatally flawed. Many wonder how high up this screening would go and how
thoroughly it would be applied. Would it for instance include senior
leaders whose family members and friends appear to suddenly have found
entrepreneurial flair they didn’t have before these leaders occupied
high offices in government? Clearly Block, Nkonyeni and Mabuyakhulu
among others would fall foul of this screening if found guilty by the
courts.
Jim Collins in How the mighty fall
says “the path out of darkness begins with those exasperatingly
persistent individuals who are constitutionally incapable of
capitulation…. Be willing to kill failed ideas (sic), even to shutter
big operations you’ve been in for a long time. Be willing to evolve into
an entirely different portfolio of activities, even to the point of
zero overlap with what you do today, but never give up on the principles
that define your culture.” It takes no rocket scientist to realise that
any solutions would have to work around the ethical and moral
“sensitivities” surrounding some leaders, literally making the whole
effort an abortion from the start. Rank and file members would wonder
why the new rules apply to some and not others.
Unless
it notches up some notable successes with its efforts at renewal, it
cannot hope to lead for another 100 years while in perpetual decline. If
the erosion of the ANC’s essence continues at this “frightening pace”, a
tipping point might be near, which would almost certainly lead to the
death of an organisation clearly hobbled by problems it is incapable of
solving. That decline means its character increasingly bears little
connection with the highest aspirations of South Africans. If that
connection reaches its weakest, the ANC will be effectively dead, for no
society wants leaders it cannot identify with.
Source: Midrand Group
Friday, November 11, 2011
Dysfunctional record-keeping keeps watchdog groups and the media in the dark.
Chaotic record-keeping in the North and South Gauteng High Courts -- the country's busiest -- seriously impede the public's access to information.
Court files go missing, apparently owing to theft in some instances and carelessness in others.
Incorrect numbering and insufficient labelling of names in some cases muddle the system.
And, in sensitive cases, files appear to have been removed from their folders and therefore withheld from members of the public and the media.
The number of cases in the country's busiest court, South Gauteng, has nearly doubled over the past three years -- from 35 000 in 2007 to about 65 000 in 2010 -- but the number of administrative staff has not kept pace.
In an interview for a position at the South Gauteng High Court in April this year, then senior counsel, now Judge Sharise Weiner, told the Judicial Services Commission that conditions at the court were "uninhabitable". She pointed to missing court files as a serious problem.
"When I acted on the last occasion, there was a roll of 90 matters in the unopposed motion court and I think there were about 20 files that had gone missing,” she reportedly told the panel.
Judge complained
A year ago, Judge Kathy Satchwell mentioned the issue of missing court files in a Business Day article describing the appalling conditions at the court, including "archives where records lie in no particular order on shelves and sometimes on the floor; a registrar's office where we are daily advised that court files containing pleadings are 'missing'".
She also complained that there was "inadequate and outdated computer technology".
A plan to digitise court files is being implemented, according to justice and constitutional department spokesperson Tlali Tlali, but it is in its infancy at both courts. The project for both courts is worth R42-million.
A scanning system has begun with the emailing of bulk documents -- but only to attorneys. A senior member of the South Gauteng High Court registrar's office told the Mail & Guardian: "Please bear with us while we try and get this scanning process to work properly."
In response to questions about the chaotic filing system and missing documents, Tlali said the workload of the South Gauteng High Court had increased substantially: "In 2007, the turnover was about 35 000 files, in 2010, the turnover was at least 58 000 files.”
A member of the South Gauteng High Court's administrative staff who has to fetch files for court cases told the M&G: "Files just go missing mysteriously. Motion court rolls are supposed to be numerical. My understanding of a numerical roll is that when it starts at one, then the next number is two, then three, and so on till the end. Not here [at this court].
'Any number'
"Here, you start at any number then end at any other number. Parties are incorrectly cited and case numbers are more often than not wrongly typed on the roll. It's usually better to totally ignore the roll and type and number your own roll. Dockets and files go missing and no one says a word."
To fulfil their watchdog role in society, researchers, nongovernmental organisations, members of the public and journalists need access to court records, such as civil and criminal documents, or title deeds, bonds and antenuptial contracts as recorded by the deeds office.
The Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000 gives the public the right to access public information.
Public records are available to different degrees in different democracies. In the United States, court documents are online, ensuring easier access for the public.
Pacer
The Public Access to Court Electronic Records (Pacer) is an electronic public access service that allows the American public to obtain case and docket information from federal appellate, district and bankruptcy courts.
A public access fee is charged at US8c a page.
There are about one million Pacer users, including attorneys, government agencies, researchers, financial institutions, the media and the general public.
In South Africa, as the justice department plods towards an electronic access system, investigative reporters continue their uphill battle to access documents.
Amabhungane investigative reporter Heidi Swart (see sidebar) has been trying to access documents regarding the application by the public works department to cancel the Pretoria police lease with property developer Roux Shabangu for the past two months.
She visited the North Gauteng High Court on three separate occasions -- September 22, and 28 and October 18 -- and left empty-handed.
Registrar responds
Senior registrar at the North Gauteng High Court Dave Pietersen responded to her story, saying the file in question was not available to the public at that time as the matter had not yet appeared in court.
