Moseneke, appearing before the commission after being nominated by President Thabo Mbeki to the post of deputy chief justice, took the opportunity to say that judges needed to be trusted. "If we appoint people as judges we should trust them" - otherwise it would create unnecessary levels of tension.
Moseneke, who ironically first went to work for an Afrikaner law firm, was later one of the founder members of the Black Lawyers Association. He was also a member of the technical committee which helped draft South Africa's interim constitution. "(It was) one of my privileges... quite a special moment... a fundamental vindication of what one stood for, what one was striving for."
Moseneke said he was "minding my own business" when he was approached by Pallo Jordan on behalf of former president Nelson Mandela to help transform the business sector. He helped restructure state enterprise Telkom before being head-hunted to lead pioneering black empowerment group Nail (New Africa Investment Limited).
When Mbeki called him to offer the position of deputy chief justice, Moseneke did not hesitate in accepting.
Source: News 24.com
Friday, May 27, 2005
Friday, May 20, 2005
PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AGAINST TERRORIST AND RELATED ACTIVITIES ACT 33 OF 2004
The purpose Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorism and Related Activities Act is to provide for measures to prevent and combat terrorist and related activities; to provide for an offence of terrorism and other offences associated or connected with terrorist activities; to provide for Convention offences; to give effect to international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities; to provide for a mechanism to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions, which are binding on member States, in respect of terrorist and related activities; to provide for measures to prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities; to provide for investigative measures in respect of terrorist and related activities; and to provide for matters connected therewith.
WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa is a constitutional democracy where fundamental human rights, such as the right to life and free political activity, are constitutionally enshrined;
AND WHEREAS terrorist and related activities, in whichever form, are intended to achieve political and other aims in a violent or otherwise unconstitutional manner, and thereby undermine democratic rights and values and the Constitution;
AND WHEREAS terrorist and related activities are an international problem, which can only be effectively addressed by means of international co-operation;
AND WHEREAS the Government of the Republic of South Africa has committed itself in international fora such as the United Nations, the African Union and the Non-Aligned Movement, to the prevention and combating of terrorist and related activities;
AND WHEREAS the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373/2001, which is binding on all Member States of the United Nations, as well as the Convention for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted by the Organisation of African Unity, requires Member States to become Party to instruments, dealing with terrorist and related activities, as soon as possible;
AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa has already become Party to the following instruments of the United Nations:
(a) The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963. The Republic became a Party thereto, by accession on 26 May 1972;
(b) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 30 May 1972;
(c) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded at Montreal on 23 September 1971. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 30 May 1972;
(d) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 23 September 2003;
(e) the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 23 September 2003;
(f) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, adopted at Montreal on 24 February 1988. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 21 September 1998;
(g) the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, signed at Montreal on 1 March 1991. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 1 December 1999;
(h) the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 1 May 2003; and
(i) the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1999. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 1 May 2003;
AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa desires to become a Party to the following remaining instruments of the United Nations, not yet ratified or acceded to by the Republic:
(a) The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, adopted at Rome on 10 March 1988;
(b) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf, adopted at Rome on 10 March 1988; and
(c) the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna on 26 October 1979, and signed on behalf of the Republic on 18 May 1981;
AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa has become a Party by ratification, on 7 November 2002, to the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted by the Organisation of African Unity at Algiers on 14 July 1999;
AND WHEREAS the United Nations Security Council from time to time passes resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, requiring Member States to combat terrorist and related activities, including taking effective measures to prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities, and the freezing of funds, assets or economic resources of persons who commit terrorist and related activities;
AND WHEREAS our national laws do not meet all the international requirements relating to the prevention and combating of terrorist and related activities;
AND WHEREAS international law, and in particular international humanitarian law, including the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the said Charter recognizes acts committed in accordance with such international law during a struggle waged by peoples, including any action during an armed struggle, in the exercise or furtherance of their legitimate right to national liberation, self-determination and independence against colonialism, or occupation or aggression or domination by alien or foreign forces, as being excluded from terrorist activities;
AND REALISING the importance to enact appropriate domestic legislation necessary to implement the provisions of relevant international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities, to ensure that the jurisdiction of the courts of the Republic of South Africa enables them to bring to trial the perpetrators of terrorist and related activities; and to co-operate with and provide support and assistance to other States and relevant international and regional organisations to that end;
AND MINDFUL that the Republic, has since 1994, become a legitimate member of the community of nations and is committed to bringing to justice persons who commit such terrorist and related activities; and to carrying out its obligations in terms of the international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities.
Source: SABINET
WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa is a constitutional democracy where fundamental human rights, such as the right to life and free political activity, are constitutionally enshrined;
AND WHEREAS terrorist and related activities, in whichever form, are intended to achieve political and other aims in a violent or otherwise unconstitutional manner, and thereby undermine democratic rights and values and the Constitution;
AND WHEREAS terrorist and related activities are an international problem, which can only be effectively addressed by means of international co-operation;
AND WHEREAS the Government of the Republic of South Africa has committed itself in international fora such as the United Nations, the African Union and the Non-Aligned Movement, to the prevention and combating of terrorist and related activities;
AND WHEREAS the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373/2001, which is binding on all Member States of the United Nations, as well as the Convention for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted by the Organisation of African Unity, requires Member States to become Party to instruments, dealing with terrorist and related activities, as soon as possible;
AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa has already become Party to the following instruments of the United Nations:
(a) The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963. The Republic became a Party thereto, by accession on 26 May 1972;
(b) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 30 May 1972;
(c) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded at Montreal on 23 September 1971. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 30 May 1972;
(d) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 23 September 2003;
(e) the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 23 September 2003;
(f) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, adopted at Montreal on 24 February 1988. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 21 September 1998;
(g) the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, signed at Montreal on 1 March 1991. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 1 December 1999;
(h) the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 1 May 2003; and
(i) the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1999. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 1 May 2003;
AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa desires to become a Party to the following remaining instruments of the United Nations, not yet ratified or acceded to by the Republic:
(a) The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, adopted at Rome on 10 March 1988;
(b) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf, adopted at Rome on 10 March 1988; and
(c) the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna on 26 October 1979, and signed on behalf of the Republic on 18 May 1981;
AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa has become a Party by ratification, on 7 November 2002, to the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted by the Organisation of African Unity at Algiers on 14 July 1999;
AND WHEREAS the United Nations Security Council from time to time passes resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, requiring Member States to combat terrorist and related activities, including taking effective measures to prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities, and the freezing of funds, assets or economic resources of persons who commit terrorist and related activities;
AND WHEREAS our national laws do not meet all the international requirements relating to the prevention and combating of terrorist and related activities;
AND WHEREAS international law, and in particular international humanitarian law, including the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the said Charter recognizes acts committed in accordance with such international law during a struggle waged by peoples, including any action during an armed struggle, in the exercise or furtherance of their legitimate right to national liberation, self-determination and independence against colonialism, or occupation or aggression or domination by alien or foreign forces, as being excluded from terrorist activities;
AND REALISING the importance to enact appropriate domestic legislation necessary to implement the provisions of relevant international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities, to ensure that the jurisdiction of the courts of the Republic of South Africa enables them to bring to trial the perpetrators of terrorist and related activities; and to co-operate with and provide support and assistance to other States and relevant international and regional organisations to that end;
AND MINDFUL that the Republic, has since 1994, become a legitimate member of the community of nations and is committed to bringing to justice persons who commit such terrorist and related activities; and to carrying out its obligations in terms of the international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities.
