The Armistice of Moudros (Turkish: Mondros Ateşkes Anlaşması), concluded on 30 October 1918, ended the hostilities in the Middle Eastern theatre between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies of World War I. It was signed by the Ottoman Minister of Marine Affairs Rauf Bey and the British Admiral Somerset Arthur Gough-Calthorpe, on board HMS Agamemnon in Moudros harbor on the Greek island of Lemnos.
As part of several conditions to the armistice, the Ottomans surrendered their remaining garrisons outside Anatolia, as well as granted the Allies the right to occupy forts controlling the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus; and the right to occupy "in case of disorder" any Ottoman territory in case of a threat to security. The Ottoman army was demobilized, and all ports, railways, and other strategic points were made available for use by the Allies. In the Caucasus, the Ottomans had to retreat to within the pre-war borders between the Ottoman and the Russian Empires.
The armistice was followed with occupation of Constantinople and subsequent partitioning of the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920) followed the armistice, but this treaty was not enacted due to the outbreak of the Turkish War of Independence.
Source: Wikipedia
Friday, August 31, 2012
First steps taken to ensure customers are treated fairly
As SA moves to overhaul its financial sector regulatory framework, a major part of the process will be moves to treat customers with due care. But woe betide firms that think this is going to be a woolly, soft-touch approach to how regulators will assess their conduct.
The treat customers fairly initiative, will form a major part of the shift towards what is known as a twin peaks approach, according to the head of the initiative at the Financial Services Board (FSB), Leanne Jackson. Under the system the state will regulate the industry through two so-called ‘peaks’. The first relates to macro-prudential governance, which will be regulated by the Reserve Bank. The second relates to market conduct, which will be regulated by a beefed up Financial Services Board. It is through these legislative and regulatory reforms that the retail banking sector will be regulated for market conduct for the first time.
Although the new framework will apply to the industry as a whole, other financial services forms such as long and short-term insurers, asset managers and financial managers have been regulated for market conduct by the FSB, under the provisions of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services act.
The treat customers fairly initiative is in line with similar shifts across the globe in the wake of the financial crisis.
The industry, although broadly supportive of the need for reform, has raised concerns that it will come with additional compliance burdens that will add to their costs. The extent to which regulators can intervene and regulate the type, and cost, of financial services products, and the impact this will have on areas like costs and innovation, is a question being asked in jurisdictions across the globe.
Appropriate products
The treat customers fairly approach is based on six outcomes, including that appropriate products and services are marketed, sold and targeted accordingly; customers are given clear information and are kept appropriately informed before, during and after the time of contracting; customers are given suitable advice, appropriate to their circumstances; and customers do not face unreasonable post-sale barriers to change a product, switch a provider, submit a claim or make a complaint.
According to the Financial Services Board’s 2011 road map document on the initiative, enforceable rules and regulations are required “to ensure that firms clearly understand the regulatory expectations,” it said.
Peter Dempsey, deputy chief executive of the Association for Savings and Investment South Africa, said the advantages of the initiative were that it was in line with global trends and clarified rights and obligations for both customers and firms. But aside from cost implications for companies, there were other difficulties with implementing the changes.
This included the subjective nature of how firms were evaluated in meeting the objectives. This was perhaps reflected in a draft self-assessment pilot project report, which was released in December. The report revealed distinct differences in how firms viewed their ability to meet the six outcomes, and the risks the FSB identified in their responses.
A good deal of work remained in establishing the regulatory framework and aligning it with other aspects of the twin peaks process said Jackson. But the pilot project did reveal the extent to which firms were underestimating the “rigour that the treat customers fairly implementation would require”.
She said firms would be “unwise” to wait for the legislative process to be complete – which is broadly expected in 2014 – before assessing the strategic implications these principles would have across all levels of their operations.
Source: Mail & Guardian
The treat customers fairly initiative, will form a major part of the shift towards what is known as a twin peaks approach, according to the head of the initiative at the Financial Services Board (FSB), Leanne Jackson. Under the system the state will regulate the industry through two so-called ‘peaks’. The first relates to macro-prudential governance, which will be regulated by the Reserve Bank. The second relates to market conduct, which will be regulated by a beefed up Financial Services Board. It is through these legislative and regulatory reforms that the retail banking sector will be regulated for market conduct for the first time.
Although the new framework will apply to the industry as a whole, other financial services forms such as long and short-term insurers, asset managers and financial managers have been regulated for market conduct by the FSB, under the provisions of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services act.
The treat customers fairly initiative is in line with similar shifts across the globe in the wake of the financial crisis.
The industry, although broadly supportive of the need for reform, has raised concerns that it will come with additional compliance burdens that will add to their costs. The extent to which regulators can intervene and regulate the type, and cost, of financial services products, and the impact this will have on areas like costs and innovation, is a question being asked in jurisdictions across the globe.
Appropriate products
The treat customers fairly approach is based on six outcomes, including that appropriate products and services are marketed, sold and targeted accordingly; customers are given clear information and are kept appropriately informed before, during and after the time of contracting; customers are given suitable advice, appropriate to their circumstances; and customers do not face unreasonable post-sale barriers to change a product, switch a provider, submit a claim or make a complaint.
According to the Financial Services Board’s 2011 road map document on the initiative, enforceable rules and regulations are required “to ensure that firms clearly understand the regulatory expectations,” it said.
Peter Dempsey, deputy chief executive of the Association for Savings and Investment South Africa, said the advantages of the initiative were that it was in line with global trends and clarified rights and obligations for both customers and firms. But aside from cost implications for companies, there were other difficulties with implementing the changes.
This included the subjective nature of how firms were evaluated in meeting the objectives. This was perhaps reflected in a draft self-assessment pilot project report, which was released in December. The report revealed distinct differences in how firms viewed their ability to meet the six outcomes, and the risks the FSB identified in their responses.
A good deal of work remained in establishing the regulatory framework and aligning it with other aspects of the twin peaks process said Jackson. But the pilot project did reveal the extent to which firms were underestimating the “rigour that the treat customers fairly implementation would require”.
She said firms would be “unwise” to wait for the legislative process to be complete – which is broadly expected in 2014 – before assessing the strategic implications these principles would have across all levels of their operations.
Source: Mail & Guardian
What next for SA-Israel relations?
By Howard Sackstein
This week the South African ambassador to Israel was summoned by his hosts for a severe reprimand. Our government’s increasingly aggressive stance on Israel has caused relations between Jerusalem and Pretoria to implode.
One by one we have watched our despotic friends in the Middle East tumble from power and we watch silently as tens of thousands of Syrians die at the hands of Bashar al-Assad and that country spirals towards civil war.
At the end of August SA will attend a Non-Aligned Movement summit in Tehran, seat of one of the most oppressive theocracies of the modern era. Oil and political donations triumph over policy!
Despite our manifest indifference to human suffering, Israel features prominently in our foreign policy.
When Israel stopped a Turkish flotilla from illegally breaking the blockade on Gaza, South Africa, Nicaragua and Ecuador were the only countries, other than Turkey, to withdraw their ambassadors from Tel Aviv.
In March South Africa granted entry to renowned Hamas terrorist Abdul Aziz Umar to visit. Umar was given seven life sentences for taking part in the Café Hillel suicide bombing attack in Jerusalem, which killed seven people. Hamas denies Israel’s right to exist and calls for the expulsion of Jews from the Middle East. Ironically, Umar was dispatched to South Africa to promote Israel Apartheid Week.
On August 22, cabinet approved a plan promoted by pro-Palestinian advocates “to require traders in South Africa not to incorrectly label products that originate from the Occupied Palestinian Territory as products of Israel”. Minister of Trade and Industry Rob Davies denied the move was politically motivated. But he was soon contradicted by the deputy minister of international relations, Marius Fransman, who said “economic diplomacy could be one of the most effective weapons of change in the Palestinian situation. I am glad to inform you that our government released a government notice, as a strategy to apply economic pressure on Israel”.
So sympathetic has South Africa become to the anti-Israel cause, that terrorists last month plotted a foiled attack on Israeli targets in South Africa.
When a group of South African Jewish organisations and business leaders attempted to address the poor service-delivery record of our government by training South Africans in Israel, Deputy Minister of International Relations Ebrahim Ebrahim applied pressure to scupper the trips.
Over the past 60 years Israel has been training people throughout the continent. Under the leadership of the Israeli trade union movement black South African civic leaders, trade unionists and NGOs have been trained in Israel since the 1970s. Yehuda Paz was banned by the apartheid government from entering South Africa. Today a post-apartheid government attempts to ban South Africans from travelling to Israel to meet Paz.
Last week Ebrahim informed South Africans that Pretoria discourages all South Africans from visiting Israel. He said “because of the treatment and policies of Israel towards the Palestinian people, we strongly discourage South Africans from going there”.
Probably the most scathing criticism of the deputy minister came from the chief rabbi of South Africa, Dr Warren Goldstein, who described the deputy minister as unfit to hold public office and demanded he resign. Goldstein said: “Your actions hark back to apartheid-style control of information and censorship. For the sake of peace and justice, we need more information, not less; we need more dialogue, not less; we need more connections with other societies, not less.”
Officials in Ebrahim’s own department told the City Press that Ebrahim was old and sometimes did not understand policy.
Israel has little to gain from its contributions to South Africa. In the mind of Israel, South Africa is underdeveloped, battling with corruption, spiralling unemployment, chronic under-education and crippling service delivery.
South Africans must worry that Israel may take action to restrict its technology from being used in South Africa. Many farmers in rural South Africa have moved from subsistence farming to commercial farming based entirely on Israeli know-how and technology.
South Africa’s bona fides have been further dented by the MTN-Turkcell court case in the US. Turkcell alleges that South Africa protected Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency in return for awarding a cellular licence to MTN. Assisting Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, not only destabilises the entire Middle East, but puts South Africa on a collision path.
South Africa has abandoned its desire to play any meaningful role in Middle East peace. Its failure to take any moral stand on international conflicts other than Israel/Palestine has undermined its own credibility. Its pronouncements are mere platitudes to gain domestic Muslim votes in the Western Cape and while service-delivery protests spread across the country fewer and fewer South African government officials will receive the training in Israel they desperately need.
Howard Sackstein has a degree in law and international relations, a post-graduate law degree and a masters in political advocacy and international conflict resolution. He was one of the founders of the Jewish anti-apartheid movement in South Africa and was executive director of South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission. He led the only ANC delegation to ever visit Israel and took Nelson Mandela to Brussels on behalf of the World Jewish Congress.
Source: Mail & Guardian
This week the South African ambassador to Israel was summoned by his hosts for a severe reprimand. Our government’s increasingly aggressive stance on Israel has caused relations between Jerusalem and Pretoria to implode.
One by one we have watched our despotic friends in the Middle East tumble from power and we watch silently as tens of thousands of Syrians die at the hands of Bashar al-Assad and that country spirals towards civil war.
At the end of August SA will attend a Non-Aligned Movement summit in Tehran, seat of one of the most oppressive theocracies of the modern era. Oil and political donations triumph over policy!
Despite our manifest indifference to human suffering, Israel features prominently in our foreign policy.
When Israel stopped a Turkish flotilla from illegally breaking the blockade on Gaza, South Africa, Nicaragua and Ecuador were the only countries, other than Turkey, to withdraw their ambassadors from Tel Aviv.
In March South Africa granted entry to renowned Hamas terrorist Abdul Aziz Umar to visit. Umar was given seven life sentences for taking part in the Café Hillel suicide bombing attack in Jerusalem, which killed seven people. Hamas denies Israel’s right to exist and calls for the expulsion of Jews from the Middle East. Ironically, Umar was dispatched to South Africa to promote Israel Apartheid Week.
On August 22, cabinet approved a plan promoted by pro-Palestinian advocates “to require traders in South Africa not to incorrectly label products that originate from the Occupied Palestinian Territory as products of Israel”. Minister of Trade and Industry Rob Davies denied the move was politically motivated. But he was soon contradicted by the deputy minister of international relations, Marius Fransman, who said “economic diplomacy could be one of the most effective weapons of change in the Palestinian situation. I am glad to inform you that our government released a government notice, as a strategy to apply economic pressure on Israel”.
So sympathetic has South Africa become to the anti-Israel cause, that terrorists last month plotted a foiled attack on Israeli targets in South Africa.
When a group of South African Jewish organisations and business leaders attempted to address the poor service-delivery record of our government by training South Africans in Israel, Deputy Minister of International Relations Ebrahim Ebrahim applied pressure to scupper the trips.
Over the past 60 years Israel has been training people throughout the continent. Under the leadership of the Israeli trade union movement black South African civic leaders, trade unionists and NGOs have been trained in Israel since the 1970s. Yehuda Paz was banned by the apartheid government from entering South Africa. Today a post-apartheid government attempts to ban South Africans from travelling to Israel to meet Paz.
Last week Ebrahim informed South Africans that Pretoria discourages all South Africans from visiting Israel. He said “because of the treatment and policies of Israel towards the Palestinian people, we strongly discourage South Africans from going there”.
Probably the most scathing criticism of the deputy minister came from the chief rabbi of South Africa, Dr Warren Goldstein, who described the deputy minister as unfit to hold public office and demanded he resign. Goldstein said: “Your actions hark back to apartheid-style control of information and censorship. For the sake of peace and justice, we need more information, not less; we need more dialogue, not less; we need more connections with other societies, not less.”
Officials in Ebrahim’s own department told the City Press that Ebrahim was old and sometimes did not understand policy.
Israel has little to gain from its contributions to South Africa. In the mind of Israel, South Africa is underdeveloped, battling with corruption, spiralling unemployment, chronic under-education and crippling service delivery.
South Africans must worry that Israel may take action to restrict its technology from being used in South Africa. Many farmers in rural South Africa have moved from subsistence farming to commercial farming based entirely on Israeli know-how and technology.
South Africa’s bona fides have been further dented by the MTN-Turkcell court case in the US. Turkcell alleges that South Africa protected Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency in return for awarding a cellular licence to MTN. Assisting Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, not only destabilises the entire Middle East, but puts South Africa on a collision path.
South Africa has abandoned its desire to play any meaningful role in Middle East peace. Its failure to take any moral stand on international conflicts other than Israel/Palestine has undermined its own credibility. Its pronouncements are mere platitudes to gain domestic Muslim votes in the Western Cape and while service-delivery protests spread across the country fewer and fewer South African government officials will receive the training in Israel they desperately need.
Howard Sackstein has a degree in law and international relations, a post-graduate law degree and a masters in political advocacy and international conflict resolution. He was one of the founders of the Jewish anti-apartheid movement in South Africa and was executive director of South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission. He led the only ANC delegation to ever visit Israel and took Nelson Mandela to Brussels on behalf of the World Jewish Congress.
Source: Mail & Guardian
What Land and Housing Rights Reveal About a Country’s Commitment to Open Society
Homeowners in Moscow’s Rechnik
district likely did not expect to wake up to bulldozers on the morning
of January 21, 2010. Thrown out of their homes by armed police, families
could only watch as their houses were demolished. Under the direction
of Moscow’s then-mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, famous—or infamous—for his embrace
of fast-paced, high-priced development, municipal authorities decided
to invalidate land permits issued during the Soviet era and reject
residents’ de facto titles to what has since become valuable land and to
the houses they had built on it. Had they built illegally? What is the
state’s responsibility to citizens in this process? What, if any, were
the underlying interests at stake in this demonstration of force? With
similar situations played out all over the globe, state actions to take
away people’s land or expel them from their homes tell us volumes about a
government’s commitment to transparency, democracy, and other elements
of good governance; they lay bare the true human rights record of a
place.
The Open Society Foundations’ Human Rights Data Initiative, a joint project of the Human Rights and Governance Program and the Information Program, has begun a year-long study of housing and property expropriations. The study will track how the issue is connected to a range of internationally recognized human rights, and explore how human rights and accountability organizations approach the problem of the abuse of states’ claim to eminent domain. Though states are empowered to use eminent domain for the public good, abuse of this authority is widespread. What we’ve found is that violations of the “positive right” to housing are only one part of the issue. The process of state infringement on land ownership illuminates a host of other problems, including the state’s failure to uphold the rule of law, provide equal protection to all citizens, tackle corruption, and engage in economic development that is respectful of ethnic minorities and the urban poor. Invariably we also find citizens shut out of decisions regarding their surroundings, the shape of their city, and preservation of its cultural heritage. Land and housing policy is a revelator that tells us about the reality and depth of commitment to open society values in a given country.
