Alpha Conde in Paris: When You Steal an Election, the Opposition is Everywhere

Alpha Conde just finished a whirlwind tour of Brazil, Thailand and Malaysia. Before he returns to Guinea, he will make one more stop,in France, which perhaps will be his most important, and most tricky, visit yet. Conde hopes, and needs, to be received by France’s new president, Francois Hollande, but as of today, there is no such visit planned. Conde sent a message to congratulate Hollande for winning the election and, falling back on his “socialist” moniker, that is, if it ever applied, referenced their days as comrades and promised continued solidarity. It is unclear if Conde ever met Hollande.

Conde’s only political cheerleader in France is the former foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, who has been a close friend of his since they met in school. The successful theft of the Guinea presidency can be attributed to many, but none more than Bernard Kouchner, who managed the process, from soup to nuts, to install Alpha Conde at Sekoutoureya Palace.

Conde lived in France for 59 years and it appears that most Guineans are still not clear about his education and the line of work he pursued there. He is called “Professor,” but is this a legitimately acquired appellation? Regardless, one thing Guineans do know is that Conde cannot legitimately be called “President.”

After you steal an election, you get hit between the eyes with the fact that you don’t have a mandate to govern. Without a legislature, you rule by decree and the arrogance of your arbitrary decisions builds resentment among the people. Those that didn’t vote for you and who know you stole the election, know that, for the people of Guinea, it is best if you leave office. You dig in your heels and, when not churning out decrees, you busy yourself by ordering human rights abuses, including extra-judicial killings and illegal detentions. Your violations of the constitution mount, as do claims that you are a traitor, and the people begin to call for your immediate ouster. But this is what the big armies, the ethnic militias, and assorted security forces are for, right? When the number of people who want you ousted balloons and you wake up to a huge march, such as the one on May 10, with 80,000+ opposition supporters in the streets, you have no other card to play, but to send in the security forces and repress the marchers. You do your best to play down the significance of the march, but the pictures and videos correct your lies. There’s only one thing left, to ban political marches altogether, as happened a few weeks ago. The opposition counters by saying you cannot ban freedom of speech and assembly and that it does not recognize the ban. The final chapter is a dangerous scenario in which the opposition will march in Conakry and it will be met with any one, a combination, or all of the following: military, police, ethnic militias, Donzos, the RPG arc-en-ciel, and foreign mercenaries. The more you do to repel the opposition, the more people will demand your removal. So, Mr. Conde, you are in a repeating, downward spiral and now you find yourself in Paris at Kouchner’s dining table waiting for a call from the Elysee Palace. Regardless of what happens in France, you have a mess on your hands at home.

But, wait, many of your countrymen are in Paris ready to rally in support of you. In fact, the rumor is that $250,000 was allotted to make sure that Guineans are on the streets to cheer you and that others will be sent to provoke a conflict with another group of Guineans — those who didn’t vote for you, who know you stole the election, who know you will use ethnic hatred to try to destroy them and who plainly wish you would just stay in Paris, drinking wine with your buddy, Bernard.

Whether your supporters are successful in provoking an incident or not tomorrow, the story will be told through their placards saying you are a usurper, a thief, a liar, a killer, an all-purpose human rights abuser and an embezzler, and with pictures and videos of it, the world will be informed.

Enjoy your visit in France and, in case you miss the protest by your political opposition, Guinea Oye will make sure to cover it, pictures and all.

Opposition supporters will be protesting Conde in front of France’s National Assembly on Saturday, June 30, from 2:00 – 6:00 PM.

Source: Guinea Oye

Textbook crisis: Education department favoured dodgy tender

The education ministry was informed EduSolutions's contract was in breach of various regulations before using it as a supplier for school textbooks.

The Limpopo textbook crisis was created by the department of basic education's reluctance to bypass EduSolutions, despite sitting on a scathing legal opinion that found the politically connected textbook supply company's R320-million contract with Limpopo was "neither fair, equitable, transparent, competitive nor cost effective".

As early as January 17, the national department received a recommendation from senior counsel advocate Pat Ellis that the department had to order textbooks outside of the contract with EduSolutions, which he found was "probably invalid".

Instead, the department waited until early May to place the orders.

The Mail & Guardian has obtained an opinion given to state attorney John Ngoetjana by Ellis as early as January 17 this year that the EduSolutions contract was probably unconstitutional and in breach of treasury regulations and the Public Finance Management Act.

It recommended that the department use an urgency provision in treasury regulations to source the books from another supplier.

Basic education director general Bobby Soobrayan confirmed on Thursday that Minister of Basic Education Angie Motshekga had been informed of the legal opinion. "The minister would have been told of the opinion early," Soobrayan said.

The M&G has also seen a circular sent to Soobrayan and Limpopo's basic education minister Dickson Masemola by the former head of the department's intervention team in Limpopo, Anis Karodia.

He stated that the textbooks contract had been "allocated to a private company [EduSolutions] at an exorbitant tender price that had compromised the department" and that "the company is under investigation and we are not allowed to procure from the said company".

The M&G was unable to establish who is investigating EduSolutions.

It has also been reported that a departmental whistle-blower, Solly Tshitangano, alerted Motshekga in July last year to alleged irregularities in the textbooks tender. Tshitangano has been suspended for alleged misconduct related to procurement.

Despite this, Karodia terminated the EduSolutions contract only on April 26 this year and the national department waited until early May to place new book orders.

The main source of that delay appears to have been Motshekga, who assured EduSolutions on April 2 that everything was still in order and that the department would honour the contract.

EduSolutions director Moosa Ntimba told the M&G this week that it planned to bring a civil claim next week against the department for "monies outstanding" and "loss of profit", maintaining that "there was no indication from the minister [on April 2] that the contract would be terminated".

Ntimba said the company had "fully co-operated" with the department. He also disputed Karodia's criticism of the "exorbitant" tender price, saying the prices were agreed "between the government and publishers".

Last week, EduSolutions failed in an application to the North Gauteng High Court in Johannesburg to have the contract reinstated.

In his opinion, Ellis said he was "confident that a proper case can be made that the contract should be reviewed and declared void".

"I am therefore of the view that the department ought to procure school books for Limpopo in terms of the urgency provisions of … treasury regulations."

His opinion also makes it clear that he consulted two senior officials from the national education department.

Karodia took over the department's administration in December, which he described as a "free-for-all" (See "Intervention team uncovers 'massive mismanagement of funds'" below).

In particular, he noted that there appeared to be "a dominant force of members within the bid adjudicating committee and they receive instructions and pronouncements form influential staff regarding the awarding of tenders".

In late March or early April, EduSolutions lodged a complaint with Motshekga and Soobrayan about Karodia's conduct, claiming that his "verbal and written utterances were defamatory, unsubstantiated and subjective".

Later in May, Motshekga removed Karodia from his position. Soobrayan said that he was removed because he was a bad manager, was "argumentative" and "made allegations about the [provincial minister Masemola] which were embarrassing to the minister".

Soobrayan also said that Karodia had spoken directly to publishers while disregarding the EduSolutions contract.

Karodia has been quoted as saying that he wanted to terminate EduSolution's contract "as soon as the intervention team arrived in Limpopo", but that he faced resistance from the national department and Motshekga.

He told City Press last week: "Myself and [chief administrator] Monde Tom raised the issue with her [Motshekga]. She said, no, no, we have to buy from EduSolutions.

"After a month and a half, Soobrayan came down to Limpopo and said we should cancel the EduSolutions contract."

An education official, who asked not to be named, said that "if the department had terminated the contract early enough, we could have had the books in the schools by April or May".

Although Motshekga has tried to distance herself from the root causes of the textbook crisis, blaming it on administrative impediments, she was alerted to concern about the validity of EduSolution's contract as early as July last year.

The M&G has seen copies of correspondence sent to Motshekga on July 5 2011 by Tshitangano alerting her to alleged "irregular transactions in the Limpopo department of education".

Tshitangano was suspended in April 2011 on charges of misconduct broadly relating "to procurement issues that occurred in May 2010" when the department advertised a bid to outsource the procurement and distribution of pupil and teacher support material to schools in the province.

In a Labour Court affidavit, Tshitangano, who is claiming unfair dismissal, said that he raised several concerns regarding the bid adjudicating committee's decision to appoint EduSolutions as the preferred bidder.

According to Tshitangano, it was not clear on what basis the tender was awarded to EduSolutions, given that the competitive bidding process necessarily involved the assessment of tenders on a points-scoring system.

The bid committee simply indicated that of the 23 bids received, only one service provider met the criteria, obviating the need for scoring and extracting any comparative analysis between competitive bids.

Tshitangano said it was unclear whether any cost-benefit analysis for the services required was done before the bid was advertised.

He wrote to the head of the Limpopo education department, Bennie Boshielo, advising him to request that state law advisers and risk and supply-chain management from the treasury carry out a review. This never took place.

In his legal opinion, Ellis noted that no order had been placed for school books in Limpopo for 2012 and "position is critical, since the first school term is a day away and no school books have been ordered".

Describing the supply system provided for in the service-level agreement with EduSolutions, he noted that:

It allows all schools to buy the most expensive books, regardless of their quality or the need for them and without regard to budgetary constraints;
After negotiating the best deal with publishers, EduSolutions could keep 30% of any discount, passing on the balance to the department. However, this was not audited.
The arrangement lacked the benefit of an open tender – of procuring the product as cheaply and effectively as possible. "The contract has appropriated that benefit for the supplier and has deprived the department of that benefit," he said.