Source: SABINET
PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AGAINST TERRORIST AND RELATED ACTIVITIES ACT 33 OF 2004
The purpose of the PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AGAINST TERRORIST AND RELATED ACTIVITIES ACT 33 OF 2004 is to provide for measures to prevent and combat terrorist and related activities; to provide for an offence of terrorism and other offences associated or connected with terrorist activities; to provide for Convention offences; to give effect to international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities; to provide for a mechanism to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions, which are binding on member States, in respect of terrorist and related activities; to provide for measures to prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities; to provide for investigative measures in respect of terrorist and related activities; and to provide for matters connected therewith.
PREAMBLE
WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa is a constitutional democracy where fundamental human rights, such as the right to life and free political activity, are constitutionally enshrined;
AND WHEREAS terrorist and related activities, in whichever form, are intended to achieve political and other aims in a violent or otherwise unconstitutional manner, and thereby undermine democratic rights and values and the Constitution;
AND WHEREAS terrorist and related activities are an international problem, which can only be effectively addressed by means of international co-operation;
AND WHEREAS the Government of the Republic of South Africa has committed itself in international fora such as the United Nations, the African Union and the Non-Aligned Movement, to the prevention and combating of terrorist and related activities;
AND WHEREAS the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373/2001, which is binding on all Member States of the United Nations, as well as the Convention for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted by the Organisation of African Unity, requires Member States to become Party to instruments, dealing with terrorist and related activities, as soon as possible;
AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa has already become Party to the following instruments of the United Nations:
(a) The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963. The Republic became a Party thereto, by accession on 26 May 1972;
(b) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 30 May 1972;
(c) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded at Montreal on 23 September 1971. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 30 May 1972;
(d) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 23 September 2003;
(e) the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 23 September 2003;
(f) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, adopted at Montreal on 24 February 1988. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 21 September 1998;
(g) the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, signed at Montreal on 1 March 1991. The Republic became a Party thereto by accession on 1 December 1999;
(h) the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 1 May 2003; and
(i) the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1999. The Republic became a Party thereto by ratification on 1 May 2003;
AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa desires to become a Party to the following remaining instruments of the United Nations, not yet ratified or acceded to by the Republic:
(a) The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, adopted at Rome on 10 March 1988;
(b) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf, adopted at Rome on 10 March 1988; and
(c) the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna on 26 October 1979, and signed on behalf of the Republic on 18 May 1981;
AND WHEREAS the Republic of South Africa has become a Party by ratification, on 7 November 2002, to the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted by the Organisation of African Unity at Algiers on 14 July 1999;
AND WHEREAS the United Nations Security Council from time to time passes resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, requiring Member States to combat terrorist and related activities, including taking effective measures to prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities, and the freezing of funds, assets or economic resources of persons who commit terrorist and related activities;
AND WHEREAS our national laws do not meet all the international requirements relating to the prevention and combating of terrorist and related activities;
AND WHEREAS international law, and in particular international humanitarian law, including the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the said Charter recognizes acts committed in accordance with such international law during a struggle waged by peoples, including any action during an armed struggle, in the exercise or furtherance of their legitimate right to national liberation, self-determination and independence against colonialism, or occupation or aggression or domination by alien or foreign forces, as being excluded from terrorist activities;
AND REALISING the importance to enact appropriate domestic legislation necessary to implement the provisions of relevant international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities, to ensure that the jurisdiction of the courts of the Republic of South Africa enables them to bring to trial the perpetrators of terrorist and related activities; and to co-operate with and provide support and assistance to other States and relevant international and regional organisations to that end;
AND MINDFUL that the Republic, has since 1994, become a legitimate member of the community of nations and is committed to bringing to justice persons who commit such terrorist and related activities; and to carrying out its obligations in terms of the international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities, [the act is therefore promolgated].
Tuesday, May 10, 2005
Inmates appear in court after escape attempt
The trial of three convicted criminals who staged a daring escape attempt in 2004 during a visit by the minister of correctional services was on Monday postponed after the one accused unexpectedly ended the mandate of his lawyer.
Klaas Ndlovu, 32, and Jacob Kgatlane, 29, indicated in August that they would plead guilty. But the Pretoria regional court on Monday had to postpone the case at the last minute after Kgatlane decided to apply for another Legal Aid lawyer. Preparations were ready for their trial to be separated from co-accused Matthews Sithole, 34, who indicated he would plead not guilty.
The men are accused of escaping from C-Max prison in May. In the process they allegedly assaulted prison warder Thomas Malamathso when he refused to open a door for them. They are also accused of assaulting inmate George Mbonani and warder Jacobus Hatting by hitting them with the butt of a firearm.
The three prisoners then allegedly kidnapped warder Johannes Phaladi by dragging him from his office to his vehicle where they apparently stole the car. In addition, they are charged with the illegal possession of a .38 Special calibre Rossi Model revolver and five rounds of ammunition. Sithole was sent to C-Max in November 1998. He was serving a 66-year sentence for murdering a warder at the Venda Prison.
Kgatlane was moved to C-Max in August 2001 due to his involvement in gang unrest at Odi prison. He was serving three years for the illegal possession of a firearm. Ndlovu was in C-Max since October 2002 doing a four-year sentence for escaping from police custody. The case was postponed to May 30.
Source: IoL
Klaas Ndlovu, 32, and Jacob Kgatlane, 29, indicated in August that they would plead guilty. But the Pretoria regional court on Monday had to postpone the case at the last minute after Kgatlane decided to apply for another Legal Aid lawyer. Preparations were ready for their trial to be separated from co-accused Matthews Sithole, 34, who indicated he would plead not guilty.
The men are accused of escaping from C-Max prison in May. In the process they allegedly assaulted prison warder Thomas Malamathso when he refused to open a door for them. They are also accused of assaulting inmate George Mbonani and warder Jacobus Hatting by hitting them with the butt of a firearm.
The three prisoners then allegedly kidnapped warder Johannes Phaladi by dragging him from his office to his vehicle where they apparently stole the car. In addition, they are charged with the illegal possession of a .38 Special calibre Rossi Model revolver and five rounds of ammunition. Sithole was sent to C-Max in November 1998. He was serving a 66-year sentence for murdering a warder at the Venda Prison.
Kgatlane was moved to C-Max in August 2001 due to his involvement in gang unrest at Odi prison. He was serving three years for the illegal possession of a firearm. Ndlovu was in C-Max since October 2002 doing a four-year sentence for escaping from police custody. The case was postponed to May 30.
Source: IoL
Tuesday, May 3, 2005
The ANC's Oilgate
A Mail & Guardian investigation into covert party funding has revealed how R11-million of public money was diverted to African National Congress coffers ahead of the 2004 elections. In what may be the biggest political funding scandal since 1994, the M&G has established that South Africa's state oil company, PetroSA, irregularly paid R15-million to Imvume Management -- a company closely tied to the ANC -- at a time when the party was desperate for funds to fight elections. The M&G possesses bank statements and has seen other forensic evidence proving that Imvume transferred the lion's share of this to the ANC within days. PetroSA this week said it was unaware of this. The ANC denied impropriety and said it was not obliged to discuss its funders.
The scheme unfolded in two stages. First, PetroSA management bent over backwards to pay Imvume the money as an advance for the procurement of oil condensate. Then, when Imvume diverted the funds to the ANC instead of paying its own foreign suppliers, PetroSA had to cover the shortfall by paying the same amount again. A multimillion-rand hole remains in the parastatalis books. PetroSA has gone through the motions to recover the debt by suing Imvume -- but most of it remains outstanding. The effect of the entire transaction was that PetroSA, and ultimately the taxpayer, subsidised the ruling party's election campaign: a blatant abuse of public resources.