"The fact that the file was empty might have been [as a result of the fact] that one of the parties had lifted the contents of the court file for various reasons, which they are entitled to do," he said.
Locating a sensitive file is a case in futility
I arrive at the North Gauteng High Court in Pretoria just before the court archives close for the day at 1pm. About 10 people queue at the counter.
I fill in a form with case particulars: case number 52530/2011, an application by the department of public works to cancel a lease with Roux Shabangu. I reach the front after about 20 minutes. A friendly woman takes the form, disappears and returns. It isn't there. There's no file with that number.
I had tried calling the court earlier to make sure that the papers would be there. But archive staff told me that I had to come there in person if I wanted the file. They could not tell me if it was there.
I try again about a week later. This time, I'm sure that the state attorney's office has filed the papers as I phoned them to check. At the archives, about 30 people are queuing. I fill in another form. A friendly staff member comes to me in the queue and takes my form. He promptly returns with the file. I’m delighted. But then I realise it’s empty. He says he does not know where the papers are and refers me to the help desk.
It's illegal to leave the court building with court papers. But I have to go outside to reach the help desk. That's just the way the building is set up. However, the file is empty, so it should be fine.
I exit the building with the file. I am neither stopped nor searched. I enter the building again and go through all the security checks. The file remains undiscovered.
The woman at the help desk looks blankly at the empty file and asks me whether the case has appeared in court yet. "I don't know," I say.
No number
Well, in that case, she cannot help me, she says. There is no way for her to find out where these papers are. I ask her whether there is a number I can phone in future to prevent futile trips. She informs me that there is not.
I dump the empty file on a stack of other files lying unguarded on the counter at the archives.
Take three. This time, my boss, [Amabhungane managing partner] Sam Sole, has phoned Judge President Bernard Ngoepe. Ngoepe has sent an email to the senior court registrar, Dave Pietersen, to fix the problem, lest the public gain the impression that the court is sitting on information that should be available to all.
I make sure I phone Pietersen before I go to court once again. I am hoping that he will agree to keep the file at his office.
Pietersen tells me in no uncertain terms that he has seen the judge president's email but that the folder I am looking for is not a priority for him. I realise that he will not assist me.
Desperate
This does not bode well. However, I am desperate to get the file, so I head back to court, hoping to find it in the archives.
Again, I grab a form and fall into line at the archive. A man calls some of us to the back into the archive room. Amid swearing and sweating, the man scratches through rows of files. There is a rough numerical order to the files but it is not an exact science. He sends me back outside. When he resurfaces he hands me my form, along with a similar form.
"Your file is not here. Call these people. They took it last."
I look at the second form. I don't know who “Jolandi” is, but I am relieved to have a name and a number.
Then I realise that Jolandi may have returned the file by now. Which would mean it could be anywhere in the twilight zone between her office and the court archives.
Looking for the registrar's office, I get lost. I knock on an open door. The man at the desk seems annoyed. I explain. He says there are two other offices that may have the file. "Would you just come and have a look at this?" he asks, pointing at his computer screen. I fix his MS Word table.
Be persistent
Delighted, he finally makes eye contact. He advises me that I should be persistent when I go to those two offices because sometimes they just don't feel like helping.
Just then I notice that the man at the archives was mistaken. Jolandi doesn’t have my file after all. The file she requested has a different case number. I give up. There's always tomorrow. And the next day. And the next. -- Heidi Swart
Source: Mail & Guardian
Court files go missing, apparently owing to theft in some instances and carelessness in others.
Incorrect numbering and insufficient labelling of names in some cases muddle the system.
And, in sensitive cases, files appear to have been removed from their folders and therefore withheld from members of the public and the media.
The number of cases in the country's busiest court, South Gauteng, has nearly doubled over the past three years -- from 35 000 in 2007 to about 65 000 in 2010 -- but the number of administrative staff has not kept pace.
In an interview for a position at the South Gauteng High Court in April this year, then senior counsel, now Judge Sharise Weiner, told the Judicial Services Commission that conditions at the court were "uninhabitable". She pointed to missing court files as a serious problem.
"When I acted on the last occasion, there was a roll of 90 matters in the unopposed motion court and I think there were about 20 files that had gone missing,” she reportedly told the panel.
Judge complained
A year ago, Judge Kathy Satchwell mentioned the issue of missing court files in a Business Day article describing the appalling conditions at the court, including "archives where records lie in no particular order on shelves and sometimes on the floor; a registrar's office where we are daily advised that court files containing pleadings are 'missing'".
She also complained that there was "inadequate and outdated computer technology".
A plan to digitise court files is being implemented, according to justice and constitutional department spokesperson Tlali Tlali, but it is in its infancy at both courts. The project for both courts is worth R42-million.
A scanning system has begun with the emailing of bulk documents -- but only to attorneys. A senior member of the South Gauteng High Court registrar's office told the Mail & Guardian: "Please bear with us while we try and get this scanning process to work properly."
In response to questions about the chaotic filing system and missing documents, Tlali said the workload of the South Gauteng High Court had increased substantially: "In 2007, the turnover was about 35 000 files, in 2010, the turnover was at least 58 000 files.”
