A foreclosure rescue scheme is a scam that targets those whose house is facing potential foreclosure. The scheme preys on desperate homeowners whose mortgages are in default by offering to prevent the foreclosure. There are various ways in which foreclosure rescue schemes work, causing different types of harm to the homeowners, but all ultimately with the likely end result of the owner being forced out of his/her home and losing even more money.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreclosure_rescue_scheme
Saturday, March 31, 2012
The crime which went away: obituary to Cosmo Desmond
Early in 1968 the apartheid government decreed that African people in and around the community at Maria Ratschitz mission near Ladysmith were to be forcibly removed and dumped on barren exposed land called at Limehill. This was not the first or the last of the forced removals characteristic of the apartheid regime's determination to deny towns and cities to the African people and instead to constitute black political entities, "homelands", on the remaining land occupied by Africans.
The apartheid dream was of South African cities and farms emptied of black people and "homeland" black police states fighting semi-autonomously against the inevitable resistance. Africans would then be confirmed as citizenless foreigners in the land of their birth. But the Limehill removal was the signal for a sustained campaign of opposition which pulled together the internal opposition, exposed the crimes of the Nationalist Party government, and spurred even dilatory Western powers into formal opposition. These horrors led to apartheid being declared a crime against humanity.
At the centre of this opposition was Cosmas Desmond, the priest located at Maria Ratschitz, who died on Saturday, March 31. He gave himself to the task of documenting and exposing these removals taking place throughout the country. A veteran VW Beetle was bought and he disappeared down dirt roads and beyond into roadless rural areas bearing previously unrecognised names such as Mondlo, Mdantsane, Sada, Ilinge, Dimbaza, Zwelitsha, Botshabelo, Alcockspruit, Waschbank, KwaNgema and Driefontein. He would reappear in Johannesburg in 1969 with notes and manuscripts which eventually made up the book published by the Christian Institute as The Discarded People. His book chronicled the dumping of people wrongly located in the plan of apartheid and "surplus" to the needs of capitalism in remote areas without houses, food and support.
Removals in isolated rural areas involved the humiliation of people reduced to quietly ascending the removal trucks under the gaze and guns of the police and left destitute on barren land. This institutionalised, administrative violence was designed to drive the "surplus" and "expendable" out of sight to live or die as they may in the police-state Bantustans. Death, disease and despair were the result. But the campaign ensured they were located, brought back to mind and that the regime was subject to surveillance and sanctions. Desmond's work triggered widespread publicity which was particularly effective in electronic media. The film Last Grave in Dimbaza which carried the graphic detail of degradation and death of sites around the country caused an international outcry and provided the evidence of such inhuman acts of systematic oppression.
This necessary documentation was critical to the United Nations presenting the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid for adoption in 1973. The crime of apartheid was defined as "inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them". Forced removals to compress people into racial categories was a unique feature of the system. The timing of the declaration links closely to the exposure of forced removals.
Desmond's work would later be taken up in a series of studies in the Report of the Surplus People's Project which provided an extended review and fresh detail into the 1980s. At his 70th birthday party I approached Cos Desmond and said he must record what he could about his life experience in writing the Discarded People. He laughed wryly at the idea of an autobiography and gave me a maybe ... he might just turn his mind to chronicling his work but he wasn't so sure of its significance. Was his life and contribution really so important?
Rewards
Anti-apartheid combatants have been rewarded but also diminished by the ending of apartheid. The reward was the freeing of our people from the bondage of apartheid, but they have also been diminished by the trivialisation of great work of resistance in words and deeds and the careless dealing with crimes against humanity. The concluding scene in Last Grave in Dimbaza is of row after row of the graves of children who died after this dumping. As one of a group of students in discussion after film audition of in 1973 which was inspired by Desmond's work we resolved that a version of the Nuremburg Trial would have to be held in the post-apartheid era. That was not to be.
To my knowledge none of the bureaucrats of death were named and shamed. Now Dimbaza is a township on far-flung hills about 66km outside of East London. This name and even that of Limehill has lost its sting. South Africa has grown and these areas are now integrated into the road system and have their local municipalities. The memory fades. What was all the fuss about? This diminution of these historic crimes and the slow pace of genuine transformation had its effect on Cos Desmond, his work and his feeling of self-worth. He had often had to stand alone not only by the action of the regime but also by the priests in the Bantustans who found his research inconvenient and irritating and the shying away of the Catholic Church (with the notable exception of Archbishop Hurley).
His friendship with members of Black Consciousness (he enjoyed the ready open respect of Steve Biko and other BC leaders) did not serve favour with the Congress Movement and the ANC. In the new South Africa he was further diminished along with the lighter weighting of the crimes he chronicled. Cosmas never stood on his dignity or pronounced on his worth. His references to himself were often diffident, self deprecatory and ironic. Recently I was intrigued to hear that Van Gogh wrote that he knew he was regarded by society as a non-entity, an eccentric and a curiosity. He responded, "All right, then ... I should one day like to show by my work what such an eccentric, such a nobody, has in his heart." This was not quite Cos who was loved and held in high regard by the circle he cared for but there is a certain line in parallel.
He criticised the compromises and social degradation in the country of his adoption as only one who loved it so deeply would do. Despite the black majority gaining electoral power, the long standing effects of forced removal policy remain and perpetuate the gaping and widening inequality in income, wealth and land characteristic of our society. What happened to the crime of inhumanity declared in response to these forced removals and the promise of redistribution? History will revise judgment of the life and worth of Cosmas Desmond.
Source: Mail & Guardian
The apartheid dream was of South African cities and farms emptied of black people and "homeland" black police states fighting semi-autonomously against the inevitable resistance. Africans would then be confirmed as citizenless foreigners in the land of their birth. But the Limehill removal was the signal for a sustained campaign of opposition which pulled together the internal opposition, exposed the crimes of the Nationalist Party government, and spurred even dilatory Western powers into formal opposition. These horrors led to apartheid being declared a crime against humanity.
At the centre of this opposition was Cosmas Desmond, the priest located at Maria Ratschitz, who died on Saturday, March 31. He gave himself to the task of documenting and exposing these removals taking place throughout the country. A veteran VW Beetle was bought and he disappeared down dirt roads and beyond into roadless rural areas bearing previously unrecognised names such as Mondlo, Mdantsane, Sada, Ilinge, Dimbaza, Zwelitsha, Botshabelo, Alcockspruit, Waschbank, KwaNgema and Driefontein. He would reappear in Johannesburg in 1969 with notes and manuscripts which eventually made up the book published by the Christian Institute as The Discarded People. His book chronicled the dumping of people wrongly located in the plan of apartheid and "surplus" to the needs of capitalism in remote areas without houses, food and support.
Removals in isolated rural areas involved the humiliation of people reduced to quietly ascending the removal trucks under the gaze and guns of the police and left destitute on barren land. This institutionalised, administrative violence was designed to drive the "surplus" and "expendable" out of sight to live or die as they may in the police-state Bantustans. Death, disease and despair were the result. But the campaign ensured they were located, brought back to mind and that the regime was subject to surveillance and sanctions. Desmond's work triggered widespread publicity which was particularly effective in electronic media. The film Last Grave in Dimbaza which carried the graphic detail of degradation and death of sites around the country caused an international outcry and provided the evidence of such inhuman acts of systematic oppression.
This necessary documentation was critical to the United Nations presenting the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid for adoption in 1973. The crime of apartheid was defined as "inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them". Forced removals to compress people into racial categories was a unique feature of the system. The timing of the declaration links closely to the exposure of forced removals.
Desmond's work would later be taken up in a series of studies in the Report of the Surplus People's Project which provided an extended review and fresh detail into the 1980s. At his 70th birthday party I approached Cos Desmond and said he must record what he could about his life experience in writing the Discarded People. He laughed wryly at the idea of an autobiography and gave me a maybe ... he might just turn his mind to chronicling his work but he wasn't so sure of its significance. Was his life and contribution really so important?
Rewards
Anti-apartheid combatants have been rewarded but also diminished by the ending of apartheid. The reward was the freeing of our people from the bondage of apartheid, but they have also been diminished by the trivialisation of great work of resistance in words and deeds and the careless dealing with crimes against humanity. The concluding scene in Last Grave in Dimbaza is of row after row of the graves of children who died after this dumping. As one of a group of students in discussion after film audition of in 1973 which was inspired by Desmond's work we resolved that a version of the Nuremburg Trial would have to be held in the post-apartheid era. That was not to be.
To my knowledge none of the bureaucrats of death were named and shamed. Now Dimbaza is a township on far-flung hills about 66km outside of East London. This name and even that of Limehill has lost its sting. South Africa has grown and these areas are now integrated into the road system and have their local municipalities. The memory fades. What was all the fuss about? This diminution of these historic crimes and the slow pace of genuine transformation had its effect on Cos Desmond, his work and his feeling of self-worth. He had often had to stand alone not only by the action of the regime but also by the priests in the Bantustans who found his research inconvenient and irritating and the shying away of the Catholic Church (with the notable exception of Archbishop Hurley).
His friendship with members of Black Consciousness (he enjoyed the ready open respect of Steve Biko and other BC leaders) did not serve favour with the Congress Movement and the ANC. In the new South Africa he was further diminished along with the lighter weighting of the crimes he chronicled. Cosmas never stood on his dignity or pronounced on his worth. His references to himself were often diffident, self deprecatory and ironic. Recently I was intrigued to hear that Van Gogh wrote that he knew he was regarded by society as a non-entity, an eccentric and a curiosity. He responded, "All right, then ... I should one day like to show by my work what such an eccentric, such a nobody, has in his heart." This was not quite Cos who was loved and held in high regard by the circle he cared for but there is a certain line in parallel.
He criticised the compromises and social degradation in the country of his adoption as only one who loved it so deeply would do. Despite the black majority gaining electoral power, the long standing effects of forced removal policy remain and perpetuate the gaping and widening inequality in income, wealth and land characteristic of our society. What happened to the crime of inhumanity declared in response to these forced removals and the promise of redistribution? History will revise judgment of the life and worth of Cosmas Desmond.
Source: Mail & Guardian
The trigger clause
MANY contracts include a clause which provides a trigger for the activation of that contract. A common example is the clause stating that an agreement for the sale of land or property is conditional upon the approval of bond financing. Another example would be a clause rendering a contract conditional upon the passing of a shareholders’ resolution on the part of one of the contracting parties. Such a clause is referred to as a condition precedent or a suspensive condition.
The effect of fulfilment of that condition precedent is that the whole contract becomes enforceable. This enforceability operates retrospectively as if the contract had been unconditional from the outset.Non-fulfilment of a condition precedent normally renders the contract void. During the period after signature of the agreement and until the fulfilment of the suspensive condition, the rights (and concomitant obligations) of the parties are held in abeyance, but there is a binding agreement between them, which neither party may renounce, pending fulfilment of the condition.
The suspensive condition may apply to all of the rights and obligations of the parties or only to some of them. Those that are not suspended must be met, regardless. Where the parties have not expressly fixed a time period for the fulfilment of a suspensive condition, it is implied that it must be fulfilled within a reasonable time. What is reasonable will depend on the circumstances of that particular case. If the condition is not met within a reasonable time the contract will be void, subject to the principles which are discussed below.
One can easily envisage a situation where a party to a contract, subject to a suspensive condition, might change his mind about being bound to the terms of that contract, and who might set about frustrating the fulfilment of the condition with the intention that it will not be met, thereby releasing him from his contractual promises. To allow such manipulation would be unjust and for that reason our law prevents a party to a conditional contract from deliberately preventing the fulfilment of the condition precedent and then asserting that he is not bound by the contract because the condition has not been fulfilled. This principle is referred to as the doctrine of fictional fulfilment and is based on grounds of equity.
The doctrine of fictional fulfilment protects the innocent party in these circumstances, by requiring that the contract be enforced as though the condition precedent had been fulfilled. In order to initiate the fictional fulfilment, the innocent party will have to show that the other party deliberately prevented the fulfilment of the suspensive condition. This principle of law is based on the understanding that a party to a conditional contract has a valid and justifiable hope that his contractual rights will become enforceable at some future date. The doctrine protects this legitimate expectation by applying the equitable rule that a party cannot take advantage of his own default to the loss or injury of another.
The doctrine of fictional fulfilment applies to a deliberate and intentional prevention of the fulfilment of a condition precedent, no matter how laudable the motive of such action or failure to act. The negligent failure to fulfil a condition is not sufficient to bring the doctrine into operation – there must be a direct intention to prevent the obligation from becoming enforceable.
The party accused of deliberately preventing the fulfilment of a condition will quite often be heard to say that it did not take the necessary steps towards fulfilment of the condition because any effort on their part would have failed, in any event, to bring about the fulfilment of the condition. Where that party is under a positive duty to try to have the condition fulfilled, the courts take the view that it is equitable to hold that party liable as though the condition had been fulfilled unless it can be shown that the steps to be taken would have been an utter waste of time and money. In other words the task of avoiding the application of the doctrine of fictional fulfilment in these circumstances is not easily accomplished.
There is also a series of cases which extends the application of the doctrine of fictional fulfilment beyond instances relating to the nonfulfilment of a suspensive condition. The same principles have been applied in cases involving the deliberate non-fulfilment of ordinary terms of the contract, that is, those which are not suspensive. For example, the court applied the doctrine in a case where a supplier sold equipment and was entitled to payment once the equipment had been installed and tested. The purchaser prevented the tests from taking place but this term of the contract was deemed by the court to have been performed, giving rise to liability for payment of the purchase price by the purchaser.
Another form of extension of the doctrine is to be found in the context of fulfilment of resolutive conditions. A resolutive condition is one which provides for the termination of the contract after an interim period of operation. It brings the contract to an end upon the happening of a specified event, for example. A fairly common resolutive condition in property deals is one that provides that the sale is to be regarded as void if the necessary planning permission is refused.
It has been held in cases relating to resolutive conditions that, where one party has deliberately caused the fulfilment of that condition thereby relieving him of an obligation which he bore up until the resolutive condition was fulfilled, he nevertheless continues to be bound, by application of a variant of the doctrine discussed above, and which might, rather clumsily, be referred to as the doctrine of fictional nonfulfilment. The parties are then required to act as though the resolutive condition had not been fulfilled.
Contracting parties are expected to keep their promises and the law will not countenance a situation where a party acting in bad faith obtains a benefit from his actions, contrary to what was intended when the deal was struck.
ENS - Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs
Janine Lee
South Africa
Source: Lexology
The effect of fulfilment of that condition precedent is that the whole contract becomes enforceable. This enforceability operates retrospectively as if the contract had been unconditional from the outset.Non-fulfilment of a condition precedent normally renders the contract void. During the period after signature of the agreement and until the fulfilment of the suspensive condition, the rights (and concomitant obligations) of the parties are held in abeyance, but there is a binding agreement between them, which neither party may renounce, pending fulfilment of the condition.
The suspensive condition may apply to all of the rights and obligations of the parties or only to some of them. Those that are not suspended must be met, regardless. Where the parties have not expressly fixed a time period for the fulfilment of a suspensive condition, it is implied that it must be fulfilled within a reasonable time. What is reasonable will depend on the circumstances of that particular case. If the condition is not met within a reasonable time the contract will be void, subject to the principles which are discussed below.
One can easily envisage a situation where a party to a contract, subject to a suspensive condition, might change his mind about being bound to the terms of that contract, and who might set about frustrating the fulfilment of the condition with the intention that it will not be met, thereby releasing him from his contractual promises. To allow such manipulation would be unjust and for that reason our law prevents a party to a conditional contract from deliberately preventing the fulfilment of the condition precedent and then asserting that he is not bound by the contract because the condition has not been fulfilled. This principle is referred to as the doctrine of fictional fulfilment and is based on grounds of equity.
The doctrine of fictional fulfilment protects the innocent party in these circumstances, by requiring that the contract be enforced as though the condition precedent had been fulfilled. In order to initiate the fictional fulfilment, the innocent party will have to show that the other party deliberately prevented the fulfilment of the suspensive condition. This principle of law is based on the understanding that a party to a conditional contract has a valid and justifiable hope that his contractual rights will become enforceable at some future date. The doctrine protects this legitimate expectation by applying the equitable rule that a party cannot take advantage of his own default to the loss or injury of another.
The doctrine of fictional fulfilment applies to a deliberate and intentional prevention of the fulfilment of a condition precedent, no matter how laudable the motive of such action or failure to act. The negligent failure to fulfil a condition is not sufficient to bring the doctrine into operation – there must be a direct intention to prevent the obligation from becoming enforceable.
The party accused of deliberately preventing the fulfilment of a condition will quite often be heard to say that it did not take the necessary steps towards fulfilment of the condition because any effort on their part would have failed, in any event, to bring about the fulfilment of the condition. Where that party is under a positive duty to try to have the condition fulfilled, the courts take the view that it is equitable to hold that party liable as though the condition had been fulfilled unless it can be shown that the steps to be taken would have been an utter waste of time and money. In other words the task of avoiding the application of the doctrine of fictional fulfilment in these circumstances is not easily accomplished.
There is also a series of cases which extends the application of the doctrine of fictional fulfilment beyond instances relating to the nonfulfilment of a suspensive condition. The same principles have been applied in cases involving the deliberate non-fulfilment of ordinary terms of the contract, that is, those which are not suspensive. For example, the court applied the doctrine in a case where a supplier sold equipment and was entitled to payment once the equipment had been installed and tested. The purchaser prevented the tests from taking place but this term of the contract was deemed by the court to have been performed, giving rise to liability for payment of the purchase price by the purchaser.
Another form of extension of the doctrine is to be found in the context of fulfilment of resolutive conditions. A resolutive condition is one which provides for the termination of the contract after an interim period of operation. It brings the contract to an end upon the happening of a specified event, for example. A fairly common resolutive condition in property deals is one that provides that the sale is to be regarded as void if the necessary planning permission is refused.
It has been held in cases relating to resolutive conditions that, where one party has deliberately caused the fulfilment of that condition thereby relieving him of an obligation which he bore up until the resolutive condition was fulfilled, he nevertheless continues to be bound, by application of a variant of the doctrine discussed above, and which might, rather clumsily, be referred to as the doctrine of fictional nonfulfilment. The parties are then required to act as though the resolutive condition had not been fulfilled.