Ellis concluded that the agreement breached the stipulated legislation in that "the provincial department appears to have attempted (to contract) out of its obligation to manage demand, acquisition, logistics and risk and left those to be dealt with by the supplier."

Intervention team uncovers 'massive mismanagement of funds'
Confidential circulars penned by Anis Karodia, head of the intervention task team sent in by the national government, throw into mind-boggling relief the administrative chaos, financial mayhem, waste and plunder of public resources he unearthed in the Limpopo education department.

In two circulars dated March 12 and March 16 2012 and distributed to the head of the intervention unit, the treasury's Monde Tom, Limpopo's minister for education Dickson Masemola, the department's chief financial officer, Martin Mashaba, and the director general of basic education, Bobby Soobrayan, Karodia declared: "There is no doubt that there has been a massive mismanagement of funds."He also said that the department had "waded through the ­latter part of 2011-2012 in a state of bankruptcy".

He conservatively estimated budget overruns and misappropriation, stemming back to 2009, at R2.6-billion.

Salaries and compensation costs stood at 87% of the total yearly budget, leaving a miniscule amount for the delivery of education services.

Karodia said Mashaba and the department's entire "top-heavy" financial system was unqualified, unable to monitor spending and had "a disregard for" planning.

Senior managers had little understanding of the department and were "slow, cumbersome and lack … direction", whereas supervision was poor and managers were unavailable when important documentation and discussions were required.

In general, the staff did "not have the attitude or will to work". There was no sense of purpose, which had led to a "free-for-all".

Karodia said the "monetary quagmire" would have to be dealt with through the three-year medium-term framework and beyond in order to stabilise the department.

Among the consequences were that schools were starved of funding, services were not provided and service providers went unpaid.

He said the school nutrition ­programme in Limpopo, which feeds children from impoverished households, needed to be revived.

Other consequences of the crisis were:

More than R50-million was owed to transport service providers, who were effectively double-charging the department through the use of an approved payment system that charged per pupil and for running costs;

Department cellphone and landline bills, which Karodia described as "vulgar", were each running at about R1-million a month;

There was aimless and unnecessary travel by a host of officials;

Many schools had not paid their electricity bills;

There was unnecessary catering and abuse of the grocery budget;

Too many workshops and meetings were held while work remained incomplete and there was unnecessary training of senior staff who should already have had the correct competency;

There were excessive hotel stays; and

District and circular office support was poor and these offices also showed poor initiative in ­rolling out directives from the department.

Source: Mail & Guardian

A.N.C., Admitting Failures, Weighs How to Lift South Africans

During apartheid, in the coastal municipality of Overstrand, just east of Cape Town, whites lived in plush, seaside enclaves whereas blacks and mixed race people lived in ugly townships and shacks. Whites owned almost all the businesses, and had access to the best jobs, health care and schools.

Eighteen years after the end of apartheid, not much has changed, said Maurencia Gillion, a local politician who grew up and still lives in Overstrand.

“The rich white people live in their beautiful holiday homes,” Ms. Gillion said. “The rest are in slums, in squatter areas. Even after 18 years, in reality apartheid remains.”

That would seem a harsh critique of the party that has governed South Africa since the end of minority rule in 1994, the century-old African National Congress. It came not from an opposition leader, but one of the party’s own. Ms. Gillion is a senior A.N.C. leader in her province, and her words were simply an echo of what the party’s leader, President Jacob Zuma, said in a speech minutes earlier.

“The structure of the apartheid economy has remained largely intact,” Mr. Zuma said, in a speech to thousands of delegates to the A.N.C.’s policy conference, held every five years, before the presidential election, to work out the party’s platform. “The ownership of the economy is still primarily in the hands of white males, as it has always been.”

The four-day conference here, which began Tuesday, has been devoted to considerable soul-searching about what the A.N.C. has, and has not, achieved in 18 years in power. With unemployment at 25 percent, and much higher for young blacks, and corruption widespread, there is a growing perception that the A.N.C. has become the party of a small black elite interested only in its own enrichment. To counter this perception, the party has released a set of back-to-basics policy proposals that it claims will help deliver on its old election slogan: “A better life for all.”

The party’s own analysis had this to say about South Africa’s predicament nearly two decades after the end of apartheid: “Too few people work; the standard of education of most black learners is of poor quality; infrastructure is poorly located, under-maintained and insufficient to foster higher growth; spatial patterns exclude the poor from the fruits of development; the economy is overly and unsustainably resource-intensive; a widespread disease burden is compounded by a failing health system; public services are uneven and often of poor quality; corruption is widespread; and South Africa remains a divided society.”

Officials were quick to say that 18 years is a short time to reverse centuries of discrimination under colonial and apartheid rule that left black South Africans ill equipped to compete in a liberalized economy. And Mr. Zuma ticked off a list of major achievements: millions of new houses for the poor; millions more connected to the electric grid and piped water systems; and a growing and vibrant black middle class.

Embedded in the policy documents and Mr. Zuma’s remarks is an argument that the process of transforming the country’s economy to put more wealth in the hands of blacks was hampered by the need to make peace with the former white rulers.

“We had to make certain compromises in the national interest,” Mr. Zuma said. “We had to be cautious about restructuring the economy in order to maintain economic stability and confidence at the time. Thus the economic power relations of the apartheid era have remained intact.”

The party is thus proposing what it calls a “second transition,” this one focused on economic, rather than political, change.

The policy proposals take a hard look at some of the most difficult issues facing South Africa, and at the A.N.C.’s internal struggles. One asks whether the government should dispense with the current policy of land redistribution and replace it with a more aggressive one. Another contemplates nationalizing the country’s mines.

Taken together, the proposals would, if adopted, represent a sharp leftward shift for the A.N.C., which despite its roots has largely backed a free-market economy with minimal state intervention. The proposals are being discussed this week and will be decided upon when the party holds its convention in December.

Some A.N.C. members have been pushing for a more radical program of redistribution of wealth from whites to blacks. The party’s Youth League, under the firebrand leader Julius Malema, had demanded that gold, platinum and diamond mines be nationalized. Cosatu, an alliance of trade unions that is one of the A.N.C.’s main allies, has pushed for banks to be nationalized.

Yet, according to the A.N.C.’s own analysis, its failure to deliver economic progress may be its own fault. The party has experienced “a silent shift from transformative politics to palace politics wherein internal strife and factional battles over power and resources define the political life of the movement,” a far cry from its founding as a liberation movement built on socialist principles.

For all the fears of a leftward shift that could lead to the repossession of white-owned land, as happened in Zimbabwe, or the nationalization of mines, such moves are highly unlikely, said Steven Friedman, a political analyst at the Center for the Study of Democracy at the University of Johannesburg.

“There is going to be lots of fairly radical rhetoric, and the actual proposals are going to be actually quite meek and mild,” Mr. Friedman said. “This has been the pattern all along.”

Indeed, some delegates at the conference advocated a go-slow approach.

“I support the sharing of wealth, but I don’t think we should go for a radical approach,” said Tim Mkhari, a delegate from Limpopo, a province on the country’s northern edge.

“We should not take the Zimbabwe route,” he said.

Source: New York Times

It's Time to Engage Iran, Russia on Syria

The battle for Syria is best understood as the epicenter and early stages of a regional sectarian conflict, rather than the last days of President Bashar al-Assad.

The civil war in Syria should give pause to those who are fixated on a timeline for Assad's fall. The Syrian president has taken some hits in the past week but has settled in for a no-holds-barred fight to hold onto power. Absent a substantial military intervention by the US or others, the military balance remains with Assad, including in Aleppo, where anti-regime militias have made a major push to seize control. The security officials named to replace those killed last week are familiar hard liners and Assad loyalists. Assad's forces appear to have beaten back the rebels in Damascus. Syrian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Jihad Makdissi acknowledged Syria's possession of chemical weapons this week, described by experts as "probably the largest and most advanced" program in the Arab world, adding that that they will not be used "unless Syria is exposed to external aggression." This threat earned a rebuke from Russia but signaled that Assad has no plans to abdicate.

Another reason reports of Assad's demise may be premature is because of the regional power struggle that is playing out in Syria. The US has until now subcontracted the armed insurgency to the patronage of Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Many in the Gulf Cooperation Council states consider Syria a sectarian battlefield to check Iranian and Shiite power and influence. Assad is an Alawite, a sect of Shiism, as well as a key ally of Iran. Alawites represents approximately 12%, or 2.6 million, of Syria's 22 million people. The so-called Shia arc of Iranian influence also includes Lebanon, which is dominated by Hezbollah, and Iraq. Iran is not likely to give up the fight with the stakes so high. Assad also has a backer in Russia, which is unwilling for now to cede its influence in Syria. Moscow may believe that the worse things get, the more its influence grows, as only it holds the key to negotiations with the Syrian government.

The implications of Syria for Iraq cannot be understated. The New York Times reports today (July 25) that "The presence of jihadists in Syria has accelerated in recent days, in part because of a convergence with the sectarian tensions across the country's long border in Iraq." Iraq, which endured a brutal sectarian civil war after Saddam Hussein was deposed by US forces in 2003, has suffered a resurgence of terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda-linked Sunni extremists with both ideological and operational ties to a growing jihadist presence in Syria. The civil war in Syria also has consequences for Lebanon, which has already seen violence at its borders, as well as Turkey, Jordan and Israel.

The Obama Administration should be mindful of steps that might accentuate, rather than resolve, the Syrian civil war and its regional consequences. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said yesterday, July 24, that "we have to work closely with the opposition because more and more territory is being taken, and it will eventually result in a safe haven inside Syria, which will then provide a base for further actions by the opposition."