A member of the South Gauteng High Court's administrative staff who has to fetch files for court cases told the M&G: "Files just go missing mysteriously. Motion court rolls are supposed to be numerical. My understanding of a numerical roll is that when it starts at one, then the next number is two, then three, and so on till the end. Not here [at this court].
'Any number'
"Here, you start at any number then end at any other number. Parties are incorrectly cited and case numbers are more often than not wrongly typed on the roll. It's usually better to totally ignore the roll and type and number your own roll. Dockets and files go missing and no one says a word."
To fulfil their watchdog role in society, researchers, nongovernmental organisations, members of the public and journalists need access to court records, such as civil and criminal documents, or title deeds, bonds and antenuptial contracts as recorded by the deeds office.
The Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000 gives the public the right to access public information.
Public records are available to different degrees in different democracies. In the United States, court documents are online, ensuring easier access for the public.
Pacer
The Public Access to Court Electronic Records (Pacer) is an electronic public access service that allows the American public to obtain case and docket information from federal appellate, district and bankruptcy courts.
A public access fee is charged at US8c a page.
There are about one million Pacer users, including attorneys, government agencies, researchers, financial institutions, the media and the general public.
In South Africa, as the justice department plods towards an electronic access system, investigative reporters continue their uphill battle to access documents.
Amabhungane investigative reporter Heidi Swart (see sidebar) has been trying to access documents regarding the application by the public works department to cancel the Pretoria police lease with property developer Roux Shabangu for the past two months.
She visited the North Gauteng High Court on three separate occasions -- September 22, and 28 and October 18 -- and left empty-handed.
Registrar responds
Senior registrar at the North Gauteng High Court Dave Pietersen responded to her story, saying the file in question was not available to the public at that time as the matter had not yet appeared in court.
"The fact that the file was empty might have been [as a result of the fact] that one of the parties had lifted the contents of the court file for various reasons, which they are entitled to do," he said.
Locating a sensitive file is a case in futility
I arrive at the North Gauteng High Court in Pretoria just before the court archives close for the day at 1pm. About 10 people queue at the counter.
I fill in a form with case particulars: case number 52530/2011, an application by the department of public works to cancel a lease with Roux Shabangu. I reach the front after about 20 minutes. A friendly woman takes the form, disappears and returns. It isn't there. There's no file with that number.
I had tried calling the court earlier to make sure that the papers would be there. But archive staff told me that I had to come there in person if I wanted the file. They could not tell me if it was there.
I try again about a week later. This time, I'm sure that the state attorney's office has filed the papers as I phoned them to check. At the archives, about 30 people are queuing. I fill in another form. A friendly staff member comes to me in the queue and takes my form. He promptly returns with the file. I’m delighted. But then I realise it’s empty. He says he does not know where the papers are and refers me to the help desk.
It's illegal to leave the court building with court papers. But I have to go outside to reach the help desk. That's just the way the building is set up. However, the file is empty, so it should be fine.
I exit the building with the file. I am neither stopped nor searched. I enter the building again and go through all the security checks. The file remains undiscovered.
The woman at the help desk looks blankly at the empty file and asks me whether the case has appeared in court yet. "I don't know," I say.
No number
Well, in that case, she cannot help me, she says. There is no way for her to find out where these papers are. I ask her whether there is a number I can phone in future to prevent futile trips. She informs me that there is not.
I dump the empty file on a stack of other files lying unguarded on the counter at the archives.
Take three. This time, my boss, [Amabhungane managing partner] Sam Sole, has phoned Judge President Bernard Ngoepe. Ngoepe has sent an email to the senior court registrar, Dave Pietersen, to fix the problem, lest the public gain the impression that the court is sitting on information that should be available to all.
I make sure I phone Pietersen before I go to court once again. I am hoping that he will agree to keep the file at his office.
Pietersen tells me in no uncertain terms that he has seen the judge president's email but that the folder I am looking for is not a priority for him. I realise that he will not assist me.
Desperate
This does not bode well. However, I am desperate to get the file, so I head back to court, hoping to find it in the archives.
Again, I grab a form and fall into line at the archive. A man calls some of us to the back into the archive room. Amid swearing and sweating, the man scratches through rows of files. There is a rough numerical order to the files but it is not an exact science. He sends me back outside. When he resurfaces he hands me my form, along with a similar form.
"Your file is not here. Call these people. They took it last."
I look at the second form. I don't know who “Jolandi” is, but I am relieved to have a name and a number.
Then I realise that Jolandi may have returned the file by now. Which would mean it could be anywhere in the twilight zone between her office and the court archives.
Looking for the registrar's office, I get lost. I knock on an open door. The man at the desk seems annoyed. I explain. He says there are two other offices that may have the file. "Would you just come and have a look at this?" he asks, pointing at his computer screen. I fix his MS Word table.
Be persistent
Delighted, he finally makes eye contact. He advises me that I should be persistent when I go to those two offices because sometimes they just don't feel like helping.