Contracting parties are expected to keep their promises and the law will not countenance a situation where a party acting in bad faith obtains a benefit from his actions, contrary to what was intended when the deal was struck.
Janine Lee
South Africa
Source: Lexology
Friday, March 30, 2012
Presidency denies Mdluli link
"The president has nothing to do with the Mdluli investigation,
it is an internal matter within the SA Police Service," the presidency said in a
statement. Earlier in the day, the Mail & Guardian reported that
information in a secret document showed Zuma played a role in getting Mdluli's
job back after he was suspended last year.
Allegations included that Zuma personally called Inspector-General of Intelligence Faith Radebe to question her decision to refer criminal charges to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to investigate Mdluli. It also alleged that Zuma attended a celebratory party which Mdluli allegedly hosted to celebrate the withdrawal of charges against him in December last year. "These reports are a complete fabrication. The president has never called IG Radebe at any point, and anyone who says he did must produce evidence," the presidency said. "The president knows nothing about a Mdluli celebratory party and never attended such a party."
Mdluli was suspended in May last year after murder charges were laid against him. Following this, fresh charges relating to fraud and corruption in the abuse of crime intelligence funds were levelled at him. However these were provisionally withdrawn in December. In February this year, the NPA announced that the best way to deal with the murder charges against Mdluli was through a formal inquest, not a trial. Earlier this week, Mdluli's suspension was lifted. Police declined to give reasons for this, saying it was an internal matter that would not be discussed in the public domain.
Source: Times Live
Allegations included that Zuma personally called Inspector-General of Intelligence Faith Radebe to question her decision to refer criminal charges to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to investigate Mdluli. It also alleged that Zuma attended a celebratory party which Mdluli allegedly hosted to celebrate the withdrawal of charges against him in December last year. "These reports are a complete fabrication. The president has never called IG Radebe at any point, and anyone who says he did must produce evidence," the presidency said. "The president knows nothing about a Mdluli celebratory party and never attended such a party."
Mdluli was suspended in May last year after murder charges were laid against him. Following this, fresh charges relating to fraud and corruption in the abuse of crime intelligence funds were levelled at him. However these were provisionally withdrawn in December. In February this year, the NPA announced that the best way to deal with the murder charges against Mdluli was through a formal inquest, not a trial. Earlier this week, Mdluli's suspension was lifted. Police declined to give reasons for this, saying it was an internal matter that would not be discussed in the public domain.
Source: Times Live
Democratic Left statement on ANC-SACP pro-Secrecy Bill march
PRESS STATEMENT: RESPONSE TO ANC-SACP-SANCO MARCH IN SUPPORT OF THE SECRECY BILL (THE PROTECTION OF STATE INFORMATION BILL)
The Democratic Left Front (DLF) condemns the ANC, SACP and SANCO for organising a anti-democratic march for today in Cape Town in support of the anti-democratic Secrecy Bill (the Protection of State Information Bill). Despite the fury of the anti-imperialist and revolutionary rhetoric used to justify this march, no democrat of any conviction in South Africa can stand silent whilst the ANC, SACP and SANCO threaten to use their mass power to trample on basic democratic rights to information. This march is the first warning shot in the use of the mass activist base of these organisations as storm-troopers for the authoritarian ruling elite. If ever there was ever a classic example of the extent to which the ANC and the SACP represent authoritarian populism, this march is it. This is typical of Stalinist propaganda that was used by anti-democratic regimes in the past. Today, the ANC and the SACP have created false bogeys of liberals, foreign infiltrators and aggressors, and espionage in order to clamp down on social dissent given their collective failure to transform capitalist South Africa.
The DLF stands unreservedly in full and firm support of the Right to Know Campaign (R2K), COSATU, the SA Human Rights Commission and other progressive organisations in South Africa who remain opposed to the Secrecy Bill. The DLF rejects the spurious allegations made by the ANC, SACP and SANCO in their statement announcing today’s march. The DLF fully endorses the R2K statement issued in response to the ANC-SACP-SANCO statement. The R2K is not dominated by foreign-sponsored NGOs and western-owned media agencies. The R2K is not misleading the public about the class orientation of the media. In fact, the R2K has not only opposed the Secrecy Bill but has also argued and mobilised for truly democratised and diversified media, something which the ANC government has failed to facilitate through the statutory Media Development and Diversity Agency. For all these reasons, the DLF reaffirms its endorsement of the R2K campaign.
The intention of the Secrecy Bill is to stifle the spaces that do exist for access to information and critically informed citizens. The Secrecy Bill is not fundamentally about protection information that threatens the security of ordinary working class South Africans, but about protecting spaces for the ruling elite to continue their plunder of the state. While recent concessions by the ANC have improved the Bill, it will still be extremely difficult, if not impossible to ensure transparency of the most shadowy of all state structures, the security cluster. The grounds for classification of documents, and the definition of national security, still remain overbroad, and will lead to documents that are of considerable public interest and importance being declared secret. The Bill also lacks an adequate public interest/public domain defence in case people come into possession of classified documents, or if they are released into the public domain. This has serious implications for activists, who may come into possession of classified documents exposing abuses of power.
The Secrecy Bill is merely symptoms of a much bigger problem. Jacob Zuma’s ruling elite, which was brought to power by the ANC’s Polokwane conference, is enhancing the coercive capacities of the state, and in the process centralising power in an increasingly unaccountable security cluster. The re-militarisation of the police, which has intensified state violence against protestors, attempts to drive unions out of the military, and the lockdown on transparency and accountability in the Ministry of Defence are also signs of the growing power of Zuma’s securocrats. The DLF fears that unless the growing power of the security cluster is checked, then South Africa may be well on its way to a national security state, which likely to contain growing dissent against service delivery and the capitalist system itself through repression.
Source: Constitutionally Speaking
The Democratic Left Front (DLF) condemns the ANC, SACP and SANCO for organising a anti-democratic march for today in Cape Town in support of the anti-democratic Secrecy Bill (the Protection of State Information Bill). Despite the fury of the anti-imperialist and revolutionary rhetoric used to justify this march, no democrat of any conviction in South Africa can stand silent whilst the ANC, SACP and SANCO threaten to use their mass power to trample on basic democratic rights to information. This march is the first warning shot in the use of the mass activist base of these organisations as storm-troopers for the authoritarian ruling elite. If ever there was ever a classic example of the extent to which the ANC and the SACP represent authoritarian populism, this march is it. This is typical of Stalinist propaganda that was used by anti-democratic regimes in the past. Today, the ANC and the SACP have created false bogeys of liberals, foreign infiltrators and aggressors, and espionage in order to clamp down on social dissent given their collective failure to transform capitalist South Africa.
The DLF stands unreservedly in full and firm support of the Right to Know Campaign (R2K), COSATU, the SA Human Rights Commission and other progressive organisations in South Africa who remain opposed to the Secrecy Bill. The DLF rejects the spurious allegations made by the ANC, SACP and SANCO in their statement announcing today’s march. The DLF fully endorses the R2K statement issued in response to the ANC-SACP-SANCO statement. The R2K is not dominated by foreign-sponsored NGOs and western-owned media agencies. The R2K is not misleading the public about the class orientation of the media. In fact, the R2K has not only opposed the Secrecy Bill but has also argued and mobilised for truly democratised and diversified media, something which the ANC government has failed to facilitate through the statutory Media Development and Diversity Agency. For all these reasons, the DLF reaffirms its endorsement of the R2K campaign.
The intention of the Secrecy Bill is to stifle the spaces that do exist for access to information and critically informed citizens. The Secrecy Bill is not fundamentally about protection information that threatens the security of ordinary working class South Africans, but about protecting spaces for the ruling elite to continue their plunder of the state. While recent concessions by the ANC have improved the Bill, it will still be extremely difficult, if not impossible to ensure transparency of the most shadowy of all state structures, the security cluster. The grounds for classification of documents, and the definition of national security, still remain overbroad, and will lead to documents that are of considerable public interest and importance being declared secret. The Bill also lacks an adequate public interest/public domain defence in case people come into possession of classified documents, or if they are released into the public domain. This has serious implications for activists, who may come into possession of classified documents exposing abuses of power.
The Secrecy Bill is merely symptoms of a much bigger problem. Jacob Zuma’s ruling elite, which was brought to power by the ANC’s Polokwane conference, is enhancing the coercive capacities of the state, and in the process centralising power in an increasingly unaccountable security cluster. The re-militarisation of the police, which has intensified state violence against protestors, attempts to drive unions out of the military, and the lockdown on transparency and accountability in the Ministry of Defence are also signs of the growing power of Zuma’s securocrats. The DLF fears that unless the growing power of the security cluster is checked, then South Africa may be well on its way to a national security state, which likely to contain growing dissent against service delivery and the capitalist system itself through repression.
Source: Constitutionally Speaking
Appeal court ‘crossed limits on Simelane’
THE Supreme Court of Appeal had "overstepped the boundaries" drawn by the separation of powers principle when it set aside President Jacob Zuma ’s appointment of Menzi Simelane as prosecutions head, Justice Minister Jeff Radebe said in court papers yesterday. While Mr Zuma has said he would abide by the decision of the Constitutional Court on whether he had acted irrationally when he appointed Mr Simelane, Mr Radebe is opposing confirmation of the judgment by the Constitutional Court, and appealing against it.
Mr Simelane’s appointment in 2009 was met with a storm of criticism, because he had been severely rebuked by the former speaker of the National Assembly, Frene Ginwala, in her inquiry into the fitness of his predecessor, Vusi Pikoli, to hold office. In her report, Ms Ginwala said Mr Simelane’s conduct during the inquiry was "highly irregular" and "left much to be desired".
The Democratic Alliance (DA) took the matter to court, saying Mr Simelane was not fit and proper for the job and that the appointment was irrational and unconstitutional. The DA won the case at the Supreme Court of Appeal. Mr Simelane was then placed on special leave — pending the confirmation of the appeal court’s decision by the Constitutional Court. In supplementary legal argument filed yesterday, Mr Radebe’s counsel, Marumo Moerane SC, said the point of departure in determining whether the president had acted lawfully was the constitution and not the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) Act.
Looking at the constitutional scheme, the purpose in this case was to find a national director of public prosecutions who would be able to secure the institutional integrity of the NPA — including that it exercised its functions without fear, favour or prejudice — while "simultaneously having a constructive working relationship with the minister". The appointment of a national director was a "policy driven" decision, and the constitution "provided for a (national director) who is a political appointee", although once in office he is bound to secure the institutional independence of the NPA, Mr Moerane said.
He also argued the appeal court had not actually found that Mr Simelane was not fit and proper — rather that the president had not sufficiently enquired into the allegations. "It is only where a court positively finds that (a national director) who has been appointed by the president is not fit and proper ... that it could set aside the decision of the president as being irrational."
Should the court not agree with his argument, Mr Moerane asked it to order that the matter be sent back to the president for him to look into whether Mr Simelane was fit and proper, rather than to set aside the appointment, as the Supreme Court of Appeal had done.
Source: Business Day
Mr Simelane’s appointment in 2009 was met with a storm of criticism, because he had been severely rebuked by the former speaker of the National Assembly, Frene Ginwala, in her inquiry into the fitness of his predecessor, Vusi Pikoli, to hold office. In her report, Ms Ginwala said Mr Simelane’s conduct during the inquiry was "highly irregular" and "left much to be desired".
The Democratic Alliance (DA) took the matter to court, saying Mr Simelane was not fit and proper for the job and that the appointment was irrational and unconstitutional. The DA won the case at the Supreme Court of Appeal. Mr Simelane was then placed on special leave — pending the confirmation of the appeal court’s decision by the Constitutional Court. In supplementary legal argument filed yesterday, Mr Radebe’s counsel, Marumo Moerane SC, said the point of departure in determining whether the president had acted lawfully was the constitution and not the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) Act.
Looking at the constitutional scheme, the purpose in this case was to find a national director of public prosecutions who would be able to secure the institutional integrity of the NPA — including that it exercised its functions without fear, favour or prejudice — while "simultaneously having a constructive working relationship with the minister". The appointment of a national director was a "policy driven" decision, and the constitution "provided for a (national director) who is a political appointee", although once in office he is bound to secure the institutional independence of the NPA, Mr Moerane said.
He also argued the appeal court had not actually found that Mr Simelane was not fit and proper — rather that the president had not sufficiently enquired into the allegations. "It is only where a court positively finds that (a national director) who has been appointed by the president is not fit and proper ... that it could set aside the decision of the president as being irrational."
Should the court not agree with his argument, Mr Moerane asked it to order that the matter be sent back to the president for him to look into whether Mr Simelane was fit and proper, rather than to set aside the appointment, as the Supreme Court of Appeal had done.
Source: Business Day
UN expert calls on India to fight impunity for extrajudicial executions
While commending India's generally high level of commitment to human rights, a United Nations expert today urged the Government to continue to fight impunity for extrajudicial executions, and communal and traditional killings. The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, said he recognized the size, complexity, security concerns and diversity of India – however, he remains concerned that the challenges with respect to the protection of the right to life in the country are still considerable.
“Evidence gathered confirmed the use of so-called ‘fake encounters’ in certain parts of the country. Where this happens, a scene of a shoot-out is created, in which people who have been targeted are projected as the aggressors who shot at the police and were then killed in self-defence,” he told reporters in New Delhi at the end of a two-week mission to India. He added, “Moreover, in the north-eastern states, and Jammu and Kashmir, the armed forces have wide powers to employ lethal force.”
This is exacerbated, the expert said, by the high level of impunity that the police and armed forces enjoy, due to the requirement that any prosecutions require sanction from the central government – something that is rarely granted. “The main difficulty in my view has been these high levels of impunity,” stressed the Special Rapporteur, who reports to the UN Human Rights Council in an independent and unpaid capacity.
Mr. Heyns also pointed to other areas of concern. These include the prevalence of communal violence, and, in some areas, the killing of so-called witches, as well as dowry and so-called “honour” killings, and the plight of dalits [untouchables] and adivasis [tribal people]. He called for the establishment of a commission of inquiry, consisting of respected lawyers and other community leaders, to further investigate all aspects of extrajudicial executions, as a first step to addressing concerns. He also recommended the immediate repeal of the laws providing for immunity from prosecution of the police and the armed forces, as well as the ratification of a number of international treaties, including those related to torture and enforced disappearance.
The full report of his visit will be submitted to the Geneva-based Council in 2013.
Source: United Nations
“Evidence gathered confirmed the use of so-called ‘fake encounters’ in certain parts of the country. Where this happens, a scene of a shoot-out is created, in which people who have been targeted are projected as the aggressors who shot at the police and were then killed in self-defence,” he told reporters in New Delhi at the end of a two-week mission to India. He added, “Moreover, in the north-eastern states, and Jammu and Kashmir, the armed forces have wide powers to employ lethal force.”
This is exacerbated, the expert said, by the high level of impunity that the police and armed forces enjoy, due to the requirement that any prosecutions require sanction from the central government – something that is rarely granted. “The main difficulty in my view has been these high levels of impunity,” stressed the Special Rapporteur, who reports to the UN Human Rights Council in an independent and unpaid capacity.
Mr. Heyns also pointed to other areas of concern. These include the prevalence of communal violence, and, in some areas, the killing of so-called witches, as well as dowry and so-called “honour” killings, and the plight of dalits [untouchables] and adivasis [tribal people]. He called for the establishment of a commission of inquiry, consisting of respected lawyers and other community leaders, to further investigate all aspects of extrajudicial executions, as a first step to addressing concerns. He also recommended the immediate repeal of the laws providing for immunity from prosecution of the police and the armed forces, as well as the ratification of a number of international treaties, including those related to torture and enforced disappearance.
The full report of his visit will be submitted to the Geneva-based Council in 2013.
Source: United Nations
'People's president' on the defensive
As the battle for leadership positions in the ANC intensifies, President Jacob Zuma has tightened up his security. His intelligence advisers are insisting that all who attend party and government events where he is speaking must be accredited, probably to avoid ugly scenes such as those witnessed during a speech in the Western Cape last month. Zuma's lecture on the ANC's second president, Sefako Makgatho, was disrupted by angry ANC Youth League members, who heckled him in front of international dignitaries and demanded to know why former league leader Julius Malema was expelled from the ANC.
Since then, Zuma's intelligence chiefs have been taking no chances and have barred anyone without proper accreditation from attending his public meetings. The decision has angered some ANC leaders, who accused him of using state security agencies to fight internal party-political battles in the run-up to the party's elective conference in Mangaung. Zuma is facing an internal revolt by militants in the party who want to replace him with his deputy, Kgalema Motlanthe. Last week, many ANC community members in Middelburg in Mpumalanga who could not produce accreditation were turned away by Zuma's heavily armed security detail. Zuma was delivering the Zacharias Mahabane memorial lecture, part of the ANC's centenary celebrations.
According to Clarence Maseko, the youth league's provincial secretary in Mpumalanga, hundreds of people were turned away at the entrance of the town's Steve Tshwete Hall. "The memorial lecture was convened under a big cloud of paranoia. The Steve Tshwete banquet hall has a capacity of 5 000 people but only 2 500 [people] were allowed because they were accredited," said Maseko. "[Even] people from around the area [Ekangala region] were turned away and not invited, as is tradition. They [ANC leaders close to Zuma] made sure people who attended were from outside. "They bussed in cronies from the Ehlanzeni and Gert Sibande regions [Mpumalanga Premier David Mabuza's strongholds] because they sing praises of him and President Zuma. The people close to Mabuza and some intelligence agents thought the people from around would embarrass the president and disrupt his speech," Maseko said.
ANC spokesperson Keith Khoza this week said that the accreditation of community members was part of the party's efforts to improve event management. He said the Middelburg and recent Human Rights Day Kliptown events were not the only ones where people had to be accredited. "We did this during the Siyanqoba rally held at the FNB Stadium last year," he said. "The ANC could account [for] each and every person in that rally. It's a [new] system we are using … Those without accreditations can listen to the president on TV or radio. A lecture is not like public meetings; it's intimate."