The introduction of safe havens would open a new chapter in the Syrian conflict. On the one hand, safe havens would provide a base for humanitarian and refugee assistance, as well as for opposition activities. But there is a catch. Safe havens can also prolong rather than end the violence, creating a de facto partition and potentially increasing the prospects of the division or collapse of the state. A safe haven can also be a catalyst for mission creep, an enticement for further military intervention by the US and others, and facilitate an increase in the presence of foreign fighters, including terrorists.

If the US seeks to prevent Syria's collapse, reduce the prospects for further bloodshed and facilitate as stable a transition as possible, then Washington needs to open an urgent new diplomatic front with Russia and Iran, the two countries which retain the most leverage with Assad.

Only Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin has the clout with Assad to initiate a conversation about a transition. The US is frustrated that Russia has thwarted initiatives at the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Syria. The sanctions effort at the Security Council, it should be said, has mostly been a waste of American diplomatic energy and capital because of Russia's position and because of the likely ineffectiveness of these sanctions on Assad, who is preoccupied with crushing the insurgency.

Iran has offered to be part of international discussions on Syria, but this has so far been nixed by the United States. Washington may, like its Gulf allies, see Iran as on defense because of the pressure of international sanctions and the conflict in Syria, and therefore want to keep Iran on the defense. While Iran may be down, it is far from out, especially in Syria and given the stalled nuclear negotiations. Better to have Iran engaged in Syria through diplomacy than via subterfuge and proxies, such as Hezbollah.

The US has no easy options or answers in Syria. It begins with do no harm. As Syria's civil war is inseparable from the broader regional conflict, the US must have its own strategy that assures that Syria does not deteriorate and go the way of 2003 Iraq, and in the process take Iraq of 2012 and others along with it.

Source: IISS

African deal for mines is scrapped as valuation fears mount

Mineral-rich Guinea is scrapping a controversial mining deal after fears it represented bad value for the country's valuable assets, keenly in demand from the likes of Rio Tinto and Brazil's Vale.

The controversy surrounds a $25m (£16m) loan made to the African state in April last year to set up a new national mining company. It was arranged by Walter Hennig, a South African-based businessman who has traded diamonds in Africa.

A fierce debate has raged in recent weeks about whether the terms of the loan entitle Mr Hennig's Palladino vehicle to take a 30 per cent stake in the new company, at what would effectively be a massive discount, in the event of a default. This could potentially be worth billions of pounds because the company has the right to take 15 per cent of every mine in the country free of charge.

Eric Joyce, the Labour MP, is among those who believe the loan could allow Mr Hennig to amass a huge cut-price stake in Guinea's mineral industry. George Soros, the billionaire investor, has called on Guinea to investigate the loan.

"There are legitimate questions concerning this loan that call for examination and accounting." Mr Soros wrote to Mr Joyce yesterday. However, Mr Soros does not agree that Mr Hennig is in line for a 30 per cent stake in the event of a default.

The government last night said it had effectively pulled the deal "because the terms of the loan are no longer favourable from a commercial standpoint."

Palladino has denied a default could result in it scooping up "30 per cent of private or national assets worth billions of dollars."

Palladino has said: "Such repayment cannot legally exceed the value of the debt due under the loan agreement and it can in no way result in the appropriation by our company of 30 per cent of private or national assets worth billions of dollars."

Tony Blair's Africa Governance Initiative foundation has been monitoring Guinea's overhaul of its mining industry.

Source: The Independent

National security: Beware a state of disgrace

A spate of perturbing cases involving our police and court systems has strong political undertones, writes Sam Sole.

Safeguards against the abuse of state power face one of their stiffest tests in the series of intertwined cases involving former crime intelligence boss ­Richard Mdluli, suspended prosecutor Glynnis Breytenbach, former police commissioner Bheki Cele and the 20 policemen arrested this week as part of a crackdown on the so-called Cato Manor police death squad.

Every government tries to use the coercive weight of state authority to remove problems it would rather not deal with through open and drawn-out legal processes. But the shortcuts taken by the Zuma administration have been piling up in an unsustainable way that threatens the prolonged destabilisation of both the police and the prosecution service. The attempts at political manipulation also have implications for the media because various sides in the conflict have used leaks and spin to smear their opponents.

Complicating the process – perhaps even driving it – is that in each case personal interests are involved for the most senior political figures, including Police Minister Nathi Mthethwa and President Jacob Zuma. Moreover, those shortcuts are now facing unprecedented scrutiny in a blizzard of cases.

In terms of Mdluli, they include:

His challenge to his suspension in the Johannesburg Labour Court;
The new disciplinary charges filed against him by outgoing acting police commissioner Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi;
The inquest into the 1999 murder of Oupa Ramogibe, the husband of Mdluli’s former lover;
The Freedom Under Law challenge to the withdrawal of charges against Mdluli and his short-lived reinstatement as divisional commissioner for crime intelligence following the intervention of Mthethwa;
The Hawks investigation into abuses of the secret services account, which implicated Mdluli and other senior crime intelligence officers;
Breytenbach’s challenge to being suspended by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), which she alleges had the ulterior motive of preventing her from prosecuting Mdluli for allegedly defrauding the secret services account;
The preliminary investigation by the public protector into Mdluli’s possible role in the surveillance or targeting of Zuma’s political rivals, following a complaint laid by Tokyo Sexwale;
The involvement of the inspector general of intelligence and the auditor general in some aspects of these investigations; and
The ministerial task team appointed by Mthethwa to look into Mdluli’s allegations of a conspiracy against him by other senior police officers.


In terms of Cele, they include:

His high court challenge to the findings of the Moloi inquiry into his fitness to hold office;
Judge Jake Moloi’s recommendation to investigate further Cele’s involvement in the Roux Shabangu police headquarters leasing scandal, as well as question marks over ­several senior police appointments;
The ongoing litigation over the cancelled leases between the department of public works, Shabangu and his banker, Nedbank;
The suggestion that, because of his closeness to some of those involved, Cele may be drawn into the Cato Manor “hit squad” case and the prosecution of nouveau millionairess Shauwn Mpisane for allegedly defrauding the South African Revenue Service. Cele was conspicuously present in court to support both sets of accused; and
The investigation into how crime intelligence came to intercept Cele’s telephone calls – as well as those of two Sunday Times journalists.


Regarding Breytenbach:

The NPA denies that her involvement in pressing for Mdluli’s prosecution played any role in disciplinary action taken against her, instead ­citing allegations of improper conduct in another politically charged case – the Kumba Iron Ore criminal case against politically connected company Imperial Crown Trading.


The interwoven strands of these cases can perhaps best be understood by traversing the history of one of the key players.

Cele, contrary to some views, has not been a steady backer of Zuma.

During his time in KwaZulu-Natal, he was for a long time associated with the S’bu Ndebele faction of the provincial ANC, which supported former president Thabo Mbeki until the reality of the Zuma tsunami forced most to switch sides. Historically, Cele was seen as the power broker for the eThekwini region that controlled access to the significant resources of the Durban metro council.

Allies of Cele, such as the Mpisanes and the Gcaba taxi family, benefited from Durban contracts in housing and transport. To complicate matters, the Gcabas are said to have been important contributors to the funds raised for Zuma while he was fighting the corruption charges being pursued by the Scorpions. In 1998 Sbu Mpisane (Shauwn’s husband), a metro police constable, was due to be a state witness in the trial of long-distance taxi boss Mandla Gcaba, accused of arranging the revenge killing of a rival taxi owner. But Mpisane, whose car was identified as the getaway vehicle, disappeared and his failure to testify may have played a role in Gcaba’s acquittal. Mpisane later reappeared and rose to fame as Durban’s richest metro policeman, courtesy of his wife’s company. Conflict between rival taxi associations also looms large in the history of the Cato Manor unit, which fell under provincial Hawks boss Major General Johan Booysen.

During Cele’s tenure as KwaZulu-Natal safety and security MEC, he and Booysen were both cited in an interdict obtained in October 2008 by the chairperson of the kwaMaphumulo Taxi Association, Bongani Mkhize, preventing the police from killing him.

Mkhize, who was embroiled in a long turf war with another taxi association, was being sought in connection with the murder of Kranskop police commander Zethembe Chonco in August that year. At the time of the interdict, the police, including members of the Cato Manor organised crime unit, had killed seven suspects linked to the Chonco murder in alleged shoot-outs. Despite the interdict, Mkhize was shot dead in February 2009 by a police task team that included ­members of the Cato Manor unit. Police claimed he fired on them, but a ballistics expert brought in by the family raised serious doubts about their version. This killing also featured in the secret intelligence report leaked by the Mdluli camp in March 2011, just ahead of Mdluli’s arrest for the 1999 love triangle murder.

The report – without advancing evidence – accused Cele of orchestrating the killing of Chonco to cover up his own supposed involvement in taxi violence, which Chonco had “stumbled on”, and then arranging for all those involved in the Chonco murder to meet a similar grisly end. Cele, in turn, is understood to have supported the murder investigation into Mdluli, which was reopened shortly before Cele assumed office in 2009. Both Zuma and Mthethwa have also been drawn into the drama around Booysen and members of the Cato Manor unit.

Police claimed to have evidence that taxi boss Mkhize was involved in planning the murder of chief Mbongeleni Zondi, a relative and ally of Zuma. According to a police intelligence source, Zondi, a former policeman, was targeted by Mkhize because he was suspected of providing the information that led to the killing of Maphumulo taxi association boss Magojela Ndimande and his bodyguard in December 2008. They, too, were gunned down by members of the Cato Manor unit, purportedly while on the trail of Chonco’s killers – and all but one of the four suspects accused of involvement in the Zondi killing are now dead at the hands of the police.