Imvume's role as an ANC "front company" first emerged in February last year when the M&G exposed its oil dealings with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Imvume principal Sandi Majali obtained lucrative crude oil allocations from that regime when he travelled to Iraq with top ANC officials between 2000 and 2002. More recently, Imvume described its boss as ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe's "economic adviser".
But it was the diversion of the Petro-SA money four months ahead of the 2004 elections that is now lifting the lid on the funding scandal. The deal puts the spotlight on PetroSA's management, which approved the payment; Imvume boss Majali, who asked for the advance and then issued the cheques to the ANC; and Motlanthe, who was Majali's ANC patron. Imvume, now unable to pay its debts, was once the empowerment pin-up of the oil industry. The contract that caused all the trouble was awarded by PetroSA to Imvume on October 15 2002 -- the day President Thabo Mbeki publicly launched PetroSA as the national oil company.
Under the contract, Imvume -- with the backing of Swiss-based resource trader Glencore International -- was to supply PetroSA with regular cargoes of condensate, a feedstock for PetroSA's Mossel Bay gas-to-liquid fuels plant. A number of condensate cargoes were delivered to Mossel Bay during 2003. The standard contractual procedure was for PetroSA to pay Imvume the full cargo price no later than 30 days after the bill of lading date (the date the cargo was loaded for shipment to Mossel Bay). Once it received payment from PetroSA, Imvume would immediately pay it on to Glencore, which sourced the cargo on international markets. Glencore paid Imvume a commission. But in December 2003 the pattern was broken, and PetroSA has confirmed that standard procedure was departed from. The bill of lading date for that cargo was December 6 2003, meaning PetroSA's payment for the cargo -- worth $10-million (about R65-million) -- was due on January 5 2004. But Imvume's Majali asked PetroSA for an advance of R15-million (just more than $2-million of the $10-million) which was paid even before the cargo was discharged on December 22. PetroSA paid the advance into a different account to that usually used by Imvume for the contract.
Evidence in the M&G's possession confirms that Imvume Management's corporate account was credited with R15-million a day later, on December 19. And the M&G has seen forensic proof that within the next four days, Imvume's Majali issued a series of four cheques to the ANC -- for R4-million, R3-million and R2-million (twice). These cheques, totalling R11-million, were all transacted on December 23. This week Majali and Imvume did not dispute that the money was paid to the ANC, but claimed their support for the party was a "private affair".
The transfers to the ANC came four months before the elections, held on April 14 2004. A number of sources have described the party's financial straits around that time, claiming it had a bank overdraft typically running at more than R100-million. When payment for the cargo became due to Glencore on January 5, Imvume failed to pay the company the R15-million advance -- and, effectively, also withheld another R3-million from the balance owed. Glencore turned to PetroSA for what it was owed, eventually threatening in February not to offload the next cargo. PetroSA agreed to cover the shortfall of R18-million, for fear that the Mossel Bay plant would run out of feedstock, leading to greater losses. Effectively, PetroSA paid R18-million twice -- once to Imvume, and once to Imvume's supplier.
PetroSA maintains that the special circumstances of the empowerment environment largely excuse the actions of its management. It also denies that there was pressure from either the Minerals and Energy Ministry or the ANC to approve the advance to Imvume. Circumstances, however, suggest that empowerment is not a sufficient explanation and that Imvume's ANC links played a role. These links were no secret in oil trading circles. A businessman active in the sector told the M&G last year: "It was talked about when they got tenders ... that it was an ANC company ... I certainly understand that ANC fundraising has a keen interest."
The advance payment to Imvume was irregular in that it was a departure from standard procedures. PetroSA maintains procurement policy allows for advance payments, but admits it "should have checked" whether the money was going into the usual account. When the transaction with Imvume blew up in its face, PetroSA continued treating the company with kid gloves.
On February 23 last year, four days after PetroSA had been forced to settle Imvume's debt with Glencore, Majali signed an acknowledgement of debt to PetroSA, agreeing to repay the R18-million plus interest within 90 days. He also ceded his company's revenue stream as security. But Imvume paid nothing in terms of that agreement. Court records show more than a month passed after the expiry of the 90-day term before PetroSA issued a letter of demand. (See "PetroSA vs Imvume Management" download box on top right of this article for full documents).
PetroSA's choice of lawyer employed to pursue the demand raises further questions about PetroSA's seriousness of purpose. The lawyer, Leslie Mkhabela, was previously Imvume's own attorney and still has a business relationship with Majali via their common interest in Forever Resorts Aventura, the privatised state leisure company. This raises conflict-of-interest questions. Mkhabela maintained this week that this was not a problem as he had disclosed his business relationship with Majali to PetroSA. The agreement signed between Mkhize and Majali was still not enforced. Instead new terms, much more favourable to Imvume, were agreed between PetroSA chief executive Sipho Mkhize and Majali in September last year. Now PetroSA waived any claim to interest and agreed that Imvume could repay the capital amount in monthly instalments over four and a half years. But again, in February this year and after paying only R1,33-million, Imvume defaulted, court papers show.
PetroSA took off the kid gloves for a little while, filing an application for summary judgement in the Johannesburg High Court. But the matter was postponed twice, and on a third court date -- May 3 this year -- PetroSA removed the matter from the roll. PetroSA this week claimed that this was to allow Imvume to remain operational, which would give PetroSA a better chance eventually to recoup the debt. The ANC this week threatened legal action against the M&G without confirming or denying the flow of money to it. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the ANC knew exactly where the funding was coming from. Between 2000 and 2002, when Majali was trading in oil allocations from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the ANC's Motlanthe repeatedly accompanied him to that country. ANC treasurer general Mendi Msimang also went along on at least one occasion. It is rumoured that the relationship between Majali and Motlanthe has cooled recently, but an Imvume brochure last year still described Majali as "economic adviser to the secretary general of the ANC". Describing the company's "winning formula", the brochure said Imvume had "access and influence on economic policy".
How they responded ...
PETROSA
The cornerstone of this deal is the policy adopted by PetroSA, which is a national initiative, black economic empowerment (BEE). PetroSA has a mandate to introduce hitherto disadvantaged South Africans into the oil and gas industry. PetroSA had a choice: to continue business as usual and exclude historically disadvantaged South Africans from the mainstream economy and prolong, if not propagate, the two-economies concept, or use our procurement muscle to bring fundamental change to the industry.
To procure a raw material referred to as condensate, the requirement was that the preferred supplier must have a South African partner who qualifies as a BEE candidate. This in effect introduced a major shift in the industry. We deliberately signed deals with the historically disadvantaged party to ensure that they were not "brought along" to the deal, but in fact they were the "principal partner" in the deal.
# On the [High Court] case PetroSA brought against Imvume PetroSA suspended the case due to the fact that if Imvume were liquidated, there would be very little proceeds flowing into PetroSA from that exercise. Imvume is much better off remaining operational for PetroSA to be able to recoup the total sum owed to PetroSA as well as interest and the legal costs.
# On Leslie Mkhabela [PetroSA's choice of lawyer to sue Imvume]
Mkhabela assured PetroSA of the following: he acted on behalf of Imvume during 2002/03. He later decided to resign from their business. While he acted for Imvume, he was invited into a consortium that submitted a bid for the Aventura Resort in exchange for his services. He retains no personal friendship with Imvume.