In a broad survey of the work of the Open Society Foundations, we’ve seen that the threat to where they live is many people’s first encounter with the potential harm of predatory state interests. Human rights and transparency organizations report incidences with alarming frequency: Azeri families living in central Baku find themselves stripped of their property and forced from their homes to make way for a glittering stadium for the Eurovision Song Contest. In Equatorial Guinea, where a small ruling clique of families reaps huge profits while over 60 percent survive on less than $1 per day, citizens were evicted with inadequate or nonexistent compensation in the name of an “urban renewal” and public utility development, that has given birth to hotels, offices and luxury housing that few will ever access. Similar dubious state claims to promoting “public good” were raised in the case of Roma settlements on municipal land in Bulgaria. Tolerated by the state for decades, communities found themselves threatened with eviction when the land was privatized without offer of alternative housing. That case was finally settled at the European Court of Human Rights in a decision that cited state responsibility to assess the necessity of the action, as well as the effects of interference an eviction will have on the right to private and family life as deciding factors against the government of Bulgaria. Activists in Brazil have documented the effect of evictions on an estimated thirty thousand people in the run-up to the “mega events” of the World Cup 2014 and 2016 Olympic Games in Rio—mass evictions carried out without sufficient compensation, forewarning, or community consultation. In many of these cases, when citizens raised their voices through the channels of protest open to them, they were answered by the state with resistance, violence, and restriction of their liberties.
If forcible removal is one end of the spectrum of violations, at the other, state bureaucratic policies can be less blatant but just as insidious. Though bureaucratic reform toward openness in land policy can be a good thing, when states institute open records and land-ownership reform to counteract corruption in legal titling of land, the process can be turned on its head. Take India, for example, where individuals began taking advantage of records opened in an effort to help the rural poor take out loans or apply for government benefits. Because they had better technical skills and access to information, wealthier residents could create what open data expert Michael Gurstein called “unequal contests around land titles,” exploiting mistakes and gaps to their own advantage. In Georgia, the buying and selling of land has been drastically simplified in the past several years, including through the establishment of electronic land records—a major step forward in limiting corruption—but curious exceptions to the speed and ease of that process have appeared when such slowdowns are in the state interest, and when dozens of citizens at a time “donate” their land in a valuable tourist zone to the state.
Land and housing rights excite communities in ways that many other rights issues do not. Housing procedures are often the most widely felt of the harms done by a chaotic or captured state, where high-level corrupt political and economic exchange between government and a small number of firms is pervasive. The combination of abusive practice and non-transparent procedures can create citizen outrage, and introduce them to their fundamental rights and the challenges and exhilaration of citizen action. As acts of state policy, evictions and eminent domain can affect large numbers of citizens from different classes and social strata, and all of them experience the lack of rule of law, and the need for information and the right to free expression to pull the levers of citizen governance.
The issue also marries disparate communities and inspires conversations about history and preservation, rights and due process, economic growth and the tangibles and intangibles of livability, livelihood, and public good. Expropriation of land and housing filters through many of the key issues of the Open Society Foundations—from corruption and poor governance, to lack of access to information, use and abuse of force, lack of independence of the judiciary, and intolerance of dissent. Open Society Foundations’ own work to mitigate the impacts of the national foreclosure crisis on low-income communities and communities of color in the U.S. highlights how the lack of transparent and accountable financial markets can lead to widespread displacement and wealth-stripping among vulnerable populations.
State policies on housing and the use of eminent domain not only energize individuals, but can also have a galvanizing effect on civil society organizations. NGOs focused on a key population are often motivated by housing and property dilemmas to develop full-context arguments on human rights, development, transparency, and citizen access to decision-making. In doing so, these organizations find new partners and new channels for activism, policy work and redress of abusive practices. At the same time, they face new challenges. Given the large amounts of money at stake, documenting procurement contracts and development deals can be very dangerous and difficult.
And finally, the expansion of access to information and technology enrich the potential for development to be conducted in ways that reflect open society values. As instruments of development, international financial institutions and technology can affect the direction of state policy on questions of housing and land. International financial institutions already exert a good deal of influence over the direction of development projects that they sponsor. Because of their leverage, IFI can either be a springboard for state abuse or a catalyst for a more transparent and equitable approach, negotiating rights-respecting plans and ensuring an open process. Technology can be used to increase efficiency and fairness by bringing game-changing data to light, or obscure processes and privilege those who already have access to knowledge and broadband.
As the Human Rights Data Initiative examines this theme, we are focusing on three key questions:
How can we do this better? We need more data: as the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy points out, governments do not produce systematic information on the use of eminent domain, and legal research does not tell us about other dimensions of this government practice. We need to help transparency and human rights organizations to work together to ensure that people’s civil and political rights are protected during the process of urban development, with particular attention to the rights essential to expression of dissent and participation in decision making processes. And we need to know from international lenders and experts what the key elements of development planning are that can preserve people’s human rights, and insist on their inclusion in negotiated agreements regarding sponsored economic development projects. It will be essential for lenders to share that information with civil society groups and bring such groups into the process as allies. States must seek to make honest transactions between public need, livelihood, and individual rights, and this transaction should be observed for the opportunity it represents to scratch the surface of commitments to civil and political liberties.
Source: Open Society Foundations
The Open Society Foundations’ Human Rights Data Initiative, a joint project of the Human Rights and Governance Program and the Information Program, has begun a year-long study of housing and property expropriations. The study will track how the issue is connected to a range of internationally recognized human rights, and explore how human rights and accountability organizations approach the problem of the abuse of states’ claim to eminent domain. Though states are empowered to use eminent domain for the public good, abuse of this authority is widespread. What we’ve found is that violations of the “positive right” to housing are only one part of the issue. The process of state infringement on land ownership illuminates a host of other problems, including the state’s failure to uphold the rule of law, provide equal protection to all citizens, tackle corruption, and engage in economic development that is respectful of ethnic minorities and the urban poor. Invariably we also find citizens shut out of decisions regarding their surroundings, the shape of their city, and preservation of its cultural heritage. Land and housing policy is a revelator that tells us about the reality and depth of commitment to open society values in a given country.
In a broad survey of the work of the Open Society Foundations, we’ve seen that the threat to where they live is many people’s first encounter with the potential harm of predatory state interests. Human rights and transparency organizations report incidences with alarming frequency: Azeri families living in central Baku find themselves stripped of their property and forced from their homes to make way for a glittering stadium for the Eurovision Song Contest. In Equatorial Guinea, where a small ruling clique of families reaps huge profits while over 60 percent survive on less than $1 per day, citizens were evicted with inadequate or nonexistent compensation in the name of an “urban renewal” and public utility development, that has given birth to hotels, offices and luxury housing that few will ever access. Similar dubious state claims to promoting “public good” were raised in the case of Roma settlements on municipal land in Bulgaria. Tolerated by the state for decades, communities found themselves threatened with eviction when the land was privatized without offer of alternative housing. That case was finally settled at the European Court of Human Rights in a decision that cited state responsibility to assess the necessity of the action, as well as the effects of interference an eviction will have on the right to private and family life as deciding factors against the government of Bulgaria. Activists in Brazil have documented the effect of evictions on an estimated thirty thousand people in the run-up to the “mega events” of the World Cup 2014 and 2016 Olympic Games in Rio—mass evictions carried out without sufficient compensation, forewarning, or community consultation. In many of these cases, when citizens raised their voices through the channels of protest open to them, they were answered by the state with resistance, violence, and restriction of their liberties.
If forcible removal is one end of the spectrum of violations, at the other, state bureaucratic policies can be less blatant but just as insidious. Though bureaucratic reform toward openness in land policy can be a good thing, when states institute open records and land-ownership reform to counteract corruption in legal titling of land, the process can be turned on its head. Take India, for example, where individuals began taking advantage of records opened in an effort to help the rural poor take out loans or apply for government benefits. Because they had better technical skills and access to information, wealthier residents could create what open data expert Michael Gurstein called “unequal contests around land titles,” exploiting mistakes and gaps to their own advantage. In Georgia, the buying and selling of land has been drastically simplified in the past several years, including through the establishment of electronic land records—a major step forward in limiting corruption—but curious exceptions to the speed and ease of that process have appeared when such slowdowns are in the state interest, and when dozens of citizens at a time “donate” their land in a valuable tourist zone to the state.
Land and housing rights excite communities in ways that many other rights issues do not. Housing procedures are often the most widely felt of the harms done by a chaotic or captured state, where high-level corrupt political and economic exchange between government and a small number of firms is pervasive. The combination of abusive practice and non-transparent procedures can create citizen outrage, and introduce them to their fundamental rights and the challenges and exhilaration of citizen action. As acts of state policy, evictions and eminent domain can affect large numbers of citizens from different classes and social strata, and all of them experience the lack of rule of law, and the need for information and the right to free expression to pull the levers of citizen governance.
The issue also marries disparate communities and inspires conversations about history and preservation, rights and due process, economic growth and the tangibles and intangibles of livability, livelihood, and public good. Expropriation of land and housing filters through many of the key issues of the Open Society Foundations—from corruption and poor governance, to lack of access to information, use and abuse of force, lack of independence of the judiciary, and intolerance of dissent. Open Society Foundations’ own work to mitigate the impacts of the national foreclosure crisis on low-income communities and communities of color in the U.S. highlights how the lack of transparent and accountable financial markets can lead to widespread displacement and wealth-stripping among vulnerable populations.
State policies on housing and the use of eminent domain not only energize individuals, but can also have a galvanizing effect on civil society organizations. NGOs focused on a key population are often motivated by housing and property dilemmas to develop full-context arguments on human rights, development, transparency, and citizen access to decision-making. In doing so, these organizations find new partners and new channels for activism, policy work and redress of abusive practices. At the same time, they face new challenges. Given the large amounts of money at stake, documenting procurement contracts and development deals can be very dangerous and difficult.
And finally, the expansion of access to information and technology enrich the potential for development to be conducted in ways that reflect open society values. As instruments of development, international financial institutions and technology can affect the direction of state policy on questions of housing and land. International financial institutions already exert a good deal of influence over the direction of development projects that they sponsor. Because of their leverage, IFI can either be a springboard for state abuse or a catalyst for a more transparent and equitable approach, negotiating rights-respecting plans and ensuring an open process. Technology can be used to increase efficiency and fairness by bringing game-changing data to light, or obscure processes and privilege those who already have access to knowledge and broadband.
As the Human Rights Data Initiative examines this theme, we are focusing on three key questions:
- What is the shape of the use and abuse of eminent domain and other tools of the state with respect to property? What is it used for, whom does it affect, and how?
- In projects where citizens, organizations, or other interests have successfully countered a demonstrably bad decision in this space, what has been the deciding factor: did access to more data tip the scales? Did evocative documentary photographs motivate new actors? Was it sharp statistical analysis, or targeted campaigning?
- How can campaigners leverage this issue to engage with citizens on open information and governance, and effect better policymaking around development?
How can we do this better? We need more data: as the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy points out, governments do not produce systematic information on the use of eminent domain, and legal research does not tell us about other dimensions of this government practice. We need to help transparency and human rights organizations to work together to ensure that people’s civil and political rights are protected during the process of urban development, with particular attention to the rights essential to expression of dissent and participation in decision making processes. And we need to know from international lenders and experts what the key elements of development planning are that can preserve people’s human rights, and insist on their inclusion in negotiated agreements regarding sponsored economic development projects. It will be essential for lenders to share that information with civil society groups and bring such groups into the process as allies. States must seek to make honest transactions between public need, livelihood, and individual rights, and this transaction should be observed for the opportunity it represents to scratch the surface of commitments to civil and political liberties.
Source: Open Society Foundations
Thursday, August 30, 2012
Poverty now a crisis in the first world: Motlanthe
The adverse impact of capitalism on social and economic growth requires a mind shift in socialism, Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe said today.
"The global crisis of capitalism and imperialism, which is negatively affecting growth, widening social inequality, increasing levels of poverty and worsening [un]employment figures, needs a sharpened, radical shift in the approach the Socialist International takes," he said in Cape Town.
Speaking at the opening of the 24th Congress of the Socialist International (SI), he said debates had to focus on the reform of the organisation. Poverty was no longer just a problem for developing nations, but also now becoming a crisis in the first world. "Therefore this leaves us with no choice but to review, analyse and rethink the impact of the global economic crisis on society and the toiling masses of the world." He said there were various concerns sociality parties needed to confront. These included a need to strive for conflict resolution, while securing conditions of development.
Motlanthe's sentiments were echoed by the SI's president and former Greek prime minister George Papandreou. Innovative and alternative solutions were needed in a changing world, he said. "This human ingenuity needs to be accompanied by political and democratic will to make these changes... That will, my friends, has been lacking in Europe and around the world."
Papandreou defended the SI's existence, saying leftist parties were important to achieve, among others, peace, justice, good governance, equality, growth and employment for all. He warned against attributing blame for the global economic crisis. "We point fingers at each other rather than reach out our hands and lift each other up."
Papandreou lamented the fact that immigrants were being held responsible for the economic troubles in several countries. He said international co-ordination was needed now more than ever. "We've seen this spectacular rise in nationalism over the years, and at the same time we've noticed a terrifying rise in racism, prejudice."
Source: Times Live
"The global crisis of capitalism and imperialism, which is negatively affecting growth, widening social inequality, increasing levels of poverty and worsening [un]employment figures, needs a sharpened, radical shift in the approach the Socialist International takes," he said in Cape Town.
Speaking at the opening of the 24th Congress of the Socialist International (SI), he said debates had to focus on the reform of the organisation. Poverty was no longer just a problem for developing nations, but also now becoming a crisis in the first world. "Therefore this leaves us with no choice but to review, analyse and rethink the impact of the global economic crisis on society and the toiling masses of the world." He said there were various concerns sociality parties needed to confront. These included a need to strive for conflict resolution, while securing conditions of development.
Motlanthe's sentiments were echoed by the SI's president and former Greek prime minister George Papandreou. Innovative and alternative solutions were needed in a changing world, he said. "This human ingenuity needs to be accompanied by political and democratic will to make these changes... That will, my friends, has been lacking in Europe and around the world."
Papandreou defended the SI's existence, saying leftist parties were important to achieve, among others, peace, justice, good governance, equality, growth and employment for all. He warned against attributing blame for the global economic crisis. "We point fingers at each other rather than reach out our hands and lift each other up."
Papandreou lamented the fact that immigrants were being held responsible for the economic troubles in several countries. He said international co-ordination was needed now more than ever. "We've seen this spectacular rise in nationalism over the years, and at the same time we've noticed a terrifying rise in racism, prejudice."
Source: Times Live
Assassinations, Disappearances, and Riots: What’s Happening in Mombasa?
The international community’s attention to Kenya has been sharply focused on the upcoming March 2013 elections and preventing the type of horrific ethnic violence that surrounded the 2007 election. But other things, big things, are afoot.
On Monday, August 27, Muslim cleric Aboud Rogo Mohammad, who the United States had placed on its sanctions list in July, was gunned down in Mombasa, Kenya. The death sparked outrage from the Muslim community and led to violent protests. Rogo’s death followed a spate of other suspicious disappearances, as well as the death of another Kenyan who was alleged to have been involved in terrorist-related activities.
It’s uncertain who the assailants have been, but many suspect Kenyan government involvement, with some witnesses saying the abductors identified themselves as police.
To gain a better understanding of Rogo’s death and the Mombasa riots, I spoke with Al Amin Kimathi, a human rights activist who is the chair of the Muslim Human Rights Forum in Kenya.
Could you provide a description of your organization, the Muslim Human Rights Forum, and the work that it does?
The Muslim Human Rights Forum is a human rights organization based in the Muslim community, but we work with all civil society groups working on minority rights. The Muslim Human Rights Forum has focused a lot of attention on counterterrorism and human rights monitoring, which focuses on Kenya and the East Africa and the Horn of Africa regions. I work extensively on these issues and have been involved in counterterrorism and human rights investigations in the region, collaborating with local and regional civil society groups.
There are news reports out of Mombasa that a controversial cleric, Aboud Rogo Mohammad, was gunned down on Monday, August 27. At the time of his death he faced charges relating to terrorist activities. Since then there has been rioting in Mombasa. How much is known about what happened to Rogo, and who killed him?
The Muslim Human Rights Forum had been monitoring the legal proceedings against Rogo, as well and other terrorism-related trials in Kenya. Of those cases, around six defendants have disappeared before Rogo met his demise. Rogo and a colleague, Abubakar Shariff Ahmed, had concerns about their safety even before Rogo was killed. He reported his concerns to the police after someone attempted to abduct the two men while they were on their way to a court appearance in July. Then, about a week ago, Rogo reported to MHRF that his son was accosted by people who identified themselves as police from the Flying Squad, which is a unit that deals with motor vehicle theft and armed robberies. However, Rogo’s son was convinced they were really counterterrorism agents and identified them as having been involved in Rogo’s previous arrest. The police told the son that they were looking for his father and warned him not to give them a hard time or any headaches like his father did. Rogo had also recently been put on the U.S. sanctions list. In response, Rogo’s lawyer wrote a letter to the Kenyan government requesting what information the U.S. had against Rogo. The lawyer warned that he thought Rogo’s listing on the sanctions list could lead to his disappearance.