Just then I notice that the man at the archives was mistaken. Jolandi doesn’t have my file after all. The file she requested has a different case number. I give up. There's always tomorrow. And the next day. And the next. -- Heidi Swart
Source: Mail & Guardian
Friday, September 14, 2007
State of Anarchy
Since mid-2005, hundreds of civilians have been killed, more than 10 thousand houses burned, and approximately 212,000 persons have fled their homes in terror to live in desperate conditions deep in the bush in northern Central African Republic (CAR). Bordering eastern Chad and war-ravaged Darfur in Sudan, this area has been destabilized by at least two major rebellions against the government of President Franois Boziz.
The vast majority of summary executions and unlawful killings, and almost all village burnings, have been carried out by government forces, often in reprisal for rebel attacks. While both main rebel groups have been responsible for widespread looting and the forced taxation of the civilian population in areas they control -and rebels in the northeast have committed killings, beatings, and rape -their abuses pale in comparison to those of the Central African Armed Forces (Forces armes Centrafricaines,FACA) and the elite Presidential Guard (Garde prsidentielle, GP). As the International Criminal Court (ICC) begins investigations into atrocities committed during the 2002-2003 rebellion against former President Patass, it should also investigate possible war crimes under its jurisdiction committed in the current round of fighting.
This report documents the human rights abuses and breaches of international humanitarian law being committed in northern CAR and describes the make-up, origins, and aims of the most significant rebel groups. The Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (Arme populaire pour la restauration de la Rpublique et la dmocratie, APRD) is active in the northwestern provinces of Ouham, Ouham-Pend, and Nana-Grbizi. The Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (Union des forces dmocratiques pour la rassemblement,UFDR) is most active in remote northeastern provinces of Bamingui-Bangoran and Vakaga.
In February and March 2007 Human Rights Watch researchers visited the majority of towns and villages affected, documenting summary executions, unlawful killings, beatings, house burnings, extortion and unlawful taxation, the recruitment and use of children as soldiers, and many other human rights abuses. Human Rights Watch researchers interviewed over 100 persons, including many victims and witnesses, local and regional government officials, military commanders, rebel officials, religious leaders, and representatives of local and international humanitarian organizations active in northern CAR.
Until quite recently there was little international awareness of the situation in northern CAR. However, in 2006, human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law began to receive some attention. The killings, village burnings, displacement, and humanitarian suffering are now occasionally reported in the international press and are the subject of increasing diplomatic notice, usually being seen as "spill-over" from the continuing crisis in Darfur.
Little attention, however, has been paid to the actual dynamics of conflict, which are largely home grown. The main rebel protagonists are Central Africans with local grievances. Human Rights Watch's research suggests that the degree of linkage with the situation in Darfur has been exaggerated. The APRD in the northwest is so poorly equipped that it is difficult to imagine it has foreign sponsorship. Human Rights Watch has found no other evidence of such support. Although there have been contacts between the UFDR and Sudan-sponsored Chadian rebels opposed to the Chadian President Dby based in the northeast of CAR in early 2006, foreign support does not appear to be a driving force behind this rebellion.
Neither has attention been paid to the issue of responsibility for human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law, nor to action to ensure accountability. The sorry fact is that the perpetrators of violence and abuse, the majority of them government soldiers, have so far enjoyed total impunity for acts that include war crimes.
The APRD Rebellion
The APRD rebellion in the northwest was launched almost immediately after controversial 2005 elections led to the election of General Boziz as President. These had excluded the candidacy of ex-President Patass, who had been overthrown by General Boziz in March 2003. The leadership of the APRD rebellion consists mostly of former Presidential Guards of Patass, himself from the region. The APRD has about 1,000 poorly equipped members, including 200 rebels armed with automatic weapons, and another 600 with home-made hunting weapons. They claim their aim is to engage in "dialogue" to address the political exclusion of Patass and his supporters and to improve the security situation in the northwest, rather than to overthrow the government.
One of the main grievances of the population of the northwest is lack of security. Armed bandits, known as zaraguinas or coupeurs de route, regularly attack villagers and have taken advantage of insufficient security provided by the state to increase attacks. The zaraguinas commonly kidnap children for ransom and regularly kill civilians during raids. Many cattle-herders from the Peulh ethnic groupin the northwest, particularly targeted because of their valuable livestock, have fled to the safety of larger towns and refugee camps in Chad. Along with the political grievances of former Patass supporters, the failure of the CAR security forces to protect local communities from banditry is an important element in the development of the APRD, and many local armed self-defense groups have merged into the rebel group.
The UFDR Rebellion
From October to December 2006, the UFDR rebel movement gained international attention by seizing military control of the major towns in the remote Vakaga and Bamingui-Bangoran provinces of northeastern CAR, right on the border of Sudan's Darfur region. The UFDR's bold military offensive led to French military intervention on behalf of the CAR government in December 2006, allowing the security forces to regain control of urban centers.
The UFDR rebellion has its roots in the deep marginalization of northeastern CAR, which is virtually cut off from the rest of the country and is almost completely undeveloped. Elements from the Gula ethnic group, many of them trained militarily as anti-poaching units, are at the core of the rebellion, citing grievances such as discrimination against their community and the alleged embezzlement by the CAR authorities of compensation funds received from the Sudanese government following clashes perpetrated by Sudanese nomads in 2002. As the rebellion has grown, a backlash of anti-Gula sentiment among government officials, the military, and the general population has developed. As a result, most of the Gula population has fled government-controlled areas in fear of retaliation.