# On PetroSA's actions and internal inquiry
At the request of Imvume, PetroSA effected a pre-payment into an account different from the normal account. We changed the account without considering that there may be negative ramifications. PetroSA has since tightened the controls around channels of communication and instruction from vendors on payments. PetroSA in its enquiry has not found any wrongdoing by any individual or individuals within PetroSA or external to PetroSA with line of sight to PetroSA. All the procedures and processes were followed. PetroSA honoured the letter of the contract. At times we assist suppliers to better deliver to PetroSA where possible. The procurement policy at PetroSA allows for payments of this nature.
# On the double payment
Glencore held the product. Even though PetroSA did not have a contract with them, they had a ship in the harbour with our product. As we had already paid, PetroSA had to make a decision; to either pay them and deal with Imvume later -- this would cost us $2,8-million -- or refuse to pay and have our refinery cease operating for a minimum of 40 days, at the cost of $1-million daily. The PetroSA board ratified the decision.
Conclusion
It is the intention of PetroSA to recoup all the funds involved in this dispute. A liquidated Imvume would not generate the required proceeds for PetroSA. This would lead to an outright loss. PetroSA needs Imvume to pay back the money owed to PetroSA.
BARRY AARON & ASSOCIATES (lawyers for Majali and Imvume):
Our clients have requested us to record that Imvume had legitimately withheld payment in the sum of $2,8-million from Glencore against receipt of the expected commission on the profit-sharing arrangement in relation to Imvume's contract with PetroSA.
The withholding of this payment was not contested by Glencore until immediately prior to delivery of the next shipment, which it then refused to offload until such time as the shortfall (as Glencore perceived it) on the previous shipment had been paid. This resulted in PetroSA effecting payment of the shortfall and Imvume executing the acknowledgement [of debt] in favour of PetroSA.
The issue of commission from Glencore remains unresolved. Imvume expected to repay PetroSA from anticipated funds and separately resolve the issue with Glencore. Unfortunately, the anticipated funds did not materialise. Imvume has concluded arrangements with PetroSA for repayment. Imvume intends honouring its obligations to PetroSA. Our clients have no objection to fair investigative journalism and comment. [The M&G] however continues to harass our clients in an ongoing witch-hunt. [The M&G] appears to have accessed Imvume's private and confidential records, including (in particular) its banking records, constituting an invasion of our clients' rights to privacy, conduct way beyond the norms of responsible or acceptable investigative journalism. Our clients are a private businessman and a private company respectively, engaging in the legitimate pursuit of their activities. Their business activities and support for the ANC are their private affair. [The M&G] is sabotaging and subverting a legitimate black empowerment initiative.
MNMR Attorneys (for the ANC and Kgalema Motlanthe)
The short time period provided for comment demonstrates that the M&G will not give proper consideration to our clients' submissions. We wish to note that following the recent decision of the Cape high court in the Idasa matter, our clients are not obliged to discuss donations received by it from any person. Even if it were so, our clients would have no obligation and would not always have the ability or means to verify the identity of the sources of all donations made to it. We record, however, that our clients deny any insinuation that they acted in any corrupt, illegal or improper manner. Our clients will not hesitate to protect their rights should the M&G publish the defamatory material contemplated in [your] e-mail.
Source: Mail & Guardian
The scheme unfolded in two stages. First, PetroSA management bent over backwards to pay Imvume the money as an advance for the procurement of oil condensate. Then, when Imvume diverted the funds to the ANC instead of paying its own foreign suppliers, PetroSA had to cover the shortfall by paying the same amount again. A multimillion-rand hole remains in the parastatalis books. PetroSA has gone through the motions to recover the debt by suing Imvume -- but most of it remains outstanding. The effect of the entire transaction was that PetroSA, and ultimately the taxpayer, subsidised the ruling party's election campaign: a blatant abuse of public resources.
Imvume's role as an ANC "front company" first emerged in February last year when the M&G exposed its oil dealings with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Imvume principal Sandi Majali obtained lucrative crude oil allocations from that regime when he travelled to Iraq with top ANC officials between 2000 and 2002. More recently, Imvume described its boss as ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe's "economic adviser".
But it was the diversion of the Petro-SA money four months ahead of the 2004 elections that is now lifting the lid on the funding scandal. The deal puts the spotlight on PetroSA's management, which approved the payment; Imvume boss Majali, who asked for the advance and then issued the cheques to the ANC; and Motlanthe, who was Majali's ANC patron. Imvume, now unable to pay its debts, was once the empowerment pin-up of the oil industry. The contract that caused all the trouble was awarded by PetroSA to Imvume on October 15 2002 -- the day President Thabo Mbeki publicly launched PetroSA as the national oil company.
Under the contract, Imvume -- with the backing of Swiss-based resource trader Glencore International -- was to supply PetroSA with regular cargoes of condensate, a feedstock for PetroSA's Mossel Bay gas-to-liquid fuels plant. A number of condensate cargoes were delivered to Mossel Bay during 2003. The standard contractual procedure was for PetroSA to pay Imvume the full cargo price no later than 30 days after the bill of lading date (the date the cargo was loaded for shipment to Mossel Bay). Once it received payment from PetroSA, Imvume would immediately pay it on to Glencore, which sourced the cargo on international markets. Glencore paid Imvume a commission. But in December 2003 the pattern was broken, and PetroSA has confirmed that standard procedure was departed from. The bill of lading date for that cargo was December 6 2003, meaning PetroSA's payment for the cargo -- worth $10-million (about R65-million) -- was due on January 5 2004. But Imvume's Majali asked PetroSA for an advance of R15-million (just more than $2-million of the $10-million) which was paid even before the cargo was discharged on December 22. PetroSA paid the advance into a different account to that usually used by Imvume for the contract.
Evidence in the M&G's possession confirms that Imvume Management's corporate account was credited with R15-million a day later, on December 19. And the M&G has seen forensic proof that within the next four days, Imvume's Majali issued a series of four cheques to the ANC -- for R4-million, R3-million and R2-million (twice). These cheques, totalling R11-million, were all transacted on December 23. This week Majali and Imvume did not dispute that the money was paid to the ANC, but claimed their support for the party was a "private affair".
The transfers to the ANC came four months before the elections, held on April 14 2004. A number of sources have described the party's financial straits around that time, claiming it had a bank overdraft typically running at more than R100-million. When payment for the cargo became due to Glencore on January 5, Imvume failed to pay the company the R15-million advance -- and, effectively, also withheld another R3-million from the balance owed. Glencore turned to PetroSA for what it was owed, eventually threatening in February not to offload the next cargo. PetroSA agreed to cover the shortfall of R18-million, for fear that the Mossel Bay plant would run out of feedstock, leading to greater losses. Effectively, PetroSA paid R18-million twice -- once to Imvume, and once to Imvume's supplier.
PetroSA maintains that the special circumstances of the empowerment environment largely excuse the actions of its management. It also denies that there was pressure from either the Minerals and Energy Ministry or the ANC to approve the advance to Imvume. Circumstances, however, suggest that empowerment is not a sufficient explanation and that Imvume's ANC links played a role. These links were no secret in oil trading circles. A businessman active in the sector told the M&G last year: "It was talked about when they got tenders ... that it was an ANC company ... I certainly understand that ANC fundraising has a keen interest."
The advance payment to Imvume was irregular in that it was a departure from standard procedures. PetroSA maintains procurement policy allows for advance payments, but admits it "should have checked" whether the money was going into the usual account. When the transaction with Imvume blew up in its face, PetroSA continued treating the company with kid gloves.