It’s difficult to say who killed Rogo. But when you look at circumstantial evidence, the pattern of events, the modus operandi, and the audacity with which the killing took place, it all points to the hand of the state. For example, in April of this year, activist and Islamic preacher Samir Hashim Khan and Mohammed Bekhit Kassim were abducted in Mombasa in broad daylight while on public transportation. Witnesses saw the two men taken away in two white Toyota Probox station wagons and, based on their behavior, the abductors were police officers. The body of Khan was found two days later 150 kilometers from Mombasa off a highway. His body was badly mutilated. Kassim, the other man, has still not been found or heard from. [Author’s note: Kenyan officials have denied involvement in Rogo’s death and instances of disappearances.]
Have there been incidents like this in the past? Why did this incident in particular spark rioting?
Rogo’s death was the immediate event that sparked the riots. But there were also demonstrations—though not bloody—when Samir Khan’s body was found. So there has been a build-up leading to the riots. The rioters were saying “enough is enough.” The disappearances and killings, taken together led to the riots.
What is the situation like in Mombasa currently? How bad is the rioting?
Behavior on both sides, the police and civilians, has been pretty bad. Rioters have gone to the extent of killing a man near a mosque in Mombasa. On Tuesday there was also a hand grenade thrown at police. Three churches were also torched down on Tuesday, and the churches are demanding compensation from government. There’s also been an unprecedentedly high-level of looting in Mombasa, including the burning of business and vehicles. This continued for two days. Then there was calm most of today, Wednesday, but there are now reports of one or two dead and several injuries from a grenade attack on police, which brought a renewed round of confrontation between police and rioters.
As for state security forces, in the Majengo area of Mombasa, which is the epicenter of rioting, the General Service Unit (GSU) mounted house-to-house searches for Muslim youths and rounded them up and put them into trucks. Twenty-four were taken to court this afternoon [Wednesday], but it’s not yet known what happened to others. The police also raided a hospital where Rogo’s wife was, and heavily armed police came onto the streets by the time Rogo was buried—which was 3 hours after his death.
This strong police presence so soon after the death didn’t go over well with the youths. It led to exchanges in stone throwing, tear gas, and live ammunition. There’s a lot of very high tension in Mombasa and the tension is spreading to Nairobi, though there aren’t any riots or demonstrations in the capital yet. But, for example, in a low income neighborhood, Pumwani Majengo, which has a large Muslim population, plainclothes police from various units have surrounded it. Pumwani Majengo is an area that authorities fear harbors al Shabaab members and they allege it’s a base for the Muslim Youth Center. [Author’s note: The MYC is an organization that a UN report labeled as contributing to recruiting for al Shabaab and setting up operational cells in Kenya.]
Has the situation gotten better, or will it get worse?
I am concerned that the situation will get worse after Friday prayers, where the youth might try to escalate their protests. Muslim, Christian, and political leaders have been urging calm, but the Mombasa youth is not following suit. The leaders who the youth listen to have not been sufficiently brought into the outreach efforts. Meanwhile, the police are being overly cautious, and are bringing out heavily armed units, which is enflaming the situation. There are fears of interreligious conflict if the situation isn’t properly handled. We are seeing very heated debates on the social media. The fact that churches were targeted is evidence of religious tensions. But Muslim and Christian leadership are trying to cool the tempers.
In your view, how should the government respond to these instances of killings and disappearances?
Now that the killings and disappearances took place, an investigation is needed. Prosecutors announced that there will be an investigation into Rogo’s death. The investigation will include people from the Kenyan Law Society and Kenyan Human Rights Commission. An investigation with independence and impartiality is a move in the right direction. Previous investigations without those qualities haven’t proven effective. There’s not a lot of credibility in them. The Muslim Human Rights Forum is calling for a Commission of Inquiry with judicial authority to inspire more confidence in the investigation. Also, Kenya must provide assurances that it does not use extrajudicial means to conduct its counterterrorism operations. Officials must be prosecuted is they were involved in any of those acts.
There has been a lot of debate in Kenya, starting all the way back in 2003, about passing an anti-terrorism legislation that would be discriminatory towards the Muslim community. This debate has picked up steam again and a bill is now with parliament for review. Some government officials say the bill has been amended to respond to its critics. Do you still have concerns with this bill?
I believe that we do need anti-terrorism legislation, but it must conform to the new constitution, including the bill of rights, and international human rights standards. In the past, civil society has prevented the adoption of anti-terrorism laws because of what they allowed the state to do. Currently, the draft bill still gives too much power [to the state], allows for no oversight, and allows for too many derogations of rights. Provisions on seizing property, intercepting communications, and clamping down on organizational activities goes against the freedom of assembly. There’s no judicial recourse for the law’s enforcement, and it criminalizes the lawyer-client relationship. I’m also concerned that the bill could be used not just for counterterrorism operations, but also to suppress political opposition. There are also a lot of newly discovered natural resources, like oil and gas, in Muslim populated areas, and there is concern that the laws could be used against Muslims in order to reap the benefits of those resources. We want to see provisions in the bill that punish unlawful counterterrorism activities. Anti-terrorism authorities have to be held accountable for their actions.
How do you view the role of international donors, such as the U.S. or U.K., in Kenya’s counterterrorism efforts?
In many ways, the Kenyan government has, in the past, overhyped terrorism to bring in donor funding, which then makes the Kenyan government take actions to show the donors that it’s doing something. Nonetheless, the donor community should be focused more on the social dynamics that result in terrorism rather than a militarized response. Specific attention should be given to marginalized populations, such as areas in northeastern Kenya with strong Muslim and ethnic Somali populations, the Coastal region, and poor neighborhood in urban centers, all of which are deprived areas needing economic assistance.
Source: ReliefWeb
On Monday, August 27, Muslim cleric Aboud Rogo Mohammad, who the United States had placed on its sanctions list in July, was gunned down in Mombasa, Kenya. The death sparked outrage from the Muslim community and led to violent protests. Rogo’s death followed a spate of other suspicious disappearances, as well as the death of another Kenyan who was alleged to have been involved in terrorist-related activities.
It’s uncertain who the assailants have been, but many suspect Kenyan government involvement, with some witnesses saying the abductors identified themselves as police.
To gain a better understanding of Rogo’s death and the Mombasa riots, I spoke with Al Amin Kimathi, a human rights activist who is the chair of the Muslim Human Rights Forum in Kenya.
Could you provide a description of your organization, the Muslim Human Rights Forum, and the work that it does?
The Muslim Human Rights Forum is a human rights organization based in the Muslim community, but we work with all civil society groups working on minority rights. The Muslim Human Rights Forum has focused a lot of attention on counterterrorism and human rights monitoring, which focuses on Kenya and the East Africa and the Horn of Africa regions. I work extensively on these issues and have been involved in counterterrorism and human rights investigations in the region, collaborating with local and regional civil society groups.
There are news reports out of Mombasa that a controversial cleric, Aboud Rogo Mohammad, was gunned down on Monday, August 27. At the time of his death he faced charges relating to terrorist activities. Since then there has been rioting in Mombasa. How much is known about what happened to Rogo, and who killed him?
The Muslim Human Rights Forum had been monitoring the legal proceedings against Rogo, as well and other terrorism-related trials in Kenya. Of those cases, around six defendants have disappeared before Rogo met his demise. Rogo and a colleague, Abubakar Shariff Ahmed, had concerns about their safety even before Rogo was killed. He reported his concerns to the police after someone attempted to abduct the two men while they were on their way to a court appearance in July. Then, about a week ago, Rogo reported to MHRF that his son was accosted by people who identified themselves as police from the Flying Squad, which is a unit that deals with motor vehicle theft and armed robberies. However, Rogo’s son was convinced they were really counterterrorism agents and identified them as having been involved in Rogo’s previous arrest. The police told the son that they were looking for his father and warned him not to give them a hard time or any headaches like his father did. Rogo had also recently been put on the U.S. sanctions list. In response, Rogo’s lawyer wrote a letter to the Kenyan government requesting what information the U.S. had against Rogo. The lawyer warned that he thought Rogo’s listing on the sanctions list could lead to his disappearance.
It’s difficult to say who killed Rogo. But when you look at circumstantial evidence, the pattern of events, the modus operandi, and the audacity with which the killing took place, it all points to the hand of the state. For example, in April of this year, activist and Islamic preacher Samir Hashim Khan and Mohammed Bekhit Kassim were abducted in Mombasa in broad daylight while on public transportation. Witnesses saw the two men taken away in two white Toyota Probox station wagons and, based on their behavior, the abductors were police officers. The body of Khan was found two days later 150 kilometers from Mombasa off a highway. His body was badly mutilated. Kassim, the other man, has still not been found or heard from. [Author’s note: Kenyan officials have denied involvement in Rogo’s death and instances of disappearances.]
Have there been incidents like this in the past? Why did this incident in particular spark rioting?
Rogo’s death was the immediate event that sparked the riots. But there were also demonstrations—though not bloody—when Samir Khan’s body was found. So there has been a build-up leading to the riots. The rioters were saying “enough is enough.” The disappearances and killings, taken together led to the riots.
What is the situation like in Mombasa currently? How bad is the rioting?
Behavior on both sides, the police and civilians, has been pretty bad. Rioters have gone to the extent of killing a man near a mosque in Mombasa. On Tuesday there was also a hand grenade thrown at police. Three churches were also torched down on Tuesday, and the churches are demanding compensation from government. There’s also been an unprecedentedly high-level of looting in Mombasa, including the burning of business and vehicles. This continued for two days. Then there was calm most of today, Wednesday, but there are now reports of one or two dead and several injuries from a grenade attack on police, which brought a renewed round of confrontation between police and rioters.
As for state security forces, in the Majengo area of Mombasa, which is the epicenter of rioting, the General Service Unit (GSU) mounted house-to-house searches for Muslim youths and rounded them up and put them into trucks. Twenty-four were taken to court this afternoon [Wednesday], but it’s not yet known what happened to others. The police also raided a hospital where Rogo’s wife was, and heavily armed police came onto the streets by the time Rogo was buried—which was 3 hours after his death.
This strong police presence so soon after the death didn’t go over well with the youths. It led to exchanges in stone throwing, tear gas, and live ammunition. There’s a lot of very high tension in Mombasa and the tension is spreading to Nairobi, though there aren’t any riots or demonstrations in the capital yet. But, for example, in a low income neighborhood, Pumwani Majengo, which has a large Muslim population, plainclothes police from various units have surrounded it. Pumwani Majengo is an area that authorities fear harbors al Shabaab members and they allege it’s a base for the Muslim Youth Center. [Author’s note: The MYC is an organization that a UN report labeled as contributing to recruiting for al Shabaab and setting up operational cells in Kenya.]
Has the situation gotten better, or will it get worse?
I am concerned that the situation will get worse after Friday prayers, where the youth might try to escalate their protests. Muslim, Christian, and political leaders have been urging calm, but the Mombasa youth is not following suit. The leaders who the youth listen to have not been sufficiently brought into the outreach efforts. Meanwhile, the police are being overly cautious, and are bringing out heavily armed units, which is enflaming the situation. There are fears of interreligious conflict if the situation isn’t properly handled. We are seeing very heated debates on the social media. The fact that churches were targeted is evidence of religious tensions. But Muslim and Christian leadership are trying to cool the tempers.
In your view, how should the government respond to these instances of killings and disappearances?
Now that the killings and disappearances took place, an investigation is needed. Prosecutors announced that there will be an investigation into Rogo’s death. The investigation will include people from the Kenyan Law Society and Kenyan Human Rights Commission. An investigation with independence and impartiality is a move in the right direction. Previous investigations without those qualities haven’t proven effective. There’s not a lot of credibility in them. The Muslim Human Rights Forum is calling for a Commission of Inquiry with judicial authority to inspire more confidence in the investigation. Also, Kenya must provide assurances that it does not use extrajudicial means to conduct its counterterrorism operations. Officials must be prosecuted is they were involved in any of those acts.
There has been a lot of debate in Kenya, starting all the way back in 2003, about passing an anti-terrorism legislation that would be discriminatory towards the Muslim community. This debate has picked up steam again and a bill is now with parliament for review. Some government officials say the bill has been amended to respond to its critics. Do you still have concerns with this bill?
I believe that we do need anti-terrorism legislation, but it must conform to the new constitution, including the bill of rights, and international human rights standards. In the past, civil society has prevented the adoption of anti-terrorism laws because of what they allowed the state to do. Currently, the draft bill still gives too much power [to the state], allows for no oversight, and allows for too many derogations of rights. Provisions on seizing property, intercepting communications, and clamping down on organizational activities goes against the freedom of assembly. There’s no judicial recourse for the law’s enforcement, and it criminalizes the lawyer-client relationship. I’m also concerned that the bill could be used not just for counterterrorism operations, but also to suppress political opposition. There are also a lot of newly discovered natural resources, like oil and gas, in Muslim populated areas, and there is concern that the laws could be used against Muslims in order to reap the benefits of those resources. We want to see provisions in the bill that punish unlawful counterterrorism activities. Anti-terrorism authorities have to be held accountable for their actions.
How do you view the role of international donors, such as the U.S. or U.K., in Kenya’s counterterrorism efforts?
In many ways, the Kenyan government has, in the past, overhyped terrorism to bring in donor funding, which then makes the Kenyan government take actions to show the donors that it’s doing something. Nonetheless, the donor community should be focused more on the social dynamics that result in terrorism rather than a militarized response. Specific attention should be given to marginalized populations, such as areas in northeastern Kenya with strong Muslim and ethnic Somali populations, the Coastal region, and poor neighborhood in urban centers, all of which are deprived areas needing economic assistance.
Source: ReliefWeb
Blair speaks amid protest
Amid the gathering of a "small" group of protesters outside the Sandton Convention Centre, former British prime minister Tony Blair said that the most successful countries in the world are those with open-minded people who accept innovation. "Those countries who are open to people who are different, those who are open to nations who are different, those who are open to ideas and innovation create successful economies and societies," he said at the Discovery Invest Leadership Summit in Johannesburg.
"This globalised world offers huge opportunities if people are open-minded. I feel that right now that it is very important in terms of leadership... you have to take responsibility for difficult and often profound long-term decisions." Blair joked about Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu's decision to pull out of the summit in protest at his attendance. "It's amazing how nice people are to you when you stop being prime minister -- except archbishops of course," he said. "He [Tutu] is perfectly entitled to do what he wants to do. The essence of democracy is that sometimes you are faced with very difficult positions."
Tutu withdrew from the conference because of Blair's decision to back the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003. Blair said removing Iraqi president Saddam Hussein from power had been difficult. "We are faced with the same types of decisions now with Syria. Do we intervene or not intervene? With Iran, do we allow them to get nuclear capability? Are we prepared to intervene and stop them?"
Tutu's office said earlier in the week that the summit had leadership as its theme, and this could not be separated from ideas of morality. Tutu believed Blair's support of the US's military invasion was morally indefensible. Blair fielded questions from the audience about his decision to invade Iraq. "I took the decision in good faith... I knew it was a highly controversial and difficult thing, but I believed it was right. "The one thing that I have learnt about leadership is that in the end, that is my responsibility. I have to stand by that [decision]. In the end that is what you will elect leaders to do. I will never regret removing a brutal dictatorship."
Blair, flanked by bodyguards, spoke about the attempts that had been made to place him under citizen's arrest for crimes against humanity. "Why don't they actually go protest against the people doing the killing and the bombing and the suicide attacks?" He said the threat of Islamic fundamentalism was still an important issue the world had to overcome.
"Extremism is still there, but we are not going to [see it end]... until we tackle it for what it is. It is based on a perversion of religion and it has to be stood up to," Blair said. "They [extremists] are funded and financed by people with a very warped view of the world and who will take away a lot of the freedoms that we have."
Protest
A member of the audience heckled Blair during his speech. "Thank you... a little bit of protest to make me feel at home," he said. The heckler was escorted out of the hall. He heckler told Talk Radio 702 he had said: "Tony Blair, you are a war criminal and I'd rather listen to Tutu". Meanwhile, outside the convention centre protesters gathered because of his role in the deployment of soldiers in Iraq in 2003. .
The Society of the Protection of our Constitution is seeking a warrant of arrest for Blair. The society's secretary Muhammed Vawda says they've filed a 'crimes against the state' complaint with the police, who've opened a docket. He says the case will now go to the National Director of Public Prosecutions for a decision. The Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Tribunal - an alternative to the International Criminal Court with no UN recognition or authority - found Blair and former US President George W. Bush guilty in absentia last year of crimes against humanity and genocide in the 2003 Iraq war.
Muslim political party Al Jama-ah earlier said it plans to affect a citizen’s arrest on Blair outside the convention centre. "We hope that Mr Blair will do the right thing and try and clear his name at the International Court of Justice in the Haque. However, our dossier indicates that there is overwhelming evidence that he is guilty of crimes against humanity," said party leader, Ganief Hendricks."