A second element making up the UFDR is Boziz's own former colleagues, so-called ex-librateurs, who participated in his overthrow of former President Patass in 2003. They accuse Boziz of betraying his promises and failing to compensate them for their support.
Abuses by FACA and GP Forces
Since the beginning of the conflict in mid 2005 with rebel forces in northern CAR, the CAR security forces have committed serious and widespread abuses against the civilian population, including multiple summary executions and unlawful killings, widespread burning of civilian homes, and the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians, which have instilled terror in the civilian population. In most instances, these village burnings and killings were in direct response to recent rebel activity in the area and amount to unlawful reprisals against the civilian population. It is the FACA and GP that have been responsible for the vast majority of the most serious human rights abuses in the conflict, and they have carried out these atrocities in full confidence of impunity from accountability for their crimes.
During the course of its research, Human Rights Watch documented 119 summary executions and unlawful killings committed by government security forces in both the northwest and northeast (the vast majority in the northwest), including at least 51 committed since late 2005 by a single military unit, the Bossangoa-based GP unit, commanded at the time by Lieutenant Eugne Ngakoss.
Human Rights Watch believes that the killings it has documented are only a fraction of the total number of those committed by government security forces. Since the beginning of the conflict these are estimated to amount to many hundreds. Killings committed by security forces have often involved dozens of civilian deaths in a single day and have often included unspeakable brutality. For example, on February 11, 2006, a single GP unit killed at least 30 civilians in more than a dozen separate villages located along the Nana-Barya to Bmal road. On March 22, this same GP unit beheaded a teacher in Bmal, cutting off his head with a knife while he was still alive. Other civilians have simply "disappeared" in military custody, arrested and not seen alive again.
Since December 2005, government forces, particularly the GP, have also been almost solely responsible for the burning down of more than 10,000 civilian homes in northwestern CAR. Hundreds of villages across vast swathes of northern CAR have been destroyed. Troops arrive in villages and indiscriminately fire into the civilian population, forcing them to flee before burning down their homes, sometimes looting them first. In December 2005, GP forces burned down 500 to 900 houses in the Markounda area. A Human Rights Watch count in the Batangafo-Kabo-Ouandago-Kaga Bandoro area found a total of 2,923 burned homes, including more than 1,000 homes in the large market town of Ouandago alone. In some places every single home in every single village was burned. Similarly massive destruction can be found all around the town of Paoua, all the way east to Nana Baryahundreds of kilometers of villages destroyed by government security forces.
The reprisal and counterinsurgency tactics of the CAR security forces have affected the lives of over 1 million people and have forced an estimated 212,000 civilians to abandon their road-side homes and live deep inside the bush, too fearful to return to their burned villages in case of repeat attack. Another 78,000 have sought refuge in neighboring Chad and Cameroon. The level of civilian fear in northern CAR is palpable. People are simply not to be seen in many areas, hiding far away. At the sound of approaching cars, everyone flees, dropping their possessions, sometimes even abandoning babies in their haste.
Living conditions for the displaced are life-threatening. They have no access to clean water, are often desperately short of food supplies, and their widely dispersed shelters are beyond the reach of the humanitarian community. Educational facilities have been closed, and aside from mobile clinics run by international organizations in some areas, health care is non-existent.
Rebel Abuses
APRD rebels in the northwest have engaged in widespread extortion, forced taxation, kidnappings for ransom, and beatings of civilians, particularly in the Batangafo-Kabo-Ouandago area of Ouham province. In that area, particularly on the Batangafo-Ouandago road, almost all villages have been systematically looted of all livestock, and village leaders have been regularly kidnapped for ransom. APRD rebels also have large numbers of child soldiers in their ranks, some as young as 12. APRD commanders expressed willingness to Human Rights Watch to demobilize the child soldiers if the post-demobilization security of the children could be guaranteed.
During its investigation in the field, Human Rights Watch documented one summary execution by the APRD (the killing of Mohammed Haroon in June 2006, in Gbazera) and did not identify any cases of home-burning by the group. Human Rights Watch has not received any credible additional reports of summary killings or village burnings by APRD rebels from local or international human rights organizations or journalists. On June 11, 2007, APRD rebels fired upon a vehicle of the international humanitarian organization Doctors without Borders (Mdecins Sans Frontires, MSF), killing Elsa Serfass, an MSF nurse. While the APRD immediately apologized for the incident, saying it had been a "mistake," the persons responsible should be held to account.
Human Rights Watch's research found that UFDR rebels in the northeast have carried out widespread abuses against the civilian population. During attacks on villages and towns they have often indiscriminately fired at fleeing civilians, leading to unlawful killings. Meanwhile, UFDR rebels have been responsible for summary executions of captured civilians. From October to December 2006, the rebels carried out massive looting of the belongings and livestock of the civilian population in areas they controlled. There have been allegations of rape by UFDR rebels, although Human Rights Watch has only been able to corroborate one case-a woman raped by five UFDR rebels during their brief capture of Birao in March 2007. The UFDR also has child soldiers in its ranks, and Human Rights Watch found that some of them had been forcibly recruited.