However, some ANC leaders and critics of Zuma said it was a clear sign that the president was losing touch with the masses. A senior ANC leader said Zuma had become inaccessible even to some of the senior members of the alliance. "To secure a meeting with President Zuma can take years now. In the past, he was available to the leaders of Cosatu and the SACP [South African Communist Party], rightwingers, church leaders, bereaved families, but all this is now impossible," the leader said.
Political analyst Zamikhaya Maseti said the first victims of inaccessibility to Zuma were the working class who made up Cosatu. "They supported him with their lives in the run-up to Polokwane and now they deeply feel a sense of betrayal and alienation from a man who they thought would be a better listening president than his predecessor, Thabo Mbeki. But now, like Mbeki, whom they accused of aloofness and arrogance, he is always on international travel and is nowhere to be found on the ground," Maseti said. "The second disconnection people feel with Zuma is born out of his decision to discontinue the presidential imbizos made famous by Mbeki. If he is a man of the people, why did he get rid of the presidential imbizos, which were a great opportunity for the president of the country to interact with people, councillors, mayors, and listen to issues affecting them?"
ANC Veterans' League president Sandi Sejake said the issue of accreditation for ANC and community members was new and foreign to the culture and traditions of the ANC. "The ANC has changed a lot," Sejake said. "ANC members become important only when the party wants votes. It used to be a voluntary party. Today you go and buy a person. This [accreditation issue] is part of buying people. We are departing from the culture of the ANC."
Presidential spokesperson Mac Maharaj said: "The ANC, like any other political party or civil organisation, is responsible for ensuring that its events and functions are conducted in an orderly manner, without untoward disruption and without endangering life and property. To this end it is also able to call on the services of the SAPS, which would respond to any given situation on the basis of their own evaluation."
ANC spokesperson Jackson Mthembu said accreditation was not "a new thing". "It has always been the norm. For each and every indoor activity of the ANC, such as public lectures, people are required to have accreditation so that we are able to manage issues such as capacity. We do not ask people for accreditation to [attend] rallies."
Source: Mail & Guardian
Since then, Zuma's intelligence chiefs have been taking no chances and have barred anyone without proper accreditation from attending his public meetings. The decision has angered some ANC leaders, who accused him of using state security agencies to fight internal party-political battles in the run-up to the party's elective conference in Mangaung. Zuma is facing an internal revolt by militants in the party who want to replace him with his deputy, Kgalema Motlanthe. Last week, many ANC community members in Middelburg in Mpumalanga who could not produce accreditation were turned away by Zuma's heavily armed security detail. Zuma was delivering the Zacharias Mahabane memorial lecture, part of the ANC's centenary celebrations.
According to Clarence Maseko, the youth league's provincial secretary in Mpumalanga, hundreds of people were turned away at the entrance of the town's Steve Tshwete Hall. "The memorial lecture was convened under a big cloud of paranoia. The Steve Tshwete banquet hall has a capacity of 5 000 people but only 2 500 [people] were allowed because they were accredited," said Maseko. "[Even] people from around the area [Ekangala region] were turned away and not invited, as is tradition. They [ANC leaders close to Zuma] made sure people who attended were from outside. "They bussed in cronies from the Ehlanzeni and Gert Sibande regions [Mpumalanga Premier David Mabuza's strongholds] because they sing praises of him and President Zuma. The people close to Mabuza and some intelligence agents thought the people from around would embarrass the president and disrupt his speech," Maseko said.
ANC spokesperson Keith Khoza this week said that the accreditation of community members was part of the party's efforts to improve event management. He said the Middelburg and recent Human Rights Day Kliptown events were not the only ones where people had to be accredited. "We did this during the Siyanqoba rally held at the FNB Stadium last year," he said. "The ANC could account [for] each and every person in that rally. It's a [new] system we are using … Those without accreditations can listen to the president on TV or radio. A lecture is not like public meetings; it's intimate."
However, some ANC leaders and critics of Zuma said it was a clear sign that the president was losing touch with the masses. A senior ANC leader said Zuma had become inaccessible even to some of the senior members of the alliance. "To secure a meeting with President Zuma can take years now. In the past, he was available to the leaders of Cosatu and the SACP [South African Communist Party], rightwingers, church leaders, bereaved families, but all this is now impossible," the leader said.
Political analyst Zamikhaya Maseti said the first victims of inaccessibility to Zuma were the working class who made up Cosatu. "They supported him with their lives in the run-up to Polokwane and now they deeply feel a sense of betrayal and alienation from a man who they thought would be a better listening president than his predecessor, Thabo Mbeki. But now, like Mbeki, whom they accused of aloofness and arrogance, he is always on international travel and is nowhere to be found on the ground," Maseti said. "The second disconnection people feel with Zuma is born out of his decision to discontinue the presidential imbizos made famous by Mbeki. If he is a man of the people, why did he get rid of the presidential imbizos, which were a great opportunity for the president of the country to interact with people, councillors, mayors, and listen to issues affecting them?"
ANC Veterans' League president Sandi Sejake said the issue of accreditation for ANC and community members was new and foreign to the culture and traditions of the ANC. "The ANC has changed a lot," Sejake said. "ANC members become important only when the party wants votes. It used to be a voluntary party. Today you go and buy a person. This [accreditation issue] is part of buying people. We are departing from the culture of the ANC."
Presidential spokesperson Mac Maharaj said: "The ANC, like any other political party or civil organisation, is responsible for ensuring that its events and functions are conducted in an orderly manner, without untoward disruption and without endangering life and property. To this end it is also able to call on the services of the SAPS, which would respond to any given situation on the basis of their own evaluation."
ANC spokesperson Jackson Mthembu said accreditation was not "a new thing". "It has always been the norm. For each and every indoor activity of the ANC, such as public lectures, people are required to have accreditation so that we are able to manage issues such as capacity. We do not ask people for accreditation to [attend] rallies."
Source: Mail & Guardian
Hawks probe FNB
THE HAWKS have lodged an investigation into allegations of discrimination against black bondholders at FNB. But the bank has denied doing anything wrong.
It is alleged that when Saambou went bankrupt 10 years ago, thousands of clients were incorporated into FNB and some of them were bondholders. Saambou's system made black bondholders pay more than their white counterparts and this was allegedly not rectified when clients were incorporated into FNB.
Yesterday a docket was opened to investigate allegations of discrimination and fraud against the bank. Hawks spokesman McIntosh Polela said: "We received a complaint from a Mr Van Zyl who has been working with people who were incorporated from Saambou. We have opened a docket, but have not started investigating yet. "He alleges fraud and discrimination. We will speak to Van Zyl and take it from there. He alleges that there were tens of thousands of people who were incorporated from Saambou when it went bankrupt, but 6000 of those were black people who were charged more than the rest. As a result some of them have lost their houses," the spokesman said.
But Marius Marais, chief executive of FNB housing finance, said the allegations of racial bias and fraud against FNB are unsubstantiated and have no factual basis. "FNB's core value is one of equality and fairness both to our customers and employees. The bank strongly rejects any allegations of racism. FNB has long sought a judicial outcome to terminate the speculation and false allegations. Trial dates have been set and then postponed by the plaintiff," he said.
Marais said FNB had taken every step to rectify the errors inherited from Saambou. "The bank will welcome any investigation by the Hawks and will offer every cooperation to the investigators. We have not yet received any communication from the Hawks, but we are seeking an urgent meeting with them to address any issues they wish to investigate," Marais said.
According to FNB the bank recalculated the acquired Saambou accounts based on a set of carefully considered principles, and in June 2006 offered a R154-million refund to Saambou customers. "Notwithstanding the unprecedented steps that FNB took in respect of Saambou customers, some individuals with a vested interest continued to pursue allegations related to Saambou's method of interest calculation," Marais said. "FNB has publicly stated that it welcomes legal finality on these matters and actively pursued a trial date that was scheduled in the North Gauteng High Court in November 2011. "The case was delayed at the request of the plaintiff and eventually deferred to a later date. As a result the bank was awarded full costs associated with the delay," Marais said.
Source: The Sowetan
It is alleged that when Saambou went bankrupt 10 years ago, thousands of clients were incorporated into FNB and some of them were bondholders. Saambou's system made black bondholders pay more than their white counterparts and this was allegedly not rectified when clients were incorporated into FNB.
Yesterday a docket was opened to investigate allegations of discrimination and fraud against the bank. Hawks spokesman McIntosh Polela said: "We received a complaint from a Mr Van Zyl who has been working with people who were incorporated from Saambou. We have opened a docket, but have not started investigating yet. "He alleges fraud and discrimination. We will speak to Van Zyl and take it from there. He alleges that there were tens of thousands of people who were incorporated from Saambou when it went bankrupt, but 6000 of those were black people who were charged more than the rest. As a result some of them have lost their houses," the spokesman said.
But Marius Marais, chief executive of FNB housing finance, said the allegations of racial bias and fraud against FNB are unsubstantiated and have no factual basis. "FNB's core value is one of equality and fairness both to our customers and employees. The bank strongly rejects any allegations of racism. FNB has long sought a judicial outcome to terminate the speculation and false allegations. Trial dates have been set and then postponed by the plaintiff," he said.
Marais said FNB had taken every step to rectify the errors inherited from Saambou. "The bank will welcome any investigation by the Hawks and will offer every cooperation to the investigators. We have not yet received any communication from the Hawks, but we are seeking an urgent meeting with them to address any issues they wish to investigate," Marais said.
According to FNB the bank recalculated the acquired Saambou accounts based on a set of carefully considered principles, and in June 2006 offered a R154-million refund to Saambou customers. "Notwithstanding the unprecedented steps that FNB took in respect of Saambou customers, some individuals with a vested interest continued to pursue allegations related to Saambou's method of interest calculation," Marais said. "FNB has publicly stated that it welcomes legal finality on these matters and actively pursued a trial date that was scheduled in the North Gauteng High Court in November 2011. "The case was delayed at the request of the plaintiff and eventually deferred to a later date. As a result the bank was awarded full costs associated with the delay," Marais said.
Source: The Sowetan
The horn ultimatum: 'Lift the ban on trade or killing goes on'
Mpumalanga's rhino-farming tycoon, John Hume, says the best financial investment he could make would be to keep stockpiling rhino horn because the price of this prestige commodity just keeps rising.
In battling the scourge of rhino poaching in South Africa, private reserves are having to increase their security measures, look to alternatives like dehorning, and where possible, work together. He would be happy to sell off his other endangered species, which include disease-free buffalos and roan and sable antelope, even his 6500ha wildlife ranch called Mauricedale, near Malalane, worth more than R4-million. "But my financial advisers tell me not to sell my rhino horn because its value is increasing more than any other investment," he said. With 764 rhinos at Mauricedale and another breeding farm in North West province, Hume is the biggest rhino farmer in the world. He has de-horned all his rhinos and shaves off about 1kg of regrowth every year.
Loath to disclose the size of his present stockpile, kept in safety vaults off his properties, by the end of 2010 it included more than 500kg of rhino horn with a retail value of an estimated R200-million. That was when horn was worth an estimated R400 000/kg; today it could fetch at least R520 000/kg. In theory, anyway, because he has not been able to sell it since a moratorium was imposed on the local horn trade in 2009. Even though his stash keeps growing and the price keeps rising, Hume has joined other private owners to demand that the trade in the horns of white rhinos be reopened. "I personally don't need the trade to be legalised," he said, "but it is the only chance we've got to stop the slaughter of rhinos."
Private ranchers own about 25% of the estimated 18 600 white rhinos in South Africa. They also own a large part of the almost 20 tonnes of horn stockpiled in the country, although no one knows exactly how much. With debate raging about how best to protect rhinos in the build-up to a seminal congress on the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (Cites) early next year, private owners want local and international bans on trade in white-rhino horn to be lifted. This week, the department of environmental affairs closed its register of draft proposals from stakeholders that will inform the government's position at Cites.
Limpopo-based wildlife researcher Rael Loon said private owners had helped to grow rhino populations in the past two decades but were being burdened with spiralling security costs. Poaching was responsible for the death of close to 140 rhinos this year alone and many ranchers no longer wanted to keep them. The average price of live rhinos has dropped from R200 000 to R150 000 for a young female, and from R160 000 to R120 000 for a young male. Because poachers were being offered up to R300 000 for a single horn, the rhinos were more valuable dead than alive. "Private owners have huge assets lying in safes that they can't use, but that could potentially be used to pay to protect the rhinos," he said. "A controlled legal trade in the private sector would bring the market out into the open so that it could be monitored and managed."
Private owners need to protect their rhinos with round-the-clock guards, hi-tech security systems and up to 90% now opt to cut off the animals' horns to reduce the risk of poaching. Running a small anti-poaching unit for a handful of rhinos can cost at least R1-million a year. "People don't realise how much work goes into patrolling fences day after day. A lot of farmers end up putting more money into security than the rhinos are worth," said Chris Sussens, the owner of a small crush of rhinos on a reserve west of the Kruger Park. Protecting his rhinos had become so expensive, he had no option but to dehorn them. He also joined Rhino Revolution, an owners' collective responsible for the dehorning of 90% of the rhinos in private hands around Hoedspruit.
Sussens said the dehorning had drastically reduced the number of infiltrations by suspected poachers on his farm, but he regarded it as an interim measure until trade re-opened and black-market prices for horn come down. "Farming rhinos and dehorning them gives control to the trade. The minute you legalise it, you will take the pressure off the natural population in the wild," Sussens said.
According to conservation economist Michael Sas-Rolfes, demand for horn in Asian markets is "price inelastic", meaning that consumers are insensitive to price increases. There was nothing especially new or remarkable about the recent rise in demand for horn, he said. "All that has happened is a realignment of market supply and demand factors."
Sas-Rolfes and Hume argue that the surge in poaching since 2008 can be directly linked to a clampdown on hunting permits that had been used to launder horn. Then in 2009, when the environment department imposed a moratorium on local trade that had been used to leak horn to the East, it closed a loophole and forced traders to look for illegal alternatives. "Once the South African government imposed measures to restrict supply, the market responded aggressively. Prices had now risen sufficiently -- and demand was sufficiently inelastic -- to justify spending on more intensified illegal efforts to obtain horn; efforts that increasingly included organised crime syndicates and necessitated lethal methods," said Sas-Rolfes.
Speculators could be stockpiling horn in anticipation of further price increases and opportunities for profit, he said. But he disagreed with the view that South Africans in the hunting and game-ranching industry were "fuelling demand" for horn by playing a role in the illegal supply chain. "I believe this view to be a confusion of cause and effect. In fact, it is more likely that the South African game-ranching industry played a role in delaying an inevitable resurgence of poaching activity, driven by Asian consumer demand."
Hume, who has had nine rhinos poached despite their being dehorned, suggested the demand could be legitimately supplied by selling off two to three tonnes of horn a year from South Africa's R10-billion stockpile. Rather than selling the horns to one buyer who could manipulate the price and the market, the stocks should be put on public auction. "We would initiate a publicity campaign around the auction to alert the poachers. It won't stop the poaching immediately, but it would relieve the current pressure," he said.
South Africa, Namibia and Botswana are the last stronghold of about 95% of the world's rhinos. The 15 000-odd southern white rhinos in South Africa hold the flag for their species: black rhino numbers have dropped from about 60 000 across Africa in 1960 to less than 5 000 today, most of them in South Africa. Only a few northern white rhinos are left in Tanzania; the Javan rhino population in Vietnam was wiped out last year, leaving no more than 50 in Java; a handful of Indian rhinos are left in protected areas in the Himalayas; and there are less than 300 Sumatran rhinos left.
It would make sense for South Africa to be in control of future trade in horn, said Loon. But getting Cites to agree to open the trade could take years because it involved complicated administrative procedures and all rhino-range states -- including some in Asia and Africa that no longer have any rhinos -- would have to agree to the proposal. "The prohibitive 'stick' approach applied by Cites is clearly not working," Loon said. "The economic-incentive 'carrot' approach appears to be a much better strategy. Current poaching statistics show that the South African conservation community is fighting a losing battle and the rhinos are paying the price."
Legalising market 'like pulling the tail off a snake' "It is virtually impossible to get a legal permit to destroy a rhino horn, so how are they going to control a trade in thousands of horns?" asked Louise Joubert, the owner of a wildlife sanctuary raising several orphaned rhinos. Lack of capacity to enforce the complicated permit system that applies to dehorning rhinos and dealing with the horns is one of the main objections raised by opponents of opening the trade. At least four permits are needed for dehorning, moving and storing a horn and conservation officials must be present during the process. The horns must be micro-chipped and DNA samples must be taken.
Joubert and other ranchers who wanted to destroy horns after a rhino died said provincial officials had no idea how to deal with the request. One owner also mentioned instances of microchips being removed from horns and implanted into others. "The legislation we have is fine; the problem is enforcement," said Joubert. "The provincial authorities who are responsible are mostly dysfunctional." She believed the recent upsurge in rhino poaching can be attributed to game farmers and international traders manipulating the market in an attempt to force the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species [Cites] to legalise the trade. "The same kind of people who deal in lion bones and other endangered species have been thwarted in their attempts to trade in rhino horn in recent years. Now they are pushing Cites to open the trade, but it is not going to solve the poaching problem," she said.
It is a view shared by Worldwide Fund for Nature South Africa's rhino programme manager, Dr Joseph Okori. He told parliamentary hearings on the rhino crisis in January that legalising trade would not be the "silver bullet" that solves the poaching crisis. "This notion has been based on many economic assumptions, postulations and correlations to other nonsustainable forms of resource utilisation such as the diamond industry. At this point, we see it lending itself to greater unforeseen risks and few, if any, guarantees towards survival of the rhino across Africa," he said.
In the recent past, South Africa had sustained and grown its rhino industry quite successfully with local internal trade and limited hunting. "Recapitalisation, providing new or additional incentives to the sector in which subsidies are considered and policy adjustments would serve a more sustainable way forward," Okori said.