He said in spite of the heavy security at the conference - which led to the conference being delayed - the party had hoped that "one of the delegates will get to Mr Blair so he realizes the charges against him will never be buried and be top of mind until he has his day in court. When this happens, it is then up to the law enforcement authorities to take the matter forward."
The police had cornered off the area and closely monitoring the situation where protesters could be seen carrying poster that read "Tony u phony" and "Blair is a war criminal". Among them was the national secretary of the Young Communist league (YCL) Buti Manamela who also addressed the protestors. The protest was broken up shortly after Blair's address. VOC/AGENCIES
Source: The Voice of the Cape
"This globalised world offers huge opportunities if people are open-minded. I feel that right now that it is very important in terms of leadership... you have to take responsibility for difficult and often profound long-term decisions." Blair joked about Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu's decision to pull out of the summit in protest at his attendance. "It's amazing how nice people are to you when you stop being prime minister -- except archbishops of course," he said. "He [Tutu] is perfectly entitled to do what he wants to do. The essence of democracy is that sometimes you are faced with very difficult positions."
Tutu withdrew from the conference because of Blair's decision to back the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003. Blair said removing Iraqi president Saddam Hussein from power had been difficult. "We are faced with the same types of decisions now with Syria. Do we intervene or not intervene? With Iran, do we allow them to get nuclear capability? Are we prepared to intervene and stop them?"
Tutu's office said earlier in the week that the summit had leadership as its theme, and this could not be separated from ideas of morality. Tutu believed Blair's support of the US's military invasion was morally indefensible. Blair fielded questions from the audience about his decision to invade Iraq. "I took the decision in good faith... I knew it was a highly controversial and difficult thing, but I believed it was right. "The one thing that I have learnt about leadership is that in the end, that is my responsibility. I have to stand by that [decision]. In the end that is what you will elect leaders to do. I will never regret removing a brutal dictatorship."
Blair, flanked by bodyguards, spoke about the attempts that had been made to place him under citizen's arrest for crimes against humanity. "Why don't they actually go protest against the people doing the killing and the bombing and the suicide attacks?" He said the threat of Islamic fundamentalism was still an important issue the world had to overcome.
"Extremism is still there, but we are not going to [see it end]... until we tackle it for what it is. It is based on a perversion of religion and it has to be stood up to," Blair said. "They [extremists] are funded and financed by people with a very warped view of the world and who will take away a lot of the freedoms that we have."
Protest
A member of the audience heckled Blair during his speech. "Thank you... a little bit of protest to make me feel at home," he said. The heckler was escorted out of the hall. He heckler told Talk Radio 702 he had said: "Tony Blair, you are a war criminal and I'd rather listen to Tutu". Meanwhile, outside the convention centre protesters gathered because of his role in the deployment of soldiers in Iraq in 2003. .
The Society of the Protection of our Constitution is seeking a warrant of arrest for Blair. The society's secretary Muhammed Vawda says they've filed a 'crimes against the state' complaint with the police, who've opened a docket. He says the case will now go to the National Director of Public Prosecutions for a decision. The Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Tribunal - an alternative to the International Criminal Court with no UN recognition or authority - found Blair and former US President George W. Bush guilty in absentia last year of crimes against humanity and genocide in the 2003 Iraq war.
Muslim political party Al Jama-ah earlier said it plans to affect a citizen’s arrest on Blair outside the convention centre. "We hope that Mr Blair will do the right thing and try and clear his name at the International Court of Justice in the Haque. However, our dossier indicates that there is overwhelming evidence that he is guilty of crimes against humanity," said party leader, Ganief Hendricks."
He said in spite of the heavy security at the conference - which led to the conference being delayed - the party had hoped that "one of the delegates will get to Mr Blair so he realizes the charges against him will never be buried and be top of mind until he has his day in court. When this happens, it is then up to the law enforcement authorities to take the matter forward."
The police had cornered off the area and closely monitoring the situation where protesters could be seen carrying poster that read "Tony u phony" and "Blair is a war criminal". Among them was the national secretary of the Young Communist league (YCL) Buti Manamela who also addressed the protestors. The protest was broken up shortly after Blair's address. VOC/AGENCIES
Source: The Voice of the Cape
Tuesday, August 28, 2012
Analysis: Syria - three wars for the price of one
If you think the war in Syria is hard to follow, that’s because there’s
actually three of them—at least. Distinct but interconnected, the
competing web of allegiances and motivations puts al-Qaeda on the same
side as the USA and makes a solution impossible. By SIMON ALLISON.
Many people, like this reporter, find the Syrian war confusing sometimes. It throws up all kind of strange and unnatural contradictions, like America appearing to be on the same side as al-Qaeda-linked jihadists and Al-Jazeera turning into a typical, propaganda-spouting state media house. No doubt policy-makers also find it difficult to understand. It’s been nearly two years and there’s still no sensible international policy on Syria, just a steady stream of ad-hoc condemnations and hamstrung mediations.
There’s a simple reason for all this confusion and complexity: it’s a very, very complicated situation. Even worse, there’s not just one war being fought in Syria, but at least three and possibly even more.
War number one is the one we’re all familiar with (especially if we’ve been watching too much Al-Jazeera). This is your typical Arab Spring narrative, pitting a downtrodden civilian population against the brutal regime that has repressed its people for so long. It’s a simple tale of good-versus-evil, of democracy taking on dictatorship, of the people sticking it to the man. We’ve seen variations of the theme in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, all of which ended with the people hurling off the yoke of dictatorship and replacing it with a new, enlightened, freely-elected government (oh, wait; it hasn’t quite ended like that in any of these countries, but let’s not spoil a good story with the facts).
Elements of this story are true in Syria. Certainly, the regime was brutal and autocratic, happy to stifle political freedoms and concentrate wealth and power in the hands of a very few, mostly of the Alawite ethnic minority. In fact, the Syrian security forces had such a world-class reputation for torture that they were, on occasion, prevailed upon by American intelligence to practise their craft on detainees as part America’s extraordinary rendition program.
There was popular dissent, too. Not much of it initially, but it grew in size and voice in the wake of the uprisings in other Arab countries. Whether or not the anti-Assad movement was really a majority will be argued over endlessly in years to come, but it is important to recognise that just as there was a large anti-Assad sentiment, so there was a significant chunk of the population that was happy with the status quo; autocracies are stable and peaceful, after all, unlike revolutions and civil wars.
War number two is not really about Syria at all. Instead, it’s about Middle Eastern and global geopolitics, and it’s very messy. In one corner is the Syrian Alawite regime and Iran, who are natural allies. The Alawites are a sect of Shi’a Islam, while Iran is an explicitly Shi’a state (as opposed to Sunni Islam, the other main branch of the religion). Russia finds itself in this camp too, desperate to protect its vital naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus—its only reliable warm water port. So too does China, which sees no reason to put its excellent trading relationship with Syria in jeopardy.
Ranged against this formidable combination is a regional alliance of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, all of which would love to see Bashar al-Assad replaced with a more compliant Sunni leader. All have designs on regional leadership, and in Syria they find common cause. Turkey was one of the first countries to express support for the Syrian rebels, while both Qatar and Saudi Arabia have helped to fund and arm them. Qatar has also been accused – with some justification – of using its hugely influential satellite TV channel, Al-Jazeera (specifically the Arabic version) to influence public opinion by portraying a one-sided version of events.
Lurking behind this regional triumvirate is the United States and the Western world, their foreign policy distorted, as usual, by their Iranian paranoia. Robert Fisk, doyen of Middle East correspondents, summed up their approach in the Independent: “This is an attempt to crush the Syrian dictatorship not because of our love for Syrians or our hatred of our former friend Bashar al-Assad, or because of our outrage at Russia, whose place in the pantheon of hypocrites is clear when we watch its reaction to all the little Stalingrads across Syria. No, this is all about Iran and our desire to crush the Islamic Republic and its infernal nuclear plans—if they exist—and has nothing to do with human rights or the right to life or the death of Syrian babies.”
Syria, in other words, is a proxy war; a relatively safe place (for everyone else, not for Syria) to fight the battles that can’t yet be fought in the open.
But it doesn’t end there. There’s a third war happening. This one pits the nominally Shi’a (though relatively secular) Syrian state against the global Sunni jihadist movement (known to Americans as “terrorists”). A flood of reports recently have explained how fighters from all over the Arab world, many of them battle-hardened in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq, have come to the support of the Syrian rebels.
This from Ed Husain in the National Review is typical: “Our collective excitement at the possibility that the Assad regime will be destroyed, and the Iranian ayatollahs weakened in the process, is blurring our vision and preventing us from seeing the rise of al-Qaeda in Syria. In March of this year, jihadis mounted seven attacks against Assad. By June, they had led 66 “operations”, and over half of these were on Syria’s capital, Damascus. The Syrian opposition is benefiting hugely from the terrorist organization’s determination, discipline, combat experience, religious fervour, and ability to strike the Assad regime where it hurts most.”
The War on Terror has reached Syria and somehow, America and al-Qaeda find themselves fighting on the same side. No wonder no one seems to know what’s really going on.
Nor does anyone know how to stop it. With all these tangled conflicts and competing interests and motivations, figuring out a solution seems like an impossible task. Which, so far, is exactly what it’s proven to be. DM
Source: Daily Maverick
Many people, like this reporter, find the Syrian war confusing sometimes. It throws up all kind of strange and unnatural contradictions, like America appearing to be on the same side as al-Qaeda-linked jihadists and Al-Jazeera turning into a typical, propaganda-spouting state media house. No doubt policy-makers also find it difficult to understand. It’s been nearly two years and there’s still no sensible international policy on Syria, just a steady stream of ad-hoc condemnations and hamstrung mediations.
There’s a simple reason for all this confusion and complexity: it’s a very, very complicated situation. Even worse, there’s not just one war being fought in Syria, but at least three and possibly even more.
War number one is the one we’re all familiar with (especially if we’ve been watching too much Al-Jazeera). This is your typical Arab Spring narrative, pitting a downtrodden civilian population against the brutal regime that has repressed its people for so long. It’s a simple tale of good-versus-evil, of democracy taking on dictatorship, of the people sticking it to the man. We’ve seen variations of the theme in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, all of which ended with the people hurling off the yoke of dictatorship and replacing it with a new, enlightened, freely-elected government (oh, wait; it hasn’t quite ended like that in any of these countries, but let’s not spoil a good story with the facts).
Elements of this story are true in Syria. Certainly, the regime was brutal and autocratic, happy to stifle political freedoms and concentrate wealth and power in the hands of a very few, mostly of the Alawite ethnic minority. In fact, the Syrian security forces had such a world-class reputation for torture that they were, on occasion, prevailed upon by American intelligence to practise their craft on detainees as part America’s extraordinary rendition program.
There was popular dissent, too. Not much of it initially, but it grew in size and voice in the wake of the uprisings in other Arab countries. Whether or not the anti-Assad movement was really a majority will be argued over endlessly in years to come, but it is important to recognise that just as there was a large anti-Assad sentiment, so there was a significant chunk of the population that was happy with the status quo; autocracies are stable and peaceful, after all, unlike revolutions and civil wars.
War number two is not really about Syria at all. Instead, it’s about Middle Eastern and global geopolitics, and it’s very messy. In one corner is the Syrian Alawite regime and Iran, who are natural allies. The Alawites are a sect of Shi’a Islam, while Iran is an explicitly Shi’a state (as opposed to Sunni Islam, the other main branch of the religion). Russia finds itself in this camp too, desperate to protect its vital naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus—its only reliable warm water port. So too does China, which sees no reason to put its excellent trading relationship with Syria in jeopardy.
Ranged against this formidable combination is a regional alliance of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, all of which would love to see Bashar al-Assad replaced with a more compliant Sunni leader. All have designs on regional leadership, and in Syria they find common cause. Turkey was one of the first countries to express support for the Syrian rebels, while both Qatar and Saudi Arabia have helped to fund and arm them. Qatar has also been accused – with some justification – of using its hugely influential satellite TV channel, Al-Jazeera (specifically the Arabic version) to influence public opinion by portraying a one-sided version of events.
Lurking behind this regional triumvirate is the United States and the Western world, their foreign policy distorted, as usual, by their Iranian paranoia. Robert Fisk, doyen of Middle East correspondents, summed up their approach in the Independent: “This is an attempt to crush the Syrian dictatorship not because of our love for Syrians or our hatred of our former friend Bashar al-Assad, or because of our outrage at Russia, whose place in the pantheon of hypocrites is clear when we watch its reaction to all the little Stalingrads across Syria. No, this is all about Iran and our desire to crush the Islamic Republic and its infernal nuclear plans—if they exist—and has nothing to do with human rights or the right to life or the death of Syrian babies.”
Syria, in other words, is a proxy war; a relatively safe place (for everyone else, not for Syria) to fight the battles that can’t yet be fought in the open.
But it doesn’t end there. There’s a third war happening. This one pits the nominally Shi’a (though relatively secular) Syrian state against the global Sunni jihadist movement (known to Americans as “terrorists”). A flood of reports recently have explained how fighters from all over the Arab world, many of them battle-hardened in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq, have come to the support of the Syrian rebels.
This from Ed Husain in the National Review is typical: “Our collective excitement at the possibility that the Assad regime will be destroyed, and the Iranian ayatollahs weakened in the process, is blurring our vision and preventing us from seeing the rise of al-Qaeda in Syria. In March of this year, jihadis mounted seven attacks against Assad. By June, they had led 66 “operations”, and over half of these were on Syria’s capital, Damascus. The Syrian opposition is benefiting hugely from the terrorist organization’s determination, discipline, combat experience, religious fervour, and ability to strike the Assad regime where it hurts most.”
The War on Terror has reached Syria and somehow, America and al-Qaeda find themselves fighting on the same side. No wonder no one seems to know what’s really going on.
Nor does anyone know how to stop it. With all these tangled conflicts and competing interests and motivations, figuring out a solution seems like an impossible task. Which, so far, is exactly what it’s proven to be. DM
Source: Daily Maverick
Kenya: Set Independent Inquiry on Mombasa Killing
The Kenyan government should establish an independent inquiry into the killing of Aboud Rogo, a controversial cleric, on August 27, 2012, and subsequent riots in Mombasa.
Rogo, who was facing charges of illegal possession of weapons and recruiting for the Somali Islamist group al-Shabaab, was shot to death in his car while he was driving outside Mombasa. Following his burial later in the afternoon of August 27, riots erupted across the Mombasa town center and continued on August 28. Cars were set alight, several churches were vandalized, and at least two people were killed. One was a prison officer working with the police to contain the riots and the other a civilian killed by rioters. Police told reporters that they arrested 22 people in connection with the riots.
“The killing of Aboud Rogo is a serious crime that needs speedy independent and impartial investigation,” said Leslie Lefkow, deputy Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “In the meantime, police should continue to stick within the law in confronting the riots sparked by Rogo’s death.”
Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that an unmarked vehicle overtook the car Rogo was driving with six passengers, including his wife, on Malindi road on August 27 and that two gunmen opened fire at close range. Rogo was shot in the head and died at the scene. His wife was also shot and is in a hospital.
The riots were in the Majengo and Kisauni areas of Mombasa. At least 24 people were admitted to hospitals with injuries related to the unrest, with three people critically injured, media reported. Youths interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they were protesting the suspected involvement of the Kenyan authorities in Rogo’s death.
Rogo’s killing follows the abductions and deaths earlier this year of several other people charged with recruitment and other offenses related to al-Shabaab.
In March, Samir Khan, who was also charged with possession of illegal firearms and recruiting for al-Shabaab, and his friend Mohammed Kassim were pulled from a public bus in Mombasa by men who stopped the bus and identified themselves as police officers, Khan’s lawyer, Mbugua Mureithi, told Human Rights Watch. Khan’s body was found, badly mutilated, a few days later in Tsavo national park. Kassim’s whereabouts remain unknown. Kassim had previously been abducted in Nairobi in February, under unclear circumstances, but was released after his captors interrogated him. Police briefed journalists at the time, saying he had been arrested by the Anti Terror Police Unit, but they later denied arresting him.
Rogo had complained of police threats before his death and requested protection. On July 24, Rogo had reported to the police, the Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights, and the court in which he was being tried for recruiting for al-Shabaab, that unknown assailants had attempted to abduct him and his co-accused Abubakar Shari Ahmed when they arrived in Nairobi for the court hearing. He swore an affidavit that men in civilian clothes who claimed to be police officers tried to force the two men into an unmarked car. He said that he and Ahmed had challenged the men to produce identification and that passers-by helped the two men resist being forced into the car.