The Need for Protection
Establishing credible mechanisms to protect the civilian population from abuses is fundamental to addressing the human rights crisis in northern CAR. The responsibility for civilian protection lies first and foremost with the CAR authorities: they must take immediate steps to end military abuses and to re-establish a functioning police force and court system that serve to protect the rights of the civilian population.
However, the international community can also do more. A stronger international protection presence in the north is urgently needed. There already is a substantial UN human rights presence in CAR, in the form of a 19-person human rights unit in the office of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the Central African Republic (Bureau d'appui des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix en Rpublique centrafricaine, BONUCA), a long-standing UN peace support mission established in 2000. However, the human rights unit has been largely passive to date and does not effectively monitor or report on human rights abuses in the north. The UN should take the necessary measures, including changes to the mandate of the human rights section, to ensure that the BONUCA human rights unit effectively monitors and reports on human rights abuses in the north, in the same way that the human rights units of UN peacekeeping missions operate in neighboring Sudan and DRC.
If the UN Security Council moves ahead with the deployment of a UN protection mission to CAR and Chad, that mission should focus on the real protection needs of the civilian population of both countries, and not focus solely on neutralizing the "spill-over effect" of the Darfur crisis.
The Need for Accountability
The crimes being committed in northern CAR by government security forces are no secret inside the country. Local newspapers and radio frequently report them, opposition parliamentarians have prepared public reports documenting the atrocities, and diplomatic envoys regularly raise their concerns with President Boziz. Despite this, the government has not investigated, prosecuted, or punished a single military officer, or even publicly reprimanded them for any of the abuses. Even in the capital, Bangui, security forces carry out summary killings of suspected bandits and rebels with impunity. During Human Rights Watch's visit, two handcuffed Chadian rebel suspects were executed on the outskirts of Bangui by security forces. The commander of the most notorious of the units, Lieutenant Eugne Ngakoss of the Bossangoa-based GP unit that has killed dozens of civilians and is directly implicated in most of the village burnings in the north, remains a free man and an active duty military officer to date.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor's office is already involved in the CAR, having announced in May 2007 that they would investigate crimes committed in CAR during the 2002-2003 fighting, and that they would continue to monitor possible crimes committed during the current conflict. The investigations of the ICC in CAR should not, however, detract from the primary obligation of the CAR authorities to end impunity and bring about accountability for crimes committed by its armed forces and others. Ultimately, the crisis in northern CAR will only be resolved when law and order is restored, and the institutions of justice have the capacity to punish those who commit crimes against the civilian population, including members of the army and the elite GP.
The international community-particularly France, without whose direct military support the government of President Boziz would not survive-have an obligation to speak out about the abuses in northern CAR and to demand accountability for the crimes committed in northern CAR.
Source: Human Rights Watch
The vast majority of summary executions and unlawful killings, and almost all village burnings, have been carried out by government forces, often in reprisal for rebel attacks. While both main rebel groups have been responsible for widespread looting and the forced taxation of the civilian population in areas they control -and rebels in the northeast have committed killings, beatings, and rape -their abuses pale in comparison to those of the Central African Armed Forces (Forces armes Centrafricaines,FACA) and the elite Presidential Guard (Garde prsidentielle, GP). As the International Criminal Court (ICC) begins investigations into atrocities committed during the 2002-2003 rebellion against former President Patass, it should also investigate possible war crimes under its jurisdiction committed in the current round of fighting.
This report documents the human rights abuses and breaches of international humanitarian law being committed in northern CAR and describes the make-up, origins, and aims of the most significant rebel groups. The Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (Arme populaire pour la restauration de la Rpublique et la dmocratie, APRD) is active in the northwestern provinces of Ouham, Ouham-Pend, and Nana-Grbizi. The Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (Union des forces dmocratiques pour la rassemblement,UFDR) is most active in remote northeastern provinces of Bamingui-Bangoran and Vakaga.
In February and March 2007 Human Rights Watch researchers visited the majority of towns and villages affected, documenting summary executions, unlawful killings, beatings, house burnings, extortion and unlawful taxation, the recruitment and use of children as soldiers, and many other human rights abuses. Human Rights Watch researchers interviewed over 100 persons, including many victims and witnesses, local and regional government officials, military commanders, rebel officials, religious leaders, and representatives of local and international humanitarian organizations active in northern CAR.
Until quite recently there was little international awareness of the situation in northern CAR. However, in 2006, human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law began to receive some attention. The killings, village burnings, displacement, and humanitarian suffering are now occasionally reported in the international press and are the subject of increasing diplomatic notice, usually being seen as "spill-over" from the continuing crisis in Darfur.
Little attention, however, has been paid to the actual dynamics of conflict, which are largely home grown. The main rebel protagonists are Central Africans with local grievances. Human Rights Watch's research suggests that the degree of linkage with the situation in Darfur has been exaggerated. The APRD in the northwest is so poorly equipped that it is difficult to imagine it has foreign sponsorship. Human Rights Watch has found no other evidence of such support. Although there have been contacts between the UFDR and Sudan-sponsored Chadian rebels opposed to the Chadian President Dby based in the northeast of CAR in early 2006, foreign support does not appear to be a driving force behind this rebellion.