On February 23 last year, four days after PetroSA had been forced to settle Imvume's debt with Glencore, Majali signed an acknowledgement of debt to PetroSA, agreeing to repay the R18-million plus interest within 90 days. He also ceded his company's revenue stream as security. But Imvume paid nothing in terms of that agreement. Court records show more than a month passed after the expiry of the 90-day term before PetroSA issued a letter of demand. (See "PetroSA vs Imvume Management" download box on top right of this article for full documents).
PetroSA's choice of lawyer employed to pursue the demand raises further questions about PetroSA's seriousness of purpose. The lawyer, Leslie Mkhabela, was previously Imvume's own attorney and still has a business relationship with Majali via their common interest in Forever Resorts Aventura, the privatised state leisure company. This raises conflict-of-interest questions. Mkhabela maintained this week that this was not a problem as he had disclosed his business relationship with Majali to PetroSA. The agreement signed between Mkhize and Majali was still not enforced. Instead new terms, much more favourable to Imvume, were agreed between PetroSA chief executive Sipho Mkhize and Majali in September last year. Now PetroSA waived any claim to interest and agreed that Imvume could repay the capital amount in monthly instalments over four and a half years. But again, in February this year and after paying only R1,33-million, Imvume defaulted, court papers show.
PetroSA took off the kid gloves for a little while, filing an application for summary judgement in the Johannesburg High Court. But the matter was postponed twice, and on a third court date -- May 3 this year -- PetroSA removed the matter from the roll. PetroSA this week claimed that this was to allow Imvume to remain operational, which would give PetroSA a better chance eventually to recoup the debt. The ANC this week threatened legal action against the M&G without confirming or denying the flow of money to it. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the ANC knew exactly where the funding was coming from. Between 2000 and 2002, when Majali was trading in oil allocations from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the ANC's Motlanthe repeatedly accompanied him to that country. ANC treasurer general Mendi Msimang also went along on at least one occasion. It is rumoured that the relationship between Majali and Motlanthe has cooled recently, but an Imvume brochure last year still described Majali as "economic adviser to the secretary general of the ANC". Describing the company's "winning formula", the brochure said Imvume had "access and influence on economic policy".
How they responded ...
PETROSA
The cornerstone of this deal is the policy adopted by PetroSA, which is a national initiative, black economic empowerment (BEE). PetroSA has a mandate to introduce hitherto disadvantaged South Africans into the oil and gas industry. PetroSA had a choice: to continue business as usual and exclude historically disadvantaged South Africans from the mainstream economy and prolong, if not propagate, the two-economies concept, or use our procurement muscle to bring fundamental change to the industry.
To procure a raw material referred to as condensate, the requirement was that the preferred supplier must have a South African partner who qualifies as a BEE candidate. This in effect introduced a major shift in the industry. We deliberately signed deals with the historically disadvantaged party to ensure that they were not "brought along" to the deal, but in fact they were the "principal partner" in the deal.
# On the [High Court] case PetroSA brought against Imvume PetroSA suspended the case due to the fact that if Imvume were liquidated, there would be very little proceeds flowing into PetroSA from that exercise. Imvume is much better off remaining operational for PetroSA to be able to recoup the total sum owed to PetroSA as well as interest and the legal costs.
# On Leslie Mkhabela [PetroSA's choice of lawyer to sue Imvume]
Mkhabela assured PetroSA of the following: he acted on behalf of Imvume during 2002/03. He later decided to resign from their business. While he acted for Imvume, he was invited into a consortium that submitted a bid for the Aventura Resort in exchange for his services. He retains no personal friendship with Imvume.
# On PetroSA's actions and internal inquiry
At the request of Imvume, PetroSA effected a pre-payment into an account different from the normal account. We changed the account without considering that there may be negative ramifications. PetroSA has since tightened the controls around channels of communication and instruction from vendors on payments. PetroSA in its enquiry has not found any wrongdoing by any individual or individuals within PetroSA or external to PetroSA with line of sight to PetroSA. All the procedures and processes were followed. PetroSA honoured the letter of the contract. At times we assist suppliers to better deliver to PetroSA where possible. The procurement policy at PetroSA allows for payments of this nature.
# On the double payment
Glencore held the product. Even though PetroSA did not have a contract with them, they had a ship in the harbour with our product. As we had already paid, PetroSA had to make a decision; to either pay them and deal with Imvume later -- this would cost us $2,8-million -- or refuse to pay and have our refinery cease operating for a minimum of 40 days, at the cost of $1-million daily. The PetroSA board ratified the decision.
Conclusion
It is the intention of PetroSA to recoup all the funds involved in this dispute. A liquidated Imvume would not generate the required proceeds for PetroSA. This would lead to an outright loss. PetroSA needs Imvume to pay back the money owed to PetroSA.
BARRY AARON & ASSOCIATES (lawyers for Majali and Imvume):
Our clients have requested us to record that Imvume had legitimately withheld payment in the sum of $2,8-million from Glencore against receipt of the expected commission on the profit-sharing arrangement in relation to Imvume's contract with PetroSA.
The withholding of this payment was not contested by Glencore until immediately prior to delivery of the next shipment, which it then refused to offload until such time as the shortfall (as Glencore perceived it) on the previous shipment had been paid. This resulted in PetroSA effecting payment of the shortfall and Imvume executing the acknowledgement [of debt] in favour of PetroSA.
The issue of commission from Glencore remains unresolved. Imvume expected to repay PetroSA from anticipated funds and separately resolve the issue with Glencore. Unfortunately, the anticipated funds did not materialise. Imvume has concluded arrangements with PetroSA for repayment. Imvume intends honouring its obligations to PetroSA. Our clients have no objection to fair investigative journalism and comment. [The M&G] however continues to harass our clients in an ongoing witch-hunt. [The M&G] appears to have accessed Imvume's private and confidential records, including (in particular) its banking records, constituting an invasion of our clients' rights to privacy, conduct way beyond the norms of responsible or acceptable investigative journalism. Our clients are a private businessman and a private company respectively, engaging in the legitimate pursuit of their activities. Their business activities and support for the ANC are their private affair. [The M&G] is sabotaging and subverting a legitimate black empowerment initiative.
MNMR Attorneys (for the ANC and Kgalema Motlanthe)
The short time period provided for comment demonstrates that the M&G will not give proper consideration to our clients' submissions. We wish to note that following the recent decision of the Cape high court in the Idasa matter, our clients are not obliged to discuss donations received by it from any person. Even if it were so, our clients would have no obligation and would not always have the ability or means to verify the identity of the sources of all donations made to it. We record, however, that our clients deny any insinuation that they acted in any corrupt, illegal or improper manner. Our clients will not hesitate to protect their rights should the M&G publish the defamatory material contemplated in [your] e-mail.
Source: Mail & Guardian
The ANC's Oilgate
A Mail & Guardian investigation into covert party funding has revealed how R11-million of public money was diverted to African National Congress coffers ahead of the 2004 elections. In what may be the biggest political funding scandal since 1994, the M&G has established that South Africa's state oil company, PetroSA, irregularly paid R15-million to Imvume Management -- a company closely tied to the ANC -- at a time when the party was desperate for funds to fight elections.