In all cases, the Cato Manor unit is claiming the justifiable use of deadly force, but the high-visibility arrests of its members this week suggest an attempt to break the bonds of solidarity that traditionally exist in such a unit. Even sympathetic sources concede that the unit may have become trigger-happy, particularly in relation to suspects allegedly involved in the killing of policemen. But the high-profile involvement of opposing political figures – notably Mthethwa’s earlier vocal demand for the disbanding of the unit and Cele’s public show of support this week – suggests there is more at stake. Booysen, although not charged, is clearly a target. He was initially threatened with suspension for failing to act on the Cato Manor unit’s alleged abuses, but rebuffed the attempt in court. But Booysen is also key to an investigation that has exposed the involvement of the president’s relatives, notably Zuma’s son Edward and Zuma’s friend Deebo Mzobe. Both men have been accused of attempting to intercede in the investigation of Durban multimillionaire Thoshan Panday, accused of fraud in police accommodation contracts. Both have denied their involvement, but not their links to Panday.

Citizen reporter Paul Kirk, who is known to have good contacts in the Cato Manor unit, reported this week that some of the arrested policemen had been involved in investigations into Edward Zuma and his business partners – and that others had been used in probes targeting Mdluli. Mthethwa has, in particular, been embarrassed by leaks about the use of secret services account money to upgrade security at his KwaZulu-Natal home.

On the other hand, the Hawks component of the investigation into the Cato Manor unit was led by Major General Ntebo Mabula, a policeman known to be a trusted associate of Mdluli. The investigation into the unit was prompted by a front-page story in the Sunday Times – complete with some shocking crime-scene pictures of Cato Manor members and their victims. Both the tip-off for the story and the supply of the pictures appear to have come from senior unnamed crime intelligence officers, although the Sunday Times has denied being manipulated by its sources.

The web of cases linking Cele, Mdluli and Breytenbach appears to have many strands that might pose a risk to Zuma and his allies, should they be fully teased out. That may explain the heavy-handed tactics on display in Durban, where the Cato Manor cops offered to hand themselves over but were arrested and handcuffed in front of their families. This approach is also evident in the Breytenbach case, in which the prosecutor has even been charged with performing work outside of the NPA by renting out a flat and running a horse-stabling business.

It may also explain the apparently endless blocking manoeuvres available to Mdluli to challenge his suspension. Whether the strong-arm tactics succeed may depend on how vulnerable those in the firing line perceive themselves to be — and how vulnerable they think the president is.

Source: Mail & Guardian

Cato Manor cops hit with 71 charges

Twenty former members of the disbanded Durban Organised Crime Unit face 71 charges, including 14 of murder, the Durban Regional Court has been told. One of the members, Captain Neville Eva, told the court he intended pleading not guilty to all the charges. Also on the provisional indictment are 14 counts of defeating the ends of justice, as well as 14 charges of unlawful possession of weapons and ammunition.

The court was packed for the bail hearings of the 20, who stand accused of being part of a hit squad.

Eva said that when the Sunday Times published an exposé alleging the existence of the hit squad, all members of the unit promised the then Independent Complaints Directorate – since renamed the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) – they would cooperate with the investigation. “Our attitude was to assist the investigation in any way possible.” Eva said the members were ordered to hand in their weapons, laptops and cellphones earlier this year.

They were also instructed not to take on any new cases, but to continue with pending cases. Eva, a veteran of 27 years, said if they had intended to tamper with evidence, they had had six months in which to do so.

IPID spokesperson Moses Dlamini confirmed the 20 were arrested on Wednesday in a joint operation by the Hawks and the IPID. Protesters supporting the 20 men stood outside the court building with placards.

People had to stand outside the court in the hallway, because there was insufficient space for supporters and families of the accused, while police monitored the crowds inside and outside the building.

Magistrate Sharon Marks threatened to have the people removed if they did not keep quiet.

Source: Mail & Guardian

Alleged Cato Manor 'hit squad' members arrested

Fifteen members of the Durban Organised Crime Unit - disbanded in February after allegations of a death squad - have been arrested, say the Hawks.

Spokesperson McIntosh Polela said the arrests were part of a joint operation by the Hawks and the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID). IPID spokesperson Moses Dlamini also confirmed the operation. Three members were arrested in Gauteng – two in Hammanskraal, north of Pretoria, and one on the West Rand. The rest were arrested in various locations around Durban. Polela said a total of 20 members of the unit would be arrested, although IOL reported on Wednesday more than 20 officers were arrested. He said the unit’s commanding officer Major General Johan Booysen, who was also the KwaZulu-Natal boss of the Hawks, was not one of the 20.

Those arrested were taken to the South African Police Service air wing at the old Durban International Airport. None of them resisted arrest, Polela said. The 20 face charges ranging from murder and the unlawful possession of ammunition to theft and assault.

The unit was shut down in February amid allegations that an alleged death squad operated in the Cato Manor crime unit. Most of its members have since been incorporated into the Hawks. Booysen was issued with a notice of suspension in March, but it was later set aside. He faced allegations of negligence or failing to act in connection with the alleged death squad.

Source: Mail & Guardian

Russia: Protecting expats and more in Syria

Russia is preparing to send two warships plus marines to Syria, as the civil war in that country shows no sign of letting up. Russia has for months supported the government of Bashar al-Assad at the UN Security Council, blocking resolutions authored by Western and Arab League states to sanction Damascus and pressure Assad to step down.

Most of Russia’s motivations for doing so are well known. Firstly, it is determined to ensure there is no Security Council cover for any external effort to topple a sovereign government, whether by military or other means. The principle of non-intervention is one that Moscow is desperate to defend. Secondly, the government of Vladimir Putin has no wish to see another president – in the Middle East or the former Soviet Union – ousted by the mob, for fear the virus could spread further. Thirdly, it fears the regional destabilisation that could accompany Assad’s downfall. And fourthly, Russia has commercial, diplomatic and military ties with the Assad government that would be in jeopardy if the opposition came to power. These interests include arms sales, use of the Tartous naval base, energy-sector investment opportunities and a close diplomatic alignment with Damascus.

The latest dispatch of naval vessels to Syria is on one level a further statement of support for the Assad government and the interests that Russia wishes to defend. So too is the delivery of reconditioned military helicopters to Syria. Yet sending ships and marines to the coast of Syria also points to an interest that sets Russia aside from all other permanent members of the UN Security Council – it has people on the ground. Rather a lot of people, in fact.

In the first instance, these are the Russian armed services personnel working in Tartous and supporting the use of Russian military equipment by the Syrian armed forces.

Secondly, there are perhaps 30,000 Russians who are married to Syrian citizens and are resident in the country. This is a consequence of decades of close relations between Soviet Russia and Syria under the current president’s father. In Moscow’s calculation, their best chance for a peaceful existence is for Assad to secure a victory over his opponents as quickly as possible. If the opposition were to win power, the nationals of a country which had backed Assad to the hilt, over many years, would face an uncertain future.

Thirdly, Syria is home to between 50,000 and 100,000 Circassians who originally hail from Russian lands around the Black Sea and the Caucasus. The Syrian Circassians were relocated to modern-day Syria in the second half of the nineteenth century, as tsarist Russia expanded. They are one of a number of Syrian minorities who support the Assad government, and most reside in and around Homs, Damascus and Aleppo. Most of those in Homs and the villages surrounding it are now refugees. As members of a community regarded as pro-Assad, they fear the Sunni opposition; yet because they are not part of Assad’s Alawite core, some parts of the Syrian security services also regard them with suspicion.

A few hundred Syrian Circassians have already emigrated to Russia but this trickle could become a stream if violence persists in Syria. Plenty of Circassians already live in Russia’s North Caucasus, in the republics of Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia and Adygea, and these are the most likely destination for the Syrian Circassians. Popular sympathy for their plight in those republics runs high, and this is not something that the federal government in Moscow can afford to ignore.

Yet if Russia threw open the door to the Syrian Circassians it would risk exacerbating instability in Kabardino-Balkaria and the other republics. Alongside that regional security problem, there would be a national political one. Putin would have to increase funding to the republics affected – but that would only exacerbate the ill feeling in the rest of Russia about the billions of dollars spent on Chechnya and its neighbours. ‘Stop feeding the Caucasus’ has been a rallying cry for nationalist opposition to Putin, and a rare issue on which the president is on the wrong side of working-class opinion.

The Circassian issue is also sensitive for Putin because it touches on one of his personal projects – the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. The games will take place on land that was originally populated by Circassians, and diaspora groups – with the encouragement of the Georgian government – are hoping to use the Winter Olympics to draw attention towards the so-called ‘Circassian Genocide’. Helping the Syrian Circassians might win Moscow some points with the diaspora, but engagement would be risky too.

In light of all this, it is little wonder that Russia would prefer to see the Syrian opposition crushed and Assad continue to rule for many years to come. It has far more at stake than arms sales, a naval base and a desire to thumb its nose at the US.

Source: IISS

Congo war crimes suspects named

The U.N.'s top human rights official on Tuesday named five Congo rebel leaders who she says may be responsible for war crimes, a rare step prompted by concerns that their group - known as M23 - could continue to rape and kill civilians in the east of the country.

Navi Pillay, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, frequently speaks out about serious abuses being committed around the world, but it is unusual for her to single out individuals unless they are suspected of being responsible for large-scale atrocities.