Neither has attention been paid to the issue of responsibility for human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law, nor to action to ensure accountability. The sorry fact is that the perpetrators of violence and abuse, the majority of them government soldiers, have so far enjoyed total impunity for acts that include war crimes.
The APRD Rebellion
The APRD rebellion in the northwest was launched almost immediately after controversial 2005 elections led to the election of General Boziz as President. These had excluded the candidacy of ex-President Patass, who had been overthrown by General Boziz in March 2003. The leadership of the APRD rebellion consists mostly of former Presidential Guards of Patass, himself from the region. The APRD has about 1,000 poorly equipped members, including 200 rebels armed with automatic weapons, and another 600 with home-made hunting weapons. They claim their aim is to engage in "dialogue" to address the political exclusion of Patass and his supporters and to improve the security situation in the northwest, rather than to overthrow the government.
One of the main grievances of the population of the northwest is lack of security. Armed bandits, known as zaraguinas or coupeurs de route, regularly attack villagers and have taken advantage of insufficient security provided by the state to increase attacks. The zaraguinas commonly kidnap children for ransom and regularly kill civilians during raids. Many cattle-herders from the Peulh ethnic groupin the northwest, particularly targeted because of their valuable livestock, have fled to the safety of larger towns and refugee camps in Chad. Along with the political grievances of former Patass supporters, the failure of the CAR security forces to protect local communities from banditry is an important element in the development of the APRD, and many local armed self-defense groups have merged into the rebel group.
The UFDR Rebellion
From October to December 2006, the UFDR rebel movement gained international attention by seizing military control of the major towns in the remote Vakaga and Bamingui-Bangoran provinces of northeastern CAR, right on the border of Sudan's Darfur region. The UFDR's bold military offensive led to French military intervention on behalf of the CAR government in December 2006, allowing the security forces to regain control of urban centers.
The UFDR rebellion has its roots in the deep marginalization of northeastern CAR, which is virtually cut off from the rest of the country and is almost completely undeveloped. Elements from the Gula ethnic group, many of them trained militarily as anti-poaching units, are at the core of the rebellion, citing grievances such as discrimination against their community and the alleged embezzlement by the CAR authorities of compensation funds received from the Sudanese government following clashes perpetrated by Sudanese nomads in 2002. As the rebellion has grown, a backlash of anti-Gula sentiment among government officials, the military, and the general population has developed. As a result, most of the Gula population has fled government-controlled areas in fear of retaliation.
A second element making up the UFDR is Boziz's own former colleagues, so-called ex-librateurs, who participated in his overthrow of former President Patass in 2003. They accuse Boziz of betraying his promises and failing to compensate them for their support.
Abuses by FACA and GP Forces
Since the beginning of the conflict in mid 2005 with rebel forces in northern CAR, the CAR security forces have committed serious and widespread abuses against the civilian population, including multiple summary executions and unlawful killings, widespread burning of civilian homes, and the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians, which have instilled terror in the civilian population. In most instances, these village burnings and killings were in direct response to recent rebel activity in the area and amount to unlawful reprisals against the civilian population. It is the FACA and GP that have been responsible for the vast majority of the most serious human rights abuses in the conflict, and they have carried out these atrocities in full confidence of impunity from accountability for their crimes.
During the course of its research, Human Rights Watch documented 119 summary executions and unlawful killings committed by government security forces in both the northwest and northeast (the vast majority in the northwest), including at least 51 committed since late 2005 by a single military unit, the Bossangoa-based GP unit, commanded at the time by Lieutenant Eugne Ngakoss.
Human Rights Watch believes that the killings it has documented are only a fraction of the total number of those committed by government security forces. Since the beginning of the conflict these are estimated to amount to many hundreds. Killings committed by security forces have often involved dozens of civilian deaths in a single day and have often included unspeakable brutality. For example, on February 11, 2006, a single GP unit killed at least 30 civilians in more than a dozen separate villages located along the Nana-Barya to Bmal road. On March 22, this same GP unit beheaded a teacher in Bmal, cutting off his head with a knife while he was still alive. Other civilians have simply "disappeared" in military custody, arrested and not seen alive again.
Since December 2005, government forces, particularly the GP, have also been almost solely responsible for the burning down of more than 10,000 civilian homes in northwestern CAR. Hundreds of villages across vast swathes of northern CAR have been destroyed. Troops arrive in villages and indiscriminately fire into the civilian population, forcing them to flee before burning down their homes, sometimes looting them first. In December 2005, GP forces burned down 500 to 900 houses in the Markounda area. A Human Rights Watch count in the Batangafo-Kabo-Ouandago-Kaga Bandoro area found a total of 2,923 burned homes, including more than 1,000 homes in the large market town of Ouandago alone. In some places every single home in every single village was burned. Similarly massive destruction can be found all around the town of Paoua, all the way east to Nana Baryahundreds of kilometers of villages destroyed by government security forces.