Steven Topham, a Limpopo rancher who sold all his rhinos last year after four were poached in the space of three weeks, said the government needed to intervene at the highest level in Asian consumer countries. "We can't keep pulling at the tail of the snake; we need to cut off its head," he said. "Dehorning and trading could be interpreted as saying to consumers that it is okay to use rhino horn, so long as they have a piece of paper. We should rather stop the trade in its tracks."
Source: Mail & Guardian
In battling the scourge of rhino poaching in South Africa, private reserves are having to increase their security measures, look to alternatives like dehorning, and where possible, work together. He would be happy to sell off his other endangered species, which include disease-free buffalos and roan and sable antelope, even his 6500ha wildlife ranch called Mauricedale, near Malalane, worth more than R4-million. "But my financial advisers tell me not to sell my rhino horn because its value is increasing more than any other investment," he said. With 764 rhinos at Mauricedale and another breeding farm in North West province, Hume is the biggest rhino farmer in the world. He has de-horned all his rhinos and shaves off about 1kg of regrowth every year.
Loath to disclose the size of his present stockpile, kept in safety vaults off his properties, by the end of 2010 it included more than 500kg of rhino horn with a retail value of an estimated R200-million. That was when horn was worth an estimated R400 000/kg; today it could fetch at least R520 000/kg. In theory, anyway, because he has not been able to sell it since a moratorium was imposed on the local horn trade in 2009. Even though his stash keeps growing and the price keeps rising, Hume has joined other private owners to demand that the trade in the horns of white rhinos be reopened. "I personally don't need the trade to be legalised," he said, "but it is the only chance we've got to stop the slaughter of rhinos."
Private ranchers own about 25% of the estimated 18 600 white rhinos in South Africa. They also own a large part of the almost 20 tonnes of horn stockpiled in the country, although no one knows exactly how much. With debate raging about how best to protect rhinos in the build-up to a seminal congress on the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (Cites) early next year, private owners want local and international bans on trade in white-rhino horn to be lifted. This week, the department of environmental affairs closed its register of draft proposals from stakeholders that will inform the government's position at Cites.
Limpopo-based wildlife researcher Rael Loon said private owners had helped to grow rhino populations in the past two decades but were being burdened with spiralling security costs. Poaching was responsible for the death of close to 140 rhinos this year alone and many ranchers no longer wanted to keep them. The average price of live rhinos has dropped from R200 000 to R150 000 for a young female, and from R160 000 to R120 000 for a young male. Because poachers were being offered up to R300 000 for a single horn, the rhinos were more valuable dead than alive. "Private owners have huge assets lying in safes that they can't use, but that could potentially be used to pay to protect the rhinos," he said. "A controlled legal trade in the private sector would bring the market out into the open so that it could be monitored and managed."
Private owners need to protect their rhinos with round-the-clock guards, hi-tech security systems and up to 90% now opt to cut off the animals' horns to reduce the risk of poaching. Running a small anti-poaching unit for a handful of rhinos can cost at least R1-million a year. "People don't realise how much work goes into patrolling fences day after day. A lot of farmers end up putting more money into security than the rhinos are worth," said Chris Sussens, the owner of a small crush of rhinos on a reserve west of the Kruger Park. Protecting his rhinos had become so expensive, he had no option but to dehorn them. He also joined Rhino Revolution, an owners' collective responsible for the dehorning of 90% of the rhinos in private hands around Hoedspruit.
Sussens said the dehorning had drastically reduced the number of infiltrations by suspected poachers on his farm, but he regarded it as an interim measure until trade re-opened and black-market prices for horn come down. "Farming rhinos and dehorning them gives control to the trade. The minute you legalise it, you will take the pressure off the natural population in the wild," Sussens said.
According to conservation economist Michael Sas-Rolfes, demand for horn in Asian markets is "price inelastic", meaning that consumers are insensitive to price increases. There was nothing especially new or remarkable about the recent rise in demand for horn, he said. "All that has happened is a realignment of market supply and demand factors."
Sas-Rolfes and Hume argue that the surge in poaching since 2008 can be directly linked to a clampdown on hunting permits that had been used to launder horn. Then in 2009, when the environment department imposed a moratorium on local trade that had been used to leak horn to the East, it closed a loophole and forced traders to look for illegal alternatives. "Once the South African government imposed measures to restrict supply, the market responded aggressively. Prices had now risen sufficiently -- and demand was sufficiently inelastic -- to justify spending on more intensified illegal efforts to obtain horn; efforts that increasingly included organised crime syndicates and necessitated lethal methods," said Sas-Rolfes.
Speculators could be stockpiling horn in anticipation of further price increases and opportunities for profit, he said. But he disagreed with the view that South Africans in the hunting and game-ranching industry were "fuelling demand" for horn by playing a role in the illegal supply chain. "I believe this view to be a confusion of cause and effect. In fact, it is more likely that the South African game-ranching industry played a role in delaying an inevitable resurgence of poaching activity, driven by Asian consumer demand."
Hume, who has had nine rhinos poached despite their being dehorned, suggested the demand could be legitimately supplied by selling off two to three tonnes of horn a year from South Africa's R10-billion stockpile. Rather than selling the horns to one buyer who could manipulate the price and the market, the stocks should be put on public auction. "We would initiate a publicity campaign around the auction to alert the poachers. It won't stop the poaching immediately, but it would relieve the current pressure," he said.
South Africa, Namibia and Botswana are the last stronghold of about 95% of the world's rhinos. The 15 000-odd southern white rhinos in South Africa hold the flag for their species: black rhino numbers have dropped from about 60 000 across Africa in 1960 to less than 5 000 today, most of them in South Africa. Only a few northern white rhinos are left in Tanzania; the Javan rhino population in Vietnam was wiped out last year, leaving no more than 50 in Java; a handful of Indian rhinos are left in protected areas in the Himalayas; and there are less than 300 Sumatran rhinos left.
It would make sense for South Africa to be in control of future trade in horn, said Loon. But getting Cites to agree to open the trade could take years because it involved complicated administrative procedures and all rhino-range states -- including some in Asia and Africa that no longer have any rhinos -- would have to agree to the proposal. "The prohibitive 'stick' approach applied by Cites is clearly not working," Loon said. "The economic-incentive 'carrot' approach appears to be a much better strategy. Current poaching statistics show that the South African conservation community is fighting a losing battle and the rhinos are paying the price."
Legalising market 'like pulling the tail off a snake' "It is virtually impossible to get a legal permit to destroy a rhino horn, so how are they going to control a trade in thousands of horns?" asked Louise Joubert, the owner of a wildlife sanctuary raising several orphaned rhinos. Lack of capacity to enforce the complicated permit system that applies to dehorning rhinos and dealing with the horns is one of the main objections raised by opponents of opening the trade. At least four permits are needed for dehorning, moving and storing a horn and conservation officials must be present during the process. The horns must be micro-chipped and DNA samples must be taken.
Joubert and other ranchers who wanted to destroy horns after a rhino died said provincial officials had no idea how to deal with the request. One owner also mentioned instances of microchips being removed from horns and implanted into others. "The legislation we have is fine; the problem is enforcement," said Joubert. "The provincial authorities who are responsible are mostly dysfunctional." She believed the recent upsurge in rhino poaching can be attributed to game farmers and international traders manipulating the market in an attempt to force the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species [Cites] to legalise the trade. "The same kind of people who deal in lion bones and other endangered species have been thwarted in their attempts to trade in rhino horn in recent years. Now they are pushing Cites to open the trade, but it is not going to solve the poaching problem," she said.
It is a view shared by Worldwide Fund for Nature South Africa's rhino programme manager, Dr Joseph Okori. He told parliamentary hearings on the rhino crisis in January that legalising trade would not be the "silver bullet" that solves the poaching crisis. "This notion has been based on many economic assumptions, postulations and correlations to other nonsustainable forms of resource utilisation such as the diamond industry. At this point, we see it lending itself to greater unforeseen risks and few, if any, guarantees towards survival of the rhino across Africa," he said.
In the recent past, South Africa had sustained and grown its rhino industry quite successfully with local internal trade and limited hunting. "Recapitalisation, providing new or additional incentives to the sector in which subsidies are considered and policy adjustments would serve a more sustainable way forward," Okori said.
Steven Topham, a Limpopo rancher who sold all his rhinos last year after four were poached in the space of three weeks, said the government needed to intervene at the highest level in Asian consumer countries. "We can't keep pulling at the tail of the snake; we need to cut off its head," he said. "Dehorning and trading could be interpreted as saying to consumers that it is okay to use rhino horn, so long as they have a piece of paper. We should rather stop the trade in its tracks."
Source: Mail & Guardian
Friends in high places rescue Mdluli
Former fraud and murder suspect Richard Mdluli is back in the top job at crime intelligence thanks to blatant interference by President Jacob Zuma's allies. And evidence suggests the president personally weighed in with moral support for their efforts to block the criminal investigation into the police spy boss. A secret report on the Mdluli investigation sets out in great detail the extent of the evidence against Mdluli.
The main charges against Mdluli concerned defrauding crime intelligence to buy two new BMWs for himself and his wife and appointing or promoting family members as highly paid agents. The wide-ranging allegations create a disturbing backdrop for the way in which Zuma and like-minded officials have intervened to support and protect Mdluli. Mdluli was last year investigated by the Hawks for abuses of the secret services account, the covert fund used to finance undercover crime intelligence operations. Prosecutors charged Mdluli, but advocate Lawrence Mrwebi, the man controversially appointed by Zuma to head the commercial crimes unit, overturned their decision.
In December last year Mrwebi ordered that the charges be withdrawn after referring the matter to the inspector general of intelligence, advocate Faith Radebe. But on March 19 this year, Radebe ruled that criminal investigations were a police responsibility and the matter should go back to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to reinstitute criminal charges.
Now, according to information obtained by the Mail & Guardian: Both Zuma and Police -Minister Nathi Mthethwa questioned Radebe's decision to refer the Mdluli investigation back to the NPA for prosecution; Zuma went so far as to call Radebe personally about her decision; Mthethwa called Radebe to a meeting with him on Tuesday this week, with acting national commissioner Lieutenant General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi; and notwithstanding the damning report on Mdluli, which was copied to Mkhwanazi, Mthethwa ordered Mdluli's suspension lifted.
Zuma openly displayed his support for Mdluli by attending a December function he hosted to celebrate the withdrawal of charges. Questioned by the M&G about Zuma's call to the inspector general and his attendance at Mdluli's celebration, presidential spokesperson Mac Maharaj declined to confirm or deny the claim. "The presidency is not obliged to give an account of the president's day-to-day meetings, discussions and any other form of communication except those of a public nature," he said in a written response.
The source of Zuma's association with Mdluli is not clear, but the policeman, as deputy to the Gauteng provincial commissioner, oversaw the detectives who investigated Zuma's rape case in 2006. Mthethwa refused to answer questions about his meeting with Radebe and Mkhwanazi, including whether he had issued an instruction to reinstate Mdluli. "Like all internal meetings, we do not divulge the contents thereof," said a statement from Mthethwa's spokesperson.
In response to questions from the M&G, the South African Police Service issued a general media announcement on Wednesday night confirming Mdluli's reinstatement. "A decision was taken to lift the suspension of Lieutenant General Richard Mdluli," the statement read, confirming the decision was effective the day of the meeting with Mthethwa. "The resolution is with effect from March 27 2012. This will not be discussed further in the public domain."
Major General Solomon Lazarus, who manages the secret services account and who had also been suspended in relation to alleged abuses of the fund, was also reinstated. The moves come on top of allegations that Mthethwa was ultimately responsible for instructions to the Hawks to shut down the investigation of Mdluli and the broader crime intelligence probe. The murder case against Mdluli was withdrawn when the NPA decided instead to institute an inquest into the 1999 death of Oupa Ramogibe, an alleged love rival of Mdluli. The authority withdrew charges despite being in possession of an independent legal opinion that reportedly recommended it proceed.
It also appears likely that the NPA will ignore the inspector general's advice to reinstitute fraud charges against Mdluli. Radebe did not respond to questions from the M&G, but her recommendation was contained in a March 19 letter that appears to have set off the interventions from Zuma and Mthethwa. In the letter, she rejected a memorandum from Mrwebi setting out his reasons for withdrawing of charges. She noted: "The mandate of the inspector general of intelligence does not extend to criminal investigations ... As such we are of the opinion the reasons advanced by the NPA in support of the withdrawal of the criminal charges are inaccurate and legally flawed. We therefore recommend that this matter be referred back to the NPA for the institution of the criminal charges."
Responding to questions from the M&G, NPA spokesman Mthunzi Mhaga said Mrwebi's decision to withdraw the case against Mdluli "was informed by the insufficiency of relevant and admissible evidence to sustain charges". This was denied by one experienced investigator familiar with the probe, who described the fraud charge as "a slam-dunk case". Mhaga said the NPA had received a copy of Radebe's letter. "We are still considering its contents and will have further discussions with the police and determine the way forward."
Police officials fear that Mdluli's reinstatement will put him in a position to complete a purge of crime intelligence officers regarded as disloyal or too close to suspended police commissioner Bheki Cele. As the secret report shows, members of crime intelligence played a key role in providing evidence to the Hawks and one had to be placed in witness protection after being threatened by senior colleagues.
Earlier this year, three top members of the command structure of the crime intelligence division in KwaZulu-Natal were suspended or transferred. And, through Lazarus, Mdluli is again placed in control of a secret slush fund rumoured to contain in excess of a billion rand. Mdluli's return to service also places him in pole position to succeed Cele, who appears to be regarded as insufficiently loyal to Zuma. The interventions to protect Mdluli appear to be part of an unrestrained campaign by Zuma to consolidate his power base in state security structures ahead of the ANC’s elective conference in December.
According to a well-informed source, a plan is in place to transfer command of the police VIP division and presidential protection unit to fall under the control of crime intelligence. This will not only ensure that they fall under Mdluli's command, but will also give him direct access to the most intimate day-to-day details of the activities of all of Zuma's political rivals.
Source: Mail & Guardian
The main charges against Mdluli concerned defrauding crime intelligence to buy two new BMWs for himself and his wife and appointing or promoting family members as highly paid agents. The wide-ranging allegations create a disturbing backdrop for the way in which Zuma and like-minded officials have intervened to support and protect Mdluli. Mdluli was last year investigated by the Hawks for abuses of the secret services account, the covert fund used to finance undercover crime intelligence operations. Prosecutors charged Mdluli, but advocate Lawrence Mrwebi, the man controversially appointed by Zuma to head the commercial crimes unit, overturned their decision.
In December last year Mrwebi ordered that the charges be withdrawn after referring the matter to the inspector general of intelligence, advocate Faith Radebe. But on March 19 this year, Radebe ruled that criminal investigations were a police responsibility and the matter should go back to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to reinstitute criminal charges.
Now, according to information obtained by the Mail & Guardian: Both Zuma and Police -Minister Nathi Mthethwa questioned Radebe's decision to refer the Mdluli investigation back to the NPA for prosecution; Zuma went so far as to call Radebe personally about her decision; Mthethwa called Radebe to a meeting with him on Tuesday this week, with acting national commissioner Lieutenant General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi; and notwithstanding the damning report on Mdluli, which was copied to Mkhwanazi, Mthethwa ordered Mdluli's suspension lifted.
Zuma openly displayed his support for Mdluli by attending a December function he hosted to celebrate the withdrawal of charges. Questioned by the M&G about Zuma's call to the inspector general and his attendance at Mdluli's celebration, presidential spokesperson Mac Maharaj declined to confirm or deny the claim. "The presidency is not obliged to give an account of the president's day-to-day meetings, discussions and any other form of communication except those of a public nature," he said in a written response.
The source of Zuma's association with Mdluli is not clear, but the policeman, as deputy to the Gauteng provincial commissioner, oversaw the detectives who investigated Zuma's rape case in 2006. Mthethwa refused to answer questions about his meeting with Radebe and Mkhwanazi, including whether he had issued an instruction to reinstate Mdluli. "Like all internal meetings, we do not divulge the contents thereof," said a statement from Mthethwa's spokesperson.
In response to questions from the M&G, the South African Police Service issued a general media announcement on Wednesday night confirming Mdluli's reinstatement. "A decision was taken to lift the suspension of Lieutenant General Richard Mdluli," the statement read, confirming the decision was effective the day of the meeting with Mthethwa. "The resolution is with effect from March 27 2012. This will not be discussed further in the public domain."
Major General Solomon Lazarus, who manages the secret services account and who had also been suspended in relation to alleged abuses of the fund, was also reinstated. The moves come on top of allegations that Mthethwa was ultimately responsible for instructions to the Hawks to shut down the investigation of Mdluli and the broader crime intelligence probe. The murder case against Mdluli was withdrawn when the NPA decided instead to institute an inquest into the 1999 death of Oupa Ramogibe, an alleged love rival of Mdluli. The authority withdrew charges despite being in possession of an independent legal opinion that reportedly recommended it proceed.
It also appears likely that the NPA will ignore the inspector general's advice to reinstitute fraud charges against Mdluli. Radebe did not respond to questions from the M&G, but her recommendation was contained in a March 19 letter that appears to have set off the interventions from Zuma and Mthethwa. In the letter, she rejected a memorandum from Mrwebi setting out his reasons for withdrawing of charges. She noted: "The mandate of the inspector general of intelligence does not extend to criminal investigations ... As such we are of the opinion the reasons advanced by the NPA in support of the withdrawal of the criminal charges are inaccurate and legally flawed. We therefore recommend that this matter be referred back to the NPA for the institution of the criminal charges."
Responding to questions from the M&G, NPA spokesman Mthunzi Mhaga said Mrwebi's decision to withdraw the case against Mdluli "was informed by the insufficiency of relevant and admissible evidence to sustain charges". This was denied by one experienced investigator familiar with the probe, who described the fraud charge as "a slam-dunk case". Mhaga said the NPA had received a copy of Radebe's letter. "We are still considering its contents and will have further discussions with the police and determine the way forward."
Police officials fear that Mdluli's reinstatement will put him in a position to complete a purge of crime intelligence officers regarded as disloyal or too close to suspended police commissioner Bheki Cele. As the secret report shows, members of crime intelligence played a key role in providing evidence to the Hawks and one had to be placed in witness protection after being threatened by senior colleagues.