“The leaders of the M23 figure among the worst perpetrators of human rights violations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, or in the world for that matter,” Pillay said in a statement issued by her Geneva-based office.

The newly formed group is composed of former rebel fighters who were integrated into the army after a 2009 peace deal but have since deserted again.

Pillay named the group's leaders as Col. Sultani Makenga; Col. Baudouin Ngaruye, Col. Innocent Zimurinda; Col. Innocent Kaina; and Gen. Bosco Ntaganda.

“Many of them may have been responsible for war crimes,” she said, noting their “appalling track records including allegations of involvement in mass rape, and of responsibility for massacres and for the recruitment and use of children.”

Ntaganda is already wanted by the International Criminal Court on war crimes charges for recruiting and using child soldiers between 2002 and 2003.

Makenga, too, recruited child soldiers and is suspected of involvement in a 2008 massacre in which his then group, the CNDP, executed at least 67 civilians in Kiwandja in Congo's North Kivu region. The U.N. also linked him to the 2007 killing by another rebel group, the FARDC, of 14 civilians in Buramba, North Kivu.

Fighting between rebels and the army has flared up again in North Kivu since April, causing more than 200,000 people to flee their homes.

Abuses attributed to Ngaruye include recruitment of child soldiers and involvement in the killing of up to 139 people in Shalio, North Kivu, in April 2009. The FARDC troops believed responsible also abducted about 40 women, some of whom were gang-raped and mutilated, the U.N. said.

Zimurinda is also alleged to have had command responsibility for the Kiwandja and Shalio massacres. The U.N. Security Council placed him on a sanctions and travel ban list in Dec. 2010.

Pillay said Kaina “is alleged to have been involved in a range of human rights abuses including crimes committed in Ituri, Orientale province, in 2004.” He was arrested by Congolese authorities in June 2006, but released without trial less than three years later.

“Every effort must be made to hold these men, and the soldiers under their command, accountable for human rights violations committed against civilians, both for crimes committed within the context of the current mutiny, and also for offences committed previously,” Pillay said.

“I fear the very real possibility that they will inflict additional horrors on the civilian population as they attack villages in eastern DRC,” she added.

Source: IoL

Richard Mdluli has some explaining to do

Suspended crime intellience head Lieutenant-General Richard Mdluli will have to explain why R150 000 of police funds was used to upgrade security at his house when he appears before a disciplinary hearing in July, City Press reported on Sunday.

The 10 charges Mdluli faces were revealed in court papers filed by former acting police chief Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi in the Johannesburg Labour Court this week. The charges against him relate to his alleged abuse of a crime intelligence “slush fund”, that he misled investigations into 250 covert appointments of crime intelligence operatives, and appointed family members and friends to police positions. The charge sheet states that Mdluli allegedly spent R150 209 on security upgrades to his Boksburg home, authorised air travel for his wife and children to the value of R84 199, and spent R46 809 on business class tickets for his wife.

Mdluli remains suspended from the police service, pending various court actions. The Labour Court case in which Mdluli is challenging his suspension is due to be heard this week. Last year, Mdluli faced fraud and corruption charges for the misuse of the fund, and faced a murder charge for the death of his former lover’s husband. The charges led to his initial suspension. This year, all the charges were withdrawn and Mdluli was reinstated in March. This was widely criticised by, among others, the Democratic Alliance and lobby group Freedom Under Law. Police Minister Nathi Mthethwa later moved him to a different division but Mkhwanazi opted to suspend him. The suspension was lifted by the Labour Court on June 1 but subsequently overturned by the same court.

New top cop Mangwashi Phiyega said she will comment on the investigation into Mdluli after she has read the files on him, the paper reported. “I will be dealing with it.”

Phiyega said documents seen in newspapers were “adulterated”. “Now that I’m here, they will show me the real files and maybe when you talk to me 12 months down the line, I will be able to say I did see the real files and what we were seeing wasn’t the real thing,” she told the publication.

Phiyega also commended the Independent Police Investigative Directorate.

“No doctor can doctor herself. It’s critical and important to have the directorate to police us and to regulate us. I really appreciate its existence.”

Source: Mail & Guardian

US expands covert military surveillance in Africa

The Obama administration is expanding its intelligence operations in sub-Saharan Africa, according to a lengthy report in the Washington Post. The increased surveillance is part of rapidly expanding military operations in Africa that are being carried out under the pretext of the “war on terror,” but are directed in large part at countering rising Chinese economic connections on the resource-rich continent.

The focus of the Post’s report was on aerial surveillance programs used to gather intelligence on local militant groups. The vast majority of these operations are being run by private companies, which are responsible for supplying pilots, sensor operators, intelligence analysts, mechanics, and linguists.

According to the report, about a dozen airbases have been developed in Africa since 2007. These bases are generally small additions to existing airfields in various African countries and are used to run small aircraft, disguised as private planes, and equipped with discreet surveillance equipment. Permission for these operations is usually granted by the local government in exchange for the US sharing the intelligence it gathers.

The program targets a wide variety of different groups on the pretext of combating terrorism. These include the loose affiliation of Tuareg secessionists and Islamists in Northern Mali, the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa, and al-Shabab in Southern Somalia. Although humanitarian concerns and the threat of global terrorism are being used to justify these operations, they in reality comprise part of a new Scramble for Africa, as the US and Europe compete over the area’s natural resources and seek to minimize Chinese influence.

In particular, the Post report cited two targets of growing interest on the part of the US military: Boko Haram in Nigeria, and the Lord’s Resistance Army’s operations in Sudan and South Sudan. In the case of Nigeria, which provides over 8 percent of the United States’ crude oil, the economic motivation for “anti-terrorism” is particularly clear.

Since the very beginning of AFRICOM’s operations, the US has been preparing plans for possible military intervention in Nigeria. In 2008, the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania conducted a series of “wargame scenarios” concerning possible interventions for AFRICOM, and estimated that it would take 20,000 troops to control the Niger Delta oilfields. At a February 18, 2008 AFRICOM conference, Vice Admiral Robert T. Moeller stated that the guiding principle of AFRICOM was to protect “the free flow of natural resources from Africa to the global market.”

Only a month later, the first commander of AFRICOM, General William Ward, declared that due to the US’s increasing reliance on African oil, the “number one theater-wide goal” would be combating terrorism. Although the US did not intervene militarily, the political significance of AFRICOM’s preparations could be seen when millions of Nigerian workers participated in a general strike against president Goodluck Jonathan’s end to fuel subsidies. Jonathan used a series of bombings claimed by Boko Haram to institute martial law and suppress the growing strike movement.

In the case of the Lord’s Resistance Army, the argument for “humanitarian intervention” is used to provide a similar cover for economic aims. According to The Post, AFRICOM is seeking a base in South Sudan that would both support the hunt for the LRA’s leader Kony and allow the US greater influence in the growing conflict between Sudan and South Sudan.

At the center of the Sudanese conflict are disagreements over oil revenues. Since South Sudan gained independence in 2011 it has been in continuous conflict with Sudan over control of oil fields in the border region and the fees to be paid to Sudan, whose pipelines are the only conduit available to export its oil. In April, while Sudan and South Sudan were engaged in regular border skirmishes, South Sudanese president, Salva Kiir, traveled to China in an attempt to gather support for construction of an alternate pipeline through Kenya.

China is a major investor in both Sudanese and South Sudanese oil infrastructure. Through an increased military presence, the US government hopes to offset Chinese economic influence. Last year in her tour of Africa, US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, said, “We don’t want to see a new colonialism in Africa,” in reference to Chinese influence on the continent.

Ultimately the aerial surveillance programs will be used to lay the groundwork for future military intervention. Last October, Obama deployed 100 military advisors to central Africa in order to work toward “the removal of Joseph Kony.” In Somalia, drones and special forces strikes are also being used to the same bloody effect as in Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan. Although the surveillance program in West and Central Africa is currently unarmed, several officials quoted in the Post emphasized the potential to expand the program.

According to the report, AFRICOM already had plans for a drone program against the LRA, but it was canceled without explanation. Recently, however, the Senate Armed Forces Committee authorized $50 million to expand surveillance operations in Africa and emphasized the need for aircraft that can “loiter over areas of interest for extended periods of time,” i.e., drones. One anonymous US military official told the Post that if they wanted to fly drones “I’m certain we could get the access and overflight [permission] that is necessary to do that.”

Source: World Socialist Web Site

It's just a case of putting them in their place

Princess and the peeve

AS Vera was floating about at defence headquarters in Pretoria she came across a woman sobbing inconsolably. On closer inspection it turned out it was none other than Princess Nonceba Lindiwe Sisulu. People in the corridors were whispering that she had just been moved from the glamorous Defence Ministry to the gritty Public Service ministry. So she would now no longer be able to wear those sexy military uniforms to state events. She would no longer be saluted by generals and admirals. She would also no longer be in a position to refuse to answer questions for "security reasons". No longer will she be able to scream at the DA's David Maynier.

Aaagh shame, poor thing.

Wardrobe malfunction

Adding to the princess' misery is that she will now have to hang around Zwelinzima Vavi, Sadtu's Thobile Ntola, Nehawu's Fikile Majola and those guys from Solidarity. And instead of slapping striking soldiers with court-martials, she will have to accept memoranda from angry workers. Vera can't wait to see which fashion label she'll be wearing when she addresses workers from the back of a truck.