Mureithi, who is also Rogo’s lawyer, sought an assurance from the prosecution that the attempted abduction would be investigated and that Rogo’s security would be assured. The court ordered the Officer Commanding Station of Kamkunji police station to investigate. Mureithi told Human Rights Watch that Rogo frequently expressed concern about being followed by police and spoke of threats from known police agents who he said told him that, “The state will find a way of dealing with you.” Rogo had requested that the case be transferred to Mombasa where he felt safer and where he was also facing other charges for illegal possession of weapons and explosives.
Rogo was on United States and United Nations sanctions lists for alleged support of al-Shabaab. In 2005 he was acquitted on murder charges related to the 2002 attack on a hotel in Mombasa, which killed 12 people.
According to the Mombasa-based human rights group Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) four people have disappeared after being arrested by the police during 2012. MUHURI and the Muslim Human Rights Forum (MHRF) have accounts from witnesses who said that the abductors identified themselves as police officers before taking away Ngoy Moise Kayembe and Shani Marove Lydia in February and Musa Osodo and Jacob Musyoka Matheka in Molo in May.
Osodo was facing charges in a Mombasa court for membership of al-Shabaab and was one of six suspects charged with killing a police officer. Two of his co-defendants, Steven Mwandi Osaka and Jeremiah Onyango Okumu, disappeared in June, also after being pulled from a public bus in Mombasa by men in civilian clothes. They have not been seen since.
Police claim to be investigating Khan’s murder and the disappearance of the others.
“The abductions, disappearances, and in some cases murder of people who are thought to be linked to al-Shabaab is incredibly disturbing,” Lefkow said. “The Kenya police are facing a crisis of confidence in Mombasa. The government needs to act swiftly to investigate and prosecute those responsible for these crimes.”
The killing and the disappearances highlight the need for urgent completion of police reforms, including the setting up of the National Police Service Commission that is responsible for investigating the police, and that was supposed to be operational earlier this year.
The riots that began on August 27 continued throughout August 28. Two churches were attacked. One was set on fire and one was looted of electrical equipment. Shops and two cars were set on fire and burning tires placed in the road in several areas of town. Police engaged in running battles with rioters, firing tear gas and rubber bullets. Prison officers were brought in as reinforcements. Twenty-four people were admitted to hospitals by the afternoon of August 28. The prison officer was killed and 12 others injured when youths threw a grenade at a patrol in the Kisauni area of Mombasa.
The deputy provincial police officer, second in command in Coast province, told Human Rights Watch that police were trying to contain the violence with “minimum force” but would not rule out the use of live ammunition. The UN standards on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials state that, “In the dispersal of violent assemblies, law enforcement officials may use firearms only when less dangerous means are not practicable and only to the minimum extent necessary.”
“So far the police appear to have exercised admirable restraint in confronting the insecurity in Mombasa,” Lefkow said. “Now they need to use precision and intelligence to pursue the people who caused the violence, avoiding indiscriminate actions.”
Source: Human Rights Watch
Rogo, who was facing charges of illegal possession of weapons and recruiting for the Somali Islamist group al-Shabaab, was shot to death in his car while he was driving outside Mombasa. Following his burial later in the afternoon of August 27, riots erupted across the Mombasa town center and continued on August 28. Cars were set alight, several churches were vandalized, and at least two people were killed. One was a prison officer working with the police to contain the riots and the other a civilian killed by rioters. Police told reporters that they arrested 22 people in connection with the riots.
“The killing of Aboud Rogo is a serious crime that needs speedy independent and impartial investigation,” said Leslie Lefkow, deputy Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “In the meantime, police should continue to stick within the law in confronting the riots sparked by Rogo’s death.”
Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that an unmarked vehicle overtook the car Rogo was driving with six passengers, including his wife, on Malindi road on August 27 and that two gunmen opened fire at close range. Rogo was shot in the head and died at the scene. His wife was also shot and is in a hospital.
The riots were in the Majengo and Kisauni areas of Mombasa. At least 24 people were admitted to hospitals with injuries related to the unrest, with three people critically injured, media reported. Youths interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they were protesting the suspected involvement of the Kenyan authorities in Rogo’s death.
Rogo’s killing follows the abductions and deaths earlier this year of several other people charged with recruitment and other offenses related to al-Shabaab.
In March, Samir Khan, who was also charged with possession of illegal firearms and recruiting for al-Shabaab, and his friend Mohammed Kassim were pulled from a public bus in Mombasa by men who stopped the bus and identified themselves as police officers, Khan’s lawyer, Mbugua Mureithi, told Human Rights Watch. Khan’s body was found, badly mutilated, a few days later in Tsavo national park. Kassim’s whereabouts remain unknown. Kassim had previously been abducted in Nairobi in February, under unclear circumstances, but was released after his captors interrogated him. Police briefed journalists at the time, saying he had been arrested by the Anti Terror Police Unit, but they later denied arresting him.
Rogo had complained of police threats before his death and requested protection. On July 24, Rogo had reported to the police, the Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights, and the court in which he was being tried for recruiting for al-Shabaab, that unknown assailants had attempted to abduct him and his co-accused Abubakar Shari Ahmed when they arrived in Nairobi for the court hearing. He swore an affidavit that men in civilian clothes who claimed to be police officers tried to force the two men into an unmarked car. He said that he and Ahmed had challenged the men to produce identification and that passers-by helped the two men resist being forced into the car.
Mureithi, who is also Rogo’s lawyer, sought an assurance from the prosecution that the attempted abduction would be investigated and that Rogo’s security would be assured. The court ordered the Officer Commanding Station of Kamkunji police station to investigate. Mureithi told Human Rights Watch that Rogo frequently expressed concern about being followed by police and spoke of threats from known police agents who he said told him that, “The state will find a way of dealing with you.” Rogo had requested that the case be transferred to Mombasa where he felt safer and where he was also facing other charges for illegal possession of weapons and explosives.
Rogo was on United States and United Nations sanctions lists for alleged support of al-Shabaab. In 2005 he was acquitted on murder charges related to the 2002 attack on a hotel in Mombasa, which killed 12 people.
According to the Mombasa-based human rights group Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) four people have disappeared after being arrested by the police during 2012. MUHURI and the Muslim Human Rights Forum (MHRF) have accounts from witnesses who said that the abductors identified themselves as police officers before taking away Ngoy Moise Kayembe and Shani Marove Lydia in February and Musa Osodo and Jacob Musyoka Matheka in Molo in May.
Osodo was facing charges in a Mombasa court for membership of al-Shabaab and was one of six suspects charged with killing a police officer. Two of his co-defendants, Steven Mwandi Osaka and Jeremiah Onyango Okumu, disappeared in June, also after being pulled from a public bus in Mombasa by men in civilian clothes. They have not been seen since.
Police claim to be investigating Khan’s murder and the disappearance of the others.
“The abductions, disappearances, and in some cases murder of people who are thought to be linked to al-Shabaab is incredibly disturbing,” Lefkow said. “The Kenya police are facing a crisis of confidence in Mombasa. The government needs to act swiftly to investigate and prosecute those responsible for these crimes.”
The killing and the disappearances highlight the need for urgent completion of police reforms, including the setting up of the National Police Service Commission that is responsible for investigating the police, and that was supposed to be operational earlier this year.
The riots that began on August 27 continued throughout August 28. Two churches were attacked. One was set on fire and one was looted of electrical equipment. Shops and two cars were set on fire and burning tires placed in the road in several areas of town. Police engaged in running battles with rioters, firing tear gas and rubber bullets. Prison officers were brought in as reinforcements. Twenty-four people were admitted to hospitals by the afternoon of August 28. The prison officer was killed and 12 others injured when youths threw a grenade at a patrol in the Kisauni area of Mombasa.
The deputy provincial police officer, second in command in Coast province, told Human Rights Watch that police were trying to contain the violence with “minimum force” but would not rule out the use of live ammunition. The UN standards on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials state that, “In the dispersal of violent assemblies, law enforcement officials may use firearms only when less dangerous means are not practicable and only to the minimum extent necessary.”
“So far the police appear to have exercised admirable restraint in confronting the insecurity in Mombasa,” Lefkow said. “Now they need to use precision and intelligence to pursue the people who caused the violence, avoiding indiscriminate actions.”
Source: Human Rights Watch
Tutu withdraws from leadership summit
Archbishop Desmond Tutu has withdrawn from participating in a leadership summit in Johannesburg to protest the presence of Tony Blair.
Tutu's decision forms a protest against Blair's decision to back the United States war in Iraq.
"The archbishop has spent considerable time over the past few days wrestling with his conscience and taking counsel from trusted advisers with respect to his attendance at the event," the archbishop's office wrote to the event organisers on Tuesday.
"Ultimately, the archbishop is of the view that Mr Blair's decision to support the United States' military invasion of Iraq, on the basis of unproven allegations of the existence in Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, was morally indefensible.
"The Discovery Invest Leadership Summit has leadership as its theme. Morality and leadership are indivisible. In this context, it would be inappropriate and untenable for the archbishop to share a platform with Mr Blair.
"The archbishop greatly regrets inconveniencing and disappointing the organisers and participants of the Discovery Invest Leadership Summit."
Following Tutu's decision, Blair released a statement.
"Obviously [Tony Blair] is sorry that the archbishop has decided to pull out now from an event that has been fixed for months and where he and the Archbishop were never actually sharing a platform.
"As far as Iraq is concerned they have always disagreed about removing Saddam by force – such disagreement is part of a healthy democracy.
"As for the morality of that decision we have recently had both the memorial of the Halabja massacre where thousands of people were murdered in one day by Saddam's use of chemical weapons; and that of the Iran-Iraq war where casualties numbered up to a million including many killed by chemical weapons.
"So these decisions are never easy morally or politically".
Anger grows
A group of Durban-based organisations want to arrest Blair on charges of war crimes when he arrives in South Africa.
"Various Muslim organisations are in talks about possible actions that will be carried out should Tony Blair visit South Africa," said Mustafa Darsot, a member of the South African Muslim Network executive committee.
"This includes protest marches outside the summit venue, possible sit-ins and legal action against Mr Blair. We have also asked various legal professionals to look at the feasibility of having a warrant of arrest issued against him."
Blair will join several big names, including chess master Garry Kasparov and Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan at the annual event, which will take place in Sandton on August 30.
Darsot said the network and several other organisations had written to Discovery Group founder and chief executive officer Adrian Gore urging him to withdraw the invitation to Blair. They did not believe he was "fit to lecture on leadership" because of his key role in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
"Mr Blair is complicit in the murder of thousands of people in Iraq and should be tried for war crimes," Darsot said. "He violated the trust and responsibility of his office and it was his cosy and illegitimate relationship with the [Rupert] Murdoch press that prevented much of the truth about his role in the invasion of Iraq and murder of its citizens from being revealed in the press."
Offence
But Iona Maclean, head of Discovery Life and Discovery Invest Marketing, said the invitation to Blair would not be withdrawn.
"The Discovery Invest Leadership Summit brings together a range of leaders to debate the challenges that face the world's economy, business, government and society," she said.
"The event is not intended to reflect a political view or cause offence. Discovery Invest selected the speakers based on their experience as leaders from various spheres of society and we will not be withdrawing our invitation to any of the speakers."
Patrick Bond, director of the Centre for Civil Society at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, said there was no question that Blair could be prosecuted for a "crime of aggression".
"The website arrestblair.org spells out Blair's role in recent mass murder from the Middle East to Central Asia," he said.
"Since Pretoria politicians justifiably complain that the International Criminal Court mainly prosecutes African tyrants, leaving European and American war criminals to travel the world gathering huge speaking fees, some action by Foreign Minister Maite Nkoane-Mashabane would reduce the talk left, walk right accusation against South Africa. She might simply follow the recent lead of Malawian President Joyce Banda, who warned Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to stay away from Lilongwe on threat of arrest."
Bond said if Nkoane-Mashabane did not intervene, South Africans who viewed Blair as a war criminal could attempt a citizen's arrest.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Tutu's decision forms a protest against Blair's decision to back the United States war in Iraq.
"The archbishop has spent considerable time over the past few days wrestling with his conscience and taking counsel from trusted advisers with respect to his attendance at the event," the archbishop's office wrote to the event organisers on Tuesday.
"Ultimately, the archbishop is of the view that Mr Blair's decision to support the United States' military invasion of Iraq, on the basis of unproven allegations of the existence in Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, was morally indefensible.
"The Discovery Invest Leadership Summit has leadership as its theme. Morality and leadership are indivisible. In this context, it would be inappropriate and untenable for the archbishop to share a platform with Mr Blair.
"The archbishop greatly regrets inconveniencing and disappointing the organisers and participants of the Discovery Invest Leadership Summit."
Following Tutu's decision, Blair released a statement.
"Obviously [Tony Blair] is sorry that the archbishop has decided to pull out now from an event that has been fixed for months and where he and the Archbishop were never actually sharing a platform.
"As far as Iraq is concerned they have always disagreed about removing Saddam by force – such disagreement is part of a healthy democracy.
"As for the morality of that decision we have recently had both the memorial of the Halabja massacre where thousands of people were murdered in one day by Saddam's use of chemical weapons; and that of the Iran-Iraq war where casualties numbered up to a million including many killed by chemical weapons.
"So these decisions are never easy morally or politically".
Anger grows
A group of Durban-based organisations want to arrest Blair on charges of war crimes when he arrives in South Africa.
"Various Muslim organisations are in talks about possible actions that will be carried out should Tony Blair visit South Africa," said Mustafa Darsot, a member of the South African Muslim Network executive committee.
"This includes protest marches outside the summit venue, possible sit-ins and legal action against Mr Blair. We have also asked various legal professionals to look at the feasibility of having a warrant of arrest issued against him."
Blair will join several big names, including chess master Garry Kasparov and Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan at the annual event, which will take place in Sandton on August 30.
Darsot said the network and several other organisations had written to Discovery Group founder and chief executive officer Adrian Gore urging him to withdraw the invitation to Blair. They did not believe he was "fit to lecture on leadership" because of his key role in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
"Mr Blair is complicit in the murder of thousands of people in Iraq and should be tried for war crimes," Darsot said. "He violated the trust and responsibility of his office and it was his cosy and illegitimate relationship with the [Rupert] Murdoch press that prevented much of the truth about his role in the invasion of Iraq and murder of its citizens from being revealed in the press."
Offence
But Iona Maclean, head of Discovery Life and Discovery Invest Marketing, said the invitation to Blair would not be withdrawn.
"The Discovery Invest Leadership Summit brings together a range of leaders to debate the challenges that face the world's economy, business, government and society," she said.
"The event is not intended to reflect a political view or cause offence. Discovery Invest selected the speakers based on their experience as leaders from various spheres of society and we will not be withdrawing our invitation to any of the speakers."
Patrick Bond, director of the Centre for Civil Society at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, said there was no question that Blair could be prosecuted for a "crime of aggression".
"The website arrestblair.org spells out Blair's role in recent mass murder from the Middle East to Central Asia," he said.
"Since Pretoria politicians justifiably complain that the International Criminal Court mainly prosecutes African tyrants, leaving European and American war criminals to travel the world gathering huge speaking fees, some action by Foreign Minister Maite Nkoane-Mashabane would reduce the talk left, walk right accusation against South Africa. She might simply follow the recent lead of Malawian President Joyce Banda, who warned Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to stay away from Lilongwe on threat of arrest."
Bond said if Nkoane-Mashabane did not intervene, South Africans who viewed Blair as a war criminal could attempt a citizen's arrest.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Sunday, August 26, 2012
South Africa: Political Elites
Although change was evident at all levels of society as South Africa began to dismantle apartheid during the 1990s, particularly dramatic changes were occurring in the country's political and social leadership. Not only were new leaders emerging on the national level, but shifts were also occurring within political organizations, as new political expectations and aspirations arose and as new demands were placed on political leaders at all levels.
Since 1948 the country's governing class, the political elite, had been dominated by Afrikaners. Afrikaners held most high positions in government, including the legislature, the judiciary, the cabinet, and the senior ranks of the military and security services. Afrikaners also came to dominate the larger community of leaders, the power elite, by assuming important roles in the civil service bureaucracy, and to a lesser extent in business, the universities, and the media. Afrikaner dominance was reinforced by the rules of apartheid, in large part because the government's security and intelligence services helped to enforce the rules of apartheid through other institutions.
In general, during the apartheid era, English-speaking whites were less important in the political and power elites. They played only secondary roles in most areas of government. English speakers were, nevertheless, prominent in commerce and industry, where the Afrikaners' success had lagged behind their political achievements, as is explained by Thompson and Prior. By the 1980s, English-speaking whites also held important positions in universities and the media, and in a few areas of government.