Earlier this year, three top members of the command structure of the crime intelligence division in KwaZulu-Natal were suspended or transferred. And, through Lazarus, Mdluli is again placed in control of a secret slush fund rumoured to contain in excess of a billion rand. Mdluli's return to service also places him in pole position to succeed Cele, who appears to be regarded as insufficiently loyal to Zuma. The interventions to protect Mdluli appear to be part of an unrestrained campaign by Zuma to consolidate his power base in state security structures ahead of the ANC’s elective conference in December.
According to a well-informed source, a plan is in place to transfer command of the police VIP division and presidential protection unit to fall under the control of crime intelligence. This will not only ensure that they fall under Mdluli's command, but will also give him direct access to the most intimate day-to-day details of the activities of all of Zuma's political rivals.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Mdluli report's shocking revelations
Today the Mail & Guardian publishes details from a secret report to the inspector general of intelligence on the allegations against crime intelligence boss Richard Mdluli. The extracts below demonstrate the extent to which President Jacob Zuma and his allies were prepared to ignore evidence of the rot at crime intelligence to protect their man.
Publication also represents a defining example of the kind of public-interest disclosure that would be criminalised by the so-called secrecy Bill before Parliament. Download the Mdluli report here.
The report was drafted by Major General Mark Hankel and signed off by then-acting crime intelligence boss Chris de Kock. According to the document, it was drafted as a written follow-up to a detailed verbal briefing given to the inspector general of intelligence, Faith Radebe, on October 31 last year when the Hawks investigation into Mdluli was in full swing. The document is headed: "Report to the inspector general of intelligence on the matter of alleged maladministration and crimes committed in respect of the Secret Services Account (SSA) of the crime intelligence division of the South African Police Service."
Hankel begins by setting out the basis for his claims. "The report is based on the interaction and insight into the Hawks' case of corruption and fraud as well as personal insight into various documents requested by the Hawks, of which some have been handed over to the Hawks pursuant to a search warrant, while others are being safeguarded as evidence in possible criminal or departmental investigations. "The report is further based on information provided by, and discussions with, certain sensitively placed officers of crime intelligence, an investigation report compiled by the Hawks as well as information under oath. It serves as official written notification to the inspector general in relation to crime, maladministration and nepotism that has come to the attention of the acting divisional commissioner of crime intelligence …"
Hankel then details the evidence gathered by the Hawks. "The Silverton CAS 155/07/2011 (fraud and corruption) was registered after investigation into the murder case against Lt Gen RN Mdluli exposed fraud and corruption involving the selling by a BMW dealer of a private BMW belonging to Lt Gen Mdluli. "This is related to the shortfall in the settlement fee on the finance from the said vehicle being paid through a second dealer with whom crime intelligence does business and from whom Lt Gen Mdluli purchased a vehicle. "It also relates to the purchase of two BMWs from the BMW dealer on which so-called 'trade assist' incentives from BMW South Africa allegedly further influenced the resale price on Lt Gen Mdluli's private BMW. "This benefited Lt Gen Mdluli to the amount of about R95 000. Col [Hein] Barnard derived no benefit from these transactions but signed a contract purporting to be RN Mdluli. "The prosecution, however, contends that the two BMWs would not otherwise have been purchased if it was not to be used to offset the shortfall on the settlement amount of Lt Gen Mdluli's private BMW. In reality, both BMW's purchased were then allocated with the one (5 Series) going to Lt Gen Mdluli for his personal use and the other (3 Series) going to his wife (Col T Lyons) in Cape Town."
But the Hawks investigation went further, Hankel explains, pointing out that the Hawks had obtained a search warrant for two covert crime intelligence premises to seize documents. He sets out the additional criminal elements being investigated against Mdluli. "The appointment/promotion of his current wife, her brother and other members of her family, his ex-wife, her daughter and his son, as well as two 'girlfriends' in the Eastern Cape. With the exception of the latter two, the investigation also targets their placement in the agent programme of crime intelligence, as well as their current deployment and daily work and productivity. "Furthermore, the investigation team of the Hawks is looking at all salary claims, advances and operational claims submitted by the handlers of the members who were what is referred to as 'principal agents' in the programme. Of particular interest to the investigation team is their utilisation of covert vehicles. "The alleged abuse of covert vehicles by Lt Gen Mdluli, who it is alleged was not entitled to the use of such vehicles in the way he did. In this regard, various vehicles were identified at his two properties. Specific focus is being given to BMWs, a Jeep Cherokee SRT8, two E-Class Mercedes-Benzes and a Lexus. The investigation includes such specifics as his use thereof while on vacation. "An overseas trip to Singapore at the end of 2009 for purposes of viewing and purchasing technical equipment for crime intelligence … Of note to the investigation team was the fact that the spouses of Lt Gen Mdluli (T Lyons) and Maj Gen [Solly] Lazarus and Col Barnard accompanied them on the trip. It is evident that Maj Gen Lazarus and Col Barnard financed their spouses’ trip costs, but that of Col Lyons (who was not a member of the SAPS at the time) … was funded from the secret service account."
Hankel then goes on to identify "new revelations" that flowed from his own inquiries, notably interference and intimidation by some of those implicated. 'During the investigation certain officers were interviewed by the Hawks to explain certain aspects of documents. One of these officers … decided out of his own accord on the third day to reveal the extent of crime that is occurring in the SSA environment. "On the day of the revelations in question, he took a colleague of his into his confidence and admitted that he had provided incriminating information to the Hawks. "That evening and the following morning, he was subjected to intimidating behaviour by some of his colleagues … This behaviour included trespassing on his property, being driven around in a vehicle, being taken to the home of a major general and being taken to the office of the same major general, all against his will. This officer is now in the witness protection programme.
"Every time certain officers are called by Major General Hankel to hand over documents or explain some or other detail, they are confronted by their major general and requested to reveal what was asked. "The latter occurred despite the express instruction by Major General Hankel not to do so. "The component head, in more than one instance, instructed the same subordinates not to co-operate with the investigation. It is also known that attempts have been made to tamper with or influence evidence. "There exists a concerted effort from within crime intelligence and specifically the SSA environment to derail the investigation. The situation includes what is believed to be a threat to the lives and personal safety and integrity of persons involved in the investigation of this matter, including those supporting the investigation."
Hankel also details abuse of the so-called agent programme. "It is evident that besides the employment, inappropriate promotion and placing of family members of Lt Gen Mdluli in the agent programme of crime intelligence, [in addition] family members of a major general and colonel in the division, as well as that of a prominent person, were placed in the programme."
Hankel says that the prominent person, a businessman from KwaZulu-Natal, was allegedly recruited to influence suspended police commissioner Bheki Cele in favour of crime intelligence. "In total, approximately 23 persons that fall in the above category are deployed as 'principal agents' in the programme. As far as can be ascertained, none of these are actually involved in bone fide undercover operations in pursuance of the operational objectives of the SA Police Service Crime Intelligence Division. "Furthermore, no activity reports are generated in respect of these individuals. It is alleged that especially the family members of the prominent person in Kwazulu-Natal go about their 'normal private lives' with no benefit to the SA Police Service. "They were allegedly employed as a favour or as part of a pay-off to the prominent person, in return for consultancy services rendered to crime intelligence in respect of the national commissioner."
Mdluli and his cohorts were also flown around the country courtesy of the secret service account. "A travel agent in Westville, Durban, was tasked with the duty of providing a travel-office service to the SSA environment, ostensibly a covert air travel service. "This arrangement was discovered when Lt Gen Mdluli's journeys were analysed. No agents of consequence utilised the service, rather it was abused by a small group of persons. Principal agents, many of them appointed and promoted in the same covert promotion process as Lt Gen Mdluli's family. "Lt Gen Mdluli and his family travelled on more than 50 occasions while the prominent person and his family, not limited to those in the agent programme, travelled on more than 50 occasions."
Hankel reports that various safe houses have been rented for the exclusive use of Mdluli and his family. "One was rented ostensibly for him to use for strategic meetings with component heads. No such meetings occurred there. Instead, he used it to house his Cape Town family (second wife and two children). They would fly up to Johannesburg and reside in the house. "A property in Gordon's Bay, belonging to Lt Gen Mdluli, was rented by crime intelligence, but used only by him. A possibility that still needs to be confirmed is that during the time that crime intelligence was hiring the property, other tenants were also hiring it from him."
Hankel argues that, rather than the Hawks investigation placing sensitive systems in jeopardy, it is the abuse that has done so. "They have placed the entire institution, including the agent programme, covert air travel, vehicles, service providers and even operations, at risk by abusing the system and exposing it to individuals of dubious character."
Source: Mail & Guardian
Publication also represents a defining example of the kind of public-interest disclosure that would be criminalised by the so-called secrecy Bill before Parliament. Download the Mdluli report here.
The report was drafted by Major General Mark Hankel and signed off by then-acting crime intelligence boss Chris de Kock. According to the document, it was drafted as a written follow-up to a detailed verbal briefing given to the inspector general of intelligence, Faith Radebe, on October 31 last year when the Hawks investigation into Mdluli was in full swing. The document is headed: "Report to the inspector general of intelligence on the matter of alleged maladministration and crimes committed in respect of the Secret Services Account (SSA) of the crime intelligence division of the South African Police Service."
Hankel begins by setting out the basis for his claims. "The report is based on the interaction and insight into the Hawks' case of corruption and fraud as well as personal insight into various documents requested by the Hawks, of which some have been handed over to the Hawks pursuant to a search warrant, while others are being safeguarded as evidence in possible criminal or departmental investigations. "The report is further based on information provided by, and discussions with, certain sensitively placed officers of crime intelligence, an investigation report compiled by the Hawks as well as information under oath. It serves as official written notification to the inspector general in relation to crime, maladministration and nepotism that has come to the attention of the acting divisional commissioner of crime intelligence …"
Hankel then details the evidence gathered by the Hawks. "The Silverton CAS 155/07/2011 (fraud and corruption) was registered after investigation into the murder case against Lt Gen RN Mdluli exposed fraud and corruption involving the selling by a BMW dealer of a private BMW belonging to Lt Gen Mdluli. "This is related to the shortfall in the settlement fee on the finance from the said vehicle being paid through a second dealer with whom crime intelligence does business and from whom Lt Gen Mdluli purchased a vehicle. "It also relates to the purchase of two BMWs from the BMW dealer on which so-called 'trade assist' incentives from BMW South Africa allegedly further influenced the resale price on Lt Gen Mdluli's private BMW. "This benefited Lt Gen Mdluli to the amount of about R95 000. Col [Hein] Barnard derived no benefit from these transactions but signed a contract purporting to be RN Mdluli. "The prosecution, however, contends that the two BMWs would not otherwise have been purchased if it was not to be used to offset the shortfall on the settlement amount of Lt Gen Mdluli's private BMW. In reality, both BMW's purchased were then allocated with the one (5 Series) going to Lt Gen Mdluli for his personal use and the other (3 Series) going to his wife (Col T Lyons) in Cape Town."
But the Hawks investigation went further, Hankel explains, pointing out that the Hawks had obtained a search warrant for two covert crime intelligence premises to seize documents. He sets out the additional criminal elements being investigated against Mdluli. "The appointment/promotion of his current wife, her brother and other members of her family, his ex-wife, her daughter and his son, as well as two 'girlfriends' in the Eastern Cape. With the exception of the latter two, the investigation also targets their placement in the agent programme of crime intelligence, as well as their current deployment and daily work and productivity. "Furthermore, the investigation team of the Hawks is looking at all salary claims, advances and operational claims submitted by the handlers of the members who were what is referred to as 'principal agents' in the programme. Of particular interest to the investigation team is their utilisation of covert vehicles. "The alleged abuse of covert vehicles by Lt Gen Mdluli, who it is alleged was not entitled to the use of such vehicles in the way he did. In this regard, various vehicles were identified at his two properties. Specific focus is being given to BMWs, a Jeep Cherokee SRT8, two E-Class Mercedes-Benzes and a Lexus. The investigation includes such specifics as his use thereof while on vacation. "An overseas trip to Singapore at the end of 2009 for purposes of viewing and purchasing technical equipment for crime intelligence … Of note to the investigation team was the fact that the spouses of Lt Gen Mdluli (T Lyons) and Maj Gen [Solly] Lazarus and Col Barnard accompanied them on the trip. It is evident that Maj Gen Lazarus and Col Barnard financed their spouses’ trip costs, but that of Col Lyons (who was not a member of the SAPS at the time) … was funded from the secret service account."
Hankel then goes on to identify "new revelations" that flowed from his own inquiries, notably interference and intimidation by some of those implicated. 'During the investigation certain officers were interviewed by the Hawks to explain certain aspects of documents. One of these officers … decided out of his own accord on the third day to reveal the extent of crime that is occurring in the SSA environment. "On the day of the revelations in question, he took a colleague of his into his confidence and admitted that he had provided incriminating information to the Hawks. "That evening and the following morning, he was subjected to intimidating behaviour by some of his colleagues … This behaviour included trespassing on his property, being driven around in a vehicle, being taken to the home of a major general and being taken to the office of the same major general, all against his will. This officer is now in the witness protection programme.
"Every time certain officers are called by Major General Hankel to hand over documents or explain some or other detail, they are confronted by their major general and requested to reveal what was asked. "The latter occurred despite the express instruction by Major General Hankel not to do so. "The component head, in more than one instance, instructed the same subordinates not to co-operate with the investigation. It is also known that attempts have been made to tamper with or influence evidence. "There exists a concerted effort from within crime intelligence and specifically the SSA environment to derail the investigation. The situation includes what is believed to be a threat to the lives and personal safety and integrity of persons involved in the investigation of this matter, including those supporting the investigation."
Hankel also details abuse of the so-called agent programme. "It is evident that besides the employment, inappropriate promotion and placing of family members of Lt Gen Mdluli in the agent programme of crime intelligence, [in addition] family members of a major general and colonel in the division, as well as that of a prominent person, were placed in the programme."
Hankel says that the prominent person, a businessman from KwaZulu-Natal, was allegedly recruited to influence suspended police commissioner Bheki Cele in favour of crime intelligence. "In total, approximately 23 persons that fall in the above category are deployed as 'principal agents' in the programme. As far as can be ascertained, none of these are actually involved in bone fide undercover operations in pursuance of the operational objectives of the SA Police Service Crime Intelligence Division. "Furthermore, no activity reports are generated in respect of these individuals. It is alleged that especially the family members of the prominent person in Kwazulu-Natal go about their 'normal private lives' with no benefit to the SA Police Service. "They were allegedly employed as a favour or as part of a pay-off to the prominent person, in return for consultancy services rendered to crime intelligence in respect of the national commissioner."
Mdluli and his cohorts were also flown around the country courtesy of the secret service account. "A travel agent in Westville, Durban, was tasked with the duty of providing a travel-office service to the SSA environment, ostensibly a covert air travel service. "This arrangement was discovered when Lt Gen Mdluli's journeys were analysed. No agents of consequence utilised the service, rather it was abused by a small group of persons. Principal agents, many of them appointed and promoted in the same covert promotion process as Lt Gen Mdluli's family. "Lt Gen Mdluli and his family travelled on more than 50 occasions while the prominent person and his family, not limited to those in the agent programme, travelled on more than 50 occasions."
Hankel reports that various safe houses have been rented for the exclusive use of Mdluli and his family. "One was rented ostensibly for him to use for strategic meetings with component heads. No such meetings occurred there. Instead, he used it to house his Cape Town family (second wife and two children). They would fly up to Johannesburg and reside in the house. "A property in Gordon's Bay, belonging to Lt Gen Mdluli, was rented by crime intelligence, but used only by him. A possibility that still needs to be confirmed is that during the time that crime intelligence was hiring the property, other tenants were also hiring it from him."
Hankel argues that, rather than the Hawks investigation placing sensitive systems in jeopardy, it is the abuse that has done so. "They have placed the entire institution, including the agent programme, covert air travel, vehicles, service providers and even operations, at risk by abusing the system and exposing it to individuals of dubious character."
Source: Mail & Guardian
MTN's cash, weapons and ties in Iran
Cellphone giant MTN was so desperate to win a mobile operating licence in the "virgin" territory of Iran that it allegedly put together a package of bribes, trading opportunities in sophisticated weaponry, capital investment and diplomatic influence that the Islamic Republic could not resist. That is the claim of rival firm Turkcell, which was pushed out of the deal when MTN arrived on the scene. It backs up the allegation with a raft of what appears to be internal MTN documents, leaked from the heart of the company's Iran operation.
The allegations are set out in a $4-billion (R32-billion) lawsuit launched in the US District Court of Columbia in Washington DC this week. The scheme, allegedly known in MTN as "Project Snooker", was allegedly driven from the top by then-chief executive Phuthuma Nhleko, with the assistance of Irene Charnley (then commercial director), and Sifiso Dabengwa (then chief operating officer). It included alleged bribes to South Africa's ambassador to Iran, Yusuf "Jo-Jo" Saloojee, and Iran's deputy foreign minister, Javid Ghorbanoghli; the involvement of former defence minister Mosiuoa Lekota in the procurement of highly sensitive weapons systems from parastatal Denel; and access for Iranian officials to South Africa's top nuclear envoy, Abdul Minty. The memos attached to the court papers apparently set out how Ghorbanoghli, dubbed "Long John", was allegedly paid $400 000 to politically undermine Turkcell's position while Saloojee, codenamed "Short John'', was allegedly paid $200 000 to help MTN deliver pro-Iran votes from South Africa at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) amid controversy over Iran's nuclear plans.
The Irancell cellphone network was projected to be worth $31.6-billion in revenues over 15 years for a licence fee of $380-million. The licence holder and the Iranian state-owned telecommunications company were to enjoy exclusive use of the market for two years before a third competing licence would be awarded. Turkcell won the bid on February 18 2004 and MTN came second. But Turkcell claims that MTN, through "unprecedented corrupt acts", blocked it from entering the agreements, clearing the regulatory environment and completing post-award obligations. To secure the 49% stake in Irancell, MTN effectively also allegedly carried all the costs for its 51% partner through "sham loans", Turkcell says.