The M&G possesses bank statements and has seen other forensic evidence proving that Imvume transferred the lion's share of this to the ANC within days. PetroSA this week said it was unaware of this. The ANC denied impropriety and said it was not obliged to discuss its funders. The scheme unfolded in two stages. First, PetroSA management bent over backwards to pay Imvume the money as an advance for the procurement of oil condensate. Then, when Imvume diverted the funds to the ANC instead of paying its own foreign suppliers, PetroSA had to cover the shortfall by paying the same amount again.
A multimillion-rand hole remains in the parastatalis books. PetroSA has gone through the motions to recover the debt by suing Imvume -- but most of it remains outstanding. The effect of the entire transaction was that PetroSA, and ultimately the taxpayer, subsidised the ruling party's election campaign: a blatant abuse of public resources. Imvume's role as an ANC "front company" first emerged in February last year when the M&G exposed its oil dealings with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Imvume principal Sandi Majali obtained lucrative crude oil allocations from that regime when he travelled to Iraq with top ANC officials between 2000 and 2002. More recently, Imvume described its boss as ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe's "economic adviser".
The transaction in a nutshell
But it was the diversion of the Petro-SA money four months ahead of the 2004 elections that is now lifting the lid on the funding scandal. The deal puts the spotlight on PetroSA's management, which approved the payment; Imvume boss Majali, who asked for the advance and then issued the cheques to the ANC; and Motlanthe, who was Majali's ANC patron. Imvume, now unable to pay its debts, was once the empowerment pin-up of the oil industry.
The contract that caused all the trouble was awarded by PetroSA to Imvume on October 15 2002 -- the day President Thabo Mbeki publicly launched PetroSA as the national oil company. Under the contract, Imvume -- with the backing of Swiss-based resource trader Glencore International -- was to supply PetroSA with regular cargoes of condensate, a feedstock for PetroSA's Mossel Bay gas-to-liquid fuels plant. A number of condensate cargoes were delivered to Mossel Bay during 2003. The standard contractual procedure was for PetroSA to pay Imvume the full cargo price no later than 30 days after the bill of lading date (the date the cargo was loaded for shipment to Mossel Bay).
Once it received payment from PetroSA, Imvume would immediately pay it on to Glencore, which sourced the cargo on international markets. Glencore paid Imvume a commission. But in December 2003 the pattern was broken, and PetroSA has confirmed that standard procedure was departed from. The bill of lading date for that cargo was December 6 2003, meaning PetroSA's payment for the cargo -- worth $10-million (about R65-million) -- was due on January 5 2004. But Imvume's Majali asked PetroSA for an advance of R15-million (just more than $2-million of the $10-million) which was paid even before the cargo was discharged on December 22. PetroSA paid the advance into a different account to that usually used by Imvume for the contract.
Evidence in the M&G's possession confirms that Imvume Management's corporate account was credited with R15-million a day later, on December 19. And the M&G has seen forensic proof that within the next four days, Imvume's Majali issued a series of four cheques to the ANC -- for R4-million, R3-million and R2-million (twice). These cheques, totalling R11-million, were all transacted on December 23. This week Majali and Imvume did not dispute that the money was paid to the ANC, but claimed their support for the party was a "private affair".
The transfers to the ANC came four months before the elections, held on April 14 2004. A number of sources have described the party's financial straits around that time, claiming it had a bank overdraft typically running at more than R100-million. When payment for the cargo became due to Glencore on January 5, Imvume failed to pay the company the R15-million advance -- and, effectively, also withheld another R3-million from the balance owed.
Glencore turned to PetroSA for what it was owed, eventually threatening in February not to offload the next cargo. PetroSA agreed to cover the shortfall of R18-million, for fear that the Mossel Bay plant would run out of feedstock, leading to greater losses. Effectively, PetroSA paid R18-million twice -- once to Imvume, and once to Imvume's supplier. PetroSA maintains that the special circumstances of the empowerment environment largely excuse the actions of its management. It also denies that there was pressure from either the Minerals and Energy Ministry or the ANC to approve the advance to Imvume.
Circumstances, however, suggest that empowerment is not a sufficient explanation and that Imvume's ANC links played a role. These links were no secret in oil trading circles. A businessman active in the sector told the M&G last year: "It was talked about when they got tenders ... that it was an ANC company ... I certainly understand that ANC fundraising has a keen interest."
The advance payment to Imvume was irregular in that it was a departure from standard procedures. PetroSA maintains procurement policy allows for advance payments, but admits it "should have checked" whether the money was going into the usual account. When the transaction with Imvume blew up in its face, PetroSA continued treating the company with kid gloves.
On February 23 last year, four days after PetroSA had been forced to settle Imvume's debt with Glencore, Majali signed an acknowledgement of debt to PetroSA, agreeing to repay the R18-million plus interest within 90 days. He also ceded his company's revenue stream as security. But Imvume paid nothing in terms of that agreement. Court records show more than a month passed after the expiry of the 90-day term before PetroSA issued a letter of demand. (See "PetroSA vs Imvume Management" download box on top right of this article for full documents).
PetroSA's choice of lawyer employed to pursue the demand raises further questions about PetroSA's seriousness of purpose. The lawyer, Leslie Mkhabela, was previously Imvume's own attorney and still has a business relationship with Majali via their common interest in Forever Resorts Aventura, the privatised state leisure company. This raises conflict-of-interest questions.
Mkhabela maintained this week that this was not a problem as he had disclosed his business relationship with Majali to PetroSA. The agreement signed between Mkhize and Majali was still not enforced. Instead new terms, much more favourable to Imvume, were agreed between PetroSA chief executive Sipho Mkhize and Majali in September last year.
Now PetroSA waived any claim to interest and agreed that Imvume could repay the capital amount in monthly instalments over four and a half years. But again, in February this year and after paying only R1,33-million, Imvume defaulted, court papers show.
PetroSA took off the kid gloves for a little while, filing an application for summary judgement in the Johannesburg High Court. But the matter was postponed twice, and on a third court date -- May 3 this year -- PetroSA removed the matter from the roll. PetroSA this week claimed that this was to allow Imvume to remain operational, which would give PetroSA a better chance eventually to recoup the debt.
The ANC this week threatened legal action against the M&G without confirming or denying the flow of money to it. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the ANC knew exactly where the funding was coming from. Between 2000 and 2002, when Majali was trading in oil allocations from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the ANC's Motlanthe repeatedly accompanied him to that country. ANC treasurer general Mendi Msimang also went along on at least one occasion.
It is rumoured that the relationship between Majali and Motlanthe has cooled recently, but an Imvume brochure last year still described Majali as "economic adviser to the secretary general of the ANC". Describing the company's "winning formula", the brochure said Imvume had "access and influence on economic policy".
How they responded ...
PETROSA
The cornerstone of this deal is the policy adopted by PetroSA, which is a national initiative, black economic empowerment (BEE). PetroSA has a mandate to introduce hitherto disadvantaged South Africans into the oil and gas industry. PetroSA had a choice: to continue business as usual and exclude historically disadvantaged South Africans from the mainstream economy and prolong, if not propagate, the two-economies concept, or use our procurement muscle to bring fundamental change to the industry.
To procure a raw material referred to as condensate, the requirement was that the preferred supplier must have a South African partner who qualifies as a BEE candidate. This in effect introduced a major shift in the industry. We deliberately signed deals with the historically disadvantaged party to ensure that they were not "brought along" to the deal, but in fact they were the "principal partner" in the deal.
# On the [High Court] case PetroSA brought against Imvume PetroSA suspended the case due to the fact that if Imvume were liquidated, there would be very little proceeds flowing into PetroSA from that exercise. Imvume is much better off remaining operational for PetroSA to be able to recoup the total sum owed to PetroSA as well as interest and the legal costs.