In the early 1990s, these political and power elites were evolving, as is demonstrated in the authoritative survey of elites, Who's Who in South African Politics, by the South African writer Shelagh Gastrow. Gastrow divided South Africa's dominant political leaders into four major categories: political leaders within the Afrikaner community, most associated with the NP; an older generation of black opposition leaders, most within the ANC; a younger generation of leaders emerging from the Black Consciousness Movement; and a new group of labor leaders who had risen to prominence as the trade union movement strengthened during the 1970s and 1980s. A fifth category might be added--according to South African political scientist Roger Southall, who reviewed Gastrow's book--the small number of white political leaders who attempted to reshape white politics along nonracial, democratic lines.
A subsequent revised edition of Gastrow's book identified 118 individuals--110 men and only eight women--as constituting South Africa's evolving political elite in 1992. Among the obvious changes occurring at that time was the emergence of formerly imprisoned, exiled, or banned opposition leaders, who had been released from prison or had been legally recognized since early 1990. They could then be legally quoted in the country's media, and their ideas were being widely disseminated. In addition, new challengers arose to replace formerly entrenched leaders, especially conservative blacks, coloureds, and Indians who had gained office through various forms of state patronage in the black homelands or in other institutions of government.
Changes were also occurring within the senior ranks of the organizations from which the country's new leaders had emerged. As the ANC, for example, was forced to cooperate with former opponents, especially the NP, in pursuing national goals, new alliances and friendships were formed, shaped in part by a pragmatic appraisal of the political realities of the time. In addition, former opposition groups--especially the ANC--began to revise their rhetoric from that of guerrilla opponents of government, or "states in exile," to adapt to their new positions of responsibility. The ANC's best educated, skilled technocrats, capable of managing governmental and other bureaucracies, were gaining particular prominence.
At the same time, a greater distance was developing between these educated elites and the less educated rank-and-file within their own organizations. In particular, there was a growing distance between the ANC and its radical youth wing in late 1994 and 1995. There was also a growing distance between the ANC leadership and their former ally, the South African Communist Party (SACP). Ties between these two organizations had not only been close in the past; their membership and leadership rolls had overlapped.
In some cases, the new elites appeared to have more in common with members of rival political organizations than with their organization's own members. Several new government leaders, for example, were drawn from traditional African elites--royal families, chiefs, and influential clans. President Mandela, while a university-trained lawyer, is also a descendant of a leading family among the Thembu (Tembu), a Xhosa subgroup. Like Mandela, the prominent Zulu leader and minister of home affairs, Mangosuthu (Gatsha) Buthelezi, is university-educated and the product of aristocratic origins. Buthelezi, a member of the Zulu royal family, is also a chief within the Buthelezi sub-group (also, "tribe") of the Zulu.
Other members of South Africa's new government also represent ethnic elites. For example, the minister of public enterprises in 1995, Stella Sigcau, is the daughter of a well-known Pondo paramount chief, Botha Sigcau. Stella Sigcau also had served as chief minister in the Transkei government during the early 1980s.
Many former ANC officials who were in government office in the mid-1990s had worked to overcome factional differences based on ethnicity during the apartheid era. Although the ANC is often stereotyped as "Xhosa-dominated," and a number of its officers are Xhosa, several ethnic groups have been represented in the ANC's senior ranks. Thomas Nkobi, treasurer general from 1973 through the early 1990s, represents a subgroup within the Zimbabwe-based Shona people. Former Secretary General Cyril Ramaphosa and National Working Committee member Sydney Mufamadi are Venda (VaVenda--see Ethnic Groups and Language, ch. 2). Ramaphosa's former deputy, Jacob Zuma, is one of several Zulu leaders who rose to prominence within the ANC. The ANC's former security and intelligence specialist, Patrick "Terror" Lekota, and former MK leader Joe Modise are Sotho (BaSotho). Several popular regional leaders are Tswana (BaTswana). In general, these leaders have rejected arguments that favored the use of ethnicity to define political factions.
Age differences appeared more divisive than ethnicity within the ANC during the early and the mid-1990s. There were heated debates over questions of political succession, as the ANC's aging leaders--many over the age of seventy--faced challenges from the generations below them. Nelson Mandela was seventy-five years old when he was elected president in 1994, and several other ANC leaders were more than seventy years of age. Their most likely successors--especially Mbeki, Ramaphosa, Zuma, and the ANC's former director of intelligence, "Mac" Maharaj--were roughly two decades younger. Some of the ANC's younger militants threatened revolt against senior party figures in the early months of the new government, as their demands for jobs, homes, and improved living standards continued to be unmet. Criticism of the "older generation" was fueled in late 1994 and early 1995, when the president's former wife, Winnie Mandela, clashed with the government and was ousted as a deputy minister, as she championed the grievances of the ANC's militant youth.
As the apartheid system was being dismantled, some members of the Afrikaner elite in government, the civil service, and the security services reacted with impressive flexibility. By adapting quickly to the new environment, many of them not only retained their valued positions in the bureaucracy but also won new respect from former adversaries. As the ANC assumed responsibility for the security establishment, the police, and the intelligence services, ANC leaders were often able to work closely and cooperatively with Afrikaners who had once been so effective in excluding blacks from the political process.
The shift in power and influence among the country's political elites had begun well before the April 1994 elections. An important arena in which this power shift occurred was that of the political negotiations concerning the interim constitution of 1993. During those negotiations, as difficult and unpromising as they sometimes appeared, then-governing whites began, some for the first time, to view their black counterparts as legitimate partners in the decision-making process. At the same time, many black leaders adjusted smoothly to the new climate of political tolerance.
More about the Government of South Africa.
Source: U.S. Library of Congress
Since 1948 the country's governing class, the political elite, had been dominated by Afrikaners. Afrikaners held most high positions in government, including the legislature, the judiciary, the cabinet, and the senior ranks of the military and security services. Afrikaners also came to dominate the larger community of leaders, the power elite, by assuming important roles in the civil service bureaucracy, and to a lesser extent in business, the universities, and the media. Afrikaner dominance was reinforced by the rules of apartheid, in large part because the government's security and intelligence services helped to enforce the rules of apartheid through other institutions.
In general, during the apartheid era, English-speaking whites were less important in the political and power elites. They played only secondary roles in most areas of government. English speakers were, nevertheless, prominent in commerce and industry, where the Afrikaners' success had lagged behind their political achievements, as is explained by Thompson and Prior. By the 1980s, English-speaking whites also held important positions in universities and the media, and in a few areas of government.
In the early 1990s, these political and power elites were evolving, as is demonstrated in the authoritative survey of elites, Who's Who in South African Politics, by the South African writer Shelagh Gastrow. Gastrow divided South Africa's dominant political leaders into four major categories: political leaders within the Afrikaner community, most associated with the NP; an older generation of black opposition leaders, most within the ANC; a younger generation of leaders emerging from the Black Consciousness Movement; and a new group of labor leaders who had risen to prominence as the trade union movement strengthened during the 1970s and 1980s. A fifth category might be added--according to South African political scientist Roger Southall, who reviewed Gastrow's book--the small number of white political leaders who attempted to reshape white politics along nonracial, democratic lines.
A subsequent revised edition of Gastrow's book identified 118 individuals--110 men and only eight women--as constituting South Africa's evolving political elite in 1992. Among the obvious changes occurring at that time was the emergence of formerly imprisoned, exiled, or banned opposition leaders, who had been released from prison or had been legally recognized since early 1990. They could then be legally quoted in the country's media, and their ideas were being widely disseminated. In addition, new challengers arose to replace formerly entrenched leaders, especially conservative blacks, coloureds, and Indians who had gained office through various forms of state patronage in the black homelands or in other institutions of government.
Changes were also occurring within the senior ranks of the organizations from which the country's new leaders had emerged. As the ANC, for example, was forced to cooperate with former opponents, especially the NP, in pursuing national goals, new alliances and friendships were formed, shaped in part by a pragmatic appraisal of the political realities of the time. In addition, former opposition groups--especially the ANC--began to revise their rhetoric from that of guerrilla opponents of government, or "states in exile," to adapt to their new positions of responsibility. The ANC's best educated, skilled technocrats, capable of managing governmental and other bureaucracies, were gaining particular prominence.
At the same time, a greater distance was developing between these educated elites and the less educated rank-and-file within their own organizations. In particular, there was a growing distance between the ANC and its radical youth wing in late 1994 and 1995. There was also a growing distance between the ANC leadership and their former ally, the South African Communist Party (SACP). Ties between these two organizations had not only been close in the past; their membership and leadership rolls had overlapped.
In some cases, the new elites appeared to have more in common with members of rival political organizations than with their organization's own members. Several new government leaders, for example, were drawn from traditional African elites--royal families, chiefs, and influential clans. President Mandela, while a university-trained lawyer, is also a descendant of a leading family among the Thembu (Tembu), a Xhosa subgroup. Like Mandela, the prominent Zulu leader and minister of home affairs, Mangosuthu (Gatsha) Buthelezi, is university-educated and the product of aristocratic origins. Buthelezi, a member of the Zulu royal family, is also a chief within the Buthelezi sub-group (also, "tribe") of the Zulu.
Other members of South Africa's new government also represent ethnic elites. For example, the minister of public enterprises in 1995, Stella Sigcau, is the daughter of a well-known Pondo paramount chief, Botha Sigcau. Stella Sigcau also had served as chief minister in the Transkei government during the early 1980s.
Many former ANC officials who were in government office in the mid-1990s had worked to overcome factional differences based on ethnicity during the apartheid era. Although the ANC is often stereotyped as "Xhosa-dominated," and a number of its officers are Xhosa, several ethnic groups have been represented in the ANC's senior ranks. Thomas Nkobi, treasurer general from 1973 through the early 1990s, represents a subgroup within the Zimbabwe-based Shona people. Former Secretary General Cyril Ramaphosa and National Working Committee member Sydney Mufamadi are Venda (VaVenda--see Ethnic Groups and Language, ch. 2). Ramaphosa's former deputy, Jacob Zuma, is one of several Zulu leaders who rose to prominence within the ANC. The ANC's former security and intelligence specialist, Patrick "Terror" Lekota, and former MK leader Joe Modise are Sotho (BaSotho). Several popular regional leaders are Tswana (BaTswana). In general, these leaders have rejected arguments that favored the use of ethnicity to define political factions.
Age differences appeared more divisive than ethnicity within the ANC during the early and the mid-1990s. There were heated debates over questions of political succession, as the ANC's aging leaders--many over the age of seventy--faced challenges from the generations below them. Nelson Mandela was seventy-five years old when he was elected president in 1994, and several other ANC leaders were more than seventy years of age. Their most likely successors--especially Mbeki, Ramaphosa, Zuma, and the ANC's former director of intelligence, "Mac" Maharaj--were roughly two decades younger. Some of the ANC's younger militants threatened revolt against senior party figures in the early months of the new government, as their demands for jobs, homes, and improved living standards continued to be unmet. Criticism of the "older generation" was fueled in late 1994 and early 1995, when the president's former wife, Winnie Mandela, clashed with the government and was ousted as a deputy minister, as she championed the grievances of the ANC's militant youth.
As the apartheid system was being dismantled, some members of the Afrikaner elite in government, the civil service, and the security services reacted with impressive flexibility. By adapting quickly to the new environment, many of them not only retained their valued positions in the bureaucracy but also won new respect from former adversaries. As the ANC assumed responsibility for the security establishment, the police, and the intelligence services, ANC leaders were often able to work closely and cooperatively with Afrikaners who had once been so effective in excluding blacks from the political process.
The shift in power and influence among the country's political elites had begun well before the April 1994 elections. An important arena in which this power shift occurred was that of the political negotiations concerning the interim constitution of 1993. During those negotiations, as difficult and unpromising as they sometimes appeared, then-governing whites began, some for the first time, to view their black counterparts as legitimate partners in the decision-making process. At the same time, many black leaders adjusted smoothly to the new climate of political tolerance.
More about the Government of South Africa.
Source: U.S. Library of Congress
Syria conflict: 'Scores of bodies found' near Damascus
Syrian opposition activists say scores of bodies have been found in a town near the capital Damascus, accusing government troops of "massacre". The activists say many of the victims in the town of Daraya had been "summarily executed". One unconfirmed report said more than 200 bodies were discovered in houses and basement shelters. Without commenting on the activists' claim, Syrian state TV said Daraya was being "purified of terrorist remnants".
'House-to-house' raids
The forces of President Bashar al-Assad launched an assault on the town on Saturday, after days of heavy bombardment. Activists on the ground later posted video footage on the internet, which apparently showed numerous bodies in the Abu Auleiman al-Darani mosque. The activists say that many of the victims had gunshot wounds to the head and chest and were killed during house-to-house raids by government troops. "Assad's army has committed a massacre in Daraya," an opposition member in Deraa told Reuters. The activist added that most of the victims had been killed from close range, and some died from sniper fire.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a UK-based opposition activist group, had earlier put the number of dead in Deraa at more than 120 for this week alone. The claims by the activists have not been independently verified because of restrictions placed on on foreign media across Syria.
Failed ceasefire
In a separate development, the head of the UN mission to Syria left the country after the mission had been wound up. Senegalese Lt Gen Babacar Gaye joined a UN convoy to Lebanon on Saturday. Last week, the UN decided against extending the mission, which was originally part of a six-point peace plan for Syria. However, the ceasefire mandated by the plan never took hold and rising violence forced the UN monitors to be confined to their hotels since June.
Source: BBC News
'House-to-house' raids
The forces of President Bashar al-Assad launched an assault on the town on Saturday, after days of heavy bombardment. Activists on the ground later posted video footage on the internet, which apparently showed numerous bodies in the Abu Auleiman al-Darani mosque. The activists say that many of the victims had gunshot wounds to the head and chest and were killed during house-to-house raids by government troops. "Assad's army has committed a massacre in Daraya," an opposition member in Deraa told Reuters. The activist added that most of the victims had been killed from close range, and some died from sniper fire.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a UK-based opposition activist group, had earlier put the number of dead in Deraa at more than 120 for this week alone. The claims by the activists have not been independently verified because of restrictions placed on on foreign media across Syria.
Failed ceasefire
In a separate development, the head of the UN mission to Syria left the country after the mission had been wound up. Senegalese Lt Gen Babacar Gaye joined a UN convoy to Lebanon on Saturday. Last week, the UN decided against extending the mission, which was originally part of a six-point peace plan for Syria. However, the ceasefire mandated by the plan never took hold and rising violence forced the UN monitors to be confined to their hotels since June.
Source: BBC News
Saturday, August 25, 2012
British bank HSBC in money laundering probe
US prosecutors probing whether HSBC was involved in laundering money for Mexican drug cartels and moving cash for Saudi banks tied to terrorists. The New York Times reported Saturday.
Citing unnamed federal authorities with direct knowledge of the investigations, the newspaper said the investigators were also probing whether HSBC circumvented US law by transferring money through its American subsidiary for sanctioned nations, including Iran, Sudan and North Korea.
Last month, HSBC announced that its Mexico unit had paid a fine totalling $27.5-million to Mexico's banking regulators for breaching anti-money laundering controls.
Earlier, HSBC apologised and a senior executive resigned after US lawmakers accused Europe's biggest bank of giving Iran, terrorists and drug dealers access to America's financial system. In a 330-page report, the US Senate found the lender allowed affiliates in countries such as Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh to move billions of dollars in suspect funds into the United States without adequate controls. The report said HSBC's Mexican affiliate "transported $7.0 billion in physical US dollars to HBUS from 2007 to 2008… raising red flags that the volume of dollars included proceeds from illegal drug sales in the United States." According to The Times, eager to resolve the investigation, HSBC reached out to federal prosecutors in July in hopes of securing a settlement by September.
But officials said a settlement in the next couple of weeks was highly unlikely, the paper pointed out. – Sapa-AFP
Source: Mail & Guardian
Citing unnamed federal authorities with direct knowledge of the investigations, the newspaper said the investigators were also probing whether HSBC circumvented US law by transferring money through its American subsidiary for sanctioned nations, including Iran, Sudan and North Korea.
Last month, HSBC announced that its Mexico unit had paid a fine totalling $27.5-million to Mexico's banking regulators for breaching anti-money laundering controls.
Earlier, HSBC apologised and a senior executive resigned after US lawmakers accused Europe's biggest bank of giving Iran, terrorists and drug dealers access to America's financial system. In a 330-page report, the US Senate found the lender allowed affiliates in countries such as Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh to move billions of dollars in suspect funds into the United States without adequate controls. The report said HSBC's Mexican affiliate "transported $7.0 billion in physical US dollars to HBUS from 2007 to 2008… raising red flags that the volume of dollars included proceeds from illegal drug sales in the United States." According to The Times, eager to resolve the investigation, HSBC reached out to federal prosecutors in July in hopes of securing a settlement by September.
But officials said a settlement in the next couple of weeks was highly unlikely, the paper pointed out. – Sapa-AFP
Source: Mail & Guardian
Friday, August 24, 2012
Politicking among police
Concerns over the politicisation of the criminal justice system were first raised over the Mbeki administration's investigation of Jacob Zuma.