Blunt Blade cuts losses

Vera's favourite bourgeois communist put on his boxing gloves and went to Durban recently to put workers in their place. After angering the workers by chastising them for demanding that he leave his cushy government job and lose his flashy car, he then tried to charm them. He did many Phansi! slogans and got the enthusiastic Phansi! responses from the workers. But being a cabinet minister he could not bring himself to say Phansi !nge e-tolls Phansi!, prompting workers to shout him down.

The bourgeois communist, who had never been booed by unionists before, ended up in hospital recovering from the emotional breakdown. But as soon as he heard that some ANC leaders planned to take on President Jacob "I know what I'm doing" Zuma at the NEC meeting, he got out of his pyjamas and ran off to defend his paymaster.

Know where your bread is buttered...

Cop is being caught up

THE new top cop, Mangwashi Phiyega, started her career on a high note this week by feeding the media with nice sound-bites. Quizzed about her lack of policing experience, she simply said: "You do not need to be a drunkard to own a bottle store." She may as well have continued to say you do not need to be a drug addict to push drugs. Nice start, but Vera thinks she will need a lot of work to catch up to Bheki Cele, the master of great quotes.

Vera would like to share a little observation. When Maria Ramos arrived at Transnet in 2004, she and Phiyega were immediately at each others' throats. Phiyega jumped ship and went to Absa. Then Ramos left Transnet to head up Absa. Phiyega was forced to jump ship again to flee her nemesis. Based on this pattern, Vera predicts that Ramos' next job is minister of police.

Vera's Question of the Week: Will the new top cop be patrolling the streets of Hillbrow on New Year's eve?

Source: The Sowetan

In memoriam - Dawid Kruiper

It is with sadness that we announce the passing of yet another San elder and leader from the ‡Khomani community in the southern Kalahari Desert. Oom Dawid Kruiper passed away on the 13th June 2012, after a brief period of hospitalization in Upington, Northern Cape Province, South Africa. Oom Dawid Kruiper, who was appointed leader of the Kruiper clan by his late father Regopstaan Kruiper in 1995, played a central role in the historic land claim of the ‡Khomani San.

In January 2002, a small clan of ‡Khomani San who were living on a tourist resort farm Kagga Kamma in the Western Cape Cedarberg, started planning to return to the Kalahari. The clan, lead by Regopstaan Kruiper, had been evicted from the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park after its formation in 1931. In 1995 their land claim, under the provisional name of the "Southern Kalahari San Land Claim Committee", was formally lodged with the Northern Cape Land Regional Claims Commissioner. The Kruiper clan, headed first by Regopstaan and then by Dawid Kruiper, were the original claim committee, which was later extended after a formal election was held for a negotiation committee, which attempted to represent each of the various communities of San in the Northern Cape. The first elected committee was chaired by Petrus Vaalbooi, whilst Dawid Kruiper was consistently acknowledged as the overall leader of the land claim.

In March 1999 and prior to the signing of the phase one agreement, a formal election process was held at Welkom to elect the first CPA under the CPA Act. This CPA constitution made provision for traditional leader as an acknowledgement of the extraordinary role played by Oom Dawid Kruiper in the years leading up to the land claim. In the ensuing years Oom Dawid has chosen to lead a simple, yet often difficult life on the farm Witdraai. He preferred to be called Bushman. His primary driver had always been to live as closely to the land of his forefather and to follow a traditional life (or natural life as he said) as possible. He held much knowledge of the natural environment which he was willing to share. He was the key driver in the establishment of a veld school through which knowledge of the veld, environment and traditions could be passed on to younger generations. The school also offered opportunities for visitors to have an authentic Kalahari experience. Oom Dawid was a reconteur par excellence, whose stories where often weaved in idiomatic language and many references to nature. He had an incredible way of comparing human behavior to that of the animals of the field….. May his soul become part of the "second milky way" and rest in peace.

Source: SA San Institute

Hilda Van der Burg and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions

On Tuesday 12 June 2012 the Constitutional Court handed down a judgment in an application for leave to appeal against the decision of the Full Court of the Western Cape High Court, Cape Town (Full Court). The Full Court found in favour of the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) and upheld the forfeiture order that was previously granted against the applicants’ property, in terms of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA).

The applicants are a married couple, who have been running an illegal shebeen in contravention of the Liquor Act for several years from their home in Athlone, Western Cape, where they live with their four children, some of whom are minors. Despite several complaints by neighbours of the harmful effects that the shebeen has on the neighbourhood, numerous police actions (including warnings, searches and seizures of liquor and arrests) and a preservation order, granted over the property, the applicants continued to run the shebeen.

The Full Court found that the applicants’ property was an instrumentality of the offence of selling liquor without a license, and that the forfeiture would not have a disproportionate effect on the applicants or their children.

In this Court, the applicants argued that the offence of selling liquor without a licence is not subject to POCA’s forfeiture provisions, as POCA targets organised crime. Furthermore, forfeiture ought to have been sought as a last resort only, and effective police action would have been more appropriate. Therefore, they argued, the forfeiture was disproportionate and ought not to be confirmed. In addition, they alleged that the forfeiture would render them and their children homeless.

The Centre for Child Law was admitted as amicus curiae. It argued that the Constitution guarantees children separate representation and that the Court should not order forfeiture unless it is satisfied that children’s interests have been adequately considered. Since the Full Court failed to consider the children’s interests adequately, it submitted, a report by a curator was necessary before deciding on the forfeiture.

In a unanimous judgment, written by Van der Westhuizen J, this Court dismissed the appeal. It found that POCA applied to the offence of selling liquor illegally and that forfeiture was not disproportionate in the circumstances. Nearly 60 police actions were ineffective in causing the applicants to desist with their profitable and co-ordinated unlawful activities. The applicants did not lead evidence to support their assertion that their legitimate monthly income from selling fruit was insufficient to lease another home and to support their children.

The Court also found that Full Court gave adequate weight to the children’s best interests and that a report by a curator was unnecessary. However, it found that the children may be in need of care and protection, and ordered the NDPP to engage a social worker to investigate and make a determination in this regard, in terms of the Children’s Act.

Source: SAFLI

Unmasking SA's new top cop: Who is Mangwashi Phiyega?

The M&G takes a look at Mangwashi Victoria Phiyega, who President Jacob Zuma has chosen to replace Bheki Cele as the new national police commissioner. Bheki Cele has been sacked from his position as national police commissioner. President Jacob Zuma announced Cele’s firing at a hastily convened press conference on Tuesday afternoon where he named Mangwashi Victoria “Riah” Phiyega as Cele’s replacement. “It is my pleasure to announce the new national police commissioner today who takes office with immediate effect,” he said.

Phiyega is currently chairperson of the presidential review committee on state owned enterprises and deputy chairperson of the independent commission on the remuneration of office bearers. She will be the first woman to hold the post of national police commissioner. Phiyega told the Mail & Guardian she was excited about her appointment. ‘I am deeply humbled by this vote of confidence and I look forward to serving with dignity and humility’ she said.

Despite holding a number of high profile positions with corporates, parastatals and NGOs, Phiyega has no policing experience and is sure to come under fire for this. Security experts have long decried the fact that neither of the countries past two police commissioners - Cele and convicted fraudster Jackie Selebi - have come from within the ranks of the police force.

According to the presidency, Phiyega is a past Absa Group executive for corporate affairs. She chaired the bank’s AllPay boards for Gauteng and the Eastern Cape, was a board member of Absa Actuaries and a trustee of the Absa Foundation. She spent a number of years at Transnet, where she occupied a range of positions in different divisions. She was group executive corporate affairs, a member of the executive committee, and an attending member of the board. It’s rumoured that her 2009 departure from Absa, where she served as head of corporate affairs, was linked to her difficult relationship with the bank’s chief executive Maria Ramos. Phiyega was said to be one of a group of Transnet executives ousted when Ramos took over as chief executive at the parastatal in 2004.

Prior to her time at Transnet, Phiyega served as general manager for ports and corporate affairs at the National Ports Authority. She has also chaired the national welfare forum, acted as a commissioner for the Road Accident Fund, and was a board member of the 2010 World Cup bid committee.
Phiyega was born in Polokwane. She holds an MA in Social Sciences from the University of Johannesburg and a post graduate diploma in business administration from the University of Wales, and has completed programmes in management and business leadership programmes at the University of Singapore and the prestigious Wharton Business School in Pensylvania. She began her professional career as a social worker and branch manager at Pretoria Child Welfare and later served as the director of the National Council of Child Welfare.

Phiyega is a member of the International Women’s Forum of South Africa, which identifies her as “a coach and mentor” linked to various organisations. Phiyega was featured in the M&G 2011 Book of South African Women. In an essay she penned for the publication, she quoted Jamaican university professor Pat Morgan, who said: “The 21st century woman embodies the hopes of her nation, knows the history of her people, exposes injustice and comforts the poor and the unemployed.”

Source: Mail & Guardian

The communists have got this right

Here’s something important to read and understand. From a South African Communist Party Central Committee statement  released today – I just caught it on Politicsweb here.

You can disagree with the communists about a range of points of strategy and of principle, but they accurately and urgently identify populism as exemplified by the ANC Youth League ruling faction (and be clear, this is what they are talking about) as the greatest threat to the ruling alliance and, more importantly, to the South African democracy.

This is their call to arms:

We are dealing with an anti-worker, anti-left, anti-communist, pseudo-militant demagogy that betrays all of our long-held ANC-alliance traditions of internal organizational democracy, mutual respect for comrades, non-racialism, and service to our people. It has created substantial space for an anti-majoritarian, conservative reactive groundswell that seeks to tarnish the whole movement, portraying us all as anti-constitutionalist and as narrow nationalist chauvinists.