It is alleged in the papers that MTN paid the €300-million licence fee, capitalisation costs and share transfer tax of Iran's state-owned defence company, Sairan (also known as Iran Electronic Industries or IEI) and Bonyad (one of the five Iranian quasi-independent charitable foundations that is integral to Iran's defence establishment) in exchange for their assistance within the ministry of defence and the "Supreme Leader".
What follows is a summary of Turkcell's claims in its court application and the supporting documentation that allegedly emanates from within MTN. It has not yet been tested in court, nor has MTN commented on the authenticity of the documents. A few weeks after Turkcell was made the preferred bidder, Charnley met with Ghorbanoghli (Long John) in Tehran where the minister told her that MTN's only chance to oust Turkcell was to win political influence in Iran and use South Africa's influence to favour the Iranian government at the UN Security Council. And so began "Project Snooker" -- the plan on how best to use Iranian and South African government officials to allegedly gain political influence. MTN reached out to a former deputy minister for the Iranian ministry of information and communications technology and to Mohammed Mokhber, the deputy president of a major charitable foundation known as Bonyad Mostazafan, controlled by the supreme leader of Iran.
The Bonyad foundation is controlled by the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps, the military complex formed by Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and is believed to control about one-third of the Iranian economy. It is known for engaging in Iran's shadow foreign policy. MTN was then introduced to Ebrahim Mahmoudzadeh, a former Iranian deputy minister of defence and then-president of Iran Electronic Industries, who reported directly to the Iranian minister of defence. As one of Turkcell's local minority partners in the Irancell consortium, Mokhber and Mahmoudzadeh told MTN executives they would be willing to work with the South African company and dump Turkcell if MTN could obtain certain defence equipment, support its nuclear programme and pay for the licence and other benefits. For example, MTN was urged to facilitate the purchase of certain military equipment from South Africa for Iran's state-owned defence company, Sairan, which was previously blocked by South Africa's national conventional arms control committee. For more than a year, MTN executives regularly visited Mahmoudzadeh and the ministry of foreign affairs to reinforce its political influence.
In about April 2004, the Iranians tested MTN's ability to deliver on defence products and nuclear votes. Sairan requested that MTN arrange a meeting with Denel, South Africa's largest manufacturer of defence equipment, as well as then-defence minister Mosiuoa Lekota. MTN was told Iran was building its defence force and it wanted to purchase military radios, encryption technologies and pilot display computer chips manufactured in the Western Cape, which South Africa refused to sell them previously. MTN made a commitment that it could procure this equipment as well as facilitate installation of eavesdropping technologies on MTN devices were they to be awarded the 49% stake in Irancell.
The MTN board of directors, including Cyril Ramaphosa, Nhleko, Dabengwa and Charnley, received regular reports on the status of Turkcell's licence and MTN's strategies. Enter Saloojee, "aka Small John", who was appointed South Africa's ambassador to Iran on May 23 2004. Before he left for Tehran, MTN briefed him about the licence situation and about its desire to win the licence from Turkcell. "Small John" started working closely with "Long John" and convinced the Iranian government that MTN had enough political clout to help Iran on its nuclear and defence equipment needs. Charnley was key to that mix because of her political connections in South Africa, particularly with Lekota -- she worked closely with him in the United Democratic Front during the 1980s. Ramaphosa also enjoyed a close relationship with Lekota because of their ties in the ANC.
It is well known in political circles that Charnley and Nhleko were closely aligned with former president Thabo Mbeki. Charnley is friends with Mbeki's wife, Zanele, who assisted the former MTN executive with funds to help start Smile Communications, a telecoms company. "Small John" was also allegedly close to Mbeki, with whom he had shared a house at some point during the struggle. In about June 2004, Saloojee invited Charnley and Nhleko to his house for dinner and that's where the discussion of the bribes for both "Small John" and "Long John" took place. Saloojee explained that he was hoping to purchase a house in South Africa for $200 000. On April 26 2007, MTN made a direct payment into a trust account for Saloojee, which was received by his property attorneys, Gildenhuys Lessing Malatji Inc. The property transaction was closed on September 26 2007.
MTN had also made a promise to Ghorbanoghli to reimburse him for his assistance and Saloojee had helped the Iranian with personal favours, such as arranging for his children to be educated in South Africa. It was at a dinner in May 2005 that Charnley offered Ghorbanoghli a $400 000 bribe through a "sham" consultancy agency agreement to reward his efforts to politically undermine and destroy Turkcell's position as the licence holder and to deliver the licence to MTN instead. The "sham" consultancy payment was authorised by Nhleko on behalf of MTN in a memo dated December 11 2006.
Charnley was sent a confidential memo in which Ghorbanoghli says he has arranged for a friend in Dubai to receive the funds on his behalf through a company called Aristo Oil International Services. In an invoice from Aristo it described the scope of the responsibilities as "introduce MTN-Iran to key role-players, arrange meetings and generally provide support and assistance during the negotiations and conclusion of the necessary agreements that will provide for MTN's entry into the Iranian mobile market". Ghorbanoghli delivered on that. On September 17 2005 MTN's executive team flew to Iran and finalised agreements with the IEDC and payment structures. A day later MTN issued a notice to its board members regarding "Project Snooker" and its decision to officially take up the GSM licence in Iran.
On September 21 2005, two months before being awarded the licence, Nhleko delivered a confidential memorandum to Dabengwa, Charnley and MTN's former chief financial officer, Robert Nisbet, which was copied to the Chris Kilowan and Paul Norman setting out in detail the ground rules for "Project Snooker" and how MTN would deliver on the defence and nuclear support promises.
Weapons: The promised Denel collaboration, which clearly came off
In August 2004, MTN accompanied Lekota on a trip to Iran, which the cellphone company organised and paid for, where they struck an "arms- for-licence" deal with the Iranian ministry of defence to deliver "The Fish". Nhleko and Charnley were present at the meeting where they signed a confidential memorandum of understanding, promising that South Africa would deliver "heaven, earth, and fish", meaning the elicit arms and technology in exchange for the licence.
"The Fish" was a code for the name for a combination of military co-operation and big-ticket defence equipment, including Rooivalk helicopters, frequency-hopping encrypted military radios, sniper rifles, G5 howitzers, cannons, armoured landmine-proof personnel carriers, radar technology, pilot "heads-up" display technology and other defence articles that included US systems and components. Iran didn't have access to this equipment legitimately because of US and international sanctions against it at the time. To reassure the Iranian authorities, MTN paid for Iran's nuclear negotiator to meet with then-president Mbeki at his Cape Town residence, a meeting which was apparently facilitated by Charnley, Ramaphosa and Saloojee through their political connections.
On November 16 2004, Charnley sent a letter via fax on behalf of MTN, copied to Saloojee, facilitating a meeting between Denel and the Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Co. The letter indicated that Charnley had met with then-Denel chief executive Victor Moche to provide helicopter technology from Denel to produce helicopters with US Apache technology in Iran. Denel's former head for North Africa and the Middle East, Donald Romfolo, confirmed they had been in talks with Iran's defence ministry and state arms company, Sairan, in 2004. But he said the national conventional arms control committee barred the company from trading in Iran "because of the US sanctions". He denied any knowledge of Charnley and said he knew of no talks with MTN or pressure applied by the company.
Lekota, now president of Cope, flatly denied on Thursday that MTN had paid for any visit by him to Iran. "This is absolutely fallacious. Defence was never bankrupt when I was there." However, he confirmed one or more visits "in my official capacity" to Iran, and he confirmed that "in one of those visits it coincided with the MTN people also travelling there -- they did form part of the South African delegation going there". "I had meetings with the relevant minister and I think even the head of state … but at no stage did I have any meetings with the cellphone company MTN, I was never in any meeting. I had no obligation or, in fact, no power to negotiate anything on behalf of MTN. I think MTN negotiated their business with their counterparts quite independent of their mission. I could not have made any promises to the Iranian government on defence co-operation without going through Cabinet."
Later, confronted with a specific allegation that he had met his Iranian counterpart in the presence of MTN officials, he conceded that "when official business had been done … we might have been entertained, and that the businesspeople that may have been part of this visit may have been part of that". "I deny that there was any negotiations around MTN's business interests by the ministry of defence led by myself." Lekota denied that he would have promised any weapons outside of the arms control committee's approvals that would have to follow. "I never made any commitments of the nature you are suggesting." In the end, and once Iran had handed the licence to MTN, it seems whatever promises about defence materiel may have been made, came to naught.
In March 2007, a year and half after MTN was awarded the licence, MTN began facing even greater pressure from its Iranian partners to deliver on some of its defence and nuclear-related promises. MTN's representative in Iran, Chris Kilowan, sent a memo to Nhleko from the Iranians calling on the company to deliver on its defence promises. "[MTN's chief executive Nhleko] should attempt as a matter of urgency to contact the president of South Africa and impress upon him that the failure to resolve the defence matters to the satisfaction of Iran will have severe negative repercussions for MTN," read the memo attached as an exhibit. The "highly confidential" memo recounts Saloojee's description of visits to South Africa by top Iranian officials on behalf of supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Khamenei dispatched Ali Larijani, then the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, to remind Mbeki "that certain defence-related promises were made by the South African minister of defence in 2004 in exchange for which MTN was allowed to replace Turkcell in the Irancell consortium". The same memo reports that Manouchehr Mottaki, then Iran's foreign minister, was sent by Ahmadinejad to "get a direct answer" from Mbeki about South Africa's alleged promises to sell arms to Iran. Kilowan wrote in the memo: "Mottaki reiterated their understanding that MTN was allowed to replace Turkcell in exchange for defense co-operation."
On the UN Security Council vote, the memo said: "It is now a matter of public record what happened to the vote on Saturday … that South Africa also voted in favour of the sanctions." The memo also relates Saloojee's concerns. "The Iranians did not expect the voting to go otherwise, although they were hopeful that South Africa would at least abstain. As it is, South Africa is now seen as having made a U-turn on the matter and we will have to closely monitor the reaction of the Iranians to the fact." MTN also found itself being threatened in late 2007 by "Long John" for not delivering on its promises. Mbeki's spokesperson, Mukoni Ratshitanga, told the M&G: "Former president Thabo Mbeki does not believe that he should oblige attempts to drag his name into this matter and will therefore not comment."
The Votes: International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations
Throughout 2004 and 2005, at the same time that MTN was lobbying hard to displace Turkcell, Iran came under intense pressure over its nuclear enrichment programme. The international community had repeatedly voted against the state before the International Atomic Energy Authority and the UN Security Council, calling on it to meet its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In fact, as Turkcell detailed, from 2004 to 2008, South Africa largely joined the votes against Iran except for a brief hiatus at the end of 2005 and the beginning of 2006, which coincided with the November 2005 license award. "MTN learned that the Iranians understood South Africa to play a critical role in being able to lead the 'non-aligned' nations on nuclear votes in international bodies," Turkcell stated. And so, Turkcell claims, the cellphone giant orchestrated an "informal" meeting between Mbeki and Iran's nuclear chief, Hassan Rowhani, at a dinner at Mbeki's Cape Town residence. "MTN paid for adviser Rowhani to stay at a hotel in Cape Town, sponsored the large dinner party, and covered all travel logistics," Turkcell claims. "Consistent with MTN's promises, the president assured adviser Rowhani that the South African government would support Iran at the [International Atomic Energy Authority]." But Mbeki, through his spokesperson, refused to comment on this account.
That September, when the International Atomic Energy Authority board found Iran not to be complying with its non-proliferation treaty obligations, South Africa abstained. Come November 20, Turkcell detailed, MTN expected it was to be awarded the licence. Instead, the Iranians are said to have delivered the message that should South Africa vote against Iran at a crucial November 24 vote before the IAEA, it would "cause trouble".
The decision the IAEA has to make was on whether to refer Iran to the UN Security Council for breaching the NPT. This appears to have sent the company's mavericks into a bit of a spin. It is alleged they approached Saloojee, who approached South African ambassador to the IAEA Abdul Minty. Other frantic calls were made, and as it happened, South Africa abstained from the vote. Three days later the Iranians issued the GSM license to MTN.
The M&G was unable to reach Minty on Thursday, but when he was approached on the matter in February, he strenuously denied having been influenced: "At no point did [MTN] approach me to influence me in any direction." According to him, South Africa's policy on Iran at the IAEA had been "very consistent". After being awarded the 49% stake, MTN made good on its promises to its 51% shareholder, carrying all its costs. MTN agreed to pay the IEDC's $88-million capital share of MTN Irancell as well as their share of the $300-million licence fee.
The Iranian partners were clear that they were not willing to pay any "interest" on, or put up security for, a "loan". Charnley presented the proposed arrangement to MTN. Rob Nisbett, the chief financial officer, was apparently shocked at the proposal and refused to permit the deal on "improper and unsecured terms". He insisted that a formal loan agreement be negotiated and entered into with the parties. He also threatened to resign if this was not done.
On November 15 2005 MTN Group directed its subsidiary, MTN International (Mauritius) Ltd, to enter into sham "loan" agreements with the IEDC. Nisbett still voiced concern about this arrangement and informed the executive team that the "loans" put MTN at huge risk. Nhleko issued Nisbett with a formal written warning for opposing the financial terms and was instructed to authorise the transaction. Documents show MTN made the "loans" through a series of complex "round trip" agreements by shifting the funds around between the IEDC, MTN-Irancell, and MTN Group, which it then recorded on its books as loans. By the time the loans were due, MTN-Irancell was highly profitable -- $118-million profit in 2007, $234-million in 2008, $516-million in 2009, $583-million in 2010 and at least $503-million projected for 2011.
Charnley did not respond to numerous messages left on her cellphone and with an assistant in her office. An automatic message at Saloojee's office -- the South African embassy in Oman where he is ambassador -- said staff did not work on Thursdays, and emails were not answered. Spokespeople for Nhleko and Ramaphosa said they would pass on the M&G's respective messages, but neither responded in time for print deadline.
Department of International Affairs and Cooperation spokesperson Clayson Monyela could not be reached, but last month he denied that any company had influence over South Africa's foreign policy. Calls to Iran's embassy in South Africa were placed on hold, after which no calls were answered.
MTN and its legal advisers were locked in all-day meetings yesterday, filing its JSE news service (Sens) announcement only at 5.30pm in response to the explosive claims made by Turkcell in a lawsuit filed in the Washington Federal Court at 2am South African time.
Africa's largest cellphone operator said the claim had still not been served, but that it would oppose it. The company reiterated that there was "no legal merit" to Turkcell's claim and no basis for such a claim to be brought before a United States court. It also noted the South African government's denial of the allegations that MTN exercised influence over it. In advance of Turkcell filing its claim, MTN announced the formation of an independent committee, under the chairmanship of internationally renowned jurist Lord Hoffmann, to investigate Turkcell's allegations. The Hoffmann committee has already begun its investigations and will report its findings to the MTN board, with any recommendations on actions to be taken as a result of its findings, including their publication. "The Hoffmann committee has invited Turkcell to participate in its investigation, but Turkcell has to date not done so," MTN said in the statement. "The invitation remains open to Turkcell to participate in the Hoffmann committee's investigation."
Turkcell has been threatening to take MTN to the US courts for corruption since February 2, but held out for a settlement from MTN first before it filed. MTN has been calling its bluff by refusing to settle out of court, claiming extortion. Turkcell has argued that MTN has many business interests in the US and that the cellphone company has violated the Alien Tort Statute, a 1789 law that gives US courts jurisdiction in some instances to consider claims by foreigners for illegal conduct that occurred in another country. The law is usually cited in human rights and torture cases.
Meanwhile, Turkcell was yesterday dealing with its own set of issues relating to infighting among its board and shareholders. Reuters reported that the board met to discuss its structure and independent board members. Having founded Turkcell in 1994, Mehmet Emin Karamehmet is locked in a boardroom struggle with the other main shareholders in Turkcell: Altimo and Nordic telecommunications group TeliaSonera.
Turkcell's board has seven members. The three main shareholders -- Cukurova, Altimo and TeliaSonera -- each has two seats. Chairperson Colin Williams is the designated independent board member. Altimo and TeliaSonera want him replaced because they say he sides with Cukurova, Reuters reports. TeliaSonera has a 37% stake in Turkcell, whereas Altimo has a 13.2% stake it bought from Karamehmet in 2005. However, Cukurova's 13.8% stake carries controlling rights because of Turkcell's structure.
Source: Mail & Guardian
The allegations are set out in a $4-billion (R32-billion) lawsuit launched in the US District Court of Columbia in Washington DC this week. The scheme, allegedly known in MTN as "Project Snooker", was allegedly driven from the top by then-chief executive Phuthuma Nhleko, with the assistance of Irene Charnley (then commercial director), and Sifiso Dabengwa (then chief operating officer). It included alleged bribes to South Africa's ambassador to Iran, Yusuf "Jo-Jo" Saloojee, and Iran's deputy foreign minister, Javid Ghorbanoghli; the involvement of former defence minister Mosiuoa Lekota in the procurement of highly sensitive weapons systems from parastatal Denel; and access for Iranian officials to South Africa's top nuclear envoy, Abdul Minty. The memos attached to the court papers apparently set out how Ghorbanoghli, dubbed "Long John", was allegedly paid $400 000 to politically undermine Turkcell's position while Saloojee, codenamed "Short John'', was allegedly paid $200 000 to help MTN deliver pro-Iran votes from South Africa at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) amid controversy over Iran's nuclear plans.
The Irancell cellphone network was projected to be worth $31.6-billion in revenues over 15 years for a licence fee of $380-million. The licence holder and the Iranian state-owned telecommunications company were to enjoy exclusive use of the market for two years before a third competing licence would be awarded. Turkcell won the bid on February 18 2004 and MTN came second. But Turkcell claims that MTN, through "unprecedented corrupt acts", blocked it from entering the agreements, clearing the regulatory environment and completing post-award obligations. To secure the 49% stake in Irancell, MTN effectively also allegedly carried all the costs for its 51% partner through "sham loans", Turkcell says.
It is alleged in the papers that MTN paid the €300-million licence fee, capitalisation costs and share transfer tax of Iran's state-owned defence company, Sairan (also known as Iran Electronic Industries or IEI) and Bonyad (one of the five Iranian quasi-independent charitable foundations that is integral to Iran's defence establishment) in exchange for their assistance within the ministry of defence and the "Supreme Leader".