Now, under a Zuma presidency, concern has congealed into dread as his appointments to the prosecution service have injected political poison into the state's most sensitive independent organs.
First came the appointment of the hopelessly compromised Menzi Simelane as national director of public prosecutions. Then came Willem Heath's return to the Special Investigating Unit. His political agenda was so transparent he blurted it out in the media and had to go.
Next was Lawrence Mrwebi, chosen to head the Specialised Commercial Crime unit. Mrwebi is a fallible man who had been deeply embroiled in efforts to shut down the Scorpions.
In December last year, when Simelane was beginning to test his leash, the Supreme Court of Appeal declared his appointment invalid, allowing Zuma to appoint a stand-in candidate arguably as deeply partial as Heath: Nomgcobo Jiba.
In 2007 Jiba was suspended for her role in trying to procure the arrest of then-Gauteng Scorpions boss Gerrie Nel. Richard Mdluli came to her defence, alleging she had been assisting police with an intelligence-driven investigation of the Scorpions. The justice minister weighed in to query her case and after Zuma took power she was reinstated.
Intelligence
Since December last year, Jiba and Mrwebi have acted like a tag team to take on politically sensitive cases. In the Mdluli case, Mrwebi ordered the withdrawal of fraud charges, relying, in part, on undisclosed "intelligence".
Jiba followed that punch with the suspension of prosecutor Glynnis Breytenbach, who wanted to pursue charges against Mdluli and was central to a politically sensitive investigation of alleged fraud in the acquisition of mining rights at Sishen. Next came the withdrawal of charges against Zuma backers and KwaZulu-Natal MECs Mike Mabuyakhulu and Peggy Nkonyeni in the "amigos" corruption case.
Today we report on further damaging allegations of Mrwebi's meddling in a case whose implications are as yet obscure. All we know is the man Mrwebi allegedly tried to protect is someone whose business it was to know the dirty secrets of the National Prosecuting Authority's provincial office.
The poison is now at the heart of the system.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Now, under a Zuma presidency, concern has congealed into dread as his appointments to the prosecution service have injected political poison into the state's most sensitive independent organs.
First came the appointment of the hopelessly compromised Menzi Simelane as national director of public prosecutions. Then came Willem Heath's return to the Special Investigating Unit. His political agenda was so transparent he blurted it out in the media and had to go.
Next was Lawrence Mrwebi, chosen to head the Specialised Commercial Crime unit. Mrwebi is a fallible man who had been deeply embroiled in efforts to shut down the Scorpions.
In December last year, when Simelane was beginning to test his leash, the Supreme Court of Appeal declared his appointment invalid, allowing Zuma to appoint a stand-in candidate arguably as deeply partial as Heath: Nomgcobo Jiba.
In 2007 Jiba was suspended for her role in trying to procure the arrest of then-Gauteng Scorpions boss Gerrie Nel. Richard Mdluli came to her defence, alleging she had been assisting police with an intelligence-driven investigation of the Scorpions. The justice minister weighed in to query her case and after Zuma took power she was reinstated.
Intelligence
Since December last year, Jiba and Mrwebi have acted like a tag team to take on politically sensitive cases. In the Mdluli case, Mrwebi ordered the withdrawal of fraud charges, relying, in part, on undisclosed "intelligence".
Jiba followed that punch with the suspension of prosecutor Glynnis Breytenbach, who wanted to pursue charges against Mdluli and was central to a politically sensitive investigation of alleged fraud in the acquisition of mining rights at Sishen. Next came the withdrawal of charges against Zuma backers and KwaZulu-Natal MECs Mike Mabuyakhulu and Peggy Nkonyeni in the "amigos" corruption case.
Today we report on further damaging allegations of Mrwebi's meddling in a case whose implications are as yet obscure. All we know is the man Mrwebi allegedly tried to protect is someone whose business it was to know the dirty secrets of the National Prosecuting Authority's provincial office.
The poison is now at the heart of the system.
Source: Mail & Guardian
South Africa 1960 – 1994
a) Political, economic and social factors contributing to the end of apartheid
The policy of total strategy or counter-revolution as it became known did not stop the anti-apartheid groups such as the ANC, PAC and UDF (United Democratic Front) from protesting for political and social equality for all races in South Africa. Poverty for blacks continued in the townships and homelands. Unemployment was on the rise due to sanctions, and education and housing were still of a third world standard.
The state of emergency failed to make South Africa safer for whites. Many whites were suffering loss of liberties under the censorship and rigid laws of the military state. Moreover, the ANC in exile continued to attack ‘soft targets’ in South Africa including shopping centres and post offices. Many whites were becoming disillusioned with apartheid and feeling the rejection of their society and culture by the rest of the world. Many Coloureds and Indians were becoming openly defiant of the white state demanding nothing short of full democracy for South Africa.
The United Democratic Front (UDF)
In 1983 a multi-racial party, the United Democratic Front was formed with the aim of uniting all resistance groups in the fight against apartheid. The UDF was highly successful because its members became a uniting force and it had many high profile members, including church leaders such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu. The UDF supporters also include ANC members such as Winnie Mandela. By 1985 the UDF gained over two million members and was a powerful force in demanding the immediate end to apartheid.
The gradual reforms of the Botha government, delivered no real change in South Africa, only cosmetic changes. South Africa could not change and embrace the modern world while apartheid existed. Many white South Africans and politicians began to feel that apartheid was like ‘living on the back of a tiger and they needed to find a way off without being eaten’.1
b) International factors contributing to the end of apartheid
By 1988 the cost of running the military state was staggering and the economic performance of South Africa was poor. Sanctions had driven the economy into recession; ‘sanction busting’ was failing to fix the problem. South Africa was unable to obtain foreign loans or foreign investment. 2
The impact of the Free Mandela Campaign, sporting sanctions, severe international criticism, military and technical equipment embargos and isolation by other African nations in the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) was crippling South Africa. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 removed the Communist threat which underpinned the existence of apartheid since the end of the Second World War. Festering social, political and economic grievances in all sectors of the South African population left the preservation of apartheid completely untenable by the start of 1990s.
c) Problems facing the National Party and the ANC in the transition to democracy in South Africa
In 1984 during townships riots, P.W. Botha declared, ‘I’m giving you a final warning; one man, one vote in this country is out-that is never!”.3 In 1989 after a mild stroke and the failure of Total Strategy, he resigned as President of South Africa. Botha was replaced by F.W.de Klerk.
On 2 February 1990, de Klerk opened Parliament, and in his maiden speech as President began dismantling the apartheid state. He rescinded the ban on the ANC, the PAC, the South African Communist Party and thirty other political organizations. He freed political prisoners and suspended the death sentence. On the 11 of November de Klerk released Nelson Mandela from prison4. South Africa would have one man one vote.
The transition to democracy was a challenging task. Some historians have called it a ‘miracle’. Both the National Party and the ANC struggled to keep South Africa from sliding into civil war in the early 1990s. Meetings were held to lay out South Africa’s new Democracy entitled A Convention for Democratic South Africa (CODESSA). It was in the CODESSA meetings, that the National Party and the ANC debated their differing visions of democracy. CODESSA 1 ended when the ANC walked out of negotiations5. Finally CODESSA II was able to pave the way for a new constitution and a national election.
Problems facing the National Party
- The traditional rulers of South Africa wanted to hold to power as long as possible. They wanted ‘one man, one vote’ to eventuate slowly to protect the white minority.
- Right Wing extremists’ elements including the AWB (Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging) vowed to prevent free elections and assassinate Nelson Mandela. They also wanted to create an Afrikaner homeland.
- Other white extremists were also letting off bombs and interrupting official democracy meetings such as CODESSA.
Problems facing the ANC
The ANC faced a number of difficulties:
- First in dealing with the National Party and with other anti-apartheid parties, especially Inkatha (a political organisation made up of Zulus from the Natal Province)
- The ANC wanted one person, one vote multiracial democracy immediately, and many of its members were understandably anxious to embrace democracy for the first time.
- In Natal/KwaZulu Province Chief Buthelezi of Inkatha refused to have anything to do with constitutional negotiations and savage violence between ANC members and Inkatha broke out. This included the assassination of Chris Hani, a national hero of the ANC and member of the South Africa Communist Party. Only a prompt appeal to the nation by Mandela averted a massive reaction.
- The ANC seemed to be losing control of its political base. Many feared that extremist whites were supplying Inkatha with weapons and instigating the fighting between rival black political groups, to prevent South Africa’s march towards democracy.
South Africa’s first democratic Election 27th April 1994
South Africans of all races turned out determined to vote in their first non-racial election on the 27th of April 1994. People lined up in long queues which stretched for miles to cast their historic ballot. The ANC won the election and Nelson Mandela, after spending almost three decades in jail, became President of a free South Africa, F.W. de Klerk became the Deputy President.
At his inauguration as President on the vast lawn of the Union Building in Pretoria Mandela said:
‘Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by another… The sun will never set on so glorious a human achievement. Let freedom reign. God bless Africa’.6
Source: NSW HSC Online http://hsc.csu.edu.au © NSW Department of Education and Communities, and Charles Sturt University, 2011
The unions, the pseudo-left and the South Africa massacre
The massacre of 34 striking workers at Lonmin’s Marikana mine in South Africa has cast into sharp relief the role of the official trade unions, in South Africa and internationally, amid a global upsurge of the class struggle.
A river of blood now separates the miners from the National Union of Mineworkers—the central component of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which is closely aligned with the African National Congress (ANC) government. The NUM has revealed itself as a tool of state repression and murder.
The eruption of working class anger against the giant mine owners has put workers in direct conflict with the organizations that supposedly represent them. After the massacre, NUM General Secretary Frans Baleni demanded that “all workers to go back to work and for the law enforcement agencies to crack down on the culprits of the violence and murders”—which, according to the NUM, are the workers themselves.
The conflict between the working class and the NUM does not stop at Marikana. The mining industry site mineweb.com wrote recently, “What is particularly worrying here is that the miners are bypassing the NUM, suggesting a total lack of trust in the traditional mining union setup. The NUM appears to be being seen as a vassal of the ruling African National Congress political party—i.e., part of the new South African establishment.”
This alignment of forces—in which the unions fall in behind the corporations and the government—is international in scope. So too is the growing rebellion of workers against these right-wing, pro-corporate institutions, as the ruling class carries out an international program of social counter-revolution.
In Europe, wherever struggles have escaped from the confines of actions officially sanctioned by the unions, the unions have collaborated with the government in repressing them. During the strike of Spanish air traffic controllers in 2010, the government called out the military to break the strike, with the support of the unions and their political allies.
In the United States, a series of significant struggles have erupted over the past two years in opposition to the AFL-CIO, as workers have sought to fight the corporate attack on jobs and benefits now spearheaded by the Obama administration.
In 2010, workers in Indianapolis, Indiana overwhelmingly rejected a 50 percent wage cut backed by the United Auto Workers, driving out union executives from a local meeting. A section of workers formed an independent rank-and-file committee to organize a fight to defend jobs and wages. A few months before, auto workers erupted in a near-riot against UAW officials supporting the closure of the NUMMI plant in Fremont, California.
Just last week, workers at the Chrysler Dundee Engine plant in Michigan, angered by forced overtime and two-tier wages, voted overwhelmingly against a local contract, to the surprise and anger of management and the UAW. Where struggles have broken out under union control—as in the strike of Caterpillar workers in Joliet, Illinois—workers quickly came up against the fact that the union works for their isolation and defeat.
These events powerfully confirm the analysis made by the International Committee of the Fourth International of the nature of the trade unions. In 1993, the Workers League, the predecessor of the Socialist Equality Party, explained that the degeneration of the trade unions was rooted in their nationalist and pro-capitalist perspective, which was undermined by the globalization of production and the breakdown of the post-war social order: “The role of these bureaucratic apparatuses in every country has been transformed from pressuring the employers and the state for concessions to the workers, to pressuring the workers for concessions to the employers so as to attract capital.”
At Marikana, the unions have moved from pressuring workers to open, violent repression. When circumstances require it, they will act the same way in Europe, the United States and beyond.
Workers’ efforts to break free of these institutions provoke the outrage not only of the corporate elite, but also of middle class organizations that posture as “left” or even socialist.
Typical is an article on the South Africa massacre published on August 21—after four days of silence—by the International Socialist Organization in the US. After cynically feigning sympathy with the workers and criticizing the NUM, the ISO makes clear that it is adamantly opposed to any attempt to break the stranglehold of this institution. The ISO even criticizes the NUM’s rival union, the more militant Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU).
“Without a doubt, the mining bosses are overjoyed at the sharpening discord between different wings of South Africa's labor movement,” the ISO writes. “And at times, AMCU leaders have been drawn into maneuvers that exacerbate the divisiveness that the mine bosses have hoped to foment.”
In fact, the mine companies are not “overjoyed” by “sharpening discord” between the unions, but desperately afraid that their NUM allies will lose control over the workers. The ISO makes clear that it too is determined to prevent “divisiveness”—i.e., working class opposition to the NUM.
A companion article, reprinted by the ISO from the South African journal Amandla!, denounces the AMCU for advancing “unrealistic demands” and “failing to condemn the violence of its members.” That is, the workers are themselves to blame for their deaths because they have the temerity to desire a decent wage.
Amandla!, closely aligned with the Democratic Left Front of South Africa, writes elsewhere that the “union’s role, once wage negotiations are complete, is to transmit the decision to the rest of the workforce.” And workers are supposed to accept this “transmission” without complaint.
The ISO and its international co-thinkers speak for privileged, complacent and reactionary sections of the upper middle class. For them, the unions are both a source of potentially lucrative careers and a mechanism to maintain organizational and political control over the working class—and thereby prevent any struggle against capitalism.
Whatever the hopes of the trade union executives and their allies, however, the objective crisis is driving millions of people along a different path—towards the formation of new organizations of struggle and towards socialist politics. The bloody events in South Africa have exposed the class lines, and they must become a strategic experience for the entire international working class.
Joseph Kishore
Source: World Socialist Web Site
A river of blood now separates the miners from the National Union of Mineworkers—the central component of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which is closely aligned with the African National Congress (ANC) government. The NUM has revealed itself as a tool of state repression and murder.
The eruption of working class anger against the giant mine owners has put workers in direct conflict with the organizations that supposedly represent them. After the massacre, NUM General Secretary Frans Baleni demanded that “all workers to go back to work and for the law enforcement agencies to crack down on the culprits of the violence and murders”—which, according to the NUM, are the workers themselves.
The conflict between the working class and the NUM does not stop at Marikana. The mining industry site mineweb.com wrote recently, “What is particularly worrying here is that the miners are bypassing the NUM, suggesting a total lack of trust in the traditional mining union setup. The NUM appears to be being seen as a vassal of the ruling African National Congress political party—i.e., part of the new South African establishment.”
This alignment of forces—in which the unions fall in behind the corporations and the government—is international in scope. So too is the growing rebellion of workers against these right-wing, pro-corporate institutions, as the ruling class carries out an international program of social counter-revolution.
In Europe, wherever struggles have escaped from the confines of actions officially sanctioned by the unions, the unions have collaborated with the government in repressing them. During the strike of Spanish air traffic controllers in 2010, the government called out the military to break the strike, with the support of the unions and their political allies.
In the United States, a series of significant struggles have erupted over the past two years in opposition to the AFL-CIO, as workers have sought to fight the corporate attack on jobs and benefits now spearheaded by the Obama administration.
In 2010, workers in Indianapolis, Indiana overwhelmingly rejected a 50 percent wage cut backed by the United Auto Workers, driving out union executives from a local meeting. A section of workers formed an independent rank-and-file committee to organize a fight to defend jobs and wages. A few months before, auto workers erupted in a near-riot against UAW officials supporting the closure of the NUMMI plant in Fremont, California.
Just last week, workers at the Chrysler Dundee Engine plant in Michigan, angered by forced overtime and two-tier wages, voted overwhelmingly against a local contract, to the surprise and anger of management and the UAW. Where struggles have broken out under union control—as in the strike of Caterpillar workers in Joliet, Illinois—workers quickly came up against the fact that the union works for their isolation and defeat.
These events powerfully confirm the analysis made by the International Committee of the Fourth International of the nature of the trade unions. In 1993, the Workers League, the predecessor of the Socialist Equality Party, explained that the degeneration of the trade unions was rooted in their nationalist and pro-capitalist perspective, which was undermined by the globalization of production and the breakdown of the post-war social order: “The role of these bureaucratic apparatuses in every country has been transformed from pressuring the employers and the state for concessions to the workers, to pressuring the workers for concessions to the employers so as to attract capital.”
At Marikana, the unions have moved from pressuring workers to open, violent repression. When circumstances require it, they will act the same way in Europe, the United States and beyond.
Workers’ efforts to break free of these institutions provoke the outrage not only of the corporate elite, but also of middle class organizations that posture as “left” or even socialist.