It was only a matter of time before a rescue attempt of the sliding democratic project was launched from within the alliance. It was always going to come either from Cosatu or the SACP – and despite its lack of a mass base, the SACP is more venerable and respected within the ANC

The communist leadership has dissipate into government and its voice has been softer and more defensive as a result. It remains to be seen if the party is still able to crack the whip loud enough to drive our domestic version of Zanu-PF back into its cage.

Source: Nic Borain

Reagan at the Wall

ON June 12, 1987, the cold war entered a terminal phase, in ways that few could have anticipated, and in fact, almost no one did — with the exception of a president down on his legendary luck.

If in 1984 Ronald Reagan had proclaimed that it was “morning again in America,” three years later the evening was coming fast for a presidency that had spent most of its energy. The Iran-contra scandal had damaged him, and in March 1987 only 42 percent of Americans approved of the job he was doing. Reagan’s diary reveals a president losing focus, with entries registering more enthusiasm for old videos than the crushing business of state. On May 23, 1987, a good day: “Ran a movie about Big Foot & to my surprise I was in it — a shot of me & Bonzo on a TV set.”

But the aging actor still had a trick or two up his sleeve. For months, a trip had been planned to Berlin, a city famous for its stages. John F. Kennedy had given one of the greatest speeches of his presidency there in 1963; it would be a challenge for Reagan to duplicate the excitement of that visit. Like him, the cold war seemed to be losing steam. But Reagan’s loyal aides pitched the idea of a major speech at the Brandenburg Gate, and the writers began to crank out drafts. A single line kept calling attention to itself: an appeal to tear down the Berlin Wall, which ran alongside the gate.

In a way, it was a no-brainer. No one had ever liked the wall, since its construction in 1961. But to express that antipathy in 1987, as tensions were winding down, was impolitic. An encouraging new leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, was bravely campaigning for perestroika (restructuring), glasnost (opening) and a third word we don’t remember as well, uskorenie (acceleration). Things were trending in the right direction in United States-Soviet relations. Most of Reagan’s foreign policy advisers opposed adding incendiary language.

There were other complications as well. The Brandenburg Gate offered an impressive backdrop, but it was so close to East Berlin that the Secret Service feared the president could be exposed to Communist snipers. Yet building a protective barrier would erect a wall around him at the same time that he was calling for the wall to be torn down. Worse, it would deny TV audiences a chance to see the wall. An ingenious solution was found — a glass partition that gave a clear view of the wall, and the gate.

But to those attuned to nuance, the gate posed its own problems.

It was not much of a gate, and for most of its history, it was illegal for anyone who was not a member of the Prussian royal family to walk through its central passage. A huge ceremonial structure, it borrowed features from the Acropolis, in tribute to the long fascination ancient Greece exerted upon the German imagination (a fascination that in no way extends to the current German-Greek relationship). For many Germans, however, its ghosts did not conjure Aegean democracy or Beethoven, but helmet-tipped Prussians and goose-stepping Nazis. The Reagan team might have been sensitive on that point, after the controversy caused by his visit to a Nazi cemetery on his previous trip to Germany.

One of Reagan’s gifts, however, was not to care about the wisps of history, or the contrary advice of his advisers. He insisted that the line be included, and so, midway through the speech, the president said, “Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” The lines were delivered crisply. It is unusual for a president to use the second-person imperative — it’s one of the reasons we remember J.F.K.’s invocation to “ask not.” Near the end, Reagan spotted a bit of graffiti spray-painted on the wall, and read it aloud: “This wall will fall. Beliefs become reality.”

Shortly after, he flew back to Washington. His diary entry for June 12 does not overwhelm with its acuity (“I was surprised that we traveled in bright sunshine for about 8 of the 8 1/2 hour flight. It didn’t get dark until a little less than an hour out and yet it was after 3 A.M. back where we left”). But something had changed in the atmosphere. A gate had opened. And two years later, it was exactly as he predicted. The wall fell — not because Mr. Gorbachev tore it down, but because he did nothing at all.

To this day, Reagan attracts fierce partisans, eager to claim he “won” the cold war, and this speech is often cited in that argument. The claim feels forced, given that the U.S.S.R. outlasted his presidency by two years. But on this day, Reagan’s inner actor proved shrewder than most who would have counseled realpolitik. His theatrical turn on Berlin’s greatest stage stated a great moral truth, the way the best theater does, and proved the accuracy of Mr. Gorbachev’s third concept, uskorenie — acceleration.

Mr. Gorbachev deserves some of the credit, and in fact, the vast majority of young Germans in 1989 felt gratitude to him, not to Ronald Reagan. No one deserves more credit than the young graffiti-painters who protested against the wall for 28 years, and finally liberated themselves. But surely some recognition should go to a president who had the good sense to ignore the advice he was given, and read the writing on the wall.

Source: New York Times

Mdluli meddling exposed in prosecutor's attack on NPA

Advocate Glynnis Breytenbach has launched a devastating attack on the acting national director of public prosecutions, Nomgcobo Jiba, accusing her of acting with “an ulterior purpose” in suspending her, allegedly to stop the prosecution of crime intelligence supremo Richard Mdluli. Breytenbach’s allegation forms part of a challenge to her suspension lodged a week ago with the Labour Court in Johannesburg.

Breytenbach was suspended by Jiba on April 30 this year, purportedly in relation to a complaint about her conduct in the prosecution of Imperial Crown Trading (ICT), the company accused of fraud and ­forgery in its battle to secure mineral rights over the giant Sishen iron ore mine. “Her [Jiba’s] real purpose was to stop me from prosecuting a senior police officer, Lieutenant General Richard Mdluli, on charges of fraud and corruption,” said Breytenbach. “She used the ICT complaint against me as an excuse to suspend me.”

The National Prosecuting Authority has denied that the disciplinary steps against Breytenbach have anything to do with the Mdluli matter. Breytenbach’s court papers deliver an indictment of the prosecuting authority’s two key decision-makers in the Mdluli matter – Jiba and advocate Lawrence Mrwebi – both appointees of President Jacob Zuma. Breytenbach’s application signals that judicial and public scrutiny of the Mdluli scandal will expand to the prosecuting authority, notably through allegations of improper decisions by Mrwebi, supported by Jiba, to withdraw charges against Mdluli. It comes in the week North Gauteng High Court Judge Ephraim Makgoba delivered a hammer blow to attempts to politically manage the police side of the Mdluli investigation. Makgoba granted an urgent application by lobby group Freedom Under Law for Mdluli to be interdicted from carrying out any functions as a police officer.

Mdluli will be barred from office pending a full judicial review of the various decisions to abandon corruption and murder charges against him, to terminate internal police disciplinary steps against him and to reinstate him as head of crime intelligence. Now Breytenbach’s application has added fuel to Freedom Under Law’s fire by providing a detailed account of the way in which Mrwebi and Jiba appeared to bend over backwards to protect Mdluli.

The Breytenbach documents reveal that:

• The stated basis for Breytenbach’s suspension was that she had “abused her authority” in the ICT case. It was based on a complaint laid by ICT lawyer Ronnie Mendelow in a letter dated October 31 2011, but she was suspended only six months later, after she had come into critical conflict with Mrwebi and Jiba over the Mdluli prosecution.
• Mdluli’s attorneys delivered representations by hand to Mrwebi in his capacity as national head of the Specialised Commercial Crimes Unit on November 17 2011, although he had not yet been appointed to that post and was officially appointed only on November 25. Mrwebi forwarded the representations to Breytenbach on November 21, requesting a full report by the 25th.
• The representations were based largely on what Breytenbach dismisses as “wild and unsubstantiated allegations” of a conspiracy by the Hawks and police management to falsely implicate Mdluli in the 1999 murder of his former lover’s husband and subsequently to nail him for taking a personal benefit from cars purchased by the crime intelligence secret fund. The latter formed the basis of the corruption case Breytenbach intended to prosecute.
• Much of the evidence for this “conspiracy” is drawn from affidavits by three crime intelligence agents and Mdluli himself. They repeat what Colonel Ronnie Naidoo of crime intelligence told them at a meeting with Mdluli at the Emperors Palace casino on October 27 2011, while Mdluli was ostensibly suspended.
• Naidoo reported to Mdluli that Hawks boss General Anwa Dramat and senior generals Mzwandile Petros and Godfrey Lebeya had begged national commissioner Bheki Cele to dismiss Mdluli before Cele himself was suspended.
• It appears these same affidavits were attached to Mdluli’s November 3 letter to Zuma, in which he made the same conspiracy allegations.
• In overturning Breytenbach’s decision to prosecute Mdluli, Mrwebi claimed to have “consulted with” the North Gauteng director of public prosecutions, advocate Sibongile Mzinyathi, as required by law, but this has been denied.
• Breytenbach alleged: “I later understood from advocate Mzinyathi that advocate Mrwebi had merely mentioned to him that he was considering the charges against General Mdluli and did not consult him on their withdrawal.”
• The sole reason Mrwebi advanced for his decision was that, in his view, the investigation of the corruption charges against Mdluli was the exclusive preserve of the inspector general of intelligence (IGI), an argument not contained in the representations from Mdluli’s lawyers.
• Breytenbach noted: “My understanding all along was that, contrary to advocate Mrwebi’s assertion, the IGI did not regard it as her function to undertake any criminal investigations. She confirmed as much in a letter to the acting national commissioner dated March 19.”
• In that letter, the inspector general stated: “The mandate of criminal investigations rests solely with the police. As such, we are of the opinion that the reasons advanced by the NPA in support of the withdrawal of the criminal charges are inaccurate and legally flawed.”
• When Breytenbach conveyed the inspector general’s letter to Mrwebi, his response was to demand to know why his confidential memorandum on the withdrawal of charges had been disclosed to the inspector general.
• In an extraordinary outburst, Mrwebi wrote back to Breytenbach: “The view of the IGI, following your solicitation of her opinion on the NPA decision on the matter, based on a document which the police or anybody else was not even legally entitled to possess, is for your consumption and does not affect the decision … That decision stands and this matter is closed.” Breytenbach commented: “This response ... was, with the greatest of respect, wholly irrational.”
• When Breytenbach and a colleague prepared a detailed appeal to Jiba to reconsider Mrwebi’s decision, it appears Jiba was content to let Mrwebi respond. That response makes it clear Mrwebi’s real reason was his acceptance of Mdluli’s conspiracy claims, relying on additional secret evidence.
• Mrwebi wrote: “Having been provided with further information on the matter and having been privy to other classified, confidential and high-level discussions with police management, I am concerned that our actions in the matter may be interpreted, justifiably, as amounting to serious abuse of the legal process and as being motivated by ulterior purposes. It is my considered view that it will therefore not be in the interests of justice for the NPA to be further involved in this matter.”
• Concluding that her suspension is unlawful, Breytenbach stated: “I submit that the ineluctable inference from the history of my suspension … is that its purpose is to remove me from office and so prevent me from proceeding with the prosecution of General Mdluli.”