What follows is a summary of Turkcell's claims in its court application and the supporting documentation that allegedly emanates from within MTN. It has not yet been tested in court, nor has MTN commented on the authenticity of the documents. A few weeks after Turkcell was made the preferred bidder, Charnley met with Ghorbanoghli (Long John) in Tehran where the minister told her that MTN's only chance to oust Turkcell was to win political influence in Iran and use South Africa's influence to favour the Iranian government at the UN Security Council. And so began "Project Snooker" -- the plan on how best to use Iranian and South African government officials to allegedly gain political influence. MTN reached out to a former deputy minister for the Iranian ministry of information and communications technology and to Mohammed Mokhber, the deputy president of a major charitable foundation known as Bonyad Mostazafan, controlled by the supreme leader of Iran.
The Bonyad foundation is controlled by the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps, the military complex formed by Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and is believed to control about one-third of the Iranian economy. It is known for engaging in Iran's shadow foreign policy. MTN was then introduced to Ebrahim Mahmoudzadeh, a former Iranian deputy minister of defence and then-president of Iran Electronic Industries, who reported directly to the Iranian minister of defence. As one of Turkcell's local minority partners in the Irancell consortium, Mokhber and Mahmoudzadeh told MTN executives they would be willing to work with the South African company and dump Turkcell if MTN could obtain certain defence equipment, support its nuclear programme and pay for the licence and other benefits. For example, MTN was urged to facilitate the purchase of certain military equipment from South Africa for Iran's state-owned defence company, Sairan, which was previously blocked by South Africa's national conventional arms control committee. For more than a year, MTN executives regularly visited Mahmoudzadeh and the ministry of foreign affairs to reinforce its political influence.
In about April 2004, the Iranians tested MTN's ability to deliver on defence products and nuclear votes. Sairan requested that MTN arrange a meeting with Denel, South Africa's largest manufacturer of defence equipment, as well as then-defence minister Mosiuoa Lekota. MTN was told Iran was building its defence force and it wanted to purchase military radios, encryption technologies and pilot display computer chips manufactured in the Western Cape, which South Africa refused to sell them previously. MTN made a commitment that it could procure this equipment as well as facilitate installation of eavesdropping technologies on MTN devices were they to be awarded the 49% stake in Irancell.
The MTN board of directors, including Cyril Ramaphosa, Nhleko, Dabengwa and Charnley, received regular reports on the status of Turkcell's licence and MTN's strategies. Enter Saloojee, "aka Small John", who was appointed South Africa's ambassador to Iran on May 23 2004. Before he left for Tehran, MTN briefed him about the licence situation and about its desire to win the licence from Turkcell. "Small John" started working closely with "Long John" and convinced the Iranian government that MTN had enough political clout to help Iran on its nuclear and defence equipment needs. Charnley was key to that mix because of her political connections in South Africa, particularly with Lekota -- she worked closely with him in the United Democratic Front during the 1980s. Ramaphosa also enjoyed a close relationship with Lekota because of their ties in the ANC.
It is well known in political circles that Charnley and Nhleko were closely aligned with former president Thabo Mbeki. Charnley is friends with Mbeki's wife, Zanele, who assisted the former MTN executive with funds to help start Smile Communications, a telecoms company. "Small John" was also allegedly close to Mbeki, with whom he had shared a house at some point during the struggle. In about June 2004, Saloojee invited Charnley and Nhleko to his house for dinner and that's where the discussion of the bribes for both "Small John" and "Long John" took place. Saloojee explained that he was hoping to purchase a house in South Africa for $200 000. On April 26 2007, MTN made a direct payment into a trust account for Saloojee, which was received by his property attorneys, Gildenhuys Lessing Malatji Inc. The property transaction was closed on September 26 2007.
MTN had also made a promise to Ghorbanoghli to reimburse him for his assistance and Saloojee had helped the Iranian with personal favours, such as arranging for his children to be educated in South Africa. It was at a dinner in May 2005 that Charnley offered Ghorbanoghli a $400 000 bribe through a "sham" consultancy agency agreement to reward his efforts to politically undermine and destroy Turkcell's position as the licence holder and to deliver the licence to MTN instead. The "sham" consultancy payment was authorised by Nhleko on behalf of MTN in a memo dated December 11 2006.
Charnley was sent a confidential memo in which Ghorbanoghli says he has arranged for a friend in Dubai to receive the funds on his behalf through a company called Aristo Oil International Services. In an invoice from Aristo it described the scope of the responsibilities as "introduce MTN-Iran to key role-players, arrange meetings and generally provide support and assistance during the negotiations and conclusion of the necessary agreements that will provide for MTN's entry into the Iranian mobile market". Ghorbanoghli delivered on that. On September 17 2005 MTN's executive team flew to Iran and finalised agreements with the IEDC and payment structures. A day later MTN issued a notice to its board members regarding "Project Snooker" and its decision to officially take up the GSM licence in Iran.
On September 21 2005, two months before being awarded the licence, Nhleko delivered a confidential memorandum to Dabengwa, Charnley and MTN's former chief financial officer, Robert Nisbet, which was copied to the Chris Kilowan and Paul Norman setting out in detail the ground rules for "Project Snooker" and how MTN would deliver on the defence and nuclear support promises.
Weapons: The promised Denel collaboration, which clearly came off
In August 2004, MTN accompanied Lekota on a trip to Iran, which the cellphone company organised and paid for, where they struck an "arms- for-licence" deal with the Iranian ministry of defence to deliver "The Fish". Nhleko and Charnley were present at the meeting where they signed a confidential memorandum of understanding, promising that South Africa would deliver "heaven, earth, and fish", meaning the elicit arms and technology in exchange for the licence.
"The Fish" was a code for the name for a combination of military co-operation and big-ticket defence equipment, including Rooivalk helicopters, frequency-hopping encrypted military radios, sniper rifles, G5 howitzers, cannons, armoured landmine-proof personnel carriers, radar technology, pilot "heads-up" display technology and other defence articles that included US systems and components. Iran didn't have access to this equipment legitimately because of US and international sanctions against it at the time. To reassure the Iranian authorities, MTN paid for Iran's nuclear negotiator to meet with then-president Mbeki at his Cape Town residence, a meeting which was apparently facilitated by Charnley, Ramaphosa and Saloojee through their political connections.
On November 16 2004, Charnley sent a letter via fax on behalf of MTN, copied to Saloojee, facilitating a meeting between Denel and the Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Co. The letter indicated that Charnley had met with then-Denel chief executive Victor Moche to provide helicopter technology from Denel to produce helicopters with US Apache technology in Iran. Denel's former head for North Africa and the Middle East, Donald Romfolo, confirmed they had been in talks with Iran's defence ministry and state arms company, Sairan, in 2004. But he said the national conventional arms control committee barred the company from trading in Iran "because of the US sanctions". He denied any knowledge of Charnley and said he knew of no talks with MTN or pressure applied by the company.
Lekota, now president of Cope, flatly denied on Thursday that MTN had paid for any visit by him to Iran. "This is absolutely fallacious. Defence was never bankrupt when I was there." However, he confirmed one or more visits "in my official capacity" to Iran, and he confirmed that "in one of those visits it coincided with the MTN people also travelling there -- they did form part of the South African delegation going there". "I had meetings with the relevant minister and I think even the head of state … but at no stage did I have any meetings with the cellphone company MTN, I was never in any meeting. I had no obligation or, in fact, no power to negotiate anything on behalf of MTN. I think MTN negotiated their business with their counterparts quite independent of their mission. I could not have made any promises to the Iranian government on defence co-operation without going through Cabinet."
Later, confronted with a specific allegation that he had met his Iranian counterpart in the presence of MTN officials, he conceded that "when official business had been done … we might have been entertained, and that the businesspeople that may have been part of this visit may have been part of that". "I deny that there was any negotiations around MTN's business interests by the ministry of defence led by myself." Lekota denied that he would have promised any weapons outside of the arms control committee's approvals that would have to follow. "I never made any commitments of the nature you are suggesting." In the end, and once Iran had handed the licence to MTN, it seems whatever promises about defence materiel may have been made, came to naught.
In March 2007, a year and half after MTN was awarded the licence, MTN began facing even greater pressure from its Iranian partners to deliver on some of its defence and nuclear-related promises. MTN's representative in Iran, Chris Kilowan, sent a memo to Nhleko from the Iranians calling on the company to deliver on its defence promises. "[MTN's chief executive Nhleko] should attempt as a matter of urgency to contact the president of South Africa and impress upon him that the failure to resolve the defence matters to the satisfaction of Iran will have severe negative repercussions for MTN," read the memo attached as an exhibit. The "highly confidential" memo recounts Saloojee's description of visits to South Africa by top Iranian officials on behalf of supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Khamenei dispatched Ali Larijani, then the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, to remind Mbeki "that certain defence-related promises were made by the South African minister of defence in 2004 in exchange for which MTN was allowed to replace Turkcell in the Irancell consortium". The same memo reports that Manouchehr Mottaki, then Iran's foreign minister, was sent by Ahmadinejad to "get a direct answer" from Mbeki about South Africa's alleged promises to sell arms to Iran. Kilowan wrote in the memo: "Mottaki reiterated their understanding that MTN was allowed to replace Turkcell in exchange for defense co-operation."
On the UN Security Council vote, the memo said: "It is now a matter of public record what happened to the vote on Saturday … that South Africa also voted in favour of the sanctions." The memo also relates Saloojee's concerns. "The Iranians did not expect the voting to go otherwise, although they were hopeful that South Africa would at least abstain. As it is, South Africa is now seen as having made a U-turn on the matter and we will have to closely monitor the reaction of the Iranians to the fact." MTN also found itself being threatened in late 2007 by "Long John" for not delivering on its promises. Mbeki's spokesperson, Mukoni Ratshitanga, told the M&G: "Former president Thabo Mbeki does not believe that he should oblige attempts to drag his name into this matter and will therefore not comment."
The Votes: International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations
Throughout 2004 and 2005, at the same time that MTN was lobbying hard to displace Turkcell, Iran came under intense pressure over its nuclear enrichment programme. The international community had repeatedly voted against the state before the International Atomic Energy Authority and the UN Security Council, calling on it to meet its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In fact, as Turkcell detailed, from 2004 to 2008, South Africa largely joined the votes against Iran except for a brief hiatus at the end of 2005 and the beginning of 2006, which coincided with the November 2005 license award. "MTN learned that the Iranians understood South Africa to play a critical role in being able to lead the 'non-aligned' nations on nuclear votes in international bodies," Turkcell stated. And so, Turkcell claims, the cellphone giant orchestrated an "informal" meeting between Mbeki and Iran's nuclear chief, Hassan Rowhani, at a dinner at Mbeki's Cape Town residence. "MTN paid for adviser Rowhani to stay at a hotel in Cape Town, sponsored the large dinner party, and covered all travel logistics," Turkcell claims. "Consistent with MTN's promises, the president assured adviser Rowhani that the South African government would support Iran at the [International Atomic Energy Authority]." But Mbeki, through his spokesperson, refused to comment on this account.
That September, when the International Atomic Energy Authority board found Iran not to be complying with its non-proliferation treaty obligations, South Africa abstained. Come November 20, Turkcell detailed, MTN expected it was to be awarded the licence. Instead, the Iranians are said to have delivered the message that should South Africa vote against Iran at a crucial November 24 vote before the IAEA, it would "cause trouble".
The decision the IAEA has to make was on whether to refer Iran to the UN Security Council for breaching the NPT. This appears to have sent the company's mavericks into a bit of a spin. It is alleged they approached Saloojee, who approached South African ambassador to the IAEA Abdul Minty. Other frantic calls were made, and as it happened, South Africa abstained from the vote. Three days later the Iranians issued the GSM license to MTN.
The M&G was unable to reach Minty on Thursday, but when he was approached on the matter in February, he strenuously denied having been influenced: "At no point did [MTN] approach me to influence me in any direction." According to him, South Africa's policy on Iran at the IAEA had been "very consistent". After being awarded the 49% stake, MTN made good on its promises to its 51% shareholder, carrying all its costs. MTN agreed to pay the IEDC's $88-million capital share of MTN Irancell as well as their share of the $300-million licence fee.
The Iranian partners were clear that they were not willing to pay any "interest" on, or put up security for, a "loan". Charnley presented the proposed arrangement to MTN. Rob Nisbett, the chief financial officer, was apparently shocked at the proposal and refused to permit the deal on "improper and unsecured terms". He insisted that a formal loan agreement be negotiated and entered into with the parties. He also threatened to resign if this was not done.
On November 15 2005 MTN Group directed its subsidiary, MTN International (Mauritius) Ltd, to enter into sham "loan" agreements with the IEDC. Nisbett still voiced concern about this arrangement and informed the executive team that the "loans" put MTN at huge risk. Nhleko issued Nisbett with a formal written warning for opposing the financial terms and was instructed to authorise the transaction. Documents show MTN made the "loans" through a series of complex "round trip" agreements by shifting the funds around between the IEDC, MTN-Irancell, and MTN Group, which it then recorded on its books as loans. By the time the loans were due, MTN-Irancell was highly profitable -- $118-million profit in 2007, $234-million in 2008, $516-million in 2009, $583-million in 2010 and at least $503-million projected for 2011.
Charnley did not respond to numerous messages left on her cellphone and with an assistant in her office. An automatic message at Saloojee's office -- the South African embassy in Oman where he is ambassador -- said staff did not work on Thursdays, and emails were not answered. Spokespeople for Nhleko and Ramaphosa said they would pass on the M&G's respective messages, but neither responded in time for print deadline.
Department of International Affairs and Cooperation spokesperson Clayson Monyela could not be reached, but last month he denied that any company had influence over South Africa's foreign policy. Calls to Iran's embassy in South Africa were placed on hold, after which no calls were answered.
MTN and its legal advisers were locked in all-day meetings yesterday, filing its JSE news service (Sens) announcement only at 5.30pm in response to the explosive claims made by Turkcell in a lawsuit filed in the Washington Federal Court at 2am South African time.
Africa's largest cellphone operator said the claim had still not been served, but that it would oppose it. The company reiterated that there was "no legal merit" to Turkcell's claim and no basis for such a claim to be brought before a United States court. It also noted the South African government's denial of the allegations that MTN exercised influence over it. In advance of Turkcell filing its claim, MTN announced the formation of an independent committee, under the chairmanship of internationally renowned jurist Lord Hoffmann, to investigate Turkcell's allegations. The Hoffmann committee has already begun its investigations and will report its findings to the MTN board, with any recommendations on actions to be taken as a result of its findings, including their publication. "The Hoffmann committee has invited Turkcell to participate in its investigation, but Turkcell has to date not done so," MTN said in the statement. "The invitation remains open to Turkcell to participate in the Hoffmann committee's investigation."
Turkcell has been threatening to take MTN to the US courts for corruption since February 2, but held out for a settlement from MTN first before it filed. MTN has been calling its bluff by refusing to settle out of court, claiming extortion. Turkcell has argued that MTN has many business interests in the US and that the cellphone company has violated the Alien Tort Statute, a 1789 law that gives US courts jurisdiction in some instances to consider claims by foreigners for illegal conduct that occurred in another country. The law is usually cited in human rights and torture cases.
Meanwhile, Turkcell was yesterday dealing with its own set of issues relating to infighting among its board and shareholders. Reuters reported that the board met to discuss its structure and independent board members. Having founded Turkcell in 1994, Mehmet Emin Karamehmet is locked in a boardroom struggle with the other main shareholders in Turkcell: Altimo and Nordic telecommunications group TeliaSonera.
Turkcell's board has seven members. The three main shareholders -- Cukurova, Altimo and TeliaSonera -- each has two seats. Chairperson Colin Williams is the designated independent board member. Altimo and TeliaSonera want him replaced because they say he sides with Cukurova, Reuters reports. TeliaSonera has a 37% stake in Turkcell, whereas Altimo has a 13.2% stake it bought from Karamehmet in 2005. However, Cukurova's 13.8% stake carries controlling rights because of Turkcell's structure.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Thursday, March 29, 2012
Delhi becomes a fortress
Even as heavy security arrangements have been made for
the stay and movement of foreign dignitaries participating in the BRICS
summit here on Thursday, a large number of Tibetan protesters were
arrested from different parts of the city and sent to Tihar Central Jail
on Wednesday.
The area surrounding Taj Palace where
leaders from China, Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa would attend
the event has been turned into a fortress with nearly 8,000 police
personnel forming part of a three-tier security cordon. While police
teams have been deployed at the traffic junctions, barricades have been
erected on the arterial roads to prevent any intrusion.
As
part of the arrangements, Sardar Patel Road from Dhaula Kuan to
Panchsheel Marg will remain closed for general traffic between 8.30 a.m.
and 4.00 p.m. An arterial road near Battle Honours Army Mess would also
be closed. The stretches affected by VVIP movements would be Sardar
Patel Marg, Mother Teresa Crescent, Kautilya Marg, Panchsheel Marg, Teen
Murti Marg, South Avenue, Rajaji Marg, Safdarjang Road, Akbar Road,
Tughlak Road, Krishna Menon Marg, 30 January Marg, Aurangzeb Road,
Prithviraj Road, Rajesh Pilot Marg, Amrita Shergil Marg, Subramanian
Bharti Marg and those roads in the vicinity.
In the
wake of self-immolation by Tibetan activist Jamphel Yeshi at Jantar
Mantar and subsequent protests, the Delhi Police imposed prohibitory
orders under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code to prevent such
protests.
Youdon Aukatsang, a member of Tibetan
Parliament in exile, on Wednesday alleged that a large number of
protesters were arrested at Jantar Mantar, whereas several others were
arrested near Oberoi Hotel and from outside the United Nations office in
Lodhi Estate. Tenzin Tsundue, a Tibetan writer, was taken into
preventive custody while he was participating in an event at the India
Habitat Centre on Tuesday night. “Tibetans living in the Majnu-Ka-Tila
area are virtually under a house-arrest. They are not being allowed to
move freely. The Tibetan Youth Hostel has been sealed,” she said.