# On Leslie Mkhabela [PetroSA's choice of lawyer to sue Imvume]
Mkhabela assured PetroSA of the following: he acted on behalf of Imvume during 2002/03. He later decided to resign from their business. While he acted for Imvume, he was invited into a consortium that submitted a bid for the Aventura Resort in exchange for his services. He retains no personal friendship with Imvume.
# On PetroSA's actions and internal inquiry
At the request of Imvume, PetroSA effected a pre-payment into an account different from the normal account. We changed the account without considering that there may be negative ramifications. PetroSA has since tightened the controls around channels of communication and instruction from vendors on payments. PetroSA in its enquiry has not found any wrongdoing by any individual or individuals within PetroSA or external to PetroSA with line of sight to PetroSA. All the procedures and processes were followed. PetroSA honoured the letter of the contract. At times we assist suppliers to better deliver to PetroSA where possible. The procurement policy at PetroSA allows for payments of this nature.
# On the double payment
Glencore held the product. Even though PetroSA did not have a contract with them, they had a ship in the harbour with our product. As we had already paid, PetroSA had to make a decision; to either pay them and deal with Imvume later -- this would cost us $2,8-million -- or refuse to pay and have our refinery cease operating for a minimum of 40 days, at the cost of $1-million daily. The PetroSA board ratified the decision.
# Conclusion
It is the intention of PetroSA to recoup all the funds involved in this dispute. A liquidated Imvume would not generate the required proceeds for PetroSA. This would lead to an outright loss. PetroSA needs Imvume to pay back the money owed to PetroSA.
BARRY AARON & ASSOCIATES (lawyers for Majali and Imvume):
Our clients have requested us to record that Imvume had legitimately withheld payment in the sum of $2,8-million from Glencore against receipt of the expected commission on the profit-sharing arrangement in relation to Imvume's contract with PetroSA.
The withholding of this payment was not contested by Glencore until immediately prior to delivery of the next shipment, which it then refused to offload until such time as the shortfall (as Glencore perceived it) on the previous shipment had been paid. This resulted in PetroSA effecting payment of the shortfall and Imvume executing the acknowledgement [of debt] in favour of PetroSA.
The issue of commission from Glencore remains unresolved. Imvume expected to repay PetroSA from anticipated funds and separately resolve the issue with Glencore. Unfortunately, the anticipated funds did not materialise. Imvume has concluded arrangements with PetroSA for repayment. Imvume intends honouring its obligations to PetroSA. Our clients have no objection to fair investigative journalism and comment. [The M&G] however continues to harass our clients in an ongoing witch-hunt. [The M&G] appears to have accessed Imvume's private and confidential records, including (in particular) its banking records, constituting an invasion of our clients' rights to privacy, conduct way beyond the norms of responsible or acceptable investigative journalism. Our clients are a private businessman and a private company respectively, engaging in the legitimate pursuit of their activities. Their business activities and support for the ANC are their private affair. [The M&G] is sabotaging and subverting a legitimate black empowerment initiative.
MNMR Attorneys (for the ANC and Kgalema Motlanthe)
The short time period provided for comment demonstrates that the M&G will not give proper consideration to our clients' submissions. We wish to note that following the recent decision of the Cape high court in the Idasa matter, our clients are not obliged to discuss donations received by it from any person. Even if it were so, our clients would have no obligation and would not always have the ability or means to verify the identity of the sources of all donations made to it. We record, however, that our clients deny any insinuation that they acted in any corrupt, illegal or improper manner. Our clients will not hesitate to protect their rights should the M&G publish the defamatory material contemplated in [your] e-mail.
Source: Mail & Guardian
The M&G possesses bank statements and has seen other forensic evidence proving that Imvume transferred the lion's share of this to the ANC within days. PetroSA this week said it was unaware of this. The ANC denied impropriety and said it was not obliged to discuss its funders. The scheme unfolded in two stages. First, PetroSA management bent over backwards to pay Imvume the money as an advance for the procurement of oil condensate. Then, when Imvume diverted the funds to the ANC instead of paying its own foreign suppliers, PetroSA had to cover the shortfall by paying the same amount again.
A multimillion-rand hole remains in the parastatalis books. PetroSA has gone through the motions to recover the debt by suing Imvume -- but most of it remains outstanding. The effect of the entire transaction was that PetroSA, and ultimately the taxpayer, subsidised the ruling party's election campaign: a blatant abuse of public resources. Imvume's role as an ANC "front company" first emerged in February last year when the M&G exposed its oil dealings with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Imvume principal Sandi Majali obtained lucrative crude oil allocations from that regime when he travelled to Iraq with top ANC officials between 2000 and 2002. More recently, Imvume described its boss as ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe's "economic adviser".
The transaction in a nutshell
But it was the diversion of the Petro-SA money four months ahead of the 2004 elections that is now lifting the lid on the funding scandal. The deal puts the spotlight on PetroSA's management, which approved the payment; Imvume boss Majali, who asked for the advance and then issued the cheques to the ANC; and Motlanthe, who was Majali's ANC patron. Imvume, now unable to pay its debts, was once the empowerment pin-up of the oil industry.
The contract that caused all the trouble was awarded by PetroSA to Imvume on October 15 2002 -- the day President Thabo Mbeki publicly launched PetroSA as the national oil company. Under the contract, Imvume -- with the backing of Swiss-based resource trader Glencore International -- was to supply PetroSA with regular cargoes of condensate, a feedstock for PetroSA's Mossel Bay gas-to-liquid fuels plant. A number of condensate cargoes were delivered to Mossel Bay during 2003. The standard contractual procedure was for PetroSA to pay Imvume the full cargo price no later than 30 days after the bill of lading date (the date the cargo was loaded for shipment to Mossel Bay).
Once it received payment from PetroSA, Imvume would immediately pay it on to Glencore, which sourced the cargo on international markets. Glencore paid Imvume a commission. But in December 2003 the pattern was broken, and PetroSA has confirmed that standard procedure was departed from. The bill of lading date for that cargo was December 6 2003, meaning PetroSA's payment for the cargo -- worth $10-million (about R65-million) -- was due on January 5 2004. But Imvume's Majali asked PetroSA for an advance of R15-million (just more than $2-million of the $10-million) which was paid even before the cargo was discharged on December 22. PetroSA paid the advance into a different account to that usually used by Imvume for the contract.
Evidence in the M&G's possession confirms that Imvume Management's corporate account was credited with R15-million a day later, on December 19. And the M&G has seen forensic proof that within the next four days, Imvume's Majali issued a series of four cheques to the ANC -- for R4-million, R3-million and R2-million (twice). These cheques, totalling R11-million, were all transacted on December 23. This week Majali and Imvume did not dispute that the money was paid to the ANC, but claimed their support for the party was a "private affair".
The transfers to the ANC came four months before the elections, held on April 14 2004. A number of sources have described the party's financial straits around that time, claiming it had a bank overdraft typically running at more than R100-million. When payment for the cargo became due to Glencore on January 5, Imvume failed to pay the company the R15-million advance -- and, effectively, also withheld another R3-million from the balance owed.
Glencore turned to PetroSA for what it was owed, eventually threatening in February not to offload the next cargo. PetroSA agreed to cover the shortfall of R18-million, for fear that the Mossel Bay plant would run out of feedstock, leading to greater losses. Effectively, PetroSA paid R18-million twice -- once to Imvume, and once to Imvume's supplier. PetroSA maintains that the special circumstances of the empowerment environment largely excuse the actions of its management. It also denies that there was pressure from either the Minerals and Energy Ministry or the ANC to approve the advance to Imvume.