The reprisal and counterinsurgency tactics of the CAR security forces have affected the lives of over 1 million people and have forced an estimated 212,000 civilians to abandon their road-side homes and live deep inside the bush, too fearful to return to their burned villages in case of repeat attack. Another 78,000 have sought refuge in neighboring Chad and Cameroon. The level of civilian fear in northern CAR is palpable. People are simply not to be seen in many areas, hiding far away. At the sound of approaching cars, everyone flees, dropping their possessions, sometimes even abandoning babies in their haste.
Living conditions for the displaced are life-threatening. They have no access to clean water, are often desperately short of food supplies, and their widely dispersed shelters are beyond the reach of the humanitarian community. Educational facilities have been closed, and aside from mobile clinics run by international organizations in some areas, health care is non-existent.
Rebel Abuses
APRD rebels in the northwest have engaged in widespread extortion, forced taxation, kidnappings for ransom, and beatings of civilians, particularly in the Batangafo-Kabo-Ouandago area of Ouham province. In that area, particularly on the Batangafo-Ouandago road, almost all villages have been systematically looted of all livestock, and village leaders have been regularly kidnapped for ransom. APRD rebels also have large numbers of child soldiers in their ranks, some as young as 12. APRD commanders expressed willingness to Human Rights Watch to demobilize the child soldiers if the post-demobilization security of the children could be guaranteed.
During its investigation in the field, Human Rights Watch documented one summary execution by the APRD (the killing of Mohammed Haroon in June 2006, in Gbazera) and did not identify any cases of home-burning by the group. Human Rights Watch has not received any credible additional reports of summary killings or village burnings by APRD rebels from local or international human rights organizations or journalists. On June 11, 2007, APRD rebels fired upon a vehicle of the international humanitarian organization Doctors without Borders (Mdecins Sans Frontires, MSF), killing Elsa Serfass, an MSF nurse. While the APRD immediately apologized for the incident, saying it had been a "mistake," the persons responsible should be held to account.
Human Rights Watch's research found that UFDR rebels in the northeast have carried out widespread abuses against the civilian population. During attacks on villages and towns they have often indiscriminately fired at fleeing civilians, leading to unlawful killings. Meanwhile, UFDR rebels have been responsible for summary executions of captured civilians. From October to December 2006, the rebels carried out massive looting of the belongings and livestock of the civilian population in areas they controlled. There have been allegations of rape by UFDR rebels, although Human Rights Watch has only been able to corroborate one case-a woman raped by five UFDR rebels during their brief capture of Birao in March 2007. The UFDR also has child soldiers in its ranks, and Human Rights Watch found that some of them had been forcibly recruited.
The Need for Protection
Establishing credible mechanisms to protect the civilian population from abuses is fundamental to addressing the human rights crisis in northern CAR. The responsibility for civilian protection lies first and foremost with the CAR authorities: they must take immediate steps to end military abuses and to re-establish a functioning police force and court system that serve to protect the rights of the civilian population.
However, the international community can also do more. A stronger international protection presence in the north is urgently needed. There already is a substantial UN human rights presence in CAR, in the form of a 19-person human rights unit in the office of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the Central African Republic (Bureau d'appui des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix en Rpublique centrafricaine, BONUCA), a long-standing UN peace support mission established in 2000. However, the human rights unit has been largely passive to date and does not effectively monitor or report on human rights abuses in the north. The UN should take the necessary measures, including changes to the mandate of the human rights section, to ensure that the BONUCA human rights unit effectively monitors and reports on human rights abuses in the north, in the same way that the human rights units of UN peacekeeping missions operate in neighboring Sudan and DRC.
If the UN Security Council moves ahead with the deployment of a UN protection mission to CAR and Chad, that mission should focus on the real protection needs of the civilian population of both countries, and not focus solely on neutralizing the "spill-over effect" of the Darfur crisis.
The Need for Accountability
The crimes being committed in northern CAR by government security forces are no secret inside the country. Local newspapers and radio frequently report them, opposition parliamentarians have prepared public reports documenting the atrocities, and diplomatic envoys regularly raise their concerns with President Boziz. Despite this, the government has not investigated, prosecuted, or punished a single military officer, or even publicly reprimanded them for any of the abuses. Even in the capital, Bangui, security forces carry out summary killings of suspected bandits and rebels with impunity. During Human Rights Watch's visit, two handcuffed Chadian rebel suspects were executed on the outskirts of Bangui by security forces. The commander of the most notorious of the units, Lieutenant Eugne Ngakoss of the Bossangoa-based GP unit that has killed dozens of civilians and is directly implicated in most of the village burnings in the north, remains a free man and an active duty military officer to date.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor's office is already involved in the CAR, having announced in May 2007 that they would investigate crimes committed in CAR during the 2002-2003 fighting, and that they would continue to monitor possible crimes committed during the current conflict. The investigations of the ICC in CAR should not, however, detract from the primary obligation of the CAR authorities to end impunity and bring about accountability for crimes committed by its armed forces and others. Ultimately, the crisis in northern CAR will only be resolved when law and order is restored, and the institutions of justice have the capacity to punish those who commit crimes against the civilian population, including members of the army and the elite GP.
The international community-particularly France, without whose direct military support the government of President Boziz would not survive-have an obligation to speak out about the abuses in northern CAR and to demand accountability for the crimes committed in northern CAR.
Source: Human Rights Watch
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)