The authority will oppose her application, but has yet to file its response.

The two interlinked cases – Freedom Under Law’s high court review and Breytenbach’s labour court challenge – threaten to expose direct political meddling in decisions about Mdluli.

Government may attempt to manage the fallout by appointing a new national commissioner and has already launched a ministerial task team in an apparent attempt to bolster Mdluli’s conspiracy claims, but the Mdluli tsunami seems unstoppable.

Source: Mail & Guardian

Banks must establish delivery of default notices; consumers have a right to contest in case of non-receipt

The Constitutional Court today acted to protect debtors who default on their credit agreements, handing down judgment in the Sebola case. Section 129(1) of the National Credit Act requires that debtors in default of a credit agreement be informed of their rights to debt counselling and other alternatives to enforcement of the agreement. Cameron J, writing for a majority, held that a notice under section 129(1) must be properly delivered to the consumer, who will be entitled to contest the enforcement of the credit agreement in the event that she did not receive the notice. Until today, it was sufficient for a credit provider to show that it had sent the notice to the consumer’s address. It did not matter if the consumer had not received it.

SERI intervened as amicus curiae in the case in order to ensure that it would always be open to a consumer to contest the enforcement of a credit agreement on the basis that she did not know of her rights to refer the matter to a debt counsellor together with her other rights in terms of section 129.

Cameron J said that the purpose of section 129 is to “give consumers a last chance before court enforcement procedures drop the guillotine on them”. Accordingly “where the credit provider posts the notice, proof of registered despatch to the address of the consumer, together with proof that the notice reached the appropriate post office for deliver to the consumer will in the absence of contrary indication constitute sufficient proof of delivery.” However “if in contested proceedings the consumer avers that the notice did not reach her, the court must establish the truth of the claim. If it finds that the credit provider has not complied with section 129 (1), it must in terms of section 130 (4) (b) adjourn the matter and set out the steps the credit provider must take before the matter may be resumed”.

Osmond Mngomezulu, an attorney at SERI, said: “We welcome the Court’s comprehensive and meticulous judgment. SERI intervened in this case in order to ensure the consumers are properly informed of their rights and were given a reasonable opportunity to exercise them. Cameron J’s judgment achieves this end”.

In a separate concurring judgment, Zondo AJ (with whom Mogoeng CJ and Jaftha J agreed) said that a creditor must go further and demonstrate that the consumer was actually aware of her rights in terms of section 129. While SERI agrees that this is the goal of section 129, the judgment of Cameron J leaves sufficient space within which a consumer can contest proceedings on the basis that she was unaware of her rights because the notice did not reach her.

SERI was represented in court by Advocates Stuart Wilson and Irene de Vos SC.

Source: Polity

The judgement on Mdluli underscores the importance of civic activism

Judge Ephraim Makgoba’s decision to interdict Lt General Richard Mdluli from his policing duties is a landmark victory for civil society activism and free press.

Corruption Watch (CW) and the Social Justice Coalition (SJC) welcomed Judge Makgoba’s granting of the urgent relief sought by Freedom Under Law (FUL) in the first part of its application to the North Gauteng High Court. The second part of the application will be heard separately on a date provided by the Judge President and will deal with, amongst other issues, the reasons why disciplinary proceedings were withdrawn and why Lt General Mdluli was reinstated as Head of Crime Intelligence.

It is on these issues that CW and SJC have filed a joint application for leave to intervene as co-applicants. In addition to the grounds raised by FUL, CW and the SJC have asked the Court to review and set aside decisions of the NPA to halt the prosecution of Lt General Mdluli for his alleged involvement in murder and corruption.

SJC’s Zackie Achmat said today’s judgement was a “victory for free press particularly investigative journalism, the independent judiciary … it affirms the importance of active citizenship, civil society and social movement activism.” The two civil society organizations were congratulatory of the achievements of FUL’s legal team and Judge Magkoba’s firm stance on the matter. “We are particularly encouraged at the firmness and clarity of the court’s reasoning. The judge made it clear that the SAPS is no ordinary institution, this is no ordinary matter, and Mdluli is no ordinary employee. This matter deserves urgent attention,” said Corruption Watch’s David Lewis

Giving reasons for his decision and referring to allegations leveled against Lt Gen Mdluli, Judge Makgoba pointed out that murder, defeating the ends of justice, fraud and money laundering were serious criminal acts which go to the fabric of public order and security.

“In my view this matter is of considerable public importance [and] the sooner this saga is brought to an end the sooner the credibility of the police, security service and the justice system as a whole can be restored,” said Judge Makgoba.

Source: Corruption Watch

Alpha Conde accused of having sold Guinean mining interests in favor of South African ... for $ 25 million

The Sunday Times wrote that Alpha Condé has signed an agreement with a certain Walter Hennig, a wealthy white businessman from South Africa is among other things specializes in diamond mining in Angola and Congo.

Mining is the economic powerhouse of Guinea with more than 70 percent of state revenues. In September, Guinea adopted a new mining code. A committee was also established to "review mining contracts" signed by the previous regimes and that the new government elected in 2010 estimates not be in favor of Guinea. Mining companies have criticized the new code and argued that several clauses will discourage mining investment in Guinea.

The Sunday Times wrote that he had access to documents which indicate that already in April last year - or months before the Code was adopted by the National Council of Transition the body that takes the place of the Parliament- Mines Minister Mohamed Lamine Fofana has agreed a loan of $ 25 million with Palladino Capital, a company controlled by Hennig and registered in the British Virgin Islands, a tax haven known. Hennig created in 2003 the firm Palladino Holdings as a vehicle for "mining, energy and other assets in Africa."

The loan of $ 25 million was never publicly revealed Guineans, initialed in the margin or in the national budget although the President Alpha Conde has said that "contracts which commit Guinea will be published on the Internet." Sources told the Guinéenews © Minister of Mines executed an order of Alpha Condé, whose son Mohamed Conde would deal with Paladino, Mvellapenda (group Tokyo Sexwale) and Och Ziff, an investment fund. The agreement was initialed by the Guinean side Mohamed Fofana and Kerfalla Yansané, the Minister of Finance and the South African side by a certain Samuel Mebiane, listed as "agent" for Palladino.

One of the clauses is controversial is the provision which states that if the Guinean government can not repay the loan, the company will convert the debt to a 30 percent in the operations of the Guinean national mining company SOGUIPAMI that was created by presidential decree adopted by the NTC in August 2011. However, under the tutelage of the IMF is, because research HIPC expenditures Guinea are controlled by the Bretton Woods institutions and it is very probable that the repayment of $ 25 million to a billionaire may be seen from askance by the mandarins of Washington announce the fight against poverty in Guinea and most want to know how the 25 million was spent.

Potentially - observers note - 25 million loan that will bring billions of dollars to Henning for participation in the project Guinean Simandou iron mine only - owned by Rio Tinto, Chinalco, and Vale Beny Steinmetz - is at least 10 billion. Guinea also options for investments in mining projects with mining giants such as BHP Billiton, Arcelor Mittal and Rusal.

But more importantly, note sources contacted by Guinéenews © This type of agreement is in flagrant violation of the Mining Code, which stipulates in Article 150 that "The State reserves the right to sell all or part of its interest in cash, without pre-emptive rights of the other shareholders of the mining title holder, through a bidding process open and transparent. " In addition it was found that the president's son would have a direct or indirect, that would be another violation of the Guinean Constitution, which stipulates in Article 39 that: "During his tenure, the President may, by itself, for a member of his family and even others, buy or lease a property in the area belongs to the State, without the consent of the Constitutional Court under the conditions set by law. '

The agreement was signed with Palladino less than a month after qu'Hennig has signed a Memorandum of Understanding under which another vehicle, Flores Bell, would become a "partner" with the government in the mining industry.

The British newspaper concludes that this revelation may become an embarrassment to Tony Blair, former British Prime Minister who is supposed to advise Conde for better governance through its NGO "Africa Governance Initiative."]

Source: Guinéenews

also see Commission for Africa