Circumstances, however, suggest that empowerment is not a sufficient explanation and that Imvume's ANC links played a role. These links were no secret in oil trading circles. A businessman active in the sector told the M&G last year: "It was talked about when they got tenders ... that it was an ANC company ... I certainly understand that ANC fundraising has a keen interest."
The advance payment to Imvume was irregular in that it was a departure from standard procedures. PetroSA maintains procurement policy allows for advance payments, but admits it "should have checked" whether the money was going into the usual account. When the transaction with Imvume blew up in its face, PetroSA continued treating the company with kid gloves.
On February 23 last year, four days after PetroSA had been forced to settle Imvume's debt with Glencore, Majali signed an acknowledgement of debt to PetroSA, agreeing to repay the R18-million plus interest within 90 days. He also ceded his company's revenue stream as security. But Imvume paid nothing in terms of that agreement. Court records show more than a month passed after the expiry of the 90-day term before PetroSA issued a letter of demand. (See "PetroSA vs Imvume Management" download box on top right of this article for full documents).
PetroSA's choice of lawyer employed to pursue the demand raises further questions about PetroSA's seriousness of purpose. The lawyer, Leslie Mkhabela, was previously Imvume's own attorney and still has a business relationship with Majali via their common interest in Forever Resorts Aventura, the privatised state leisure company. This raises conflict-of-interest questions.
Mkhabela maintained this week that this was not a problem as he had disclosed his business relationship with Majali to PetroSA. The agreement signed between Mkhize and Majali was still not enforced. Instead new terms, much more favourable to Imvume, were agreed between PetroSA chief executive Sipho Mkhize and Majali in September last year.
Now PetroSA waived any claim to interest and agreed that Imvume could repay the capital amount in monthly instalments over four and a half years. But again, in February this year and after paying only R1,33-million, Imvume defaulted, court papers show.
PetroSA took off the kid gloves for a little while, filing an application for summary judgement in the Johannesburg High Court. But the matter was postponed twice, and on a third court date -- May 3 this year -- PetroSA removed the matter from the roll. PetroSA this week claimed that this was to allow Imvume to remain operational, which would give PetroSA a better chance eventually to recoup the debt.
The ANC this week threatened legal action against the M&G without confirming or denying the flow of money to it. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the ANC knew exactly where the funding was coming from. Between 2000 and 2002, when Majali was trading in oil allocations from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the ANC's Motlanthe repeatedly accompanied him to that country. ANC treasurer general Mendi Msimang also went along on at least one occasion.
It is rumoured that the relationship between Majali and Motlanthe has cooled recently, but an Imvume brochure last year still described Majali as "economic adviser to the secretary general of the ANC". Describing the company's "winning formula", the brochure said Imvume had "access and influence on economic policy".
How they responded ...
PETROSA
The cornerstone of this deal is the policy adopted by PetroSA, which is a national initiative, black economic empowerment (BEE). PetroSA has a mandate to introduce hitherto disadvantaged South Africans into the oil and gas industry. PetroSA had a choice: to continue business as usual and exclude historically disadvantaged South Africans from the mainstream economy and prolong, if not propagate, the two-economies concept, or use our procurement muscle to bring fundamental change to the industry.
To procure a raw material referred to as condensate, the requirement was that the preferred supplier must have a South African partner who qualifies as a BEE candidate. This in effect introduced a major shift in the industry. We deliberately signed deals with the historically disadvantaged party to ensure that they were not "brought along" to the deal, but in fact they were the "principal partner" in the deal.
# On the [High Court] case PetroSA brought against Imvume PetroSA suspended the case due to the fact that if Imvume were liquidated, there would be very little proceeds flowing into PetroSA from that exercise. Imvume is much better off remaining operational for PetroSA to be able to recoup the total sum owed to PetroSA as well as interest and the legal costs.
# On Leslie Mkhabela [PetroSA's choice of lawyer to sue Imvume]
Mkhabela assured PetroSA of the following: he acted on behalf of Imvume during 2002/03. He later decided to resign from their business. While he acted for Imvume, he was invited into a consortium that submitted a bid for the Aventura Resort in exchange for his services. He retains no personal friendship with Imvume.
# On PetroSA's actions and internal inquiry
At the request of Imvume, PetroSA effected a pre-payment into an account different from the normal account. We changed the account without considering that there may be negative ramifications. PetroSA has since tightened the controls around channels of communication and instruction from vendors on payments. PetroSA in its enquiry has not found any wrongdoing by any individual or individuals within PetroSA or external to PetroSA with line of sight to PetroSA. All the procedures and processes were followed. PetroSA honoured the letter of the contract. At times we assist suppliers to better deliver to PetroSA where possible. The procurement policy at PetroSA allows for payments of this nature.
# On the double payment
Glencore held the product. Even though PetroSA did not have a contract with them, they had a ship in the harbour with our product. As we had already paid, PetroSA had to make a decision; to either pay them and deal with Imvume later -- this would cost us $2,8-million -- or refuse to pay and have our refinery cease operating for a minimum of 40 days, at the cost of $1-million daily. The PetroSA board ratified the decision.
# Conclusion
It is the intention of PetroSA to recoup all the funds involved in this dispute. A liquidated Imvume would not generate the required proceeds for PetroSA. This would lead to an outright loss. PetroSA needs Imvume to pay back the money owed to PetroSA.
BARRY AARON & ASSOCIATES (lawyers for Majali and Imvume):
Our clients have requested us to record that Imvume had legitimately withheld payment in the sum of $2,8-million from Glencore against receipt of the expected commission on the profit-sharing arrangement in relation to Imvume's contract with PetroSA.
The withholding of this payment was not contested by Glencore until immediately prior to delivery of the next shipment, which it then refused to offload until such time as the shortfall (as Glencore perceived it) on the previous shipment had been paid. This resulted in PetroSA effecting payment of the shortfall and Imvume executing the acknowledgement [of debt] in favour of PetroSA.
The issue of commission from Glencore remains unresolved. Imvume expected to repay PetroSA from anticipated funds and separately resolve the issue with Glencore. Unfortunately, the anticipated funds did not materialise. Imvume has concluded arrangements with PetroSA for repayment. Imvume intends honouring its obligations to PetroSA. Our clients have no objection to fair investigative journalism and comment. [The M&G] however continues to harass our clients in an ongoing witch-hunt. [The M&G] appears to have accessed Imvume's private and confidential records, including (in particular) its banking records, constituting an invasion of our clients' rights to privacy, conduct way beyond the norms of responsible or acceptable investigative journalism. Our clients are a private businessman and a private company respectively, engaging in the legitimate pursuit of their activities. Their business activities and support for the ANC are their private affair. [The M&G] is sabotaging and subverting a legitimate black empowerment initiative.
MNMR Attorneys (for the ANC and Kgalema Motlanthe)
The short time period provided for comment demonstrates that the M&G will not give proper consideration to our clients' submissions. We wish to note that following the recent decision of the Cape high court in the Idasa matter, our clients are not obliged to discuss donations received by it from any person. Even if it were so, our clients would have no obligation and would not always have the ability or means to verify the identity of the sources of all donations made to it. We record, however, that our clients deny any insinuation that they acted in any corrupt, illegal or improper manner. Our clients will not hesitate to protect their rights should the M&G publish the defamatory material contemplated in [your] e-mail.
Source: Mail & Guardian
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