Typical is an article on the South Africa massacre published on August 21—after four days of silence—by the International Socialist Organization in the US. After cynically feigning sympathy with the workers and criticizing the NUM, the ISO makes clear that it is adamantly opposed to any attempt to break the stranglehold of this institution. The ISO even criticizes the NUM’s rival union, the more militant Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU).
“Without a doubt, the mining bosses are overjoyed at the sharpening discord between different wings of South Africa's labor movement,” the ISO writes. “And at times, AMCU leaders have been drawn into maneuvers that exacerbate the divisiveness that the mine bosses have hoped to foment.”
In fact, the mine companies are not “overjoyed” by “sharpening discord” between the unions, but desperately afraid that their NUM allies will lose control over the workers. The ISO makes clear that it too is determined to prevent “divisiveness”—i.e., working class opposition to the NUM.
A companion article, reprinted by the ISO from the South African journal Amandla!, denounces the AMCU for advancing “unrealistic demands” and “failing to condemn the violence of its members.” That is, the workers are themselves to blame for their deaths because they have the temerity to desire a decent wage.
Amandla!, closely aligned with the Democratic Left Front of South Africa, writes elsewhere that the “union’s role, once wage negotiations are complete, is to transmit the decision to the rest of the workforce.” And workers are supposed to accept this “transmission” without complaint.
The ISO and its international co-thinkers speak for privileged, complacent and reactionary sections of the upper middle class. For them, the unions are both a source of potentially lucrative careers and a mechanism to maintain organizational and political control over the working class—and thereby prevent any struggle against capitalism.
Whatever the hopes of the trade union executives and their allies, however, the objective crisis is driving millions of people along a different path—towards the formation of new organizations of struggle and towards socialist politics. The bloody events in South Africa have exposed the class lines, and they must become a strategic experience for the entire international working class.
Joseph Kishore
Source: World Socialist Web Site
Cato Manor cops appear in Durban court
An indictment against 30 police officers part of Cato Manor, described them as a crime enterprise that enriched itself by killing. Thirty police officers, who appeared in the Durban Regional Court, were an organised crime enterprise that enriched itself by killing, according to the indictment against them.
It described the Serious and Violent Crimes Unit (the original name for the Cato Manor branch of the Durban Organised Crime Unit) as an "enterprise", headed by KwaZulu-Natal Hawks' boss Johan Booysen.
"The unlawful activities of the enterprise began to manifest themselves from May 2008 to September 2011 through a pattern of racketeering activities," the state claimed in the indictment. " ... In some of their killings, the unlawful activities were motivated by the desire to enrich themselves through state monetary awards and/or certificates of excellent performance ...," it continued.
The policemen have been accused of obtaining financial benefits from associations, businesses and individuals which were in conflict with the people they allegedly killed.
The indictment did not provide details of how the officers enriched themselves, or of the benefits they were said to have received. According to the state, the officers acted with "common purpose", but it conceded it does not know "when and where the common purpose was formed".
The case against the officers—28 KwaZulu-Natal organised crime unit members and two National Intervention Unit (NIU) members—has been postponed until October 29 to allow the prosecution time to provide the men's legal team with documentation about the case.
According to the indictment, the policemen face two charges of racketeering, 19 of murder, one of attempted murder, nine of housebreaking, three of assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, and 25 of unlawful possession of a firearm. They also face 24 counts of unlawful possession of ammunition, six of theft, three of unlawfully pointing a firearm, one of malicious damage to property, and 23 of defeating the ends of justice.
Sue the state
On Friday morning, family and friends of the officers gathered outside the court building. The courtroom was packed to capacity and security guards had to refuse entry to some people.
The Mercury newspaper reported on Friday that charges against another two NIU members were withdrawn earlier this year. Dumisani Nzama and Vusi Ngondwana had since reportedly briefed a lawyer to sue the state. They were arrested in June with 18 Durban Organised Crime Unit members.
While their names were on the charge sheet at the first court appearance, they did not appear in court with the others. Shortly after that, journalists were told the charges against them had been withdrawn.
The Mercury reported that attorney Malcolm Lutge had confirmed he was representing Nzama and Ngondwana in a civil claim against Police Minister Nathi Mthethwa. The other 30 policemen are out on R5 000 bail each. Among them is the head of the Hawks in KwaZulu-Natal, Johan Booysen.
Independent Police Investigative Directorate spokesperson Moses Dlamini said Wednesday's arrests completed its investigations into the Cato Manor unit.
Source: Mail & Guardian
It described the Serious and Violent Crimes Unit (the original name for the Cato Manor branch of the Durban Organised Crime Unit) as an "enterprise", headed by KwaZulu-Natal Hawks' boss Johan Booysen.
"The unlawful activities of the enterprise began to manifest themselves from May 2008 to September 2011 through a pattern of racketeering activities," the state claimed in the indictment. " ... In some of their killings, the unlawful activities were motivated by the desire to enrich themselves through state monetary awards and/or certificates of excellent performance ...," it continued.
The policemen have been accused of obtaining financial benefits from associations, businesses and individuals which were in conflict with the people they allegedly killed.
The indictment did not provide details of how the officers enriched themselves, or of the benefits they were said to have received. According to the state, the officers acted with "common purpose", but it conceded it does not know "when and where the common purpose was formed".
The case against the officers—28 KwaZulu-Natal organised crime unit members and two National Intervention Unit (NIU) members—has been postponed until October 29 to allow the prosecution time to provide the men's legal team with documentation about the case.
According to the indictment, the policemen face two charges of racketeering, 19 of murder, one of attempted murder, nine of housebreaking, three of assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, and 25 of unlawful possession of a firearm. They also face 24 counts of unlawful possession of ammunition, six of theft, three of unlawfully pointing a firearm, one of malicious damage to property, and 23 of defeating the ends of justice.
Sue the state
On Friday morning, family and friends of the officers gathered outside the court building. The courtroom was packed to capacity and security guards had to refuse entry to some people.
The Mercury newspaper reported on Friday that charges against another two NIU members were withdrawn earlier this year. Dumisani Nzama and Vusi Ngondwana had since reportedly briefed a lawyer to sue the state. They were arrested in June with 18 Durban Organised Crime Unit members.
While their names were on the charge sheet at the first court appearance, they did not appear in court with the others. Shortly after that, journalists were told the charges against them had been withdrawn.
The Mercury reported that attorney Malcolm Lutge had confirmed he was representing Nzama and Ngondwana in a civil claim against Police Minister Nathi Mthethwa. The other 30 policemen are out on R5 000 bail each. Among them is the head of the Hawks in KwaZulu-Natal, Johan Booysen.
Independent Police Investigative Directorate spokesperson Moses Dlamini said Wednesday's arrests completed its investigations into the Cato Manor unit.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Wildcat strike over at Royal Bafokeng's platinum mine. How painless was that?
Just two days after it started, a wildcat strike at Royal Bafokeng Platinum’s mine just north of Rustenburg ended after the parties met. The lessons offered by Lonmin’s rival are as profound as they are simple. Never forget the little guy. By SIPHO HLONGWANE.
On Thursday, just 24 hours after Royal Bafokeng Platinum (RBPlat) confirmed in a statement that there was an unprotected industrial action at the north shaft of the Bafokeng Rasimone Platinum Joint-Venture, there was hardly any sign that anything untoward was happening outside the gates. People were moving in and out after the end of the morning shift and there was no sign of any tension or anger that might suggest that something was happening.
The only alert was a single police Casspir (armoured truck) that was parked some distance away from the gates. The security guard at the entrance of the mine said that members of the press were not permitted to enter the premises, but all striking miners were inside and holding a meeting with the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). RBPlat spokesperson Kea Kalebe confirmed the news.
By nightfall, people connected to the matter said that the strike was over, a deal had been reached to the satisfaction of all parties, and workers had in fact returned to their posts on Thursday.
What overshadowed the strike at BRPM was the violence a week before at the Marikana shaft of Lonmin PLC, which saw 44 people killed, 78 injured and some 260 arrested. On the morning of the meeting at BRPM, a fiery memorial service was being held at the Wonderkop squatter camp, located just outside Lonmin’s mine.
Speaking to a few RBPlat standing outside the gates made the impression that the strikes at Lonmin and Impala Platinum (Implats) before that were an inspiration for a few hundred workers to down tools at RBPlats. “Nabo bafuna R12,500,” said one lady. (They too want R12,500.) That figure has been a rallying cry at Lonmin, as angry workers demand to have their net wages more than tripled.
According to three employees interviewed at RBPlat (all of whom declined to be named), the strike at the north shaft was initiated by rock-drill operators, the same group of people at the centre of the ferment, but other types of workers then joined. Most drill operators are hired on a short-term basis, and they wanted to be employed permanently at the higher wage level.
NUM is the majority representative union at BRPM, and thus the bargaining partner to RBPlat. The Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union, for so long a headache for both NUM and mining companies elsewhere on the Bushveld Complex (site of 80% of the world’s platinum reserves), barely has a presence at this mine.
In an interview with Daily Maverick on Thursday night, the NUM local secretary Jeff Moleke said that the only unions present at the table was his, and the Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood and Allied Workers Union (Ceppwawu), which represents employees who work in the other areas of platinum production.
“We had a meeting today where the issues of the striking workers were raised. Ultimately we reached an agreement that means that the workers will go to work as from [Thursday],” Moleke said.
Without revealing the exact nature of the agreement, the NUM local secretary said that some of the complaints were dealt with right there at the table, but some solutions would happen in a staggered fashion.
One of the immediate interventions by RBPlat’s management was to lift the suspension of several striking miners.
“The situation was resolved to the satisfaction of all parties,” Moleke said. The violence at Implats and Lonmin was discussed and the workers were told that in a situation such as happened at the other two mines, where violence was ever-present, nobody would win.
“The issue of changing contracts to permanent employment was raised. Given the current economic conditions, management did not accede to that,” he said.
RBPlat could not be reached to confirm the end of the strike and the terms of the deal after the meeting ended late on Thursday.
The swift way in which RBPlat’s management responded to the wildcat strike stands in contradiction to the halting fashion in which Lonmin tried to deal with trouble at its mine. The small numbers of the striking workers along with the absence of a strong Amcu certainly helped; the immediate implementation of a timeline is what diffused the situation.
However, RBPlat’s real secret weapon is one long in the making, and shows how big a difference reaching out to uplift the lives of employees makes. Royal Bafokeng Holdings owns a 100% stake in Royal Bafokeng Platinum Holdings, which in turn owns 57% of RBPlats in partnership with Rustenburg Platinum Mines and publicly floated shares.
The RB Holdings company is an investment vehicle for the Royal Bafokeng nation, which mostly lives in Phokeng, near Rustenburg in the North West.
Platinum profits are invested in many social development programs, including infrastructure investments in all 29 Bafokeng villages, such as roads, street lighting, waste collection, electrification, and water provision. The dividends to the Bafokeng nation also fund healthcare delivery services, including ARV provision to more than 2,000 people and care for the elderly.
“Over the past three years, an ambitious education reform programme has been rolled out to 60+ schools in the region, including early childhood development, a 13th year programme for university-bound students, and a school nutrition programme,” said Susan Cook, an anthropologist working at the time as Research and Planning Executive in the office, in a separate interview with Daily Maverick.
The development of the Bafokeng Nation is measured against the Vision 2020, a guideline or set of principles that outlines short and long term plans for the Bafokeng nation. The plan seeks to make every member of the community self-sustained through education and skills provision.
The community buy-in is non-existent at Lonmin, where the workers complained that they were being fed into a machine with nothing to show for it. While RBPlats is a company created as an investment vehicle for the nation, and thus has an obvious social development mandate; and Lonmin is a company with shareholders in Britain, the latter’s failure to establish any sort of accord with workers or to invest in broad social development in the communities that worked in the mines would have ensured that there was zero trust to begin with. In such an atmosphere, big wage demands are not solved quickly and amicably. DM
Source: Daily Maverick
On Thursday, just 24 hours after Royal Bafokeng Platinum (RBPlat) confirmed in a statement that there was an unprotected industrial action at the north shaft of the Bafokeng Rasimone Platinum Joint-Venture, there was hardly any sign that anything untoward was happening outside the gates. People were moving in and out after the end of the morning shift and there was no sign of any tension or anger that might suggest that something was happening.
The only alert was a single police Casspir (armoured truck) that was parked some distance away from the gates. The security guard at the entrance of the mine said that members of the press were not permitted to enter the premises, but all striking miners were inside and holding a meeting with the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). RBPlat spokesperson Kea Kalebe confirmed the news.
By nightfall, people connected to the matter said that the strike was over, a deal had been reached to the satisfaction of all parties, and workers had in fact returned to their posts on Thursday.
What overshadowed the strike at BRPM was the violence a week before at the Marikana shaft of Lonmin PLC, which saw 44 people killed, 78 injured and some 260 arrested. On the morning of the meeting at BRPM, a fiery memorial service was being held at the Wonderkop squatter camp, located just outside Lonmin’s mine.
Speaking to a few RBPlat standing outside the gates made the impression that the strikes at Lonmin and Impala Platinum (Implats) before that were an inspiration for a few hundred workers to down tools at RBPlats. “Nabo bafuna R12,500,” said one lady. (They too want R12,500.) That figure has been a rallying cry at Lonmin, as angry workers demand to have their net wages more than tripled.
According to three employees interviewed at RBPlat (all of whom declined to be named), the strike at the north shaft was initiated by rock-drill operators, the same group of people at the centre of the ferment, but other types of workers then joined. Most drill operators are hired on a short-term basis, and they wanted to be employed permanently at the higher wage level.
NUM is the majority representative union at BRPM, and thus the bargaining partner to RBPlat. The Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union, for so long a headache for both NUM and mining companies elsewhere on the Bushveld Complex (site of 80% of the world’s platinum reserves), barely has a presence at this mine.
In an interview with Daily Maverick on Thursday night, the NUM local secretary Jeff Moleke said that the only unions present at the table was his, and the Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood and Allied Workers Union (Ceppwawu), which represents employees who work in the other areas of platinum production.
“We had a meeting today where the issues of the striking workers were raised. Ultimately we reached an agreement that means that the workers will go to work as from [Thursday],” Moleke said.
Without revealing the exact nature of the agreement, the NUM local secretary said that some of the complaints were dealt with right there at the table, but some solutions would happen in a staggered fashion.
One of the immediate interventions by RBPlat’s management was to lift the suspension of several striking miners.
“The situation was resolved to the satisfaction of all parties,” Moleke said. The violence at Implats and Lonmin was discussed and the workers were told that in a situation such as happened at the other two mines, where violence was ever-present, nobody would win.
“The issue of changing contracts to permanent employment was raised. Given the current economic conditions, management did not accede to that,” he said.
RBPlat could not be reached to confirm the end of the strike and the terms of the deal after the meeting ended late on Thursday.
The swift way in which RBPlat’s management responded to the wildcat strike stands in contradiction to the halting fashion in which Lonmin tried to deal with trouble at its mine. The small numbers of the striking workers along with the absence of a strong Amcu certainly helped; the immediate implementation of a timeline is what diffused the situation.
However, RBPlat’s real secret weapon is one long in the making, and shows how big a difference reaching out to uplift the lives of employees makes. Royal Bafokeng Holdings owns a 100% stake in Royal Bafokeng Platinum Holdings, which in turn owns 57% of RBPlats in partnership with Rustenburg Platinum Mines and publicly floated shares.
The RB Holdings company is an investment vehicle for the Royal Bafokeng nation, which mostly lives in Phokeng, near Rustenburg in the North West.
Platinum profits are invested in many social development programs, including infrastructure investments in all 29 Bafokeng villages, such as roads, street lighting, waste collection, electrification, and water provision. The dividends to the Bafokeng nation also fund healthcare delivery services, including ARV provision to more than 2,000 people and care for the elderly.
“Over the past three years, an ambitious education reform programme has been rolled out to 60+ schools in the region, including early childhood development, a 13th year programme for university-bound students, and a school nutrition programme,” said Susan Cook, an anthropologist working at the time as Research and Planning Executive in the office, in a separate interview with Daily Maverick.
The development of the Bafokeng Nation is measured against the Vision 2020, a guideline or set of principles that outlines short and long term plans for the Bafokeng nation. The plan seeks to make every member of the community self-sustained through education and skills provision.
The community buy-in is non-existent at Lonmin, where the workers complained that they were being fed into a machine with nothing to show for it. While RBPlats is a company created as an investment vehicle for the nation, and thus has an obvious social development mandate; and Lonmin is a company with shareholders in Britain, the latter’s failure to establish any sort of accord with workers or to invest in broad social development in the communities that worked in the mines would have ensured that there was zero trust to begin with. In such an atmosphere, big wage demands are not solved quickly and amicably. DM
Source: Daily Maverick
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