Source: The Hindu
Cosatu: Secrecy Bill will create a 'police state'
Cosatu will be the first to challenge the Protection of State Information Bill in court because it risks turning South Africa into a security state again, general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi warned on Thursday. Vavi said that although the Bill was redrafted under pressure from the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the version passed by the National Assembly last year still raised the spectre of abuse of classification to conceal corruption.
He told MPs the scope of the draft legislation was too wide, the penalties it imposed disproportionate, and the potential impact on South Africa's democratic values devastating. "You have to be concerned that the scope of the Bill is extended way beyond what is necessary ... it takes a huge swipe at everything that moves," he told a third day of public hearings on the secrecy Bill by the National Council of Provinces.
Cosatu's biggest fear was the Bill might "inadvertently draw us closer to a threat of entrenching a security state". "Back to where we come from -- the police state. Everything marked confidential and everybody seeing something marked confidential suddenly fearing 15 to 25 year imprisonment." Reminding MPs that he represented two million union members -- and voters -- Vavi said the Bill was ripe for constitutional challenge on several grounds and Cosatu would not be deterred by the fact that it would find itself on the same side as opposition parties. He singled out clause 3 (2) (b), which allowed the minister of state security to confer the power to classify information on any other state entity, and clause 49, which bans the publication of anything deemed a state security matter, as unacceptable. "You cannot give the minister a blanket right. What we fear is that if you give such a blanket right you might end up with the lease agreements between the police and the various agencies being classified. That is very, very dangerous. Please don't pass a law you will regret in future," he said. Had the Bill been law, these provisions and those that would send journalists to jail for disclosing state secrets might have meant that two scandal-tainted ministers sacked last year -- Sicelo Shiceka and Gwen Mahlangu-Nkabinde -- would still be in their posts, Vavi said. "Just close your eyes and think if we would have seen the backs of two ministers last year. We would have not known that if it had not been for the excellent work of the media," he said, adding that the Bill was not the place to address concerns about media ownership and bias.
"The persecution of the media would only exacerbate the problems of inaccuracy and bias. In our view, it is necessary to enhance investigative reporting in the public interest. However as the Bill places extensive restrictions on the access and disclosure of classified information, it would necessarily severely curtail this objective."
Vavi went on to bemoan the Bill's assertion, contained in clause 1 (4), that it trumped the progressive Promotion of Access to Information Act. "What it means is that fundamental piece of transformation becomes secondary to security legislation. We think that is very dangerous." Furthermore, the draft law's provisions on whistleblowers -- many of them union members -- who disclosed classified information to reveal wrongdoing was plainly unconstitutional. Clause 43 offered exemption from prosecution only if the revelations pertained to the whistleblower's employer and, in addition, shifted the burden of proof from the state to the accused. "We have said if these types of clauses go through then we will be left with no choice but to approach the Constitutional Court," he said. "We will be the first to arrive there. Our lawyers are standing very ready to do so."
Veteran human rights lawyer George Bizos, appearing on behalf of the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), listed seven fundamental flaws in the Bill and concurred that it violated the Constitution. The LRC agreed with Vavi's criticism of the heavy onus the Bill sought to place on those accused of breaching it, saying it could see somebody "condemned to 25 years in jail for being stupid".
Bizos urged MPs to refer the Bill to the Constitutional Court, warning that if it were enacted in its current form "there will be a very long queue of applicants to take the president, the minister of justice to court". He then deviated from his text to deplore the government's planned assessment of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal and urged the government to follow former president Nelson Mandela's example in respecting the courts.
Vavi said he found succour in the fact that Mandela's former defence lawyer shared his views on the Bill. "It gives us comfort that you are in the same corner," he said.
Source: Mail & Guardian
He told MPs the scope of the draft legislation was too wide, the penalties it imposed disproportionate, and the potential impact on South Africa's democratic values devastating. "You have to be concerned that the scope of the Bill is extended way beyond what is necessary ... it takes a huge swipe at everything that moves," he told a third day of public hearings on the secrecy Bill by the National Council of Provinces.
Cosatu's biggest fear was the Bill might "inadvertently draw us closer to a threat of entrenching a security state". "Back to where we come from -- the police state. Everything marked confidential and everybody seeing something marked confidential suddenly fearing 15 to 25 year imprisonment." Reminding MPs that he represented two million union members -- and voters -- Vavi said the Bill was ripe for constitutional challenge on several grounds and Cosatu would not be deterred by the fact that it would find itself on the same side as opposition parties. He singled out clause 3 (2) (b), which allowed the minister of state security to confer the power to classify information on any other state entity, and clause 49, which bans the publication of anything deemed a state security matter, as unacceptable. "You cannot give the minister a blanket right. What we fear is that if you give such a blanket right you might end up with the lease agreements between the police and the various agencies being classified. That is very, very dangerous. Please don't pass a law you will regret in future," he said. Had the Bill been law, these provisions and those that would send journalists to jail for disclosing state secrets might have meant that two scandal-tainted ministers sacked last year -- Sicelo Shiceka and Gwen Mahlangu-Nkabinde -- would still be in their posts, Vavi said. "Just close your eyes and think if we would have seen the backs of two ministers last year. We would have not known that if it had not been for the excellent work of the media," he said, adding that the Bill was not the place to address concerns about media ownership and bias.
"The persecution of the media would only exacerbate the problems of inaccuracy and bias. In our view, it is necessary to enhance investigative reporting in the public interest. However as the Bill places extensive restrictions on the access and disclosure of classified information, it would necessarily severely curtail this objective."
Vavi went on to bemoan the Bill's assertion, contained in clause 1 (4), that it trumped the progressive Promotion of Access to Information Act. "What it means is that fundamental piece of transformation becomes secondary to security legislation. We think that is very dangerous." Furthermore, the draft law's provisions on whistleblowers -- many of them union members -- who disclosed classified information to reveal wrongdoing was plainly unconstitutional. Clause 43 offered exemption from prosecution only if the revelations pertained to the whistleblower's employer and, in addition, shifted the burden of proof from the state to the accused. "We have said if these types of clauses go through then we will be left with no choice but to approach the Constitutional Court," he said. "We will be the first to arrive there. Our lawyers are standing very ready to do so."
Veteran human rights lawyer George Bizos, appearing on behalf of the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), listed seven fundamental flaws in the Bill and concurred that it violated the Constitution. The LRC agreed with Vavi's criticism of the heavy onus the Bill sought to place on those accused of breaching it, saying it could see somebody "condemned to 25 years in jail for being stupid".
Bizos urged MPs to refer the Bill to the Constitutional Court, warning that if it were enacted in its current form "there will be a very long queue of applicants to take the president, the minister of justice to court". He then deviated from his text to deplore the government's planned assessment of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal and urged the government to follow former president Nelson Mandela's example in respecting the courts.
Vavi said he found succour in the fact that Mandela's former defence lawyer shared his views on the Bill. "It gives us comfort that you are in the same corner," he said.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Five years in jail for cop who took bribe of R100 - and a sheep
A former police captain who was filmed in 2008 taking R100 and a live sheep as a bribe, has been sentenced to five years in jail by the Pretoria North Magistrate’s Court. Captain Richard Stevens Makhene, 54, on Wednesday received a seven-year sentence, of which two years were suspended. Magistrate Ben van Schalkwyk also denied Makhene leave to appeal.
Makhene was head of the Hammanskraal police station’s crime prevention unit when a Carte Blanche television crew filmed the bribe with a hidden camera. The footage was later used as evidence in court, to back up testimony by Stephen Smith, who testified that Makhene and four policemen had pulled his bakkie off the road and discovered that three of the workers in the vehicle were illegal immigrants.
Makhene informed Smith it was a crime to employ illegal immigrants, and that he would probably have to pay a R25,000 fine. Smith said he didn’t have “that kind of money”, and Makhene offered to drop the case for R10,000. Smith then offered him R100 and a live sheep, which Makhene accepted. There was no room for the sheep in the police car’s boot, so Makhene and his colleagues put it on the back seat.
Source: The Sowetan
Makhene was head of the Hammanskraal police station’s crime prevention unit when a Carte Blanche television crew filmed the bribe with a hidden camera. The footage was later used as evidence in court, to back up testimony by Stephen Smith, who testified that Makhene and four policemen had pulled his bakkie off the road and discovered that three of the workers in the vehicle were illegal immigrants.
Makhene informed Smith it was a crime to employ illegal immigrants, and that he would probably have to pay a R25,000 fine. Smith said he didn’t have “that kind of money”, and Makhene offered to drop the case for R10,000. Smith then offered him R100 and a live sheep, which Makhene accepted. There was no room for the sheep in the police car’s boot, so Makhene and his colleagues put it on the back seat.
Source: The Sowetan
Wednesday, March 28, 2012
More South Africans believe politicians are corrupt
Forty percent of South Africans think parliamentarians and councillors are corrupt, according to the Afrobarometer survey, the Star reported on Wednesday. The figure increased from 2008, when 25% of South Africans thought "almost all" or "most" members of Parliament were involved in corruption, according to Dr Cherrel Africa of the University of the Western Cape, who presented the results of the survey in Durban on Tuesday.
According to the study, coordinated by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa, most South Africans do not go to their councillor when they have a problem. Seventy-two percent of people in urban areas, and 74% of those in rural areas, said they never contacted councillors. In addition, between 95% and 96% of people surveyed said they never contacted an MP or member of their provincial legislature.
The approval ratings of the country's nine premiers were also measured. KwaZulu-Natal's Zweli Mkhize got the highest rating, at 72%, along with his Free State counterpart Ace Magashule. Western Cape premier Helen Zille got 61%.
Noxolo Kieviet of the Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga's David Mabuza got the lowest ratings.
Source: Mail & Guardian
According to the study, coordinated by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa, most South Africans do not go to their councillor when they have a problem. Seventy-two percent of people in urban areas, and 74% of those in rural areas, said they never contacted councillors. In addition, between 95% and 96% of people surveyed said they never contacted an MP or member of their provincial legislature.
The approval ratings of the country's nine premiers were also measured. KwaZulu-Natal's Zweli Mkhize got the highest rating, at 72%, along with his Free State counterpart Ace Magashule. Western Cape premier Helen Zille got 61%.
Noxolo Kieviet of the Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga's David Mabuza got the lowest ratings.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Madonsela: Secrecy Bill will 'bedevil' investigations
Public protector Thuli Madonsela has pleaded with parliamentarians to rethink key aspects of the Protection of State Information Bill, saying it would "severely" affect her work. Madonsela told them on Wednesday that the Bill, as it stood, would shrink her powers and bedevil investigations into state wrongdoing. It would reduce her to the status of an ordinary citizen because it would oblige her to hand classified information to the police like anyone else.
Likewise, it would strip away the right she held to access classified information in the course of her duty, instead forcing her to go to court to obtain it like any other South African. "The public protector is directly affected by this Bill," she told the second day of public hearings in Parliament on the contentious draft law. We will not be toothless but we are going to function under more onerous circumstances."
She said the obligation clause 15 of the Bill created for those who received classified information to hand it to the police to avoid prosecution posed the risk of her being arrested while she was studying any of the secret documents delivered to her office almost daily. "Will I be affected? Yes, severely. At the moment I'm not chasing around trying to find out what documents came to my office and which police station do I rush to report it. I don't want to do that. Unfortunately, Parliament has elevated the police above chapter nine institutions. Why does this democracy trust a police station above chapter nine institutions?" she asked.
Madonsela said that at the moment she had the prerogative to scrutinise any information sent to her office to see how it should be handled, but this would become a perilous exercise if the Bill were passed. "What if I am arrested while I'm applying my mind?" she asked, adding: "Probably the same could happen to journalists."
Madonsela tactfully suggested that the Bill's impact on her office was one of a number of unintended consequences of the legislation but baulked when ANC MP Nosipho Ntwanambi asked why the person in her post should not be treated in the same manner as ordinary South Africans. "When a member of Parliament says you should be subject to the same rights and responsibilities as a person in the street, it scares me. My responsibility is to be some kind of buffer between the state and the citizen."
Madonsela said she did not believe the Bill should include a special exemption for her office but rather a chapter recognising the special status of all similar institutions, in the same manner that it enshrined the special powers of courts. "What I am asking Parliament to accept is that chapter nine institutions were created by you as an accountability mechanism, and you should give them the space to exercise that responsibility."
Madonsela called for the inclusion of a public interest defence in the Bill, rejecting State Security Minister Siyabonga Cwele's oft-repeated argument that this would lead to the wholesale publication of state secrets. "Will it open the floodgates? No, I don't think so." She said such a defence would have to withstand an objective test on whether the public good derived from publication of a classified document outweighed the risk to the national security.
Like many other critics of the legislation, she said its definition of national security was too wide and it could pave the way for over-classification. Asked whether she was flatly declaring the Bill unconstitutional, Madonsela declined to answer but impressed on MPs that rethinking the Bill could spare them the potential embarrassment of having it declared invalid by the courts. "You have the power to prevent this matter being settled by a court of law," she said.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Likewise, it would strip away the right she held to access classified information in the course of her duty, instead forcing her to go to court to obtain it like any other South African. "The public protector is directly affected by this Bill," she told the second day of public hearings in Parliament on the contentious draft law. We will not be toothless but we are going to function under more onerous circumstances."
She said the obligation clause 15 of the Bill created for those who received classified information to hand it to the police to avoid prosecution posed the risk of her being arrested while she was studying any of the secret documents delivered to her office almost daily. "Will I be affected? Yes, severely. At the moment I'm not chasing around trying to find out what documents came to my office and which police station do I rush to report it. I don't want to do that. Unfortunately, Parliament has elevated the police above chapter nine institutions. Why does this democracy trust a police station above chapter nine institutions?" she asked.
Madonsela said that at the moment she had the prerogative to scrutinise any information sent to her office to see how it should be handled, but this would become a perilous exercise if the Bill were passed. "What if I am arrested while I'm applying my mind?" she asked, adding: "Probably the same could happen to journalists."
Madonsela tactfully suggested that the Bill's impact on her office was one of a number of unintended consequences of the legislation but baulked when ANC MP Nosipho Ntwanambi asked why the person in her post should not be treated in the same manner as ordinary South Africans. "When a member of Parliament says you should be subject to the same rights and responsibilities as a person in the street, it scares me. My responsibility is to be some kind of buffer between the state and the citizen."
Madonsela said she did not believe the Bill should include a special exemption for her office but rather a chapter recognising the special status of all similar institutions, in the same manner that it enshrined the special powers of courts. "What I am asking Parliament to accept is that chapter nine institutions were created by you as an accountability mechanism, and you should give them the space to exercise that responsibility."
Madonsela called for the inclusion of a public interest defence in the Bill, rejecting State Security Minister Siyabonga Cwele's oft-repeated argument that this would lead to the wholesale publication of state secrets. "Will it open the floodgates? No, I don't think so." She said such a defence would have to withstand an objective test on whether the public good derived from publication of a classified document outweighed the risk to the national security.
Like many other critics of the legislation, she said its definition of national security was too wide and it could pave the way for over-classification. Asked whether she was flatly declaring the Bill unconstitutional, Madonsela declined to answer but impressed on MPs that rethinking the Bill could spare them the potential embarrassment of having it declared invalid by the courts. "You have the power to prevent this matter being settled by a court of law," she said.
Source: Mail & Guardian
Gabon Government Taps Into South Africa Solution To Solve Water Crisis
For most South Africans accessing safe, drinking water is as simple as opening a tap in their home. However in Gabon, residents in rural areas and the poorer suburbs of big cities have to walk several hundred metres to obtain water from more privileged neighbourhoods. Water pollution has exacerbated the situation.
To remedy the situation, the Government of Gabon has engaged with Intaka Tech through Intaka Tech’s Gabonese intermediary, to supply water treatment plants to serve the potable water needs of rural areas. (Drinking water or potable water is water pure enough to be consumed or used with low risk of immediate or long term harm.) These plants will provide an immediate and viable solution, due to their superior corrosion resistance and short installation and commissioning times. The units are easy to operate and maintain.
Intaka Tech CEO, Rodrigo Savoi says: "We are proud to be bringing clean water to rural areas in need and contributing to the future infrastructure of Gabon."
Intaka Tech will be supplying three water treatment plants to treat river water that will be installed and operational as of May 2012. Of the units sold, two have a production capacity of 25,000 litres an hour per unit which approximates to 1100,000 litres per day in total, while the third has a production capacity 6 000 litres an hour, equating to almost 130,000 litres per day.
The units will be shipped to Libreville and transported by rail and road to the central region of Gabon. Although Intaka Tech will supply these units, abstraction and onward distribution will be managed solely by the client.
Chairman of Intaka Tech, Dr Gastón Savoi says, "This is the beginning of a programme with the Government of Gabon that once again highlights the need to provide access to safe water in most African countries, particularly in their rural areas."
Source: Intaka
To remedy the situation, the Government of Gabon has engaged with Intaka Tech through Intaka Tech’s Gabonese intermediary, to supply water treatment plants to serve the potable water needs of rural areas. (Drinking water or potable water is water pure enough to be consumed or used with low risk of immediate or long term harm.) These plants will provide an immediate and viable solution, due to their superior corrosion resistance and short installation and commissioning times. The units are easy to operate and maintain.
Intaka Tech CEO, Rodrigo Savoi says: "We are proud to be bringing clean water to rural areas in need and contributing to the future infrastructure of Gabon."
Intaka Tech will be supplying three water treatment plants to treat river water that will be installed and operational as of May 2012. Of the units sold, two have a production capacity of 25,000 litres an hour per unit which approximates to 1100,000 litres per day in total, while the third has a production capacity 6 000 litres an hour, equating to almost 130,000 litres per day.
The units will be shipped to Libreville and transported by rail and road to the central region of Gabon. Although Intaka Tech will supply these units, abstraction and onward distribution will be managed solely by the client.
Chairman of Intaka Tech, Dr Gastón Savoi says, "This is the beginning of a programme with the Government of Gabon that once again highlights the need to provide access to safe water in most African countries, particularly in their rural areas."
Source: Intaka
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